WILSON & WILSON v. CITY COUNCIL OF REDWOOD
CITY








Filed 1/25/11






CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

WILSON & WILSON, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CITY COUNCIL OF REDWOOD CITY et al., Defendants and Appellants.

A123480 (San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. CIV 429131)

Story Continued From Part I………….


A. Completion of the Project Mooted Wilson’s Challenges to the ADDA
California law has long recognized that the completion of a public works project moots challenges to the validity of the contracts under which the project was carried out. In Jennings v. Strathmore Public etc. Dist. (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 548 (Jennings), the plaintiff, a “ ‘citizen resident’ ” of the public utility district, filed suit to enjoin the construction of facilities for the sewer district and sought a declaration that two contracts for construction of a sewer system were void. (Id. at pp. 548-549.) The plaintiff alleged that the sewer district entered into the contracts in bad faith for the purpose of evading the requirements of the Labor Code by setting a prevailing wage rate that was below the general wage rate for similar work. (Jennings, at p. 549.) After first concluding that completion of construction had made the request for injunctive relief moot, the court went on to consider whether the plaintiff could still maintain his action for declaratory relief. (Id. at pp. 549-550.) The court held that he could not, explaining that “[if the] plaintiff could maintain such an action because he did not like the prevailing wage scale fixed, after the work was nearly done then any claimed ‘citizen resident’ could, at any time, without limitation, bring an action to declare such contracts void.” (Id. at p. 551.) The court granted the defendant district’s motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, stating, “a decision as to the validity of the contracts, at this time, after the work has been completed and after the payments have been made and where no relief, under the complaint could be afforded plaintiff, would be purely academic and would serve no useful purpose.” (Ibid.)
A project’s completion also moots requests to set aside or rescind resolutions authorizing the project. (Roscoe v. Goodale (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 271, 273 [completion of improvements to sewage and water system rendered moot petitioner’s request to rescind city council resolution under which work was carried out].) It also moots an action seeking to require preparation of an EIR for a particular project. (See Hixon v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 370, 378-379 [cutting down of trees for first phase of project rendered moot request for writ of mandate to compel preparation of EIR for that phase].) The completion of the Project prior to the trial court’s entry of judgment therefore meant that nothing could be accomplished by invalidation of the Resolutions, and it follows that Wilson’s action was rendered moot. (See Downtown Palo Alto Com. for Fair Assessment v. City Council (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 384, 391 [holding appeal moot where “[t]he validity of the ordinance is no longer of consequence to the parties before this court”].)
B. Wilson’s Counterarguments Are Unpersuasive
Wilson urges that its claims are not moot for a number of reasons. First, it asserts that completion of the Project would not moot the action because “[i]nvalidation of the Resolutions caused the title to the air-space, and thus [the Project], to revert to the City.” Second, in its supplemental brief, Wilson argues that the Project is not truly complete and that “a validation action precludes the possibility of any party acquiring vested rights in the subject matter of the transaction until judgment is entered determining its legality.” Third, Wilson contends that the Developer proceeded at its own risk by commencing construction before final judgment in the validation action. None of these arguments is persuasive.
1. Title to the Air Rights Parcel Did Not Revert to the City
Contrary to Wilson’s contention, invalidation of the Resolutions has not caused title to the air space and the retail-cinema portion of the Project to revert to the City. Wilson did not specifically request this relief in the FAC, and it is not mentioned in Wilson’s trial brief. This is perhaps unsurprising, because in the court below Wilson took the position that the ADDA did not provide for any such transfer of air rights. In any event, the City pointed out prior to trial that the conveyance of the air rights parcel had already occurred and Wilson had not sought to enjoin it. Wilson did not dispute that the conveyance had taken place, and despite having been alerted to the issue, it did not ask the trial court to invalidate the transfer and return title to the City. And although the trial court did invalidate the Resolutions, it did not expressly return title to the air space to the City.
Wilson’s statements to the trial court confirm that it never sought reconveyance of the air rights parcel to the City. When the trial court asked what relief Wilson was seeking, Wilson’s counsel replied: “What we want is, we want the hearing that should have happened.” Donald Wilson explained that he wanted the court to “invalidate it and send it back; because the notice was inadequate.” But when the trial court asked Wilson’s counsel what effect his requested relief would have on the Project, counsel responded, “I suspect nothing.” The trial court pressed further, asking Donald Wilson directly whether he was “trying to stop the garage and fill in the hole,” and Wilson’s answer was no.
The record demonstrates that Wilson did not request that the trial court return title to the air rights parcel to the City. It further demonstrates Wilson’s understanding that the relief it did request would have no practical effect on the Project. Wilson cannot escape a finding of mootness merely by asserting—for the first time on appeal—that the trial court’s judgment effected a reconveyance of title Wilson did not request and the trial court did not expressly order.
2. Substantial Completion of the Project Is Sufficient to Moot Wilson’s Claims
Wilson argues in its supplemental brief that the Project is still not entirely complete, and therefore the action was not moot when the trial court rendered judgment. We disagree because a project need not be complete in every detail before challenges to its approval will become moot. As the court in Jennings, supra, 102 Cal.App.2d 548 pointed out, the plaintiff could not maintain an action for declaratory relief “after the work was nearly done.” (Id. at p. 551, italics added.) Substantial completion of the Project rendered Wilson’s challenges to the validity of the Resolutions moot.
Both state and federal courts generally refuse to hear challenges either to permits or contracts for construction once the construction has been substantially completed. Thus, the Fifth Circuit has held that the substantial completion of a retail complex rendered moot challenges to the validity of an Army Corps of Engineers permit for construction of the complex. (Bayou Liberty Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps (5th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 393, 397.) Similarly, where a plaintiff sought only declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the contract for construction of a sewer treatment facility had been improperly awarded to another bidder, the Seventh Circuit held the matter moot because the facility was 98 percent complete. (James Luterbach Const. Co., Inc. v. Adamkus (7th Cir. 1986) 781 F.2d 599, 602; accord, Florida Wildlife Federation v. Goldschmidt (5th Cir. 1980) 611 F.2d 547, 549 [where construction activity sought to be enjoined had already substantially occurred, action was moot]; Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. DeVilbiss (Colo. 1986) 729 P.2d 353, 360 [challenge to zoning board’s approval of height variance rendered moot by completion of construction of facility]; Rath v. City of Sutton (2004) 267 Neb. 265, 272-274 [673 N.W.2d 869, 879-881] [completion of wastewater treatment facility rendered taxpayer’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief moot]; Citineighbors Coalition v. NYC Landmarks (2004) 2 N.Y.3d 727, 728-730 [811 N.E.2d 2, 3-5, 778 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741-743] [substantial completion of addition to building rendered moot challenge to certificate of approval from city landmarks commission].)
In its supplemental brief, Wilson also takes the position that completion of the physical structure of the Project does not mean the Project is “complete.” It concedes that the “theatre shell” was in existence before the entry of judgment, and it further concedes that “the theatre portion of the project is open and operating,” but asserts that completion must be determined solely by reference to the terms of the ADDA. Wilson relies on the definition of the Project in section 107 of the ADDA, but that definition actually supports the conclusion that the Project is substantially complete.^[1] The documents attached to the City’s request for judicial notice establish that prior to entry of judgment, the City had issued notices of completion for both the underground parking facility and the street improvements associated with the Project. In addition, the documents demonstrate that the theatre buildout was also completed prior to entry of judgment, as were most of the interior improvements for the building’s retail and restaurant tenants. Thus, even judged solely by the definition provided in the ADDA, the Project is substantially complete.
Unlike Wilson, we do not find it significant that the City has not produced a “certificate of completion” for the Project. Section 517 of the ADDA states only that “after completion of all construction to be completed by Developer for the Project, Developer may notify the Agency that construction is complete and request issuance of the Certificate of Completion.” (Italics added.) The ADDA contains no requirement that the Developer request such a certificate, and the City’s obligation to issue one is contingent upon the Developer’s request. The absence of a certificate of completion therefore does not mean the Project is not yet complete.^[2]
3. Validation Actions Are Not Immune From Mootness
Citing Woodward Park Homeowners Assn. v. Garreks, Inc. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 880 (Woodward Park) and Neilson v. City of California City (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 633 (Neilson), Wilson contends that the Developer proceeded at its own risk by commencing construction before final judgment in the action below. More broadly, it also asserts that the nature of a validation action “precludes the possibility of any party acquiring vested rights in the subject matter of the transaction until judgment is entered determining its validity.” Once again, we disagree.
To the extent that Wilson appears to argue that validation actions are somehow exempt from ordinary rules of justiciability, it is incorrect. Like all other actions, validation actions must be justiciable. (See City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 66 [validation action must satisfy requirements of ripeness and standing].) Consequently, a validation action may well become moot if the challenged redevelopment project is allowed to proceed during the pendency of the action. (See Millbrae School Dist. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1494, 1496-1497 [“In order to prevent mootness, we would be obliged to issue a stay of the redevelopment while the appeal was pending,” italics added].) As discussed earlier, Wilson sought no stay of the construction and indeed indicated that it was not interested in stopping it. Its reverse validation action was thus no less vulnerable to mootness than any other action.
Regarding Wilson’s claim that the Developer proceeded at its own risk, the cases upon which Wilson relies are not on point. Woodward Park, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 880 is distinguishable on its facts. There, a homeowners association challenged the approval of a car wash project proposed by a corporation. (Id. at pp. 881-882.) The trial court entered a judgment ruling that the city was required under CEQA to prepare an EIR before approving the project. (Woodward Park, at pp. 882, 889.) Despite the pending proceeding and the trial court order, the corporation completed construction without obtaining an EIR and began to operate the car wash. (Id. at p. 889.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court judgment, holding that the completion and operation of the car wash did not render the case moot on appeal. (Id. at pp. 888-890.) The court held that effective relief was still possible since a decision requiring “preparation of an EIR could result in modification of the project to mitigate adverse impacts or even removal of the project altogether.” (Id. at p. 888.) Clearly, the Woodward Park court was concerned about the public policy effects of finding the appeal moot on the facts before it. The court observed: “[D]espite the trial court’s order mandating the preparation of an EIR, the [c]ity chose to delay preparation of the EIR and [the corporation] chose to operate the facility absent the EIR. It would hardly be sound public policy to allow a party to avoid CEQA by continuing with construction of a project in the face of litigation, delaying preparation of a court-ordered EIR pending appeal, and then arguing the case is moot because the project has been completed and is operating.”^[3] (Id. at p. 889.)
In this case, in contrast, neither the Developer nor the City proceeded in violation of a court order. Wilson filed suit in February 2003, but for reasons not apparent from the record, this matter did not go to trial until May 2004. The parties did not submit their supplemental posttrial briefs until August 2005, and the hearing on the matters briefed was continued several times before it finally took place almost two years later on June 15, 2007. At that hearing, the City’s counsel informed the court that the Project was completed and that the case had become moot. The trial court did not issue its statement of decision invalidating the Resolutions until 10 months later, on April 25, 2008, well after the Project had been substantially completed.
Validation actions are intended to settle promptly all questions about the validity of an agency’s action. (E.g., McLeod v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1166.) Here, for reasons not disclosed by the record, resolution of the case was anything but prompt, and we think it would be unreasonable to expect the City and the Developer simply to hold the Project in abeyance for five years as they awaited a final judgment in this reverse validation action. Thus, contrary to Wilson’s suggestion, there was no “unseemly race to completion intended to moot [Wilson’s] lawsuit.” (Citineighbors Coalition v. NYC Landmarks, supra, 2 N.Y.3d at p. 729 [811 N.E.2d at p. 4, 778 N.Y.S.2d at p. 742].)
Wilson is also partially responsible for its claims becoming moot. It failed to seek a stay of the Project’s construction and, as explained earlier, completion of the Project deprived the controversy of life. Had Wilson asked the trial court to stay construction pending a decision on its claims, this problem might have been avoided. (See Fair v. United States E.P.A. (9th Cir. 1986) 795 F.2d 851, 854-855 [appellants’ challenge to construction of sewer became moot on appeal when sewer completed; appellants responsible for mootness because they failed to request stay pending appeal].) Even if Wilson erroneously believed it had sufficient time to litigate its claims to judgment before completion of the Project, that does not justify its failure to seek a stay. (See Environmental Coalition of Orange County, Inc. v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 164, 173.) “Since [Wilson] made no effort to seek preliminary injunctive relief or a stay order in order to preserve the status quo, [it] is not in any position to complain of the very change in circumstances that [it] might have prevented by seeking such relief.” (Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, supra, 729 P.2d at p. 359, fn. omitted.)
III. Wilson’s Request for Declaratory Relief to Prevent Future Condemnation of Its Property Was Not Ripe
The trial court found that an actual and justiciable controversy existed between the parties and thus declaratory relief was appropriate. It based this finding on Wilson’s ownership of property in the area affected by the Project. It further concluded the matter was ripe because “the ADDA requires [the City] to try to acquire [Wilson’s] property.” It pointed to the language in the Business Points in which the City stated it would “use its best efforts and legally available means to acquire the remaining parcels,” and noted that funds for the acquisition of Wilson’s property had already been obtained. The trial court explained that Wilson was under threat of losing its property by eminent domain and that “there is no limitation in the ADDA that would prevent [the City] from being required to acquire the property at a future time absent a grant of the [d]eclaratory [r]elief sought.”
The City contends that there was no actual and justiciable controversy concerning Wilson’s claim that its property might be condemned at some future date because it is undisputed that the Project was completed before the statement of decision was issued and no attempt has been made to acquire Wilson’s property. In the City’s view, any such claim is based purely on speculation and is therefore unripe. We agree.
To qualify for declaratory relief, Wilson would have to demonstrate its action presented two essential elements: “(1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to [Wilson’s] rights or obligations . . . . [Citation.]” (Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 405, 410 (Brownfield).) A declaration of rights or duties with respect to property may be a proper subject of declaratory relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060; Stonehouse Homes, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 539.) But even assuming that Wilson’s action satisfies the first requirement, it must still present an “actual controversy.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) “The ‘actual controversy’ language in Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 encompasses a probable future controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties. [Citation.]” (Environmental Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 877, 885, italics added.) It does not embrace controversies that are “conjectural, anticipated to occur in the future, or an attempt to obtain an advisory opinion from the court.” (Brownfield, at p. 410.) Thus, while a party may seek declaratory judgment before an actual invasion of rights has occurred, it must still demonstrate that the controversy is justiciable. (See Burke v. City etc. of San Francisco (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 32, 34.) And to be justiciable, the controversy must be ripe. (Stonehouse Homes, at p. 540.)
“ ‘Whether a claim presents an “actual controversy” within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 is a question of law that we review de novo.’ [Citation.]” (American Meat Institute v. Leeman (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 728, 741.) The same standard of review applies when we determine whether a matter is ripe for adjudication. (Farm Sanctuary, Inc. v. Department of Food & Agriculture (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 495, 501, fn. 5 (Farm Sanctuary).) “To determine whether an issue is ripe for review, we evaluate two questions: the fitness of the issue for judicial decision and the hardship that may result from withholding court consideration. [Citation.]” (Security National Guaranty, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 402, 418.) As we explain, the record in this case demonstrates that Wilson’s claims regarding the possible condemnation of its property were not ripe and thus presented no actual controversy that the trial court could adjudicate.
A. The Issue Is Not Fit for Immediate Judicial Resolution
The first prong of the ripeness analysis requires us to determine whether the issue is “appropriate for immediate judicial resolution.” (Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 172.) “Under the first prong, the courts will decline to adjudicate a dispute if ‘the abstract posture of [the] proceeding makes it difficult to evaluate . . . the issues’ [citation], if the court is asked to speculate on the resolution of hypothetical situations [citation], or if the case presents a ‘contrived inquiry’ [citation].” (Farm Sanctuary, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 502.) Wilson’s action cannot satisfy this first prong because it required the trial court to speculate on the resolution of an entirely hypothetical situation—the possible condemnation of Wilson’s property. (See ibid.)
Wilson sought declaratory relief to protect its property from possible future condemnation. Its efforts to demonstrate that this claim was ripe are unconvincing.^[4] Wilson relies heavily on language in the Business Points in which the City stated that it “will use its best efforts and legally available means to acquire the remaining parcels” on Block 2. The first flaw in this argument is that the Business Points are not a binding agreement. Instead, they are “principles for the negotiation of a Parking Facilities Agreement for the Project,” and the parties expressly stipulated that “execution of [the Business Points] will not bind or obligate the signatories until all the signatories execute the final Parking Facilities Agreement.” (Italics added.) Moreover, the City took pains to note that it could not “commit to making the acquisition before a legally required eminent domain public hearing is held.” The Business Points thus constitute no more than “a general outline of the basic terms” of an agreement to be negotiated in the future. Resolution of Wilson’s claim therefore required the trial court to speculate not only on the content of the future parking facilities agreement, but also on whether the City would take the legislative steps necessary to initiate eminent domain proceedings against Wilson’s property. The abstract posture of such a claim makes it too uncertain to constitute a justiciable controversy. (See Stonehouse Homes, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 541 [holding unripe developer’s declaratory judgment action challenging city resolution that merely directed committee to prepare recommendations for future legislation to amend zoning ordinance].)
This case resembles Silva v. City & County of San Francisco (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 784. In that case, the board of supervisors had declared that the plaintiff’s land would be acquired “when necessary” and had allocated money in the city’s budget for purchase of the land. (Id. at p. 786.) The plaintiff sought a declaration that the proper value of his land was $10,000 “and that if and when defendant chooses to take the property this will be the amount it must pay.” (Id. at p. 789.) The court held the case presented no actual controversy because the city “does not deem it ‘necessary’ to acquire the property through condemnation proceedings.” (Ibid.) Thus, “[t]he only declaratory judgment that could be rendered under the allegations of the complaint would be of an advisory nature . . . .” (Ibid.)
The same is true here. The City has taken no steps to acquire Wilson’s property, and, indeed, it may never do so. As our Supreme Court explained in Selby, supra, 10 Cal.3d at page 118, “[w]hether eventually any part of plaintiff’s land will be taken . . . depends upon unpredictable future events.” (See also Pacific Legal Foundation, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 173 [“The primary concern expressed in Selby was that courts not be drawn into disputes which depend for their immediacy on speculative future events”].) Former Justice Reynoso might well have been describing this case when he wrote: “In this case there has been no actual taking, no enforced public use, and no prevention of use by the owner, and there has been no eminent domain proceeding. If the public acquisition becomes a reality remedies are available. Meanwhile, the court may not speculate on the future intention of a public agency.”^[5] (Viso v. State of California (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 15, 24.)
B. Wilson Will Suffer No Hardship From Delaying Review
Nor will Wilson suffer any hardship from a refusal to entertain its challenge to the City’s potential future use of its eminent domain powers. It is undisputed that the City has not yet sought to condemn Wilson’s property. Indeed, the trial court found, and the City admitted below, that Wilson’s property is not needed for the Project. If the City should determine that Wilson’s property is needed for some future project, the law requires the City to make a specific finding of that need before exercising its eminent domain powers. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1240.030, subd. (c).) To do so, it would have to adopt a “resolution of necessity,” which it admittedly has yet to do. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.220; Santa Cruz County Redevelopment Agency v. Izant (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 141, 149 [“A resolution of necessity is a prerequisite to beginning a condemnation action. [Citations.]”].) No such resolution could be adopted without giving Wilson notice and an opportunity to be heard on whether its property is truly needed for any proposed project. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.235, subds. (a), (c).) Even if the City were to adopt such a resolution, Wilson could challenge its validity either before commencement of any eminent domain proceeding by filing a writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 or after the commencement of the proceeding by objecting to the City’s right to take its property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.255, subd. (a)(1) & (2); see Redevelopment Agency v. Rados Bros. (2001) 95 Cal.App.4th 309, 316.) Thus, if the City ever does move to condemn Wilson’s property, Wilson may pursue appropriate legal remedies at that time. (Selby, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 118.)
IV. Conclusion
To summarize, we hold that while Wilson’s challenge to the validity of the Resolutions may have presented a ripe controversy at its inception, the status of the case changed once the Project was substantially completed. (See Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1183.) “At that point, there was no longer a controversy before the trial court, and the court should have exercised its discretion by refusing to decide it. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1183-1184.) Because Wilson’s claims had clearly become moot, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss Wilson’s challenges to the validity of the Resolutions. (See Zetterberg v. State Dept. of Public Health (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 657, 665.)
Similarly, Wilson’s challenge to the City’s possible future exercise of its eminent domain authority is not ripe. The posture of this case would “require a court to speculate about unpredictable future events in order to evaluate the parties’ claims.” (PG&E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1217.) Wilson’s claimed uncertainty about the City’s future intentions with regard to its property does not give rise to a justiciable controversy. (Stonehouse Homes, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 542.) If the City does decide to implement its redevelopment plan so as to affect Wilson’s free use of its property, Wilson may challenge the City’s action at that time. (Selby, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 118.) In the absence of a ripe controversy, the trial court abused its discretion in entertaining the action and declaring the rights of the parties. (Sherwyn v. Department of Social Services (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 52, 59.)
Where the trial court has decided a nonjusticiable controversy, the appropriate course is to reverse its judgment and to remand the matter to the trial court with directions to dismiss the action. (Giles v. Horn, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 229; Sherwyn v. Department of Social Services, supra, 173 Cal.App.3d at p. 59.) We follow that course here. Since we reverse the judgment in Wilson’s favor, it necessarily follows that Wilson is not entitled to attorney fees in the trial court. (See, e.g., California Grocers Assn. v. Bank of America (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 205, 220 [“An order awarding [attorney] fees ‘falls with a reversal of the judgment on which it is based.’ [Citation.]”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the action. Costs to the City. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)



SIMONS, Acting P.J.

We concur.



NEEDHAM, J.


BRUINIERS, J.

















Superior Court of San Mateo County, No. CIV429131, Joseph E. Bergeron, Judge

John J. Hartford; Hannig Law Firm and John H. Blake; Wilson & Wilson and Donald A. Wilson for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Kerr & Wagstaffe, James M. Wagstaffe and Maria Radwick; McDonough Holland & Allen PC, Iris P. Yang and Kara K. Ueda; Stanly T. Yamamoto, City Attorney for the City of Redwood City, for Defendants and Appellants.




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