CA Unpub Decisions
California Unpublished Decisions
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Defendant and appellant Derrick Ashley Heisser was convicted of burglary (count 1—Pen. Code, § 459;[1] super. court case No. RIF145932) and was found in violation of his probation (super. court case No. SWF029850). On May 25, 2010, the court granted defendant 60 months of probation, ordered a restitution fine of $200, and a probation revocation fine of $200, which it stayed.
On June 18, 2012, the People charged defendant with felony possession of a firearm by a prohibited individual (count 1—§ 25850, subd. (c)), possession of a firearm by one addicted to a narcotic (count 2—§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), and possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (count 3—§ 30305, subd. (a).[2] The People additionally charged defendant with a violation of probation. On August 30, 2012, defendant pled guilty to count 1 and admitted a violation of his probation. The court revoked defendant’s probation and sentenced him to serve 16 months in state prison. As to defendant’s conviction in the substantive count in case No. RIF1203073, the court imposed a restitution fine of $240 and a parole revocation fine of $240.[3] As to the probation revocation case, the court noted it was “Imposing all of the fees previously imposed[.]†The minute order for the order revoking defendant’s probation reflects imposition of a restitution fine of $240 and a parole revocation fine of $240. |
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Plaintiff and appellant Dominic Ernesto Madrid (Madrid) filed a petition for writ of review and mandamus to set aside a decision by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV or Department) suspending his driver’s license. The trial court denied the petition and Madrid appeals.
ISSUES The case presents two issues of the interpretation of drunk driving laws. The first issue is which party has the duty to obtain and disclose the name of the phlebotomist who drew Madrid’s blood under Vehicle Code section 23158, subdivision (a), and which party has the duty to produce the phlebotomist for cross-examination at the administrative hearing. The second issue is the applicability of the collateral estoppel doctrine, when Madrid pled guilty to the drunk driving charge after the DMV suspension hearing. |
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Defendant Ricky Lammone Thipthammavong began inappropriately touching Jane Doe 1, his biological daughter, when she was five years old. Defendant had sexual intercourse with Doe 1 numerous times. Defendant stopped molesting Doe 1 when she was 11 years old. Defendant also had sexual intercourse with Jane Doe 2, who is also his biological daughter, starting when she was five years old, and ending when she was almost eight years old.
Defendant was convicted of seven counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child (rape and sexual penetration by force) and one count of committing a lewd act upon a child. |
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Jessie Espinosa Sambrano and Anthony Castro Lares, defendants and appellants, appeal from the judgment entered after a jury found them both guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1),[1] six counts of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, & 11); one count of discharging a firearm at a dwelling house (§ 246; count 5); and two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 6 & 7).[2] In connection with count 1, the jury found true the special circumstance allegation that defendants committed the murder by means of a drive-by shooting within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(21). In connection with all the counts, the jury also made true findings on section 12022.53 firearms use allegations and section 186.22, subdivision (b) criminal street gang allegations. The jury also found true great bodily injury enhancements under sections 12022.7 and 12022.55 alleged in connection with counts 3, 4, 6, and 7.
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Patrick Barber, plaintiff and appellant (Barber), appeals from the judgment entered against him and in favor of defendant and respondent California Youth Authority (CYA) following a bench trial on Barber’s complaint for damages based on unlawful retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5. Barber, who represents himself in this appeal, contends the trial court committed various errors in finding against him on his unlawful retaliation claim. We conclude Barber’s claims are meritless. Therefore, we will affirm.
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Kathryn H. appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating jurisdiction of her minor daughter, Kylee H., and issuing custody and visitation orders. Kathryn contends the court violated her substantive due process right to custody and control of Kylee by issuing a grandparent visitation order. She further contends the family court, not the juvenile court, is the proper forum for issuing a visitation order. We affirm the judgment.
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Gonzalo R. and Linda D. appeal a juvenile court order terminating their parental rights to their minor son, G.R., under Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 366.26. Gonzalo contends the court violated his due process rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard when it proceeded with the selection and implementation hearing in his absence. Linda joins in Gonzalo's argument. We affirm the order.
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Shaun Sundahl, who was employed by the City of Calexico's police department (the Department) as a sergeant, appeals from the trial court's decision in favor of the City of Calexico, its chief of police and its city manager[1] (collectively, the City) in this administrative mandamus proceeding. The City brought this action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to challenge a decision by the Personnel Commission of the City of Calexico (the Commission) determining that Sundahl should be demoted rather than terminated for certain violations of Department policies.
Sundahl contends that the trial court erred in ruling that the Commission was required, under the circumstances, to permanently terminate Sundahl's employment rather than demote him. We conclude that the Commission was within its discretion to determine that demotion rather than termination was the appropriate discipline to impose on Sundahl. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment granting the petition, and we direct that judgment be entered denying the petition. |
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Anthony Lynn Pinkins pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree burglary. (Pen. Code,[1] § 459.) In exchange, the People dismissed a charge of failure to appear after release on one's own recognizance. (§ 1320, subd. (b).) The court sentenced Pinkins to a stipulated prison term of 16 months, to run consecutively to another prison term he was serving. The court ordered him to pay restitution fines of $240 each under sections 1202.4, subdivision (b) and 1202.45. Pinkins appeals. We affirm.
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Annette Rae Robinson appeals from a judgment on a petition brought by Donna Martens, invalidating an amendment to decedent William R. Kuhner's trust and disqualifying Robinson as a transferee of the trust's assets. Robinson contends that the trial court erred in rejecting her argument that Martens's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. We conclude that Robinson has failed to provide an adequate appellate record to support her contention, and accordingly we affirm the judgment.
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Plaintiff and appellant Phil Hauser, appearing in propria persona as he did in the trial court, appeals the order granting under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16[1] the anti-SLAPP motion of 89-year-old defendant and respondent Beatrice Nelson[2] to strike his verified complaint asserting two defamation claims against Nelson. The court ruled Nelson satisfied her burden under subdivision (b)(1) of section 425.16 to make a prima facie showing her speech that gave rise to Hauser's claims was protected under subdivision (e)(3) of section 425.16 as a written or oral statement made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest. The court also ruled Hauser could not satisfy his burden under subdivision (b)(1) of section 425.16 to establish a probability of success on his claims.
As we explain, we independently conclude the trial court properly granted Nelson's anti-SLAPP motion. |
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In this case we consider whether a licensed real estate agent owed her client a duty to conduct an independent review of public records or a duty to engage in additional investigation to ascertain the existence of a recorded covenant burdening property prior to her client purchasing the property, when that covenant was not identified by a title insurance company in its preliminary report or its policy of title insurance.
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This is the latest in a lengthy series of appellate proceedings initiated by the appellants in which they have unsuccessfully challenged the probate court's adverse orders and judgments with respect to administration of their parents' trust and probate estates. This appeal has no merit whatsoever.
We have no power to consider the arguments appellants raise on the merits. Appellants' arguments are foreclosed both by appellants' failure to present a record that supports their contentions and by our disposition of a prior related appeal. As we explain, we must dismiss the appeal with respect to one of the orders appellants challenge and affirm the other orders that are the subject of this appeal. Not only is it plain from the record that we have no power to consider the arguments appellants raise in their briefs, the arguments appellants attempt to raise herein are indistinguishable from the arguments they attempted to assert in the related appeal we recently dismissed. We dismissed that appeal for appellants' failure to file a timely brief. Here, in making arguments that are not supported by the record and that our prior orders preclude appellants from making, appellants and their counsel have made an unmistakable and bad faith attempt to avoid the impact of our prior orders. Our prior orders were made for the purpose of not only securing justice between the parties herein but also as a necessary means of maintaining an orderly appellate process that protects the rights and interests of all the litigants who appear before us. We cannot countenance appellants' and counsel's obvious attempt to subvert our orders and our now final disposition of their prior appeal. Thus, we find this is an unusual instance where the imposition of substantial monetary sanctions on appellants and their counsel, payable both to the respondents herein and the clerk of the court, are warranted. |
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