Wiltgen v. Superior Court
Filed 1/27/14 Wiltgen v.
Superior Court CA4/2
>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
>IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA>
>
>FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
>
>DIVISION TWO
LEAH WILTGEN
et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF
RIVERSIDE COUNTY,
Respondent;
WILLIAM J.
HEALEY III et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
E059852
(Super.Ct.No.
INC1100102)
OPINION
ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of mandate. John G. Evans, Judge. Petition is granted in part and denied in
part with directions.
Best, Best &
Krieger, Irene S. Zurko and Kira L. Klatchko for Petitioners.
No appearance for
Respondent.
Kramer, Deboer
& Keane and Jeffrey G. Keane for Real Parties in Interest.
DISCUSSION
In
this matter we have reviewed the petition and the opposition filed by real
parties in interest. While real parties’
failure to address the essential merits of
the case could be deemed a concession, we have determined that resolution
of the matter involves the application of settled principles of law, and that
issuance of a peremptory writ in the
first instance with respect to certain issues is therefore appropriate. (Palma
v. U.S. Industrial Fasteners, Inc. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 171, 178.)
First,
while we have been unable to determine exactly what legal theories real parties
intend to present in the cause of action
labeled “negligence,†we conclude that it is appropriate to sever out whatever
claim real parties make based on petitioners’ alleged misuse of funds and/or
the “waste†of real parties’ time and effort.
(See Lilienthal & Fowler v.
Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848.)
Insofar as real parties may intend to press claims for href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">defamation or the failure to provide
insurance coverage, we will deny the petition as petitioners did not address
any such claims.href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
“The
primary responsibility for supervising
charitable trusts . . . for ensuring compliance with trusts and articles of
incorporation, and for protection of assets held by charitable trusts and
public benefit corporations, resides in the Attorney General.†(Gov. Code, § 12598; City of Palm Springs v. Living Desert Reserve (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
613.) It is quite true that in an appropriate
case, an action to enforce the terms of a trust may be brought by fiduciaries
of the trust or by the direct, identifiable beneficiaries of the trust. (See generally San Diego etc., Boy Scouts of America v. City of Escondido (1971)
14 Cal.App.3d 189.) But that is a far
cry from allowing any disgruntled donor to pursue personal litigation seeking href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.us/">personal damages against the current
fiduciaries based on alleged breach of the charitable intention. Indeed, real parties’ cross-complaint does
not even purport to state a claim on behalf of any charitable organization or
the beneficiaries thereof.
We
note that this matter does not involve a claim that charitable donations were
induced by false promises as to the use of the funds, and we express no opinion
on any such claim.
Accordingly,
we have no difficulty in determining that, as a matter of law, this claim fails
and petitioners were entitled to summary adjudication of the issue.
We grant the petition in this
respect.
DISPOSITION
The
petition for writ of mandate is granted in part and denied in part. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue
directing the superior court to vacate its order denying summary adjudication
of the claim for mismanagement or misuse of funds in the cause of action
labeled “negligence,†and to enter a new order granting the motion in that
respect only. In all other respects the
petition is denied.
Petitioner is directed to prepare and have the
peremptory writ of mandate issued, copies served, and the original filed with
the clerk of this court, together with proof of service on all parties. In the interest of justice, the parties are to bear their own costs.
The previously ordered stay is lifted.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RICHLI
J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
id=ftn1>
href="#_ftnref1"
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] We do
note that real parties’ assertion that petitioners failed to maintain errors
and omissions coverage in their favor may be confusing such a duty (which does
not appear to be reflected in the bylaws) with the obligation imposed by the
school district that booster clubs maintain liability
insurance.