CA Unpub Decisions

After the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant Nathan Louis Lomax pled no contest to possession of cocaine base for sale and misdemeanor resisting arrest and admitted two prior prison terms and one prior strike. The trial court dismissed a charge of possession of heroin for sale and several other enhancement allegations.
Sentenced to state prison, defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the evidence against him was obtained through an illegal detention. We disagree and affirm.

Appellant V.S. (mother), appeals from a court order granting respondent J.K. (father), sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ minor child and limiting mother’s visitation with the child to supervised, therapeutic visitation.[1] Mother’s only claim on appeal relative to that order is that the “[t]rial court prejudicially erred in granting sole custody and physical custody to the alleged father without prior determination of paternity Uniform Act on Blood Test Cal. Fam. Code Section 7550, or without the burden of proof of paternity Cal. Fam. Code Section 7555.” Finding her claim lacks merit, we affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Mark Dewaine Kidd of assault with a deadly weapon and found true an enhancement allegation that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim. The trial court also found additional enhancement allegations true and sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 12 years in state prison.
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in failing to adequately instruct the jury on the definition of great bodily injury. He argues the error requires reversal of his conviction on the great bodily injury enhancement.
We conclude the trial court did not commit instructional error. We will affirm the judgment.

Christal D. (mother) appeals from the order terminating parental rights to her children Christopher and Brianna. She argues there was a lack of compliance with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. section 1901 et seq. (ICWA) and the state-imposed inquiry requirements. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2).) We agree that the juvenile court failed to make sufficient inquiry before ruling ICWA did not apply. The error cannot be deemed harmless in light of the maternal uncle’s suggestion that he and mother may have American Indian heritage. We remand for the limited purpose of making a proper inquiry.

Defendant and appellant Renata Marquez King appeals from a judgment following her no contest plea to possession for sale of a controlled substance (cocaine base) and cruelty to a child by endangering health.[1] On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel filed an opening brief in accordance with People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 requesting this court to conduct an independent review of the record to determine if there are any arguable issues. On April 10, 2013, we gave notice to defendant that counsel had failed to find any arguable issues and that defendant had 30 days within which to submit by brief or letter any grounds of appeal, contentions, or arguments she wished this court to consider. Defendant did not file a responsive brief or letter. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Ricardo Renteria guilty of corporal injury to a spouse/cohabitant/child’s parent (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)[1]), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and four counts of contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). The jury found true the allegations that defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the commission of the corporal injury offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of the corporal injury and assault offenses (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting expert witness testimony on battered woman’s syndrome because it was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative, such testimony left the jury with the impression that the victim was unavailable at trial due to defendant’s conduct, and the testimony improperly told the jury that domestic violence victims are truthful. We affirm.

Defendant Alex Da Silva appeals from the judgment entered upon his jury conviction of forcible rape (Pen. Code § 261, subd.(a)(2))[1] of one victim and assault with intent to commit rape (§ 220) of another. He raises numerous issues, none of which warrants reversal of the judgment. We affirm.

Herve Willems and Convertibles Only, Inc., doing business as Heritage Classics Motorcar Company (Heritage), appeal from a money judgment in favor of respondent Peter Nydrle. Appellants argue that the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction. We agree and reverse.

After his father died, appellant Derek B. Douglas became his mother’s adviser, and his brothers believed Derek[1] exerted undue influence over their mother. This matter stems from benefits Derek received when their mother, Eva Maria Douglas, acted as the sole trustee of the Douglas Family Trust (Douglas Trust).
Following their father’s death, the Douglas Trust was divided into two trusts, designated as the Survivor’s Trust (Trust A) and the Exemption Trust (Trust B). The couple’s residence became a Trust B asset. Under the terms of the Douglas Trust, if Eva Maria acted as the sole trustee, she had no authority to invade the principal of Trust B. While acting as sole trustee, Eva Maria used the residence, a Trust B asset, as collateral to obtain approximately $875,000 in loans. Derek, to the exclusion of his brothers, directly or indirectly received the benefits from some of these loans.
Eva Maria also amended the Douglas Trust to appoint Derek successor trustee. In a Second Amendment to the Douglas Trust, Eva Maria granted a conditional gift of industrial property, a Survivor’s Trust (Trust A) asset, to Derek that previously would have been shared equally among her four sons.

This case is before us on remand after the California Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) In an unpublished opinion, we struck a $1,524 presentence investigation fee because there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that appellant had the financial ability to pay the fee. (Pen. Code, § 1203.1b. subds. (b) & (e).)[1] We vacate our decision and affirm the judgment on the ground appellant forfeited the issue by not objecting to the imposition of the presentence investigation fee. (People v. McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 597-599; People v. Valtakis (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1071-1072.)

Jesus Leonardo Barriere (appellant) was previously convicted of, inter alia, numerous counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child. Following a prior appeal, we affirmed the judgment, with minor exceptions related to sentencing. Appellant now appeals again after the trial court ordered that he pay $1,000,000 in victim restitution for noneconomic losses, pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F).[1] He contends (1) the restitution order violated his constitutional right to a jury trial under both the United States and California Constitutions; (2) section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(F), violates his right to equal protection of the laws under both the United States and California Constitutions; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in making the award because it did not use a rational method of calculation. We shall affirm the judgment.

Orly Taitz filed a statement of contest seeking to prevent the Secretary of State from certifying the election results of the 2012 primary election, contending President Obama is not a natural born citizen, and thus is ineligible for the office of the President, and that California voter rolls are rife with fraud. She named as defendants President Barack Obama, Senator Diane Feinstein, and Elizabeth Emken, who prevailed over Taitz in the Republican primary to later challenge Senator Feinstein in the general election. Failing in her attempt to block the primary results, Taitz later filed an ex parte motion seeking to stay certification of the results of the 2012 general election.

Appellant C.D., a minor, was declared a ward of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) based on his admission of two misdemeanor counts. On appeal, his appellate counsel has filed a brief which summarizes the facts with citations to the record, raises no issues, and asks this court to independently review the record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) We affirm.

On October 3, 2012, appellant, Ronald Sean Price, executed a felony advisement, waiver of rights and plea form, and entered into a plea agreement. Appellant waived his constitutional rights in the plea form and in court pursuant to Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122. The court reviewed the consequences of a guilty plea with appellant and the parties stipulated to a factual basis for the plea.[1] Under the terms of the plea agreement, appellant would be released pending sentencing. The court would sentence appellant to a term of two years and strike the prior serious felony conviction if appellant followed the directions of the probation department and appeared for the sentencing hearing. If appellant failed to do these things, the court could impose a maximum sentence of 11 years.