CA Unpub Decisions

Defendant Daniel Sanchez pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit embezzlement (Pen. Code, §§ 182, subd. (a)(1); 484, 487, subd. (b)(3)) and one count of commercial bribery by an employee (Pen. Code, § 641.3). He also admitted an enhancement allegation that the victim’s loss exceeded $3,200,000.00 (Pen. Code, § 12022.6, subd. (a)(4)). The court granted him probation, which included a 138-day county jail term, and ordered that he pay victim restitution in the amount of $40,000.00. Defendant appeals the restitution order, contending the amount imposed is not supported by an adequate factual basis. For the reasons explained, we find no error and will affirm the order.

Following a trial by jury, defendant Jesus Hernandez Rivera was convicted of six counts arising from the years long sexual abuse of his two minor daughters, “Jane Doe #1” (O.H.) and “Jane Doe #2” (J.H.). The jury found defendant guilty of the following counts: one count of violating Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a) (lewd or lascivious acts against a child under the age of 14); two counts of violating section 288, subdivision (c) (lewd or lascivious acts against a child 14 or 15 by a person at least 10 years older); two counts of violating section 288.5, subdivision (a) (continuous sexual abuse of a child); and one count of violating section 288.7, subdivision (b) (oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child 10 years or younger). The jury also found true the special multiple victims allegation attached to counts 2, 3 and 4 pursuant to section 667.61, subdivision (e)(4) (the One Strike law).

On this appeal defendant Febronio Alexander Mendoza challenges his sentence imposed pursuant to a plea agreement resolving two counts of robbery in the second degree and a related firearm-use enhancement. He contends, and the Attorney General agrees, that the court imposed an unauthorized and therefore illegal term on the firearm-use enhancement. However, the parties disagree as to the appropriate remedy. Defendant contends we should vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing. The Attorney General contends we can modify the sentences, and as modified, affirm the judgment. We conclude the appropriate remedy is to vacate the sentences and remand the matter for resentencing.

A lawsuit against the insurer on a homeowner’s insurance policy must be brought within 12 months after inception of the loss. This one-year limitation period is tolled “from the time an insured gives notice of the damage to his insurer . . . until coverage is denied.” (Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 693 (Prudential-LMI).)
In this case, the insurer closed the case (because the insureds failed to submit necessary documents) and reopened it later (when the insureds gave further information), on three different occasions. When the insurer closed the case for the second time, the insurer told the insureds that the time for filing suit was running, and specified the time periods already included in the one-year limit (the time before the insureds notified the insurer of the loss, and the time between the first closing and later re-opening of the claim). The insureds ignored this advice, taking the position that the time to file suit was cont

Appointed counsel for defendant Javance Payne asked this court to review the record to determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. Defendant submitted a supplemental brief. We see no arguable issues in this case.
We provide the following brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case. (See People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 110, 124.)
On January 31, 2008, defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter
(Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to 25 years to life in prison pursuant to the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
On January 21, 2016, defendant filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 36 (§ 1170.126). On January 26, 2016, the trial court denied the petition.

Appellant Marcial Canuri Velez stands convicted of multiple offenses, including attempted robbery. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the attempted robbery conviction. Velez also contends the abstract of judgment contains an error in that it reflects an incorrect figure for custody credits. We will affirm the convictions and direct the preparation of a corrected abstract of judgment.

A jury convicted Gabriel Orozco of first degree murder with special circumstances and active participation in a criminal street gang. The jury found true sentence enhancement allegations for committing murder for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang, and personally discharging a firearm causing death and personal use of a firearm. Orozco admitted five prior prison term allegations.
The court sentenced Orozco to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for murder, plus 25 years to life for use of a firearm causing death. The court imposed a concurrent two-year term for active participation in a criminal street gang. The court struck the five prior prison terms and the gun use and gang enhancements for sentencing purposes.
Orozco argues the court committed reversible error and violated his constitutional right to present a defense by excluding certain impeachment evidence. To the extent his trial attorney forfeited the cons

The court sentenced appellant Jonathan Andrew King to a stipulated prison term of six years after he pled no contest to assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 1), misdemeanor making criminal threats (§ 422; count 5), and misdemeanor battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 8) and admitted a personal use of a firearm enhancement in count 1 (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).

Robert David Hodges appeals his convictions arising from his sexual abuse of his minor daughter, Jane Doe. He argues the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the evaluation of character evidence presented in his defense. Specifically, he argues the trial court improperly instructed the jury that evidence of a defendant’s character for kindness and respectfulness can, by itself, create reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the charged offenses. Hodges contends that in his case, the relevant character trait was “sexual normalcy,” and the trial court should have instructed the jury that character evidence of defendant’s sexual normalcy could create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the charged offenses. We reject Hodges’s contention because there was no character evidence presented regarding Hodges’s sexual proclivities and preferences or his putative sexual normalcy, hence there was no evidentiary basis for instructing the jury to consider such evidence. Fur

Appellant Damor Hill was convicted in 2006 of violating Penal Code section 4573.6, unauthorized possession of controlled substances in prison. In December 2014, Hill filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47, as set forth in section 1170.18. The superior court denied the petition on the basis a section 4573.6 offense was not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.18. Hill appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Appellant Damor Hill was convicted in 2006 of violating Penal Code section 4573.6, unauthorized possession of controlled substances in prison. In December 2014, Hill filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47, as set forth in section 1170.18. The superior court denied the petition on the basis a section 4573.6 offense was not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.18. Hill appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

Appellant Damor Hill was convicted in 2006 of violating Penal Code section 4573.6, unauthorized possession of controlled substances in prison. In December 2014, Hill filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to Proposition 47, as set forth in section 1170.18. The superior court denied the petition on the basis a section 4573.6 offense was not eligible for resentencing under section 1170.18. Hill appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

In this appeal, appellant challenges the order of restitution imposed by the trial court after a hearing. Specifically, appellant contends he was denied his right to examine the victim and her daughter on the nature of therapy they have received as a result of the conduct to which appellant pleaded no contest. We have reviewed the record and concluded the restitution amount was properly imposed and appellant’s due process rights were not violated. We therefore affirm the judgment.

Defendant and appellant Carl E. Block was granted an early termination of his probation upon a showing he had been law abiding during his term of probation and had successfully completed a residential treatment program. However, without setting forth any reason for doing so, the trial court denied Block's further request for relief under Penal Code section 1203.4. On the record presented here, such relief was mandatory. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order insofar as it denied Block relief under Penal Code section 1203.4 and instruct the trial court to permit Block to withdraw his plea and dismiss the charges against him, as required by the statute.