CA Unpub Decisions

Appellant Jerome L. Humphrey entered a negotiated plea of guilty to two counts of violating Penal Code[1] section 269, subdivision (a)(1), rape of a child under the age of 14 years. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a term of 30 years to life and issued a 10‑year restraining order pursuant to section 136.2, prohibiting any communication between Humphrey and the victim. Humphrey challenges the 10-year restraining order. We affirm.

The juvenile court found that appellant/defendant Angel M. (Angel) assaulted Jose P. (Jose) and his mother with a firearm during a drive-by shooting. After the incident, Jose identified Angel as the shooter to law enforcement. However, at trial, Jose claimed he did not remember whether Angel was the shooter. In fact, Jose responded that he did not remember the vast majority of questions posed to him at trial. However, his prior identification of Angel was brought into evidence by the testimony of law enforcement officers recalling their prior conversations with Jose. After all the evidence had been presented, the juvenile court found true the allegations that Angel had committed two counts of assault with a firearm.
Angel contends that Jose’s recalcitrance prevented Angel from being able to meaningfully cross-examine him. As a result, he argues the evidence of Jose’s prior statements should have been stricken to protect his Confrontation Clause rights. Without J

On appeal, the Attorney General contends the trial court abused its discretion in concluding the counts were time-barred because: (1) the party who reported two of the fraudulent loans to the district attorney’s office (loans 12 and 14b) is not a “discoverer” for purposes of triggering the statute of limitations; (2) assuming the reporting party is a discoverer, there are triable issues of fact as to whether he knew or should have known about the mortgage fraud as to loans 12 and 14b prior to October 27, 2006; (3) alternatively, if the reporting party is not a discoverer, there are triable issues of fact as to whether the district attorney’s office knew or should have known about the mortgage fraud as to loans 12 and 14b prior to October 27, 2006; and (4) the undisputed evidence fails to show the reporting party or the district attorney’s office knew or should have known about the mortgage fraud as to all other loans prior to October 27, 2006. We reverse the judgment of the

Defendant and appellant Daniel Raymond Stith filed a notice of appeal challenging the validity of his plea. A trial court granted his request for certificate of probable cause, which stated that defendant’s plea was taken despite his lack of knowledge of the consequences of the plea. We affirm.

Defendant Donald Lee Condon appeals from the denial of his petition for resentencing under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. According to defendant, he is entitled to have two one-year prior prison term enhancements stricken from his current sentence because those prior convictions were reduced to misdemeanors after the passage of Proposition 47. Because defendant’s sentence became final well before the passage of Proposition 47, and because the resentencing provision of Proposition 47 only applies prospectively to nonfinal prior prison term enhancements, the trial court correctly denied defendant’s petition. We therefore affirm.

Francesca T. and Marvin F. are the parents of Michael F., who was born in April 2016. Francesca and Marvin are intellectually disabled and receive services from the San Diego Regional Center. When Michael was born, nurses observed that the parents needed prompting to feed and change him, and Francesca struggled to understand what the nurses told her. A nurse said she did not believe the parents were capable of understanding and properly attending to an infant's needs. In one instance, Michael began choking during a feeding and the parents did not respond until a nurse intervened.

Angela A. appeals from an order denying her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order against her ex-husband, Marvin A. Angela argues: (1) the trial court utilized an improper standard by requiring her to establish further abuse since issuance of the original restraining order, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing Marvin to have joint legal custody of their children after the court issued the original restraining order against him. We reject Angela's arguments and affirm the court's order.

On June 7, 2016 John Stephen Petryshyn pleaded no contest to one count of driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more within 10 years of a prior conviction for the same or related offense. (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (b), 23550.5, subd. (a).) At the time he entered his plea, Petryshyn was advised of his constitutional rights and the nature and consequences of the plea, which he stated he understood. Petryshyn’s counsel joined in the waivers of Petryshyn’s constitutional rights. The trial court expressly found Petryshyn’s waivers, plea and admissions were voluntary, knowing and intelligent.
The trial court sentenced Petryshyn in accordance with the negotiated plea agreement to the upper term of three years in state prison. The court awarded presentence custody credit of 52 days and ordered Petryshyn to pay statutory fines, fees and assessments. All remaining charges and a pending misdemeanor, Los Angeles Superior Court case number 5AV06682, we

Appellant was convicted of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, 212.5)[1] and sentenced to four years in state prison. In November 2014, he was released on parole, with supervision scheduled to expire in April 2017.
On April 5, 2016, following appellant’s arrest, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a petition to revoke appellant’s parole, alleging that he had violated the condition requiring him to obey all laws by committing aggravated trespass (§ 602.5, subd. (b)) and vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)(2)). At the parole revocation hearing (which was combined with the probable cause hearing), the parties presented the following evidence.

Defendant Brian Glover appeals from the denial of his petition for relief under Proposition 47, the Safe Neighborhoods and Schools Act. In 2012, Glover stole a laptop computer from an employee’s office within a furniture store. He pled no contest to second degree burglary. After completing his sentence, Glover petitioned to have the conviction designated as a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 459.5 (shoplifting), which was enacted pursuant to Proposition 47.[1] The trial court denied the petition on the ground section 459.5 did not apply because Glover’s criminal conduct did not amount to shoplifting. We conclude Glover’s criminal conduct met the elements of section 459.5 and reverse.

In this disability discrimination case, Hieu T. Tran, El Monte Superstore, Inc. (El Monte Superstore) and Westminster Superstore, LLC (Westminster Superstore) appeal from a money judgment awarding respondent Jorge Anderson over $400,000 in damages and penalties. Appellants argue the court erred in excluding evidence of other lawsuits filed by respondent, the amount of future noneconomic damages is not supported by the evidence, and the damage award is excessive because respondent’s counsel improperly appealed to the jury’s passions and sympathies during closing argument. On the record before us, we conclude that appellants have not shown reversible error and affirm.

Defendant Konstanty Makowski appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 1) and driving under the influence causing injury with a blood alcohol level over .08 percent (id., § 23153, subd. (b); count 2). The jury found true the allegations that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on his victims, causing one to become comatose due to brain injury or suffer permanent paralysis (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subds. (a) & (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years on count 1, stayed sentence on count 2 (id., § 654), and imposed eight years for the great bodily injury enhancements, for a total prison term of 11 years.
On appeal, defendant challenges the trial court’s exclusion of expert and percipient witness testimony regarding the dangerousness of the intersection where he struck his victims. Because we find the trial court

This writ challenges a $250 sanctions order imposed on “Mishya” Rimpel Singh, a deputy public defender, for making a tardy request to continue a jurisdiction hearing in juvenile court. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County found good cause for the continuance, but nevertheless imposed the $250 sanction for Singh’s having filed an untimely request. We conclude the court based this sanctions order on a facially ambiguous local rule. Because Singh cannot be sanctioned for knowingly violating a rule that, by its terms, may or may not apply, we agree with Singh that imposing sanctions here was an abuse of discretion.
Now that the Superior Court has been called upon to take a position on what precise conduct it deems to be a violation of the rule, thus clarifying the ambiguity in application, the court has identified the offending conduct as Singh’s having sent an unprepared colleague to report on whether she intended to make a motion for a continuance. Separ

The procedural history of this dependency proceeding and further information about the relationship between Alexander P. (the minor) and appellant Michael P. are set out in our earlier opinion ruling on two prior consolidated appeals, In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475 (Alexander P.).
The minor, who is now five years old, became the subject of a dependency petition two years ago, when he was three. (Alexander P., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 479.) Michael is not the minor’s biological father, but he helped raise the minor from his birth in February 2012 until January 2013, when the minor’s mother (Mother) took steps to sever ties with Michael. (Id. at pp. 480–481.) Thereafter, Michael continued to have joint custody of the minor and frequent visits until April 2014, when Michael’s visitation was reduced to twice weekly supervised visits due to concerns about his domestic violence against Mother. (Id. at p. 481.) Even that visitation ended in August 201