CA Unpub Decisions

Pedro Velasquez entered a plea of no contest to one count of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)). The court placed him on three years' formal probation and ordered him to pay $14,092.80 to the vehicle's owner, Christina Ayala. Additionally, the court imposed the following fines and fees: $40 pursuant to Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1); $30 pursuant to Government Code section 70373, subdivision (a)(1); $100 pursuant to section 1203.1b, subdivision (a); $25 pursuant to section 1203.1b, subdivision (h); $25 per month pursuant to section 1203.1b, subdivision (a); $200 for the cost of appointed counsel; $300 pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b); and $300 stayed pursuant to section 1202.44.

A jury found Bernard Glenn guilty of two counts of attempted murder. They also found the allegations that he used a firearm and committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal street gang to be true. Glenn, who was 17 years old at the time the crimes were committed, was sentenced to two consecutive terms of 35 years to life. On appeal, he argues primarily that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We remand the matter for the limited purpose of allowing Glenn to present mitigating evidence for use at a future juvenile offender Parole Board hearing in line with the holding of People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). We also modify the judgment to award Glenn additional presentence custody credits to which the parties agree he is entitled. We otherwise affirm.

Southern California Permanente Medical Group (Permanente) fired Gumaro Trevino from his job as a registered nurse. Trevino then filed this action, asserting, among other things, employment discrimination based on his religion, in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.).
Permanente moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination and that Trevino could not show that these reasons were pretextual. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment accordingly.
Trevino appeals. Finding no error, we will affirm.

Prosecution for crimes involving fraud must begin within four years of the completion of the offense or the discovery of its commission, whichever is later. (Pen. Code, §§ 801.5, 803, subd. (c).) “Discovery,” however, does not require actual knowledge: “The crucial determination is whether law enforcement authorities or the victim had actual notice of circumstances sufficient to make them suspicious of fraud thereby leading them to make inquiries which might have revealed the fraud.” (People v. Zamora (1976) 18 Cal.3d 538, 571-572 (Zamora).) That is, law enforcement is held to a “standard of reasonable diligence.” (Id. at p. 572.)

Plaintiff Adam Swendrak sued his landlords, defendants Joyce and Kelli Urode, after they posted a notice informing the tenants of the apartment complex in which he lived that the police had placed him on a psychiatric hold under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 (the notice). During trial, Swendrak moved to amend his pleading to add a new cause of action to conform to proof; the court denied that motion. Thereafter, a jury found defendants liable for negligence and public disclosure of private facts (invasion of privacy) for posting the notice, and awarded Swendrak $200,000 in non-economic damages and $625,000 in punitive damages. After the court entered judgment, defendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV motion) and a motion for new trial. Those motions challenged the jury’s finding of liability for the invasion of privacy claim and the award of punitive damages.

Shawbeth, Inc. appeals from the judgment entered against it after a court trial on its cause of action for conversion and request for imposition of a constructive trust. Shawbeth sued Diversified Funding, Inc. and Oralabs, Inc. (collectively, Diversified) to recover $420,595 Shawbeth had put into an escrow account but never got back. Shawbeth alleged that, after it deposited the funds into escrow, the escrow agent, Karen Gardner at First National Escrow (FNE), transferred the funds first to a different escrow account and then to Diversified, all without Shawbeth’s authorization or consent. The trial court found that, because Shawbeth did not meet its burden of proving that Diversified owned or possessed property of Shawbeth, Shawbeth’s conversion and constructive trust causes of action failed. Because the evidence does not compel a finding in favor of Shawbeth as a matter of law, we affirm.

A jury acquitted defendant Joseph Anthony Wright of making a criminal threat, but found him guilty of four counts of assault with a firearm (counts 8-11), one count of carrying a loaded firearm in a public place by a gang member (count 13), and one count of discharging a firearm in a school zone (count 14). The jury found true that defendant committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal conduct by gang members. The jury also found true allegations with respect to counts 8 through 11 that defendant personally used a firearm. The jury did not find true the allegation with respect to count 9 that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a total term of 23 years and four months in prison.
On appeal, defendant contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the imposition of the gang enhancement

An amended information was filed charging Sean Webber with driving under the influence of a drug. (Former Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (e), now Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (f).) The information also alleged three or more prior driving under the influence convictions within the prior 10 years (Veh. Code, § 23550, subd. (a)), two prison prior terms (Pen. Code, §§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668)), and a prior strike conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (b)–(i), 1170.12, 668). The jury found Webber guilty as charged. The trial court found one prior offense was not a qualifying offense, and the case became a misdemeanor. The court denied Webber probation and sentenced him to time served.
Webber appeals. He contends he had a right to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta), and the court erred in terminating his pro per status. We conclude the trial court did not err and affirm the judgment.

After a jury trial, defendant and appellant Luis Villaneda (defendant) was convicted of second degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a) ) for the killing of victim Gonzalo Robles. On appeal, defendant makes the following claims of reversible error: (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct in three different respects at trial; (2) defendant was handcuffed during closing argument; and (3) the trial court denied defendant’s petition for disclosure of juror information. We affirm the judgment.

Convicted of a series of felonies, Felix Silva challenges two of his convictions, the calculation of his presentence custody credits, and the amount of his restitution and parole revocation fines. We modify the judgment with respect to the custody credits and fines but otherwise affirm.

Defendant Tiwalola Oladiji Shoyinka appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459 ) and misdemeanor prowling (§ 647, subd. (h)). The trial court sentenced Shoyinka to the middle term of four years in state prison for the burglary and stayed the sentence on the misdemeanor (§ 654). On appeal, Shoyinka contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in instructing the jury that it could convict him of burglary based on an intent to commit rape when there was insufficient evidence that he had any such intent. We agree that this instruction was erroneous. However, we conclude that the error was not prejudicial because the court also instructed the jury that it could convict Shoyinka of burglary on the basis that he intended to commit indecent exposure. The evidence supporting Shoyinka’s burglary conviction on that alternative basis was sufficiently strong that it is not reasonably probable the verdict w

Luis Ramos entered into a plea agreement. Pursuant to that agreement Ramos pleaded guilty to eight counts of felony sexual battery (Pen. Code, § 243.4); one count of forcible sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (e)); one count of attempted forcible sexual penetration (§§ 289, subd. (e), 664); and three counts of misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (e)(1)). The agreement called for the dismissal of the remaining charges and stipulated to a sentence "lid" of 15 years in prison.
The court denied the defense request for probation and sentenced Ramos to a term of 15 years in prison. Ramos filed a timely notice of appeal, but did not include a certificate of probable cause (§ 1237.5). Thus the appeal is from matters occurring after the plea.

Defendant Roderick Jason Obalade appeals following conviction on three counts of second-degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211; unless otherwise set forth, statutory references that follow are to this Code), each with personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and one count of possession of rock cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)). Defendant contends: (1) The trial court infringed on his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by limiting him to written communications with trial counsel during trial; (2) a pretrial identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive; and (3) this court must reduce his felony drug conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to Proposition 47 adopted by voters November 4, 2014, after his conviction and while this appeal was pending. We conclude defendant forfeited the first two points by failing to raise them in the trial court, and Proposition 47 requires defendant to first pursue a statutory remedy in the trial court. We accordingly affirm the

Raymond Noriega appeals from the judgment after his jury conviction of carrying a loaded unregistered handgun for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Since the gang enhancement is premised on case-specific hearsay testimony regarding appellant’s gang membership, it must be reversed.