P. v. Renteria
Filed 8/8/13 P. v. Renteria CA2/5
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
RICARDO CHAVEZ RENTERIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
B242235
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA080444)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge.
Affirmed.
Weilbacher
& Weilbacher, William Weilbacher Jr. for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback
II, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Stephanie C. Santoro, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
>
INTRODUCTION
A jury
convicted defendant and appellant Ricardo Renteria guilty of corporal injury to
a spouse/cohabitant/child’s parent (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), and four counts of contempt
of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1)). The jury
found true the allegations that defendant personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon in the commission of the corporal injury offense (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)) and personally inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of
the corporal injury and assault offenses (§ 12022.7, subd. (e)). The trial court sentenced defendant to eight
years in state prison. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial
court erred in admitting expert witness testimony on battered woman’s syndrome
because it was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative, such testimony
left the jury with the impression that the victim was unavailable at trial due
to defendant’s conduct, and the testimony improperly told the jury that
truthful. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The
prosecutor called Melissa Renteria,
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2] the complaining witness in this case. The trial court informed the jury that
Melissa was not available to testify during the trial and that her lack of
availability was not due to any conduct by defendant. Because Melissa was unavailable, her
preliminary hearing testimony, which she gave some five months before trial,
was read to the jury.
Melissa
testified at the preliminary hearing
that she and defendant had been in a relationship for 14 years, had been
married for one year, and had six children.
On January 9, 2011, Melissa and defendant were at home on Burl Avenue,
in Lennox, Los Angeles County. About
9:17 p.m., Melissa got into an argument with defendant. Melissa could not remember what the argument
was about, but remembered that defendant was talking to an ex-girlfriend on the
phone. Defendant asked Melissa to
leave. Melissa agreed, but changed her
mind, suggesting that she and defendant just ignore each other and talk later
when they were no longer angry. Melissa
began ironing her son’s clothes. She
drank a tall can of beer and took two sleeping pills. She wanted to go to sleep immediately so as
to avoid arguing with defendant or hearing him on the phone.
Defendant
asked Melissa what she was doing “there.â€
She responded that she was staying.
Defendant said that he had asked her to leave and that she was
trespassing. Defendant took Melissa’s
iPod and cell phone. Melissa asked
defendant to return her cell phone and reached for it. She started to stand and defendant began
hitting her. Defendant hit Melissa in
the eye and she fell. He grabbed
Melissa’s hair and dragged her “from one side of the wall to the other.†Defendant then picked up Melissa and slammed
her down to the floor. Melissa’s
forehead hit the floor. As she tried to
get up, defendant picked up a hammer.
Defendant held Melissa by her hair and struck her head with the hammer,
rendering her unconscious.
When
Melissa regained consciousness, she was lying on the floor and saw blood. Defendant was sitting on the bed talking on
the phone. Melissa wanted to leave and
tried to grab her phone and a pair of her daughter’s boots to wear. Defendant told Melissa that she could not
take the boots. Defendant then got on
top of Melissa and started strangling her.
Melissa asked defendant to stop, telling him that he was hurting her and
that she could not breathe. She tried to
fight off defendant, biting his arm, but she passed out.
Melissa
woke up and determined that she had urinated on herself. She changed her clothes so she could
leave. Defendant’s mother came over and
asked Melissa what was happening.
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] Melissa said she wanted to leave. Defendant said that Melissa could not leave;
he wanted her mother to pick her up.
Melissa called Lara who picked up Melissa and took Melissa to her
house. Lara called the police.
Melissa
denied that she told any of the officers who interviewed her that she had
engaged in a “tussle†with defendant and gave up when she got tired. She testified that throughout her
relationship with defendant there had “always been abuse.†Melissa testified, “I was just tired of
it. So I was just—if he’s going to do
something, he’s going to do something.
Let him get it over with and me go to sleep.â€
Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Department deputies went to Melissa and defendant’s home. There, deputies found a hammer, a receipt
with blood on it next to the hammer, and blood stains on the floor. Defendant was arrested.
Melissa had
a black eye from defendant hitting her and received medical treatment for a
head injury. An emergency room doctor
testified that she used three staples to close a two-centimeter laceration on
Melissa’s head. She also testified that
Melissa had a “fresh†injury to her eye and tenderness in her lower neck. According to Lara, when Melissa was
discharged from the hospital, she returned to Lara’s house. Melissa later left Lara’s house and lived in
two shelters and then with various friends.
While
defendant was in jail, the jailers recorded phone calls between defendant and
his mother and defendant and Melissa. In
a phone call with his mother, defendant said, in apparent reference to Melissa,
that “she should just say that—that she did it to herself in an accident.â€
In one
conversation, defendant and Melissa said:
“[Defendant]: Just, you remember yesterday what I said,
right?
“[Melissa]: Yes.
“[Defendant]: About—about—that being an accident like
[unintelligible].
“[Melissa]: Yeah.â€
In a second
conversation, defendant told Melissa that if she did not “speak up,†“theyâ€
were going to keep defendant in jail for five or six months, until “everythingâ€
“settled down.†Melissa responded that
she had written a letter but was thinking about writing a better letter with
“bigger and fancier words.†Defendant
said, “Yeah, well, whatever, but, you have to—the point is that you have to say
that you don’t want that anymore that the D.A. that—he’s putting it on you and
you don’t—you know? All that you know it
is a misunderstanding. . . . Because
otherwise, I’m just going to stay in here and then the—the longer I stay in
here then I’m gonna have say, you know what?
You’re gonna have to go to your mom’s or—or somewhere else and I—I don’t
wanna do that but—you know?â€
In May
2011, Melissa received several messages from defendant via Facebook. On June 1, 2011, Melissa met with the
prosecutor in the case. The prosecutor
informed her that there was a protective order in the case. Thereafter, Melissa called defendant because
she had considered “working things out with him.†From June 2, 2011, to the July 7, 2011,
preliminary hearing, Melissa and defendant had “basically been together on and
off.†Melissa slept at defendant’s
house. They were seeing each other,
talking, and having sex.
Gail
Pincus, Executive Director of the Domestic Abuse Center in Van Nuys, testified
as an expert witness on domestic violence.
Pincus explained that her testimony began with the premise that the case
involved an abusive relationship, but under the code section that allowed her
to testify, she could not offer an opinion about whether Melissa and defendant
were in an abusive relationship. She was
testifying only to educate the jury about how battered women typically think,
feel, and behave. Pincus stated that she
had “absolutely no knowledge of this case.â€
She testified that she did not know the defendant or victim in this case—she
did not even know the victim’s name. She
had never met or interviewed Melissa and had never spoken to defendant. Pincus had not made a determination that
Melissa had been in an abusive relationship.
According
to Pincus, an early study on domestic violence showed a “cycle of violenceâ€
that has three phases. At the beginning
of the relationship, the abuser is charming, romantic, intense, sort of rigid,
and then a rule setter. In the first
phase, there is a long period of rising tension in the relationship. In the second phase, there is actual physical
violence. In the third phase, there is a
honeymoon period. The victims persevere through
the rising tension and actual physical violence to return to the honeymoon
period in which the abuser is charming and romantic and there is no
tension. Victims of such abuse may
self-medicate with alcohol or drugs as an avoidance strategy.
Another
study found that the core of an abuser’s personality is the need for absolute
power and control over the victim and any children. The abuse begins with criticism such as the
victim is overly emotional or is fat or stupid.
The abuser also isolates his victim from her family, friends, church, or
other aspects of her life that make her a part of a community and provide her
with a support system. He also engages
in economic control or abuse to make his victim economically dependent on him
so she feels as though she cannot escape.
He will minimize, deny, or blame the abuse on his victim, and will
attempt to destroy the victim’s self-esteem.
The abuser
engages in such conduct because of “male privilege,†meaning that the abuser’s
sense of masculinity is based on how much power and control he has over his
female victim. When such a man believes
that his victim has acted in a way that has dishonored, disobeyed,
disrespected, humiliated, or embarrassed him, he no longer thinks of her as the
woman he loves, but as a hated object.
At some point, when the victim breaks one of the abuser’s rules, the
abuser “crosses through this mythical membrane that we all have that separates
out violent thoughts from violent actions and literally gives himself
permission to cross over into the physical violence.†Once the abuser works through the “adrenalineâ€
from the victim’s perceived slight, he has regained his manhood—his power and
control over the victim.
Abusers are
afraid of going to jail, that their victims will leave, or that others will
learn of their abuse. If the abuser
believes one of these consequences will happen to him, he will flip into the
honeymoon phase, begging, crying, and promising that the abuse will never
happen again. If the victim calls the
police and the abuser is jailed, the abuser becomes desperate and obsessed with
the victim who, the abuser believes, holds the key to his jail cell. The abuser begins a “campaign†to pressure
the victim to say that she lied.
Around the
abuser’s behavior, the victim “does a dance of accommodation†that previously
was referred to as “battered women syndrome†but now is referred to as
“intimate partner battering and its effects.â€
In the face of the abuser’s criticism, the victim wonders how she has
changed from the person to whom the abuser was so charming and nice, and tries
to figure how what she can do to remedy the situation. The victim minimizes and blames herself for
the abuse. Eventually, the victim will
leave—victims leave an average of five to seven times before they leave for
good—but the victim will return when the abuser promises never to do it
again.
When the
victim returns, she becomes “hypervigilant, walking on eggshells, and develops
a sense of helplessness, hopelessness.â€
The victim becomes numb to the first level of violence and emotional
abuse and control. If there is an
incident that the victim perceives as life threatening to herself or someone
she loves, a “trauma window†opens that clears out the victim’s numbness and
she is “very clear.†The victim can
recall the details of what has just happened to her and the history of violence
and she is willing to do something different.
It is
during this window that the victim might call 911 or a battered women’s shelter
or go to the hospital emergency room.
“At that moment, that victim is going to spontaneously spit out what
happened to them out of the fear of what has just happened to them. They have enormous need to tell people what
just happened to them. They don’t edit
it. They may jump around a lot from past
history to current, whatever, but they just—they have this need to sort of tell
the story.†Depending on the skill of
the interviewer, the victim can give a “very, very detailed account†of her
recent and past abuse.
The trauma
window is very fragile and remains open only as long as the victim feels
safe. Contact by the abuser or his family,
financial pressure, or her children’s calls for their father may cause the
window to close. The victim then
minimizes and blames herself for her abuser’s conduct and regrets reporting
him. She returns to the abuser, starting
the cycle of abuse over again. She will
do what the abuser tells her to do to interfere with the court process, such as
recant her story or disappear. It is
common for the trauma window to close before the victim has a chance to
testify.
For some
victims, those who cannot endure the abuse any longer, the trauma window
remains open despite outside pressures.
These victims go to shelters, get counseling, and pull away from the
abusive relationship. They cooperate
with prosecutors and obtain restraining orders.
In recent
years, among the injuries that occur in domestic violence cases, strangulation
has received significant attention.
Strangulation is difficult to document as there are no outward signs
about 60 percent of the time. Signs of
strangulation include coughing, difficulty swallowing, a sore throat, red marks
on the face and neck, urinating or defecating, and vomiting.
Defendant
testified in his own behalf. He
testified that he and Melissa were not married when the incident in this case
took place. They got married one month
later. Melissa had approached defendant
shortly after the incident and informed him that she was pregnant with his
child.
On the date
of the incident, defendant and Melissa lived at his mother’s house in an
attachment to the garage. About 9:00
p.m. that day, defendant and Melissa were sitting on their bed. Defendant was playing solitaire on his cell
phone. Melissa was listening to an
iPod. They began to argue when defendant
received a text from his ex-girlfriend.
Melissa
cursed at defendant and grabbed a hammer.
She approached defendant rapidly with the hammer raised. Defendant thought Melissa was going to hit
him with the hammer, so he got up quickly and grabbed her arm or wrist causing
the hammer to nick the back of her head.
Melissa bit defendant’s arm, and he grabbed her face and pushed her
away. Melissa then bit his other
arm. Melissa grabbed the hammer, fell to
the ground, and wrestled with defendant for the hammer. Defendant took the hammer from Melissa and
threw it on the bed.
Melissa
touched the back of her head and started screaming that defendant had hit her
with the hammer. Defendant denied that
he hit her and asked to see the back of her head. Melissa took a receipt from her pocket and
placed it on the back of her head.
Defendant took off his shirt and gave it to Melissa so she could put it
on her head. Defendant denied slamming
Melissa to the floor, pulling her hair, dragging her across the floor, or
punching her in the face. According to
defendant, Melissa had bruising on her right eye when she returned from the
liquor store prior to the incident.
When
defendant was talking to his mother on the recorded conversation that was
played for the jury, he was referring to an incident between his sister and her
boyfriend when he said, “Yes, she should just say that, that she did it to
herself in an accident.†The statement
was not about Melissa.
On March 9,
2011, defendant was given a copy of a protective order. Melissa was named on the order as a “protected
person.†The order stated that he was to
have no personal, electronic, telephonic, or written contact with Melissa. The protective order had an exception for
contact with Melissa for the safe exchange of their children for visitation
pursuant to any later issued family, juvenile, or probate court order. Such a later order was never issued. Defendant testified that his attorney told
him that he could contact Melisa if it related to the well-being of his
children. Between May and July 2011,
Melissa called defendant more than 43 times.
Defendant had contact with Melissa at least twice in May, almost every
day in June, and in July. Defendant
admitted that he was guilty of the charged contempt counts.
DISCUSSION
I. Pincus’s Testimony
Defendant
appears to contend that the trial court erred in admitting Pincus’s testimony
because it was irrelevant and more prejudicial than probative under Evidence
Code section 352 (section 352). The
trial court did not err, and any error was harmless.
Prior to
trial, the prosecutor stated that he intended to present Pincus’s testimony to
explain why Melissa would reunite with defendant, arguing that a jury would not
understand how a victim could reunite with her abuser after such a vicious
attack. He argued that Pincus’s
testimony also was relevant to the contempt counts for violating a protective
order. Defense counsel stated that she
had no objection to Pincus’s testimony if Melissa first testified, but that without
Melissa’s testimony, Pincus’s testimony would allow the jury to speculate as to
what happened and why it happened. She
also objected that the testimony would be more prejudicial than probative under
section 352. The trial court ruled that
the probative value of Pincus’s testimony significantly outweighed its
prejudicial effect.
of Review and Application of Relevant Principles
We review
the admission of expert witness testimony under Evidence Code sections 801
(section 801) and 1107 (section 1107) for an abuse of discretion. (People
v. Kovacich (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 863, 902.) Likewise, we review for an abuse of
discretion a trial court’s decision to admit evidence over a defendant’s
section 352 objection. (
774, 824.) A trial court abuses its
discretion when it rules in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd and results in a manifest miscarriage
of justice. (People v. Shaw (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 492, 496.)
Section 801,
subdivision (a) permits expert testimony on subjects “sufficiently beyond
common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of
fact.†Section 1107, subdivision (a)
provides, “In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the
prosecution or the defense regarding intimate partner battering and its
effects, including the nature and effect of physical, emotional, or mental
abuse on the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence,
except when offered against a criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the
act or acts of abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge.†Section 352 provides, “The court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of
confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.â€
Expert
witness testimony on domestic abuse “cannot be admitted to prove the occurrence
of the charged crimes.†(
908.) It may be admitted, however, to
explain the behavior of the victims of such abuse. (Ibid.) In People
v. Kovacich, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th 863, the defendant was found guilty of
the first degree murder of his wife. (
verbally and physically abused his wife over a period of years. (Id.
at pp. 869-871.) An expert testified
about the cycle of violence in domestic abuse cases and the coping strategies
or mechanisms that victims develop to stay in their relationships including
denying, minimizing, or rationalizing the abuse. (Id.
at pp. 900-901.) The court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the expert’s testimony
because the victim’s credibility was in issue even though her death precluded
her from testifying. (
necessary to disabuse the jurors of commonly held misconceptions about domestic
violence victims and to explain the psychological reasons for a victim’s
seemingly self-impeaching behavior such as staying with or returning to her
abuser. (Ibid.)
The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Pincus’s testimony because it
was relevant to Melissa’s credibility and admissible under sections 801 and
1107. That is, the testimony explained
Melissa’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior in resuming her relationship with
defendant after he beat her and struck her with a hammer, a matter not within a
juror’s common experience. (
Cal.App.4th at p. 902; §§ 801, subd. (a), 1107, subd. (a).)
The trial
court also did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence over
defendant’s section 352 objection. The
probative value of Pincus’s testimony was high because it explained intimate
partner battery and its effects and helped the jury understand why Melissa
might resume her relationship with defendant despite his abuse. There was little potential for prejudice as
Pincus made clear that she was testifying only to educate the jury about how
battered women typically think, feel, and behave. Pincus testified that she had not interviewed
Melissa or defendant, had “absolutely no knowledge of this case,†and had not
made a determination that Melissa had been in an abusive relationship. (People
v. Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 824.)
Even if the
trial court erred in admitting Pincus’s testimony, any error was harmless. “The erroneous admission of expert testimony
only warrants reversal if ‘it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the
error.’ (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] (
P.2d 525] [applying Watson standard
to the erroneous admission of expert testimony].)†(People
v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 247.)
We also review a trial court’s determinations under section 352 under
the Watson standard. (People
v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 924.)
As noted
above, Pincus specifically testified that she knew nothing about the facts of
this case or Melissa’s relationship with defendant. Apart from Pincus’s testimony, Melissa gave
detailed testimony at the preliminary hearing about defendant’s January 9,
2011, attack. Many of the details of
that attack—that defendant punched Melissa in the eye, that he hit her in the
head with a hammer, and that he choked her—were corroborated by the emergency
room doctor’s testimony about the physical injuries Melissa suffered. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury
with CALCRIM No. 850 that Pincus’s testimony was not evidence that defendant
committed any of the charged offenses, and that it could consider her testimony
only in deciding if Melissa’s conduct was consistent with someone who had been
abused and in evaluating the believability of Melissa’s testimony. The trial court’s limiting instruction cured
any potential prejudice to defendant. (
867 [jurors are presumed to understand and follow limiting instructions].) Accordingly, any error was harmless. (People
v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 247; People
v. Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 924.)
II. Melissa’s Absence From The Trial
Defendant
next contends that Pincus’s testimony left the improper impression with the
jury that Melissa did not testify at trial due to battered woman’s
syndrome. Although unclear, it appears
that defendant contends that the trial court’s instruction to the jury that
defendant was not responsible for Melissa’s unavailability was inadequate. Defendant has forfeited this contention. Even if defendant did not forfeit the
contention, the instruction was proper.
Background
Prior to
trial, the trial court appointed counsel for Melissa because she was
potentially guilty of contempt for having violated the trial court’s order that
there was to be no contact between defendant and Melissa. The prosecution was unwilling to grant
Melissa immunity so she could testify in defendant’s trial without possibly
incriminating herself, so she stated her intention to exercise her Fifth Amendment
right not to testify.
Later, the
trial court and counsel for the parties had the following discussion:
“[Trial
court]: I think the jurors should also
be told that [Melissa’s] lack of availability has nothing to do with any
conduct by the defendant. Because what I
don’t want is the jury to think, well, the reason she’s not here is because he
did something to her which prevents her from being here. [¶] Do
agree with that?
“[Defense
counsel]: I do.
“[Trial
court]: Do you have any problem with
that?
“[Prosecutor]: No.â€
At the point
in defendant’s trial that the prosecutor intended to call Melissa, the trial
court asked Melissa if she had changed her mind and would testify. Melissa responded that she would exercise her
Fifth Amendment right and not testify.
The trial court declared Melissa to be an unavailable witness within the
meaning of Evidence Code section 240 and ruled that her preliminary hearing
testimony could be read to the jury.
Just before Melissa’s preliminary hearing testimony was read to the
jury, the trial court instructed the jury, “Folks, this would be the point in
time when the complaining witness, Melissa Renteria, would be testifying. Melissa Renteria is not available to testify
during this trial. Her lack of
availability is not due to any conduct by this defendant.â€
At trial,
Pincus testified that an abuse victim whose “trauma window†has closed and who
has returned to her abuser will do what her abuser tells her to do to interfere
with the court process or otherwise help the abuser. One of the ways an abuser will tell his
victim to interfere with the court process is to disappear.
A defendant
who does not object to an instruction, but instead agrees that the trial court
may so instruct the jury forfeits any claim that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury. (
326 [forfeiture found where defense counsel did not object to an instruction
and agreed that it be given].) When the
trial court proposed that the jury should be instructed that defendant was not
responsible for Melissa’s unavailability, defense
counsel agreed. When the trial court
ultimately instructed the jury consistent with its proposed instruction,
defense counsel did not object. Accordingly,
defendant forfeited review of this issue.
(Ibid.)
Even if
defendant had not forfeited review of this issue, his apparent contention on
appeal is without merit. The trial court
specifically and unambiguously instructed the jury that Melissa’s
unavailability at trial was “not due to any conduct by this defendant.†We presume jurors understand and follow a
trial court’s instructions. (
662.) No reasonable juror could have
misunderstood the trial court instruction as permitting him or her to decide
that defendant was responsible for Melissa’s unavailability based on Pincus’s
testimony that abuse victims interfere, at the request of their abusers, with
the court process by disappearing. (
529, 594 [“We credit jurors with intelligence and common sense [citation] and
do not assume that these virtues will abandon them when presented with a
court’s instructions. [Citations.]â€],
overruled on another ground in Price v.
Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13.)
III. Melissa’s Truthfulness
With
respect to an abuse victim’s conduct after her “trauma window†opens, Pincus
testified, “At that moment, that victim is going to spontaneously spit out what
happened to them out of the fear of what has just happened to them. They have enormous need to tell people what
just happened to them. They don’t edit
it.†The clear import of Pincus’s
testimony, defendant contends, is that at a certain time during the “cycle of
violence†the claims of an alleged abuse victim are unedited and likely to be
true. Testimony of that nature,
defendant argues, violates the rule in People
v. Johnson (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 778 that an expert may not testify about
the truthfulness of a class of witnesses.
(Id. at p. 786 [“Evidence of a
generalized tendency of some groups of witnesses to lie, unrelated to the
credibility of the specific witnesses in issue, is irrelevant and not the
subject of legitimate scientific evidence from expert witnessesâ€].) Defendant has forfeited review of this
contention, the contention fails, and any error was harmless.
“The
general rule is that an expert may not give an opinion whether a witness is
telling the truth, for the determination of credibility is not a subject
sufficiently beyond common experience that the expert’s opinion would assist
the trier of fact; in other words, the jury generally is as well equipped as
the expert to discern whether a witness is being truthful. (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a); see
[301 P.2d 854].)†(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 82 [opinion of
expert witness in support of a capital defendant’s battered woman’s syndrome
defense was improper as it concerned the defendant’s truthfulness which was a
matter for the jury].) Notwithstanding
that general rule, a defendant must make a timely and specific objection or a
motion to strike to preserve for appeal a claim that an expert witness
improperly opined on a witness’s truthfulness.
(Id. at pp. 81-82, citing
Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a) & People
v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 666; see also People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 505.)
First,
defendant’s contention fails because he did not object to the challenged testimony
on the ground asserted on appeal, or at all.
Because defendant did not object to Pincus’s testimony on the ground
that Pincus had improperly offered expert opinion testimony about a witness’s
truthfulness, he has forfeited review of this claim. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a);
Cal.4th at pp. 81-82; People v. Holt,
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 666; People
v. Valdez, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 505.)
Second,
defendant’s claim fails on the merits.
Defendant contends that Pincus testified that, at certain times, abuse
victims are “inherently truthful.â€
Pincus’s testimony is not reasonably susceptible of that
interpretation. Pincus’s testimony
concerned the point in the cycle of abuse that some victims reach when they are
able to report their abusers and the abuse.
Although Pincus testified that such victims report the abuse they have
suffered without “edit,†she said nothing about the veracity of such reports.
Finally,
for the reasons stated above, any error in admitting Pincus’s testimony was
harmless. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MOSK,
J.
We concur:
TURNER,
P. J.
KRIEGLER,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Because Melissa Renteria and defendant share the same last
name, we will refer to Melissa by her first name.
