CA Unpub Decisions

A jury found defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a); count 1) and of driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent or more (§ 23152, subd. (b); count 2). In connection with count 2, the jury found it to be true that defendant’s blood alcohol level was 0.15 percent or more. Count 3 — driving without a valid license (§ 12500, subd. (a)), and count 4 — failure to maintain insurance (§ 16028, subd. (a)), were dismissed. The court sentenced defendant to two years in state prison on count 1, and two years in state prison on count 2, to run concurrently, with count 2 stayed pursuant to Penal Code section 654. The court suspended sentence as to count 3 (notwithstanding that it had previously been dismissed).
On appeal, defendant contends the evidence against him was acquired as the result of a detention without reasonable suspicion, and that the court erred in denying his suppression motion. He also contends the blood te

Mauricio Salgado entered into a plea agreement, under the terms of which he pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)). Salgado admitted the offense involved substantial sexual conduct. He also stipulated to a prison term of 15 years to life. The remaining charges were dismissed. The court sentenced Salgado consistent with the plea agreement.
Salgado did not obtain a certificate of probable cause, but did file a timely notice of appeal.
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) indicating counsel has not been able to identify any arguable issue for reversal on appeal. Counsel asks this court to review the record for error as mandated by Wende. We offered Salgado the opportunity to file his own brief on appeal. He has filed a supplemental letter, which we will discuss below.

In a trial by jury, defendant and appellant Dennis Baliscan Regalado was found guilty of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2), count 3); two counts of criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a), counts 2 & 4); dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1), count 5); two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon with two priors (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1), counts 6 & 7); possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1), count 8); and dissuading a witness from testifying (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1), count 9). Defendant was originally sentenced to 113 years to life in prison.
On April 14, 2015, this court found that defendant’s sentence violated California’s prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17; People v. Regalado (Apr. 14, 2015, B255074) [nonpub. opn.] (Regalado I).) We remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing. (Regalado I, supra, B255074, at p. 2.)

Convicted by a jury of assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and also found by the jury to have inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd, (a)) and to have suffered a prior strike and two prior prison terms (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667.5, subd. (b)), defendant Paul Lee Moreau contends: (1) the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 by allowing the People to impeach defendant with a prior conviction for “the exact same crime” he was charged with in this case, (2) in the alternative, defendant suffered ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not request that the prior conviction be sanitized, and (3) trial counsel was also ineffective in failing to object to the $2,400 fine imposed pursuant to section 1202.4, subdivision (b), which defendant lacked the ability to pay. We shall affirm the judgment, but remand the matter for correction of the abstract of judgment as described in part IV of the discussio

Defendant and appellant, Michael James Miranda, pled guilty to receiving a stolen vehicle after having sustained a prior conviction for felony vehicle theft. (Count 1, Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a); Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court imposed a split sentence of six months’ incarceration and 18 months of mandatory supervision. On appeal, defendant contends that the conditions of his mandatory supervision requiring that he obtain his probation officer’s approval prior to changing residences or traveling more than 50 miles from his residence are constitutionally overbroad. We affirm.

Defendant David Scott Milliron pleaded no contest to assault by means likely to cause great bodily injury and was sentenced to the upper term. On appeal, he contends reversal is required because the trial court failed to consider two factors in mitigation and improperly used one factor in aggravation. We disagree and affirm.

A jury convicted defendant Saleh Sheikh Khazaly (defendant) of stalking (Pen. Code, § 646.9 subd. (b) (count 1)) and disobeying a prior domestic violence protective order (§ 273.6, subd. (d) (count 2)). He was sentenced to the three-year midterm on count 1 with a concurrent two-year term on the count 2.
On appeal, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the stalking conviction. The Attorney General contends the sentence imposed on the second count should have been stayed rather than imposed and ordered to be served concurrently. We find no error on either score and affirm.

Defendant Maurice Pierre Hurth appeals from a postjudgment order granting a petition under Penal Code sections 1203.2 and 3455, subdivision (b), to revoke his postrelease community supervision (PRCS) after he was found operating a stolen vehicle with stolen license plates in the backseat. The court ordered defendant to serve 114 days in jail, with credit for time served and reinstated PRCS. The sole issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s order finding he violated the terms and conditions of his PRCS. We affirm.

Defendant Troy Jason Hollowell appeals from the trial court’s denial of his Penal Code section 1170.18 petition for resentencing. He contends the court erred in failing to strike one of his prior prison terms after the underlying conviction for that term was redesignated a misdemeanor in a separate 1170.18 proceeding. We conclude section 1170.18 does not apply retroactively to invalidate the prison prior when the conviction that supported the prison prior is later reduced to a misdemeanor. We affirm the trial court’s order.

This case involves a shooting with four victims. In an information filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, defendant and appellant Noe Hernandez was charged with murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a); counts 2-4). As to all counts, it was further alleged that a principal personally used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), and (e)(1), and that the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)). A jury found appellant guilty on all four counts. In addition, it found true the gang allegation, the personal firearm allegations, and the allegations that the attempted murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. As to each of the counts, appellant was sentenced to 40 years to life in state prison. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court did not orally specify whether the sentence

Defendant Terrance Merent Hartley pleaded no contest to grand theft by an employee. (Pen. Code, §§ 484, 487, subd. (b)(3).) Imposition of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for three years. Defendant was ordered to complete 100 hours of community service, stay 100 yards away from the Milpitas Best Buy where he committed the theft, and pay $6,392 in restitution to Best Buy.
On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel has filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) that states the case and facts, but raises no issue. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf within 30 days. That period has elapsed and we have received no written argument from defendant. Pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 (Kelly), we have reviewed the entire record, keeping in mind that our review is limited to grounds for appeal that occurred after entry of defendant’s no c

Appellant Rafael Gonzalez is incarcerated in Wasco State Prison and was convicted of possessing heroin in prison, a violation of Penal Code section 4573.6. Gonzalez appealed and appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We affirm.

A jury convicted defendants Angelo Marcus Gonzales and Lionzo Angel Villarreal, Jr., of first degree murder, shooting into an occupied vehicle, and active participation in a criminal street gang. It also found true numerous gang and firearm enhancement allegations. In addition, the jury convicted Villarreal of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury.
The trial court sentenced both defendants to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder, plus 25 years to life for the gang enhancement. The trial court also sentenced Villarreal to six years for the assault conviction. The court imposed various fines and fees.

This case returns to us following our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792 (Garcia), concluding the requirement of Penal Code section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3), that convicted sex offenders waive “any privilege against self-incrimination” and participate in polygraph examinations as part of the sex offender management program, does not violate Fifth Amendment rights. The high court construed the statutory language as requiring a defendant to provide truthful answers during polygraph examinations and as also precluding the state from using such compelled answers in any subsequent criminal prosecution. (Garcia, at p. 799.) In our prior opinion, filed October 4, 2016, we also concluded defendant could be required to submit to polygraph examinations but the state could not use compelled answers in any subsequent criminal proceedings, albeit through different reasoning.