CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found Jesus Cesena guilty of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187)[1] (count 1)[2] and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) (count 2).The jury also found that Cesena personally used a knife during the commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)[3]). The trial court sentenced Cesena to an aggregate term of 16 years to life in prison on count 1, consisting of 15 years to life for the murder, and one year for the knife enhancement. The court stayed execution of the sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654.
On appeal, Cesena claims that the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3472 that "[a] person does not have the right to self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force." Cesena claims that there is no substantial evidence in the record that supported giving this instruction. We reject this claim and conclude that there is substantial evidence that

Appointed counsel for defendant Dennis Lee Johnson asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.

O.N. (mother) and Ro.M. (father), parents of the minor, R.M., appeal the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights. (Welf.& Inst. Code, §§ 366.26 & 395.)[1] They contend the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying their request for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing, and erred in failing to apply the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption.[2] (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) On the first contention, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance request. On the second contention, we conclude the parents failed to establish the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. Thus, the juvenile court did not err in terminating parental rights. We affirm the juvenile court’s order.

A jury found defendant Kenya Monique Allen guilty of evading an officer with wanton disregard. On appeal, defendant contends: (1) her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to incriminating statements and failing to properly argue against admission of her prior convictions; (2) incriminating statements were admitted in violation of her Sixth Amendment right to confrontation; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting her prior convictions as impeachment evidence;and (4) her due process rights were violated due to the cumulative prejudice resulting from these errors. Finding no merit in these contentions, we affirm.

Appointed counsel for defendant Thomas Anthony Rumph asks this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Finding no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant, we affirm the judgment.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)

This matter comes to us on remand from the California Supreme Court with directions to reconsider our earlier decision in light of People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646 (Conley). On reconsideration we shall affirm our earlier decisionin its entirety.

Charged with bank robbery, the trial court suspended proceedings to assess defendant Elvertis Johnson’s mental competence to stand trial. A jury determined defendant was competent, but after proceedings were reinstituted defendant’s new counsel again expressed concern about defendant’s competence. The trial court suspended proceedings again and ordered new psychiatric evaluations. In 2010, after comparing the former and new evaluation reports, the trial court concluded there had been no substantial change warranting another competency trial. Later, in 2011, when defendant’s counsel reported defendant would not speak to him or look at him, the trial court concluded defendant was feigning incompetence and refused to suspend proceedings.

Marvin Leo Vital, Jr., was charged in an information with one count of custodial possession of a weapon (Pen. Code, § 4502, subd. (a)). Vital pleaded not guilty and the matter proceeded to jury trial.
According to the evidence presented a trial, in July 2014, Vital occupied a four-bed cell at the Los Angeles County Jail. On July 3, 2014, Los Angeles County Sheriff Deputy Nicholas Baray found a sharpened piece of plastic, capable of being used as a weapon or shank, hidden inside a wrist brace among other items that were on top of Vital’s bed. After Deputy Baray advised Vital of his right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney and, if indigent, to appointed counsel (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694]), Vital admitted the wrist brace belonged to him and he had been given the plastic shank.

Simon G. (father) and Y.L. (mother) each separately appeal from an order terminatingparental rights. There are six children involved in this appeal: Dania L. (born June 2008); K.G. (born Oct. 2009); I.G. (born Mar. 2011); Simon G. (born Mar. 2012); Daphne G. (born Jan. 2013); and Silvia L. (born Jan. 2015).[1]
Father appeals from the order terminating his parental rights to Dania, K.G., I.G., Simon, and Daphne. He argues that he was not provided with adequate reunification services, and if adequate reunification services were provided, then the law is inadequate to protect the fundamental constitutional rights of parents.
Mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to Silvia. She argues that there was insufficient evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding that Silvia was adoptable. Mother argues that the order terminating her parental rights as to Silvia must be reversed.

A jury convicted defendant Deandre Stone of four counts of possession for sale of various controlled substances and two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon. The court sentenced defendant to a total term of 15 years in state prison. We have conducted an independent examination of the entire record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), and conclude that no arguable issues exist. We therefore affirm.

A jury convicted appellant Charles Alexander of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664/187; count 1) with a finding that he personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a); count 2) with a finding that he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (a car) (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), carrying a loaded unregistered handgun (§ 25850, subd. (a); count 3), and having a concealed firearm in a vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1); count 4).[1] The trial court sentenced him to a term of 29 years in prison.
On appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing on the kill zone theory of attempted murder and in admitting evidence relating to gang membership. We disagree with these contentions. Appellant also contends that the abstract of judgment must be corrected to reflect an enhancement on count 2 under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), rather than section 12022.53, subdivision (b)(1). We order the abstra

Christopher Ndiagu appeals from a judgment and sentence, following his convictions for driving under the influence causing injury and driving with a blood alcohol level over .08 percent causing injury. He contends the trial court denied him his right to present a defense and to cross-examine witnesses when it ruled that he could not present evidence of three other drivers’ blood alcohol levels. We conclude the court did not exclude such evidence at trial and accordingly, we affirm.

Defendant Eileen W. Cambe appeals from a judgment for plaintiff Rodilyn Almuete following a bench trial on Almuete’s claim that Cambe breached a promissory note obligation to repay money that Almuete loaned her. Cambe argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings of breach and resulting damages. Cambe also argues that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Almuete from asserting her claim in this litigation because she failed to disclose the unrepaid loans as an asset in a federal bankruptcy petition that she filed before suing Cambe. Cambe’s arguments lack merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

In 2007, Heart Tronics, Inc., a medical device company, purchased directors and officers liability insurance policies from AXIS Insurance Company (AXIS) and Houston Casualty Company (HCC). The AXIS policy has been exhausted.
Under the HCC policy, HCC agreed to pay defense expenses incurred by Heart Tronics’s officers and directors, and individuals serving in functionally equivalent capacities, in any criminal or civil proceedings, including appeals. An exclusion provided that upon final determination that an insured person committed willful misconduct, the insured would be obligated to repay the insurer any defense expenses paid on his or her behalf.
Mitchell J. Stein served Heart Tronics as a de facto officer, managing the company full-time without pay or formal position or title. In 2013, Stein was convicted of securities fraud in federal court. He tendered his appeal of that conviction to HCC, but HCC denied coverage, in part because it considered the conviction to