Yesson v. San Francisco Mun. Transp.
Agency
Filed 1/30/14 Yesson v. San Francisco Mun. Transp.
Agency CA1/2
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules
of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying
on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as
specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
TINA YESSON,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
v.
SAN FRANCISCO MUNICIPAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY,
Defendant and
Respondent.
A136527
(Sonoma
County Super. Ct.
No. SPR83944)
INTRODUCTION
Tina Yesson, successor trustee of
the John C. Enrico 1999 Revocable Living Trust, appeals from the order of the
petition for an order determining that she, as the trustee of her father’s
trust, had the right to sell the taxi permit (also known as a taxi medallion)
held by her father at the time of his death, under the Taxi Medallion Sales
Pilot Program (Pilot Program) adopted by respondent San Francisco Municipal
Transportation Agency (SFMTA). The court
concluded that neither the medallion nor the right to sell the medallion became
the property of the decedent or of his estate or trust as a result of SFMTA’s
authorization of the Pilot Program. We
shall affirm the trial court, but on the alternative grounds found “persuasiveâ€
by the trial court, that the Pilot
Program did not go into effect until March 28, 2010, after
Enrico’s death.
BACKGROUND
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
On December 12, 1968, the San Francisco Police Commission granted John C. Enrico permit
number 846, to operate a taxicab in
referred to as the City). Under
then-existing city law, taxi permits
could be inherited, sold, assigned and transferred.
In 1978, San Francisco
voters passed Proposition K, an initiative ordinance establishing a new system
of regulation for city-issued taxi medallions.
Proposition K barred the inheritance, sale, assignment or transfer of
taxi medallions. Under Proposition K,
all taxi medallions belonged to the City, had to be held by working drivers,
and were distributed as they became available to individuals on the Medallion
Waiting List. In accordance with the
requirements of Proposition K, Enrico surrendered his permit to the City and on
December 17,
1979, the City issued him taxi medallion
number T-291. His operation of the
medallion was subject to the requirements of Proposition K, as well as to
additional taxi regulations codified in Article 16 of the San Francisco Police
Code and subsequently in the San Francisco Transportation Code (Transportation
Code). In 1984, the police department
approved Enrico’s request to lease Medallion T-291 to Yellow Cab Company. Enrico leased the medallion to Yellow Cab
Company from 1984 until his death in 2010.
During this time, Yellow Cab Company paid Enrico a monthly lease fee in
exchange for operating the medallion.
In 2007, San Francisco
voters passed Proposition A, giving the San Francisco Board of Supervisors the
power to transfer regulatory authority over taxi affairs to the SFMTA. Authority to regulate San Francisco taxis
passed to SFMTA in March 2009. Subsequently,
the SFMTA Board of Directors (SFMTA Board) re-codified Proposition K’s
requirements, as well as additional taxi regulations, in the Transportation
Code, Division II, Article 1100, et seq.
Proposition A also gave the SFMTA Board the power to adopt taxi
regulations that would override “any prior ordinance,†including the provisions
of Proposition K.
By 2009, when SFMTA assumed its
regulatory function over the local taxi industry, significant flaws had become
apparent in the process by which medallions were issued. It is unlawful to operate a taxi in the City
without a City-issued medallion. The
demand for medallions far exceeded the supply and medallions were issued to
drivers on a waiting list, for a fee of approximately $1,600. Approximately 3,000 names were on the
waiting list at the time of trial and people qualifying for medallions had been
on the waiting list for about 15 years. A medallion holder is allowed to lease the
medallion to a cab company or to a driver.
It is thus an income-producing asset for the medallion holder. However, because the waiting list is so
lengthy, applicants are often senior citizens by the time they actually receive
a medallion. At the same time local law
requires that every medallion holder who received a medallion after Proposition
K was adopted in 1978, and who is physically able to do so must be a so-called
“full-time driver.†That is, the
medallion holder must actually drive his or her taxi for at least 156 four-hour
shifts, or for 800 hours, during a single calendar year. (Transportation Code, § 1102,
subdivision (o).) The advanced age of
many medallion holders can make it difficult, or even unsafe, for them to
comply with the City’s legal requirements, especially the “full-time drivingâ€
requirement. SFMTA began exploring
possible reforms to the Proposition K-based medallion distribution service,
holding multiple town hall meetings to solicit input from various
stakeholders.
At a public hearing on February 26, 2010, the SFMTA Board approved Resolution No. 10-029, adopting
amendments to Transportation Code, Division II, Article 1100, to implement the
Pilot Program.
title="">[2] The resolution explained that the “Pilot
Program represents an interim measure that would allow the San Francisco taxi
industry to gradually transition away from the Waiting List system of Medallion
distribution that has characterized the San Francisco taxi industry for 32
years†and that it “represents an opportunity to collect information, monitor
results and elicit industry recommendations for the purpose of adopting a
long-term Taxi Medallion reform solution . . . .†The resolution enacted new Transportation
Code section 1109, subdivision (e), stating, among other things: “Any medallion held by a natural person
who: (1) has attained or will attain the
age of 70 years old or older as of December 31, 2010; or (2) has a bona fide
disability . . . is eligible for sale in accordance with this subsection
(e).†(Transportation Code § 1109,
subd. (e)(1).) Transportation Code
section 1109, subdivision (e)(3) authorized the Director of Transportation to
set the initial medallion sales price after a public hearing and at a price not
to exceed $400,000 and after considering certain specific factors in setting
that price. Transportation Code section
1109, subdivision (e)(6) further stated that “Medallions shall be purchased and
sold under the Pilot Program in accordance with procedures adopted by the SFMTA.â€
The resolution also stated that: “[p]rior
to authorizing any Medallion sale, SFMTA staff will return to the Board to
inform the Board of the established Medallion Sale Price and to propose
additional regulations governing (1) Medallion financing following meetings
with potential lenders, and (2) the composition of an industry group to monitor
the results of the Pilot Program that will provide recommendations for
long-term taxi industry reform . . . .â€
On March 23, 2010, Enrico died at the age of 96.
At public hearings held March 30,
April 20 and May
4, 2010, the SFMTA Board adopted additional
regulations to implement the Pilot Program.
On or about April 14, 2010, SFMTA mailed to
potentially eligible medallion sellers and buyers a “Notice & Opportunity
to Participate in Taxi Medallion Sales Pilot Program,†a “Buyers’ Participation
Form,†and a “Sellers’ Participation Form.
On April 21, 2010, Yesson, a resident of Sonoma County, filled
out and signed a “Sellers’ Participation Form†as “Trustee for John Enrico†and
mailed it to the SFMTA, which received the form on April 28, 2010. On April 26, 2010, Yesson Notified Yellow Cab Company by phone of Enrico’s death and on
April 27, 2010, Yellow Cab Company transmitted written notice to the SFMTA that
Enrico had died.
As of the May 15, 2010 filing
deadline, the SFMTA had received approximately 300 Sellers’ Participation Forms
from medallion holders expressing a desire to participate in the Pilot
Program. Upon receipt of the forms,
SFMTA staff screened the forms to determine which applicants met the age requirement,
disability requirement, or both requirements to be eligible to participate in
the Pilot Program. Following the
completion of the screening process, on or about June 9, 2010, the SFMTA sent “Commitment to Sell Agreements†to the medallion
holders who it had determined were eligible to participate in the Pilot
Program. The SFMTA did not send a
“Commitment to Sell Agreement†to Yesson.
On August 11, 2010,
the SFMTA wrote Yesson rejecting her request to participate in the Pilot
Program and explaining its view that “[y]our father’s interest in Medallion #T-291,
which consisted of his right and duty to operate the medallion, expired upon
his death. If, prior to his death, your
father was eligible to sell his Medallion under the Pilot Program by virtue of
either age or disability, that eligibility was also extinguished by his death†and
his interest in the medallion “is not part of his estate.â€
In August 2010, the first sale of a
medallion under the Pilot Program occurred.
Yellow Cab Company returned Medallion T-291 to SFMTA for reissuance in
February 2011. SFMTA did not sell the
medallion or otherwise use it in the Pilot Program. Rather, on March 11, 2011,
it reissued the medallion to the next qualified applicant at the top of the
waiting list, who paid SFMTA only the standard $1,600 processing fee.
On May 17, 2011, Yesson filed a claim against the City, alleging she had the right
to sell Medallion T-291. The City
rejected her claim on June 22, 2011. On September 2, 2011, Yesson filed the underlying petition in the Sonoma County Superior
Court, seeking an order determining ownership of disputed trust property and
for damages, restitution, and imposition of a constructive trust.
In her petition, Yesson asserted the
96-year-old Enrico was eligible to participate in the Pilot Program when it
passed on February
26, 2010, and from that date forward was qualified to sell his medallion pursuant
to the provisions of the amended Transportation Code. She asserted he wished to do so and that he
died after adoption of the Pilot Program, but before SFMTA promulgated formal
procedures for qualified medallion holders to notify SFMTA of their eligibility
and intention to sell. Yesson argued
below, as she does here, that upon his death and pursuant to his will, Enrico’s
personal property, including the medallion and the right to sell it, became the
property of his trust. She sought an
order determining that title to the medallion was vested in her as trustee and
requiring SFMTA to pay her $200,000, the amount a medallion holder would net by
selling a medallion through the Pilot Program (the medallion sale value of
$250,000, less a 15% Medallion Sale transfer fee and a 5% driver fund transfer
fee).
The Sonoma County Superior Court
denied the petition, finding: “Beginning
in 1978, decedent’s taxi medallion was at all times owned by the City and
County of San Francisco; the medallion was not, and never could be, property of
the decedent or of his estate or trust.
Furthermore, the SFMTA did not confer a vested or alienable property right
upon the decedent to sell his medallion through the Pilot Program, and,
trust.†It described Yesson’s claim as “
‘an attempt to cobble together a property interest where none exists.’ †The court also found “persuasive†SFMTA’s
argument that Resolution No. 10-029 did not take effect until after Enrico’s
death, but the court “prefer[red] to decide this case on settled principles of
the law of inheritance.†The court
concluded, “Had the decedent survived a little longer, he likely could have
benefitted from the Pilot Program. His
inability to so benefit was due to unfortunate timing. It is not uncommon that the timing of changes
in laws and regulations sometimes determines people’s fortunes, yet bad timing
establishes neither a denial of constitutional due process nor a cause of
action for legal or equitable relief.â€
This
timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A.
As the parties here agree, the case
was tried below on stipulated facts and so we apply the de novo standard of review. (Crocker
National Bank v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 49 Cal.3d 881,
888; Nguyen
v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 437.)
We agree with the initial argument made
by SFMTA that adoption of Resolution No. 10-029, establishing the Pilot Program
and amending the Transportation Code was a legislative act, subject to
referendum. Therefore, Resolution No. 10-029
took effect 31 days after adoption of the resolution and five days
created any property rights—and we do not suggest that it did—Enrico was not
possessed of any such rights at the time he died.
B.
Under both the California Constitution and the Charter of the City
and County of San Francisco, the initiative and referendum are powers reserved by the
people. (Cal. Const., art.
II, § 9; S.F. City Charter, § 14.102.)
“The referendum is the means by which
the electorate is entitled, as a power reserved by it under our state
Constitution, to approve or reject measures passed by a legislative body. (Cal. Const., art.
II, §§ 9, subd. (a), 11 & art. IV, § 1; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of
(Empire Waste Management v. Town
of Windsor (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 714, 717 (Empire Waste); Lindelli v.
Town of San Anselmo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1108 (Lindelli).) “The initiative
and referendum are not rights ‘granted the people, but . . . power[s] reserved
by them. Declaring it “the duty of the
courts to jealously guard this right of the people†[citation], the courts have
described the initiative and referendum as articulating “one of the most
precious rights of our democratic process†[citation]. “[I]t has long been our judicial policy to
apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order
that the right not be improperly annulled.
If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve
power, courts will preserve it.†’ [Citations.]†(Rossi
v. Brown (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 695; see Lindelli,
supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109.)
“An essential component of the
referendum power is the ability to stay legislation until voters have had the
opportunity to approve or reject it.
With limited exceptions, every municipal ordinance is subject to an
automatic 30-day stay before it becomes effective. ([Elections Code,] § 9235.) During that period, any qualified registered
voter may circulate a referendum petition challenging the ordinance. ([Elections Code,] § 9237.) Provided that the requisite number of
signatures is obtained, ‘the effective date of the ordinance shall be
suspended, and the legislative body shall reconsider the ordinance.’ (
(Lindelli, supra, 111
Cal.App.4th at p. 1109.) Section 14.102
of the San Francisco Charter similarly provides for the referendum power to
apply to ordinances adopted by the City.
As explained in Midway
Orchards v. County of Butte (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 765 (Midway Orchards), “The power
of referendum is simply not the power
to repeal a legislative act . . . . Under
current article II, section 9 [of the state Constitution], ‘The referendum is
the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes. . . .’ The power is the same as the Legislature’s
approval of a bill. [Citation.] The power is to determine whether a legislative
act should become law
It is not to determine whether a legislative act, once effective, should
be repealed. [¶] In accord with
this view of the referendum power, neither state statutes nor local ordinances
subject to referendum go into effect during the time permitted for the filing
of a referendum petition. [Citations.]
Thus, ‘A prime purpose of deferment of the effective date of ordinances
is to preserve the right of referendum.’ [Citation.]†(Id. at
pp. 780–781.)
Moreover, “it is well established
that any legislative act may be . . . subject to referendum, regardless of
whether that act is denominated an ‘ordinance’ or ‘resolution.’ †(DeVita
v. County of Napa (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 787, fn. 9; accord,
at p. 777.) “Resolutions subject to
referendum, like ordinances, are not effective until 30 days from the date of
their enactment[.]†(
be effective before the power of referendum can be exercised. (Id.
at pp. 781–782.)
We
recognize that resolutions ordinarily take effect immediately and that many
administrative acts not subject to referendum are undertaken by resolution and
are effective upon passage according to the usual rule. (Midway
Orchards, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 782.) The determinative question then, is whether Resolution
No. 10-029 amending the Transportation Code and enacting the Pilot Program was
a legislative act and so subject to referendum as claimed by SFMTA or was an
administrative action as claimed by Yesson.
C.
“A referendum may review only
that are strictly executive or administrative.
[Citation.]†(
p. 717, fn. 1; see Lindelli, supra,
111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1112–1113; see Sacks
v. City of Oakland (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1090.) “Under the most frequently stated description
of the line between legislative and administrative/executive acts, ‘ “[a]cts
constituting a declaration of public purpose, and making provisions for ways
and means of its accomplishment, may be generally classified as calling for the
exercise of legislative power. Acts
which are to be deemed as acts of administration, and classed among those
governmental powers properly assigned to the executive department, are those which
are necessary to be done to carry out legislative policies and purposes already
declared by the legislative body, or such as are devolved upon it by the
organic law of its existence.†[¶] . . . “Again it has been said: ‘The
power to be exercised is legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new
policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if it merely
pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power
superior to it.’†[Citation.]’
[Citation.]†(Lindelli, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1113; see
Cal.App.4th at p. 1090; Pettye v. City
and County of San Francisco (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 233, 241.)
SFMTA’s adoption of the Pilot
Program has the earmarks of a legislative act, as the resolution declared its
public purpose and outlined the ways and means of its accomplishment. We agree with SFMTA that the Pilot Program
prescribed a new policy or plan for regulating the system of permitting taxi
service in the City. The newly enacted
provisions of the Transportation Code enacted by Resolution No. 10-029, set out
a new course for the legal treatment of taxi medallions. For the first time in decades, SFMTA would
allow certain medallions to be sold. In
the trial court, Yesson herself characterized the SFMTA Board as having “created
a sea-change in the longstanding Proposition K assumption that taxi medallions
were non-transferable City property.†On
appeal, she asserts that medallion ownership “changed dramatically†with the
adoption of Resolution No. 10-029, amending the City’s Transportation Code by
adding section 1109, subdivision (e) creating the Pilot Program.
In determining whether Resolution No.
10-029 was a legislative act by SFMTA, we refer to the above description of the
line between legislative and administrative acts and to the following:
It is well established that “ ‘[t]he
amendment of a legislative act is itself a legislative act. The power to legislate includes by necessary
implication the power to amend existing legislation.†(City of Sausalito
v. County of Marin (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 550, 563–564; 58 Cal.Jur.3d (2013)
Statutes § 61.) Here, the initial
adoption of Proposition K through an initiative of the people of the City, was
unquestionably a legislative act. (See
107, 110, 113–114 [upholding Proposition K as an “initiative ordinance†against
constitutional challenges].) SFMTA’s
(the codification of Proposition K), as it was empowered to do by Proposition
A, is a strong indication that the amendment was a legislative act according to
this rule.
“[A]dministrative agencies ‘ “may have
executive, administrative, investigative, legislative
or adjudicative powers.†’ (
Cal.3d 793, 799, fn. 3, italics added.)â€
(Pettye v. City and County of San
Francisco, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 244 [San Francisco proposition that
required city to replace general assistance with in-kind benefits for housing,
utilities, and meals was a legislative act].)
SFMTA exercises both legislative and administrative powers.
Nor does the interim or temporary
nature of a program change the legislative character of the decision to enact
it. (Lindelli,
supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 1113 [legislative body’s approval of one-year
“interim contract†was a legislative act, subject to referendum, as it involved
the decision in the first instance of which private entity was best suited to
provide services for the duration of the contract].) In this case, the decision to adopt the
short-term Pilot Program involved the same initial policy decision that would
qualify a long-term taxi medallion reform program as a legislative act, subject
to the referendum process. (See
Any doubts about whether Resolution No. 10-029, authorizing the
medallion sales Pilot Program was a legislative act, would be set to rest by
the “Rules of Order†adopted by the SFMTA’s Board in January 2009, more than a
year before the resolution amending the Transportation Code and enacting the
Pilot Program was adopted. Article 8,
section 1 of the “Rules of Order†provides:
“Article 8 – LEGISLATIVE PROCESS [¶] Section 1. Effective Date. Resolutions that adopt provisions of the
City’s Transportation Code relating to parking, traffic, and taxi service shall
go into effect at the beginning of the 31st day after approval if no referendum
petition is filed. The foregoing rule
shall not affect actions of the board to approve contracts, budgets, departmental
policies and other matters that do not amend the San Francisco Transportation
Code.†(Added January 6, 2009.)
By adopting this section of
its Rules of Order, the Board affirmatively recognized and made clear its
obligation with respect to the reserved referendum power of local voters. Even though the SFMTA Board cannot enact
ordinances (that power being reserved to the Board of Supervisors under the
City Charter), the SFMTA Board was empowered by Proposition A, codified at
section 8A.101, subdivision (b) of the City Charter, to enact measures that
override previous City ordinances concerning taxi service.
in nature.
D.
Yesson contends the action taken by
the SFMTA Board in adopting Resolution No. 10-029 was wholly administrative and,
therefore, was effective immediately upon its adoption.
She points out that resolutions
ordinarily become effective immediately (Midway
Orchards, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at pp. 781–782) and asserts that the
resolution merely implemented several pre-existing San Francisco Charter
provisions. Those provisions are
identified by Yesson as found in “Article VIIIA: The Municipal Transportation
Agency†and are set forth in the margin.
identified by the SFMTA staff report proposing the Pilot Program describe the
stated goals and objectives in language similar to that found in the Charter’s
article VIIIA.100 (“Preambleâ€) and in its article VIIIA.115 (“Transit First Policyâ€).
It is not surprising that the general
goals and objectives of the Pilot Program, such as providing safe,
environmentally sustainable and economically feasible alternatives to
individual automobile transportation, would mirror the even more general and
lofty goals and policies of the “Municipal Transit Agency†article of the City
Charter. It is not simply the statement
of goals and objectives of a resolution that determines whether it was the
product of a legislative act. Rather, it
is what the resolution actually does.
The “Transit First Policy†contained in
the City Charter mentions taxis only in the context of including them as
“public transit†and an “economically and environmentally sound alternative to
transportation by individual automobiles.â€
It does not mention permits or medallions at all. Yesson cannot point to any resolution or
ordinance before SFMTA Resolution No. 10-029 that enacted a policy of allowing medallion
sales. Through this resolution and
subsequent ones, SFMTA made new law.
This resolution did not merely implement previously adopted policies,
but created a wholly new policy and plan of allowing qualified medallion
holders to sell their medallions. As
SFMTA points out, there are many very different, and in some cases
diametrically opposed, ways in which SFMTA might try to further these general
goals. For instance, it could make
medallions entirely non-transferable; it could allow all medallions to be sold
in a free market; it could, as it did, allow specified taxi medallions held by
eligible persons to be sold for consideration to qualified purchasers. The choice among these alternatives was a
significant policy choice. Acts declaring such new public policy are the
essence of the exercise of legislative power.
(Pettye v. City and County of San
Francisco, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 241, 244.) The adoption of a dramatically different and
wholly new policy of allowing limited medallion sales was a legislative act
and, therefore, was subject to the people’s right of referendum.
Yesson contends that only where a
resolution is passed with all the formalities of an ordinance does it become a
legislative act subject to referendum and the 30-day waiting period, rather
than an administrative act. However, her
sole authority, City of Sausalito v.
County of Marin, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 565–566 [holding that
although a resolution adopting a master plan was legislative in substance, it
was invalid in form where it was not executed by ordinance], did not address the circumstances under which resolutions are
subject to referendum. Moreover, her
argument is counter to established authority holding, “any legislative act may
be . . . subject to referendum, regardless of whether that act is denominated
an ‘ordinance’ or ‘resolution.’ †(
Cal.4th 763, 787, fn. 9; accord, Midway
Orchards, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 777.)
Nor could a legislative body insulate its enactments from referendum by
clothing them as less formal resolutions. (Midway
Orchards, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 782.)
Yesson maintains that the language
of the resolution itself indicates it was intended to be effective immediately,
as it stated, “the Board adopts the Taxi Medallion Sales Pilot Program,†and “that
any Medallion offered to an applicant on the waiting list after February 16,
2010 shall be counted toward the number of Medallions offered to Waiting List
applicants pursuant to the . . . Pilot Program.†She urges we may infer from this language that
SFMTA staff anticipated the Pilot Program commenced upon its adoption at the February 26, 2010 meeting. She finally notes
the SFMTA secretary’s certification the resolution was “adopted†February 26, 2010. Nothing in this language
indicates to us that adoption of the resolution was administrative rather than
legislative in nature or that it was intended to be effective immediately. The resolution appears to simply use the date
February 16 as a convenient benchmark for counting medallions to be issued
according to the old, Proposition K-based system, to indicate the old system
was not being completely eliminated, but remained in place while the Pilot
Program was being implemented. Nor does
the certification that the resolution was “adopted†on February 26 add anything
to the question whether such adoption was a legislative act subject to
referendum.
Nor are we persuaded that the action
of the SFMTA Board was not “legislative†by language in the staff report for
the February 26, 2010 board meeting at which the Pilot Program was adopted or
the March brochure referencing the board’s adoption of the Pilot Program on
February 26, and speaking of “regulations that have already been adopted†and
posted on a website. These references by
staff to “adoption†dates do not suggest staff was addressing the issue of
whether the resolution was subject to a 30-day referendum period. Moreover, if the nature of the action was
“legislative,†the California Constitution mandated the 30-day referendum
period, during which the resolution could not take effect. Neither SFMTA Board or the agency staff could
avoid the referendum period, even had they wished to do so, as the referendum
right is guaranteed by the California Constitution and by the City
Charter. (See Midway Orchards, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at pp. 778–779.)
Yesson argues the measures contained
in Resolution No. 10-029 “were simply ratifications of interim administrative
proposals made by SFMTA staff and were not subject to referendum.†We disagree.
That staff previously had made recommendations for such a policy shift
is irrelevant to whether the particular act is legislative or administrative in
nature. Staff does not have the ability
to make law. Only the legislative body
can do so. Yesson’s argument suggests
that a legislative body could insulate its actions from referendum by ensuring
a staff recommendation preceded the change in policy or plan. That is clearly not the case. (Midway
Orchards, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 782.)
We conclude the trial court did not
err in determining that Enrico never acquired the right to sell taxi medallion T-291
and in denying Yesson’s petition.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Yesson’s petition
for an order determining ownership of disputed trust property and for
additional relief is affirmed. The City
is awarded its costs in connection with this appeal.
>
_________________________
Kline,
P.J.
We concur:
_________________________
Haerle, J.
_________________________
Richman, J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1]The
parties filed a Stipulated Statement of Facts in the trial court.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2]The
Resolution itself stated in relevant part:
“RESOLVED,
That the Board adopts the Taxi Medallion Sales Pilot Program, allowing the
SFMTA to sell up to 60 Taxi Medallions that have been returned to the SFMTA,
and allowing Taxi Medallion Holders age 70 and above and other Taxi Medallion
Holders who are disabled to sell their Medallions at a price to be established
by the SFMTA to qualified taxicab Drivers, as set forth in amendments to
Transportation Code Division II, Article 1100; and, be it further
“RESOLVED,
That no Taxi Medallion shall be purchased sold [sic] pursuant to the Taxi
Medallion Sales Pilot Program until the Executive Director CEO adopts a
Medallion Sale Price and provides notice to the public of such Medallion Sale
Price; and, be it further
“RESOLVED,
That any Medallion offered to an applicant on the Waiting List after February
16, 2010 shall be counted toward the number of Medallions offered to Waiting
List applicants pursuant to the Taxi Medallion Sales Pilot Program; and, be it
further
“RESOLVED,
That the Board ratifies the decision of SFMTA staff to close the Waiting List
effective December 16, 2009 and all other actions by SFMTA staff between March
1, 2009 to February 15, 2010 taken for the purpose of implementing Transportation
Code, Division II, Article 1100.â€
