CA Unpub Decisions

The probate court awarded guardianship of S.T. to John, Sharlene, and Athena Herrick (collectively Herricks). S.T.'s mother, V.T. (Mother), appeals the court's order, contending the order should be reversed because: (1) the court applied the incorrect standard of proof; (2) the court's findings are not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the court failed to make the required findings under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), title 25 United States Code sections 1901 et seq. We determine the probate court applied the correct standard of proof and substantial evidence supports the court's findings. However, we conditionally reverse the order and remand the matter to the probate court for the sole purpose of requiring compliance with ICWA, if necessary.

In November 2014 Chavez entered a negotiated plea of no contest to one felony count of possession of contraband (methamphetamine) in jail (Pen. Code, § 4573.6, subd. (a)) and one misdemeanor count of violating a domestic relations order (Pen. Code, § 273.6, subd. (a)) and admitted he had suffered one prior serious or violent felony conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(j); 1170.12). He was sentenced to a state prison term of four years.

Defendant and appellant Valentino Vidal Loeza purports to appeal from the denial of his suppression motion (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). He also challenges the validity of his plea and admission following entry of judgment based on Loeza’s plea of no contest to possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and possession of ammunition by a felon (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 2) and, as to both counts, his admission to having suffered a prior felony conviction in Los Angeles Superior Court case number KA062618. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Loeza on formal probation for a three year period under certain terms and conditions, including that he serve 90 days in jail, CALTRANS, or Tree Farm, with 10 days custody credit; he was ordered not to drive a motor vehicle unless lawfully licensed and insured; and he was not to own, use or possess any dangerous or deadly weapons.
We conclude the appeal must be dismissed for lack of a certificate

A jury convicted Linda Michelle Boggess of four counts of insurance fraud. (Ins. Code, § 1871.4, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court placed her on probation for five years. Boggess contends the court erred when it denied her motion to represent herself at trial. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 819-820 (Faretta).) We reverse.

The instant dispute arose when Worman, a 25 percent shareholder in the Companies, became concerned that she was not receiving dividend distributions but was nevertheless incurring tax liability for distributions attributed to her in IRS Schedule K-1 forms issued by the Companies. On August 20, 2013, Worman served statutory demands to inspect the Companies’ records. When the Companies failed to respond to the inspection demands, Worman filed a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court on November 1, 2013.

James Tony Murray and American Truck and Tool Rentals, Inc. (American Rentals) (collectively “Murray”) appeal from a judgment entered after a court trial on claims of breach of contract, specific performance, conversion, unjust enrichment, unfair competition, unlawful detainer, and claim and delivery brought against Murray by Brian Maginnis (Maginnis).
Murray also appeals from the attorney fee award, arguing it was not warranted.
Maginnis cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in making an award of attorney fees substantially lower than Maginnis’s attorney fee request.
We find no error and affirm the judgment.

Appellant Rachel Jean King was convicted, following a jury trial, of evading a peace officer and receiving stolen property. On appeal, she contends (1) the trial court erred when it permitted the prosecution to impeach her with evidence that she had threatened and assaulted other people; (2) the prosecutor committed misconduct by misstating the evidence during closing argument; (3) the court erred when it refused to admit relevant evidence critical to the defense; and (4) the court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity. Appellant further argues that even if none of the errors, standing alone, were prejudicial, the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal. As we shall explain, because we find that appellant was prejudiced by numerous errors that occurred during her trial, we shall reverse the judgment.

A jury convicted defendant Ricardo Alfonso Gomez of possession of a firearm on school grounds (Pen. Code, § 626.9, subd. (b) ; count one), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count two), possession of ammunition by a prohibited person (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count three), transportation of methamphetamine for sale (Heath & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a); count four), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; count five), transportation of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code § 11352, subd. (a); count six), possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351; count seven), and street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count eight). It also found true defendant had committed counts one through seven for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b).) Subsequently, the trial court found true defendant had been previously convicted of a serious and violent felony (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1) & 1170.12, subds. (

Appellant/defendant Kalvin Michael Cardenas kidnapped a 10-year-old girl as she was walking to school and forced her into his pickup truck. He drove her to a secluded area, restrained her, and repeatedly sexually assaulted her. He left her partially submerged in a type of ponding basin, with her head above water. She was partially clothed and her hands were still restrained. He threatened to kill her if she tried to escape. The victim waited several hours and then managed to release her restraints, climbed out of the water, and was found by someone who lived in the area. The victim described the suspect and his vehicle to law enforcement officers, who released the description to the media in an attempt to find him. The investigators received a tip that a few months earlier, a man matching the description in a similar vehicle had tried to contact young girls in Dinuba. After additional investigation, defendant was identified as the Dinuba suspect, and the victim in this case ide

Defendant and respondent Antoinette Lorraine Mayo pled guilty to one felony count of second degree commercial burglary for entering a doctor’s office and stealing a cell phone. (Pen. Code, § 459.) She subsequently filed a petition to redesignate her felony conviction as a misdemeanor under Proposition 47 (§ 1170.18), which the trial court denied.
Defendant appeals the order denying the petition and contends that the court erred in determining that she did not enter a commercial establishment within the meaning of section 459.5. We agree and reverse.

Defendant Gustavo Lopez pleaded guilty to burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced to 365 days in custody and three years of probation.On appeal, defendant objects to a portion of probation condition 6(n) and to condition 10(g). Condition 6(n), which defendant challenged in the trial court, required him to "[s]ubmit person, vehicle, residence, property, personal effects, computers, and recordable media . . . to [a] search at any time with or without a warrant, and with or without reasonable cause, when required by [his probation officer] or law enforcement officer." (Italics added.) Defendant specifically challenges the italicized portion of condition 6(n) concerning computers and recordable media (sometimes, electronic search condition), contending this "limitless electronic search" is both unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad because it is "completely unrelated to his second degree burglary offense or potential fu

A jury convicted defendant Julius Humphrey of assault with a deadly weapon, criminal threats, and false imprisonment. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a 22-year-old domestic violence conviction, under Evidence Code section 1109. We disagree and affirm.

At about 12:15 p.m. on a July afternoon, “Christian” called 911 from his house to ask police to come quickly because two men had just “walked in [his] driveway” with a gun. He asked police to “Hurry!” and said: “They’re at my house.” While he was speaking, his “mom [said] . . . they left.” The men drove a white Honda. One wore a blue Dodgers sweater and the other wore a white shirt.
Christian called 911 again shortly after his first call and said, “They came back.” He said the men parked the white Honda outside the house and “they got outside the car.” The dispatcher told him, “The officers are there and they can’t find the car.”
Baldwin Park Police Officer Leonard Avila testified that he went to Christian’s house in response to a 911 call. He knew from the dispatch that there were two men in the driveway with a gun, they were driving a white Honda, and one wore a blue sweater. When Avila arrived, the dispatcher said the “[reporting

Appellant Young Sook Yi filed a quiet title action alleging her son had forged a power of attorney that he then used to obtain a loan secured by a deed of trust to Yi’s home. The complaint further alleged that Yi’s son defaulted on the loan, causing her house to be foreclosed upon, and then sold to respondents Soung Jin Oh and Jamie J. Oh. Yi sought an order declaring the power of attorney, the deed of trust and the Ohs’ grant deed void.
The Ohs demurred, arguing Yi had failed to allege any facts showing they had actual or constructive knowledge that the power of attorney was forged, or that any of the documents in their chain of title were invalid. Yi, however, argued that it was immaterial whether the Ohs had any such knowledge because a forged instrument is void as a matter of law, and cannot provide foundation for good title.