W.J. v. Super.
Filed 5/9/13 W.J. v. Super. Ct. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
W.J.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY,
Respondent;
SAN BERNARDINO
COUNTY CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Real
Party in Interest.
E058012
(Super.Ct.Nos.
J246776, J246777,
&
J246778)
OPINION
ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary
writ. Gregory S. Tavill, Judge. Petition denied.
Gloria
Gebbie for Petitioner.
No
appearance for Respondent.
Jean-Rene
Basle, County Counsel, and Adam E. Ebright, Deputy County Counsel, for Real
Party in Interest.
Petitioner
W.J. (Mother) filed a petition for extraordinary writ pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 8.452, challenging the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders as to her three children, and setting a Welfare and
Institutions Code
title="">[1] section 366.26 hearing. Mother argues that: (1) her due process rights were violated
when the juvenile court added an additional allegation after the conclusion of
evidence; (2) her right to confront and cross-examine witnesses was
violated when the juvenile court allowed minors’ counsel to question the
children in chambers; and (3) the juvenile court erred in denying her
section 361.5. We reject these
contentions and affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The
children came to the attention of the San
Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) on November 8, 2012,
when then seven-year-old D.J. was complaining of pain to his hands, arms,
chest, and leg at school. D.J. reported
that his stepfather, J.W., had beat him with an electric cord the previous
night for getting in trouble for stealing food from another student at
school. The beating resulted in the
child suffering from numerous lacerations, welts, and bruises to his arms,
legs, back, buttocks, stomach, and chest.
J.W. threatened to beat the child more severely if the child did it
again. After the beating, the child was
sent to bed without dinner, and he was not given breakfast the following
morning despite the fact that the child had been trying to get food at school. D.J. indicated that he often did not get food
at home; school personnel noted that there had been times D.J. had taken food
and appeared as though he had not been fed at home.
D.J.
also stated that Mother was in another room when he was being beaten by J.W.,
and Mother did not come in during the beating or check on him after he was
beaten. D.J. further disclosed that
Mother had also beaten him in the past with a piece of a broken dresser drawer,
and on another occasion with a belt, resulting in a cut to his head and blood
gushing from his scalp. After the
beating, Mother made the child clean up the spilled blood. D.J. also stated that he had seen Mother and
J.W. beat his then five-year-old half-sister Z.W. with a belt and an electric
cord.
domestic violence between his mother and J.W.
Z.W. confirmed that D.J. had been beaten by J.W. She also confirmed that her parents had hit
her with a belt on the buttocks and back.
All
three children were subsequently taken to an emergency room for evaluation and
treatment. D.J. reported that J.W. beat
him with an extension cord and that Mother hit him with a belt. He also stated that Mother had seen J.W. with
the extension cord and had heard him crying during the beating. D.J. had multiple lacerations, bruises, and
welts all over his body, and there were numerous older injuries on his body
that were consistent with belt or extension cord lacerations. The treating doctor reported that she had
found severe contusions, too numerous to document, on D.J.; that D.J. had
defensive wounds on his hands; and that the lacerations and hematomas on D.J.
would leave scars. The doctor also noted
that D.J.’s injuries were inflicted on top of older injuries and were so
extensive that they covered up some evidence of prior injuries. The doctor concluded D.J.’s injuries were
clearly the result of child abuse. The
two younger children had no visible injuries.
When
police officers contacted Mother, Mother lied to the police, claiming that J.W.
was her brother, that she was not at home during the beating, and that she did
not know the child was being beaten by J.W.
She also stated that she did not see any injuries on D.J. or notice that
D.J. appeared to be in pain. Z.W.,
however, reported that Mother was in the living room while J.W. was beating
D.J. Mother further denied beating any
of the children. The police searched the
home and found an extension cord that was covered in a red substance, believed
to be blood. They also found blood on a
pillow on D.J.’s bed, on a towel in the bathroom, and smeared on the wall. The police also interviewed a neighbor who
reported that she had seen Mother hitting the children with a belt, a tree
twig, and grabbing them by the hair to slap them on numerous occasions.
J.W.
and Mother were arrested for child
endangerment. J.W. admitted at the
police station that he had beaten D.J. with an electric cord due to the child’s
ongoing behavioral issues. J.W. believed
the child may have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Mother continued to deny knowing anything
about D.J.’s injuries, claiming they discipline the children by making them do
chores. Mother also stated that they had
been having problems with D.J.’s behavior issues and that the child had been
diagnosed with ADHD. After seeing D.J.’s
injuries, Mother later agreed that the injuries were excessive.
On
November 13, 2012, CFS filed petitions on behalf of the children pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to
protect), (c) (serious emotional damage), (g) ( no provision for support), and
(j) (abuse of sibling). The children
were formally detained at the detention hearing and placed in a foster
home. The parents were provided with
supervised visitation upon release from custody, and ordered to submit to
random drug testing. The parents were
also informed that they might not be provided with reunification services
pursuant to section 361.5.
In
a jurisdictional/dispositional report, the social worker recommended that the
allegations in the petition be found true, that no reunification services be
provided to the parents, and that a section 366.26 hearing be set. The social worker noted that Mother had
minimized and lied about the discipline of D.J.; that she lied about J.W.’s
identity to the police; and that she gave conflicting statements about her
whereabouts when J.W. beat D.J. Mother
denied any history of domestic violence; however, the social worker found
evidence showing that Mother had been a victim in a domestic violence case
against J.W. and that J.W. had an order to stay away from Mother. The social worker further pointed out that
the abuse was severe and ongoing, and that although D.J. appeared to be the
primary target, there were consistent reports that Mother had hit Z.W. as
well. In addition, both parents were
surprised about being arrested for child abuse, indicating to the social worker
that they believed in inflicting physical abuse as a form of discipline; they
appeared to be only concerned about being arrested, and did not show any
concern about D.J. Neither parent had
asked how D.J. was doing or about his medical condition. The social worker believed that returning the
children to the parents care would be detrimental given the seriousness of the
abuse, the parents’ attitudes, Mother’s attempts at deception, and the parents’
lack of empathy or remorse. The social
worker was also concerned that the parents would not benefit from services
based on the parents’ prior completion of a parenting
class and substance abuse counseling.
The
social worker further noted that D.J. was in need of counseling and an
assessment for medications. Since being
in foster care, the child had stated that he wanted to die, and he had
purposely urinated on his bed and the floor and was banging his head against
the wall. D.J. had also hit his younger
sisters and other children, and he had stolen at school and walked out of his
classroom. The social worker recommended
moving D.J. to a home separate from his sisters; however, the foster parent,
who was experienced with caring for children with behavioral and emotional
issues, indicated that she would work with the child so he did not have to be
moved.
The
contested jurisdictional hearing was held on January 30, 2013. At that time, Mother’s counsel, before any
witnesses were called, requested that the juvenile court speak to the two older
children, then eight-year-old D.J. and then five-year-old Z.W., in chambers to
discuss their wishes. Mother’s counsel
also specifically stated, “I don’t really want to call them as witnesses. I don’t think they need that
experience.†CFS offered to stipulate as
to the children’s wishes, but Mother’s counsel confirmed that she wanted the
court to hear from the children personally.
The
court thereafter questioned D.J. and Z.W. with their counsel present. The children indicated that they wanted to
return to their parents’ care and that they wanted to visit J.W. However, they did not understand why they
were taken from their parents’ care.
Additionally, in response to minors’ counsel’s question of what he
thought would happen to him if he got in trouble again, D.J. stated that he
would have to “stand at the wall†and that he did not believe J.W. would use
“the switch†again because J.W. had told him that day that they would have
“lots of fun†when they got home. Z.W.
stated that if she got in trouble again, she would “hold the wall, and they
[would] whoop me with the metal part of the belt.†Minors’ counsel also asked whether D.J. and
Z.W. had anything else they wanted to tell the judge, and Z.W. asked, “What
judge?†Minors’ counsel replied, “This
is the judge. Did you know that?†Z.W. responded, “Okay. [¶]
Can I have some ice cream?†D.J.
stated that he would like visits with his dad.
Thereafter,
with all the parties present, the court noted that the children desired visits
with their mother and father and that they wanted to go home, but that it was
clear that neither child understood why the case existed or whether they
understood the judge’s role. The court
offered to have the reporter read back the transcript of the interview if any
party desired, but no one asked to have it repeated.
The
social worker thereafter testified. In
relevant part, the social worker stated that Mother had regularly visited with
the children two times a week for two hours; that the visits appeared to have
gone well; that the children enjoyed seeing their mother; and that Mother had
began attending parenting and anger management classes. In response to the court’s inquiry of whether
offering services to the parents would be in the children’s best interest, the
social worker noted that he was “torn†because of the “shocking†abuse. The social worker explained that while the
children were bonded with the parents and they wanted to return home, the
social worker believed that it would be detrimental to the children to offer
services to the parents given Mother’s dishonesty with CFS and the police,
Mother’s failure to protect, Mother’s own abuse of the children, the severity
of the abuse, the history of domestic violence, and the fact that Mother
remained in a relationship with J.W. after the abuse. Mother then briefly took the stand but chose
to exercise her Fifth Amendment right and refused to testify about the events
that took place on the day D.J. was beaten due to the criminal charges against
Mother and J.W.
Following
arguments from counsel, the court found the allegations in the petitions to be
true. In regards to D.J., the court
added another section 300, subdivision (a), allegation indicating that
J.W. had whipped D.J. with an electrical cord and that Mother had consented to
the child being whipped with the electrical cord. The court denied reunification services to
both parents under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). The children were declared dependents of the
court and maintained in their foster home.
The section 366.26 hearing was set for May 30, 2013.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Additional
Allegation
Mother
contends that her due process rights were violated by the juvenile court’s
addition of a second section 300, subdivision (a), allegation at the conclusion
of evidence. We disagree.
“Since
the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of
his [or her] children is a compelling one, ranked among the most basic of civil
rights [citations], the state, before depriving a parent of this interest, must
afford [the parent] adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.†(In re
B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 688-689; see also In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 306.) A parent whose child may be found subject to
the dependency jurisdiction of the juvenile court has a due process right to be
informed of the nature of the hearing, as well as the allegations upon which
the deprivation of custody is predicated, so that the parent may make an
informed decision whether to appear and contest the allegations. (In re
Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 751.) “Notice of the specific facts upon which
removal of a child from parental custody is predicated is fundamental to due
process.†(In re Jeremy C. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 384, 397.) Notice at the time of the hearing on the
merits is not sufficient; the parent is entitled to notice, in writing, “of the
specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing†and “at
the earliest practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the
hearing to permit preparation.†(
actions†in making its jurisdictional findings.
(In re J.O. (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 139, 152, fn. 13.)
In
dependency proceedings, as in civil law in general, “amendments to conform to
proof are favored, and should not be denied unless the pleading as drafted
prior to the proposed amendment would have misled the adversarial party to its
prejudice.†(In re Jessica C. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1042 (
amendment of a petition to “correct or make more specific†the factual
allegations supportive of the offense charged so long as the very nature of the
charge remains unchanged. (
481; see also In re Andrew L. (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 683, 689.) “‘If a
variance between pleading and proof . . . is so wide that it would, in effect,
violate due process to allow the amendment, the court should, of course, refuse
any such amendment.’†(
Explaining
this concept, the Jessica C. court
gave the following example: “[S]uppose a petition only alleges, under
subdivision (d) of section 300, a variety of specific sexual acts perpetrated
by a parent, but the trial judge does not find these are true. The county then attempts to amend the
petition to allege serious emotional damage under subdivision (c) of section
300, based on the idea that any child who would make such allegations, even if
false, has obviously been subject to emotional abuse. Such a tactic would be nothing more than a
cheap way to establish dependency without giving the parent adequate notice of
dependency jurisdiction under an emotional abuse theory.†(Jessica
C., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p.
1042, fn. 14.)
Such
a variance does not exist in the present case.
Unlike the Jessica C.
illustration, the juvenile court found the existing allegations of the petition
true and added an allegation that conformed to proof. The court added an allegation that J.W. had
whipped D.J. with an electric cord and that Mother had agreed to the
whipping. The social worker’s reports
noted that D.J. had stated that Mother was in another room when he was being
beaten by J.W.; that Mother had heard him crying; and that Mother did not come
in during the beating or check on D.J. after the beating. Z.W. also reported that Mother was in the
living room when the beating occurred.
Additionally, the factual allegations in the original petition under
section 300, subdivision (b), stated that Mother knew or should have known that
D.J. was at risk of physical abuse from J.W. and that she failed to protect
D.J. from that abuse.
Furthermore,
Mother was aware that CFS was asserting that she not only consented to the
abuse by J.W., but that she had also perpetuated physical abuse. CFS provided all parties with explicit notice
of the issues being litigated, and the court conducted a full hearing affording
each party the opportunity to be heard.
Mother was also given the opportunity to present evidence in regards to
the allegations and what role she played in the abuse, but she opted to assert
her Fifth Amendment right rather than testify on her own behalf when she had
the opportunity to do so. Mother was not
misled or prejudiced by the amendment.
Therefore, no error occurred.
B. Questioning
Minors in Chamber
Mother
also argues that the juvenile court committed prejudicial error when it allowed
minors’ counsel to question the children in chambers and outside the presence
of her and her counsel in violation of her right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses. CFS responds that Mother
forfeited this contention by failing to raise it below; in the alternative, CFS
claims Mother’s argument is unmeritorious because she was not denied an
opportunity to call the children as witnesses during the hearing and question
them in open court.
Section
350, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part: “The testimony of a minor may be taken in
chambers and outside the presence of the minor’s . . . parents, if
the minor’s . . . parents are represented by counsel, the counsel is present
and any of the following circumstances exist:
[¶] (1) The court determines that testimony in
chambers is necessary to ensure truthful testimony. [¶]
(2) The minor is likely to be
intimidated by a formal courtroom setting.
[¶] (3) The minor is afraid to testify in front of his
or her . . . parents. [¶] After testimony in chambers, the
. . . parents . . . may elect to have the court reporter
read back the testimony or have the testimony summarized by counsel for the
parent or parents.â€
The
appellate court in In re Laura H.
(1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1689 determined that taking a minor’s testimony in
chambers without the father’s attorney being present was a violation of the
father’s constitutional right to confront the witness. (Id.
at pp. 1694-1696.) The court also
held that a failure to object to this procedure in the juvenile court did not
constitute a waiver. (
In
In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th
766, counsel stipulated that the minor could be interviewed in chambers without
counsel being present. The minor’s
mother was present in court when the stipulation was entered into the record
and remained silent. The Second District
Court of Appeal reasoned that the mother’s silence in the face of the
stipulation constituted acquiescence to the procedure, and she was precluded
from challenging the procedure on appeal.
(Id. at pp. 771-772.)
The
court in In re Meranda P. (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 1143 rejected the reasoning and holding of Laura H. The
proceeding is civil, not criminal, in nature and a parent in a dependency
proceeding is not entitled to full confrontation and cross-examination. Thus, a parent may waive confrontation rights
by acquiescence. (Id. at pp. 1157-1158 & fn. 9.)
The
record reflects that at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing Mother’s
counsel urged that the juvenile court interview D.J. and Z.W. in chambers to
discuss their wishes, despite CFS’s offer to stipulate as to the children’s
wishes. Mother’s counsel also
specifically stated, “I don’t really want to call them as witnesses. I don’t think they need that
experience.†The court thereafter
questioned D.J. and Z.W. with their counsel present. The children indicated that they wanted to
return to their parents’ care, but failed to understand the proceedings due to
their young ages. Minors’ counsel
questioned the children about what they thought would happen if they got in
trouble again. Both children stated that
they would have to “hold the wall,†with Z.W. also stating that her parents
would “whoop†her with a belt. D.J.
stated that he did not believe J.W. would use “the switch†again because J.W.
had told him that day that they would have “lots of fun†when they got
home. Thereafter, with all the parties
present, the court noted that the children desired visits with their mother and
father and that they wanted to go home, but that it was clear that neither
child understood why the case existed.
The court offered to have the reporter read back the transcript of the
interview if any party desired but no one asked to have it read back.
Mother’s
counsel acknowledges that no one asked for a read back, asserting presumably
because the court’s summary was favorable.
She however claims that the “contents of what transpired was unknown
until the formal preparation of the record,†at which time she discovered
minors’ counsel had questioned the children outside the presence of other
counsel and without giving Mother an opportunity to clarify the children’s
responses and cross-examine them. She
therefore argues that “[a]ny extension beyond†the issue of whether the
children wanted to return to their parents “should have at the least been
brought to the attention of counsel before, if not at the least after, it was
allowed.â€
There
is nothing in the record to indicate that Mother, or any other party, was
denied the opportunity to question the children or cross-examine them. In fact, Mother’s counsel specifically stated
that she did not want to call the children as witnesses. Further, the in chambers questioning of the
children was conducted at the behest of Mother’s counsel, despite an offer of
stipulation as to the children’s wishes.
Mother also was aware that minors’ counsel was in chambers with the children
and there is no indication on the record that she did not know that minors’
counsel would ask the children questions.
Moreover, because Mother failed to ask for a read back following the in
chambers interview of the children, despite the court’s offer to do so, Mother
cannot now complain that her right to question and cross-examine the children
was violated merely because she was unaware of what had transpired at that
time. Mother had the opportunity to discover
the contents of the in chambers interview with the children following the in
chambers proceeding, but failed to do so.
Although
the better practice is for a parent’s attorney to be present during an in
chambers interview, and section 350 mandates the attorney’s presence, that
right can be waived. (
acquiesced to the procedure followed by the juvenile court and, therefore, has
waived any right to challenge this procedure on appeal. (Ibid.)
C. Denial
of Reunification Services
Mother
also argues that the juvenile court erred in denying her reunification services
and in finding that it was not in the children’s best interests to offer her
services.
“We
affirm an order denying reunification services if the order is supported by
substantial evidence.†(
831, 839 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) “‘In
juvenile cases, as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court
asked to assess the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a
determination as to whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether
or not contradicted, which will support the conclusion of the trier of
fact. All conflicts must be resolved in
favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the
verdict, if possible.’†(
Cal.App.4th 586, 600 (Francisco G.).)
Although
reunification is a high priority in the dependency system, the Legislature has
recognized that, under certain circumstances, it would be fruitless to provide
a parent with reunification services. (
reunification services need not be provided.
“Once it is determined one of the situations outlined in subdivision (b)
applies, the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative
assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental
resources. [Citation.]†(In re
Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478.) As relevant here, the circumstances include
where there is a substantiated allegation of severe physical abuse. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6).)
Section
361.5, subdivision (b)(6), allows the court to deny services if it finds, by
clear and convincing evidence, “[t]hat the child has been adjudicated a
dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of . . . the
infliction of severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling
by a parent . . . and the court makes a factual finding that it would not
benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent .
. . .â€
There
is clearly substantial evidence to support the conclusion that section 361.5,
subdivision (b)(6), mandated the denial of reunification services to both
parents. (In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260-1261.) The juvenile court found that both parents
were offending parents. The court explained,
“The abuse is so substantial and ongoing for such a long period of time, it’s
clear to the Court that the mother was a participant in the abuse.†The court also stated, “[M]other knew about
the pattern of abuse. It was ongoing for
so long. The mother was a co-participant
in the abuse. And so it’s the finding of
the Court that the whipping with the electric cord was perpetrated by the
mother as if she did it herself. She certainly
consented to it, authorized it, facilitated it.†The beatings resulted in D.J. suffering from
numerous lacerations, welts and bruises to his arms, legs, back, buttocks,
stomach, and chest. The child also had
numerous older injuries on his body that were consistent with belt or extension
cord lacerations. He also had numerous
severe contusions and defensive wounds on his hands. The treating doctor noted that the
lacerations and hematomas on D.J. would leave scars, and that D.J.’s injuries
were inflicted on top of older injuries, covering up some evidence of prior
injuries. Additionally, Mother and J.W.
had beat Z.W. with a belt and an electric cord as well.
Second,
granting Mother reunification services would not benefit the children. (§ 361.5, subds.(b)(6), (h).) Subdivision (h) of section 361.5 provides: “In determining whether reunification
services will benefit the child pursuant to paragraph (6) or (7) of subdivision
(b), the court shall consider any information it deems relevant, including the
following factors:†These six factors
include: “(1) The specific act or
omission comprising the severe sexual abuse or the severe physical harm
inflicted on the child or the child’s sibling or half sibling. [¶]
(2) The circumstances under which the abuse or harm was inflicted on the
child or the child’s sibling or half sibling.
[¶] (3) The severity of the
emotional trauma suffered by the child or the child’s sibling or half
sibling. [¶] (4) Any history of abuse of other children by
the offending parent or guardian.
[¶] (5) The likelihood that the
child may be safely returned to the care of the offending parent or guardian
within 12 months with no continuing supervision. [¶]
(6) Whether or not the child desires to be reunified with the offending
parent or guardian.†(§ 361.5,
subd. (h).)
Mother
here cruelly and deliberately harmed D.J.
She silently stood by while J.W. severely whipped D.J. with an electric
cord, despite his crying, suffering, and pain.
And after the beating, she failed to check on D.J.’s emotional or
physical well-being. Moreover, she had
also physically abused D.J. and Z.W.
D.J. reported that Mother had previously beaten him with a piece of
broken dresser drawer and that she had once beaten him so severely on his head
that his scalp was bleeding. D.J. also
noted that Mother thereafter made him clean up his spilled blood. The physical evidence found in the parents’
home corroborated the children’s statements.
Police found an electric cord encrusted with a child’s blood, a
blood-stained pillow in D.J.’s room, and a wall smeared with blood. Additionally, the record revealed that Z.W.
was also beaten with a belt and an electric cord; that the parents had engaged
in domestic violence in front of the children; that D.J. was often denied food;
and that D.J. suffered from emotional issues.
Moreover, the record shows that Mother had demonstrated her lack of
concern for the children through her dishonesty, denial, and the fact that she
remained in a relationship with J.W. after the abuse. Although Mother regularly visited the
children, the visits appeared to go well, the children desired to be with the
parents, and Mother had engaged in services, considering the severity of the
ongoing abuse, Mother’s dishonesty, denials, history of domestic violence, and
Mother’s continued relationship with J.W., granting Mother services would not
be in the children’s best interests.
When
the prerequisites of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), are met, the juvenile
court “shall not†order reunification services for the offending parent unless
it finds, “by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best
interest of the child.†(§ 361.5,
subd. (c).) “‘“[O]nce it is determined
one of the situations outlined in subdivision (b) applies, the general rule
favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering
services would be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]â€â€™
[Citation.] The burden is on the
parent to change that assumption and show that reunification would serve the
best interests of the child.†(
1220, 1227.) As explained previously,
Mother here cannot meet that burden.
Accordingly,
there was substantial evidence to
support the court’s denial of reunification services. (Tyrone
W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 852-853.)
III
DISPOSITION
The
petition is denied.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
J.
CODRINGTON
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All future statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2] J.W. is the father of Z.W. and her
17-month-old sister. J.W. is not a party
to this appeal.
