CA Unpub Decisions

The Orange County District Attorney (OCDA) appeals from the trial court’s order granting Guy Sinclair Adams’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The OCDA argues the following: the court erred by granting the habeas petition without first issuing an order to show cause (OSC); Adams was not in custody on his prior convictions; and Proposition 47 did not apply to prior prison terms. Because we agree the trial court erred by granting relief without first issuing an OSC, we need not address the OCDA’s other contentions. We reverse the court’s order granting Adams’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.

“‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.]” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “A necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.” (Mountain Lion Coalition v. Fish & Game Com. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1051, fn. 9.)
DC Partners, Inc.’s appeal runs headlong into this general principle and its corollary. The record on appeal is so silent that it all but disappears. Accordingly, we must affirm the judgment of the lower court, which found that cross-defendant and respondent Amir Gnessin had not violated either Labor Code sec

In a second amended information, the People charged defendant with two counts of felony stalking in violation of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a). In count one, they alleged he stalked Shannon Knight. In count two, they alleged he stalked Trisha P. Following a jury trial at which he represented himself and called no witnesses, defendant was convicted of both counts. After denying his post-trial motions, the court suspended imposition of sentence, placed defendant on formal probation for five years, and ordered him to complete 180 days in a residential treatment program. Defendant waived his 890 days of custody credit for purposes of allowing him to complete the program.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we appointed counsel to represent him. Defendant’s appellate counsel filed a brief in which he raised no issues and asked us to review the record independently. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).) After we notified defendant that his counsel

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) and 11-month-old Ivan M. appeal the order dismissing the Department’s petition to declare Ivan a dependent child of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The Department and Ivan contend the evidence presented at the jurisdiction hearing compelled a finding that Ivan was subject to dependency jurisdiction based on his mother’s unresolved history of substance abuse. We reverse and remand for the court to conduct a disposition hearing based on Ivan and his mother’s current circumstances.

After overruling Raymond Zamudio’s demurrer to the petition for revocation of parole filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office and denying his motion for an assessment whether imposition of intermediate sanctions would be appropriate, the superior court found Zamudio in violation of the conditions of his parole, revoked parole and ordered it restored after Zamudio had served 150 days in county jail. On appeal Zamudio contends the ability of a district attorney to petition for revocation of parole without first completing certain procedural steps and including in the petition information required when a revocation petition has been filed by the supervising parole agency violates his and other parolees’ right to equal protection of the law under the state and federal constitutions. We affirm.

Tomiko S. Tyler appeals an order revoking and modifying parole terms to include an additional 180 days custody in county jail and enrollment in substance abuse classes. (Pen. Code, § 1237, subd. (b); see People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 453, fn. 2 [appealable as a postjudgment order affecting a defendant’s substantial rights].)
On August 29, 2016, Tyler charged his GPS device as instructed. The next day, his parole agent received three notifications over several hours showing that the battery was running out, in violation of the condition that the device be charged twice a day. Although instructed to immediately contact his parole agent when the device began to vibrate due to low battery power, Tyler did not do so.

Bilal J. Strong appeals from judgment after conviction by jury of obstructing a peace officer and battery on a peace officer. (Pen. Code, §§ 148, subd. (a)(1), 243, subd. (b).) The court denied probation and sentenced Strong to 365 days in jail with 212 days of credit.
The owner of a smoke shop reported a theft. Strong matched the owner’s description of the suspect. Two uniformed sheriff’s deputies saw him walking nearby.
The deputies approached Strong. One asked Strong where he was coming from. He grabbed Strong’s arm when he moved away. Strong was agitated and the deputies tried to apply handcuffs. Strong pulled away, struggled, and turned. The handcuffs cut a deputy’s wrist in the struggle. Strong resisted being placed in the patrol car, and a deputy sprayed him with pepper spray. A bystander testified that Strong did not resist.

Lara pulled his girlfriend out of a vehicle, grabbed her by the hair, yanked her down some stairs, and punched and kicked her. At trial, he admitted a prior strike conviction. The trial court sentenced him to six years in prison: the midterm of three years, doubled because of Lara’s prior strike conviction.

A jury found Erik Hobart guilty of evading a peace officer with reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 1); unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 2); and vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A); count 3). The trial court denied probation and sentenced Hobart to a total term of two years in prison.
Hobart appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion and deprived him of due process of law by denying probation. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Mike Alan Hanby of four counts of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)) and determined that he personally used a firearm in connection with those assaults. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The jury also found he was guilty of numerous other counts and that other special allegations were true. All of the charges arose from an incident in which he armed himself with three loaded firearms, went to a store and took merchandise valued at nearly $2,000, then pointed a gun at four unarmed employees who came out to confront him about the theft. When police gave chase trying to apprehend him, he evaded them for several miles while failing to stop at red lights and stop signs before finally surrendering.
Hanby contends the trial court abused its discretion (1) when it failed to find this was an unusual case warranting probation, and (2) when the court sentenced Hanby to 11 years in prison for his numerous felony convictions.

Defendant Steven Lee Guire was charged with possession of marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359 [count 1]); cultivation of marijuana (§ 11358 [count 2]); possession of concentrated cannabis (§ 11357, subd. (a) [count 3]); and unlawful sale or transportation of marijuana (§ 11360, subd. (a) [count 4]). At trial, he raised a medical marijuana defense. The jury found defendant guilty on counts 1 and 3, found him not guilty on count 4, and could not reach a verdict on count 2. The trial court imposed and then suspended execution of a three-year prison sentence. Defendant was placed on probation on the condition he serve 365 days in county jail.
On appeal, defendant contends (1) the trial court improperly admitted and improperly excluded certain evidence; (2) the court did not provide appropriate jury instructions; and (3) the cumulative effect of the abovementioned errors was highly prejudicial. For the reasons set forth below, we find no prejudicial error and affirm

The trial court denied Lloyd Ramos Fernando’s petition to recall his sentence on the ground Fernando’s two prior felony convictions for theft of an access card were categorically ineligible for reclassification as misdemeanors and resentencing under Proposition 47. While Fernando’s appeal from that order was pending, the Supreme Court decided People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski), holding the offense of theft of access card account information is eligible for Proposition 47 relief if the petitioner can establish the value of the access card information did not exceed $950. The Court also held value for this purpose is determined by the reasonable and fair market value of the information when sold in an illicit market.

Juan Valencia Castro pled guilty to taking a vehicle without consent (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). Pursuant to the plea agreement, Castro was granted probation on various terms and conditions. On appeal, Castro challenges the probation condition requiring that he permit the warrantless search of any electronic device if required by a law enforcement officer. He asserts the condition is unreasonable under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) and is unconstitutionally overbroad. We reject these contentions and affirm the order.

The People filed an information charging Marquise Caliz and Rayvon Moreland with the murder of Andre Lockhart and the attempted murder of Steven Wade. The People alleged Caliz and Moreland committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by the gang, within the meaning of Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1)(C). The People further alleged a principal personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e), a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), and a principal personally and intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivisions (d) and (e)(1). The case was tried to a jury, which deadlocked (10-2 in favor of guilt for Caliz, 11-1 in favor of acqui