Filed 1/5/18 Terry S. v. Superior Court CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR


TERRY S. et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ALAMEDA COUNTY,
Respondent;
ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,
Real Party in Interest.



A148984

(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. SJ13020715)



In this juvenile writ proceeding, both Ch. M. (mother) and Terry S. (father) seek extraordinary relief from the juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code with respect to their young son, C.M. Specifically, both parents argue that they were denied reasonable services and/or active efforts to prevent the breakup of their Indian family as mandated by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., and state law. Mother additionally asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s detriment finding, which blocked return of C.M. to her care. Finally, mother argues at length that this matter must be reversed—and additional services offered to her—because the juvenile court proceeded to disposition without an actual case plan for her and because her counsel was ineffective in failing to object to, and/or appeal from, this fundamental error. Having reviewed these extended and procedurally complex proceedings in detail, however, we see no error requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s setting order. We therefore deny the petitions.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 8, 2013, the Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) filed a juvenile dependency petition pursuant to subdivision (b) of section 300 with respect to C.M. (born February 2013) which alleged that: mother had struggled with alcoholism for numerous years; she used alcohol and Vicodin during her pregnancy with C.M.; she tested positive for both opiates and alcohol at the time of C.M.’s birth; C.M. was born premature and had medical complications; the parents had a history of domestic violence; father had an extensive law enforcement history involving numerous felony and misdemeanor convictions; father had issues with anger management; and the parents’ housing was unstable. At the time the petition was filed, C.M. remained hospitalized.
As detailed in the Agency’s detention report, mother admitted to drinking extensively during her pregnancy and acknowledged being an alcoholic for eight years, since the age of 18. She had been seen in the emergency room on several occasions due to alcohol intoxication and had been placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold pursuant to section 5150 due to hallucinations during alcohol withdrawal. Despite these facts, mother had never received treatment for her addiction. Moreover, mother reported a long history of drug abuse, including marijuana, cocaine, ecstasy, and Vicodin. And, although mother was diagnosed with bipolar disorder when she was 14, her medication compliance was spotty, and she did not believe that she needed therapy. At the time the petition was filed, mother was living with her parents, who had themselves been involved with the dependency system when mother was a minor. Father described this home as a “ ‘chaotic’ ” one in which the residents used drugs, and mother confirmed this. In addition, both parents admitted to engaging in domestic violence. According to mother, the physical violence was mutual and was induced by alcohol. In January 2012, father had been arrested after he punched mother repeatedly while driving in a stolen vehicle. At the time of that incident, mother already had an active restraining order against father.
C.M. was born at 32 weeks’ gestation, weighing less than four pounds. He was diagnosed as suffering from moderate fetal alcohol syndrome, but hospital staff could not confirm that this was the cause of his premature birth. The infant was being given morphine to treat his withdrawal from Vicodin. He was more medically fragile than initially thought and would require consistent monitoring and medication on discharge.
Mother and father both appeared at the detention hearing on April 9, 2013. After considering the detention report and admitting it into evidence, the juvenile court detained C.M., but authorized his release to a suitable relative or to mother, should she enter residential treatment. On that same date, father—who was at that point an alleged father only—submitted paperwork indicating that he was affiliated with the Delaware Tribe for purposes of the ICWA. At the jurisdictional hearing on April 30, 2013, mother submitted the matter on the Agency’s report, and father pled no contest. The juvenile court—after considering the jurisdictional report and admitting it into evidence—found the allegations in the petition to be true, found C.M. to be a child described by subdivision (b) of section 300, and continued the matter for disposition. The Agency had requested a 30-day continuance with the hope that mother would enter residential treatment by that time. At that point, C.M. had been discharged from the hospital and placed in foster care.
At the continued dispositional hearing on May 30, 2013, father was declared to be the presumed father of C.M. and the matter was continued, at the Agency’s request, to July 16, 2013. The Agency noticed the Delaware Tribe regarding this continued hearing. Because it had determined that C.M. was too medically fragile to be placed in residential treatment with mother, the Agency was recommending continued out-of-home care and reunification services for both parents. At the hearing on July 16, father filed an amended ICWA notice additionally alleging a tribal connection to the Cherokee Nation. Disposition was thus continued to September 9, 2013, for further ICWA compliance. Additional continuances advanced the dispositional hearing to September 24 and then to October 24, 2013.
Disposition was finally completed on October 24, 2013. The Cherokee Nation had found both father and C.M. eligible for tribal membership, but had stated that it would not consider intervening in the dependency matter until either father or C.M. became an enrolled member. In support of its dispositional recommendations, the Agency submitted a declaration from an Indian expert, Percy Tejada, who opined that there were no other services that the Agency could have provided that would have prevented the need for removal of C.M. from his Indian home and that returning C.M. to either parent would cause him to suffer emotional and/or physical damage. Moreover, according to Mr. Tejada, the Agency had made “ever[y] effort” to comply with the ICWA’s placement preferences. Based on the evidence before it, the juvenile court found: that the ICWA applied; that both reasonable and active efforts had been made by the Agency in an attempt to avoid the breakup of the family; that, by clear and convincing evidence, return of C.M. to either parent would be detrimental under both state and federal law; and that the ICWA placement preferences had been considered and followed. The court thus declared C.M. a juvenile court dependent, removed him from the physical custody of mother and father, and ordered the parents to comply with their respective reunification case plans. Although the record reflects that father objected to the admission of Mr. Tejada’s expert declaration, there is no indication that either parent challenged the adequacy of their case plans.
The court conducted an interim review in January 2014 and continued the matter to April. In advance of the April 8, 2014 six-month review hearing, the Agency submitted a status review report, which detailed mother’s continuing struggles with maintaining sobriety and father’s failure to engage in services. In particular, during this time frame mother had been unsuccessful in three different attempts at residential treatment and acknowledged using methamphetamine on a number of occasions. The Agency recommended that reunification services be terminated and that a permanent plan of adoption be pursued for C.M. Both parents requested a contest, and the matter was continued to June 16, 2014, and then again to September 19, 2014.
C.M.’s enrollment in the Delaware Tribe was finalized in September 2014, and the Delaware Tribe indicated that it would not intervene in the minor’s dependency proceedings. Nevertheless, the six-month (and now 12-month) review was continued to December 5, 2014, so that it could be determined how best to involve the Delaware Tribe short of intervention, especially with regards to possible placement issues. While this continued hearing was pending, father filed a Petition to Invalidate All Actions pursuant to the ICWA (Petition to Invalidate), arguing that the Agency had failed to make active efforts under the ICWA and that Mr. Tejada’s expert declaration was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s dispositional findings. Father demanded that the court immediately return C.M. to the parents. During this same time frame, in October 2014, mother entered North County Serenity House, a residential substance abuse treatment program in Southern California.
An extended trial ensued with respect to the Petition to Invalidate, which the court agreed to resolve prior to the contested review hearing. On April 2, 2015, the juvenile court granted father’s petition in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the court found that active and reasonable efforts had been made in the case consistent with the ICWA. However, it further concluded that Mr. Tejada’s expert declaration had been erroneously admitted because there was no stipulation in the record authorizing the qualified expert witness to testify by means of declaration. The court requested briefing on the appropriate remedy in such a situation and continued the matter. Father subsequently filed a notice of appeal with respect to the court’s April 2 orders resolving the Petition to Invalidate.
Ultimately, a corrective dispositional hearing was held over a number of dates in May and June 2015. On June 26, 2015, the juvenile court reaffirmed its original out-of-home dispositional orders and additionally found that there had been good cause to deviate from the ICWA’s placement preferences at the time of the prior dispositional hearing. Both parents filed notices of appeal challenging these orders.
The Agency then filed a status review report in August 2015 for what was in essence a combined, 6-, 12-, 18-, and 24-month review hearing, recommending that C.M. be returned to mother’s care under a family maintenance plan and that the case be transferred to San Diego County. At that point, mother had been in residential treatment at North County Serenity House for approximately 10 months and was expected to graduate in October 2015. She planned to move into an approved transitional housing program in San Diego. The Agency believed mother to be in substantial compliance with her case plan. Pre-placement visits between C.M. and mother were in progress. However, the Cherokee Nation asked that mother complete hair follicle testing prior to the return of C.M. to her care, reportedly due to a discussion with father in which he stated that mother had been passing her drug tests by using someone else’s urine. Mother resisted efforts by the social worker to arrange for this testing, ultimately admitting that she had relapsed on methamphetamine while in residential treatment. She asked the social worker to facilitate placement of C.M. with a maternal aunt. As a result, the Agency filed an Addendum Report changing its recommendation to termination of reunification services and referral for permanency planning. The matter was contested and continued for trial.
In the meantime, despite her relapse, mother was allowed to remain in treatment and graduated from the program in October 2015. Instead of entering a transitional housing program, however, she relocated to Berkeley to reside with father in the home of the maternal grandmother. During this same time frame, the maternal aunt and uncle were approved as a placement for C.M. The Cherokee Nation, having formally intervened in August 2015, supported this placement, indicating that it was an ICWA-compliant home and that it was in the best interests of C.M. to be placed with a relative since the parents had “not been able to correct the conditions that lead [sic] to the removal of the child.” On this basis, the Cherokee Nation did not object to the termination of the parents’ reunification services. The Delaware Tribe also favored placement with the maternal aunt. The parents, however, now objected to that placement.
On October 30, 2015, father filed a section 388 petition seeking return of C.M. to his care. On November 6 and 13, 2015, the contested review hearing was continued. During that time frame, the Agency requested an order approving placement of the minor in the home of the maternal aunt and uncle, noting that the couple had tribal ties and were committed to C.M. staying connected to his Native American heritage. Father filed a written objection, stating that he was not being adequately represented by his attorney, that the juvenile court judge could no longer provide him with due process, that the social worker was acting with malice, and that the maternal aunt was an unsafe placement for his son. The court formally denied father’s section 388 petition without hearing on November 16, 2015. The contested hearing was continued further to November 24, 2015.
On November 24, 2015, the juvenile court conducted a Marsden hearing based on father’s complaints regarding his attorney. The court denied father’s request for an “ICWA lawyer” and further declined to replace father’s current counsel. The case was then continued to December 1, 2015. After the November 24 hearing, however, mother was involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to section 5150. Her request for a continuance of the December 1 date was subsequently granted, and the matter was continued to December 21, 2015.
Testimony finally began with respect to the contested review hearing at issue on December 21, after the juvenile court denied father’s motion to represent himself and father had to be removed from the courtroom for disrupting the proceedings. The juvenile court gave the Agency discretion to increase mother’s visits and continued the matter for further hearing. The contested review hearing was then continued over the next five months for various reasons, including another psychiatric hospitalization of mother from January 14 to January 19, 2016. During this time frame, the court placed C.M. with the maternal aunt and uncle on January 12, without prejudice to the parents’ ability to object to the placement during the contested hearing. On January 15, the court replaced father’s counsel for medical reasons—despite continued requests by father to represent himself—which again led to the need to remove father from the courtroom. After a Marsden hearing on February 5, the court replaced mother’s counsel.
In April 2016, before testimony in the contested hearing could resume, father filed a petition seeking transfer of the matter to the Cherokee Tribal Court in Oklahoma (Tribal Court). Written opposition to the transfer was filed both by the Agency and by minor’s counsel. Although the juvenile court had notified the Tribal Court of the pending petition and asked for a response either accepting or declining the transfer by May 12, 2016, the Tribal Court did not respond.
At a hearing on May 13, 2016, the ICWA representative indicated that although the Tribal Court was aware of the petition, it would not respond due to certain procedural irregularities involving the need for local counsel. At that point, the juvenile court denied father’s request for a further continuance, found that the petition was untimely, concluded that further delay was not in C.M.’s interest, and denied the transfer petition. After father exited the courtroom, the court determined to proceed in his absence, and testimony in the contested hearing—which had begun back in December 2015—finally resumed.
The matter then proceeded through multiple hearings from May to July 2016, with testimony from mother, father, and the social worker. On July 26, 2016, the juvenile court announced its decision. Specifically, it found by clear and convincing evidence that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family but that those efforts had been unsuccessful. In addition, it found that reasonable services had been provided by the Agency but that the parents had not made substantial progress with their case plans. After finding that it would be detrimental to the child to return him to the custody of either parent, the court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing.
Mother and father subsequently filed timely notices of their intent to file writ petitions. On October 14, 2016, we stayed the permanency planning hearing pending resolution of the parents’ petitions. The petitions were filed in April 2017 (father) and May 2017 (mother), and are now before this court for resolution. (Rules 8.450(e), 8.452.)
II. DISCUSSION
At the conclusion of the contested 6-, 12-,18-, and 24-month review hearing that is here at issue, counsel for the Agency spoke at length about C.M.’s early medical and developmental struggles; his impressive progress, such that he was nearly free of the need for continuous medical and developmental interventions; and his current existence as a spirited and happy child, able to give and receive love and affection. She lamented, however, that the focus of these extended and highly litigated proceedings appeared to have been on everything other than the well-being of this little boy. We could not agree more. Indeed, we have chronicled the convoluted procedural history of this matter in some detail precisely to highlight this fundamental problem. While we understand the complexities generated by the ICWA overlay in this case, and are not unsympathetic to the strain on court resources—both generally and specifically with respect to this aggressively litigated matter—we feel compelled to remind all those involved that “[c]ontinuances in juvenile dependency proceedings are disfavored, particularly when they infringe on maximum time limits under the code.” (In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1635.) Moreover, pursuant to section 352, no continuance should ever be granted that is “contrary to the interest of the minor” and every continuance should only be “for that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the continuance.” (§ 352, subd. (a).)
Be that as it may, we are now where we are, with both parents again before us attempting to stave off permanency planning for their at-risk son by raising a number of claims of error with respect to the proceedings below. Indeed, mother goes so far as to assert at length that she is entitled to additional reunification services due to errors that occurred years ago at the first dispositional hearing in this matter. Under these circumstances, we have carefully reviewed the extensive record presented to us, both to confirm that no reversible error has occurred and in the hope of foreclosing any future challenges based on past events. We conclude that none of the parents’ arguments have merit.
A. Father’s Writ Petition
Father, in his writ petition, argues that active efforts were not made in this case because he was not provided with culturally appropriate services with respect to visitation and domestic violence treatment. We note preliminarily that father does not appear to have raised this particular issue before the juvenile court. Rather, at the conclusion of the contested review hearing here at issue, father’s counsel argued only that C.M. should be placed with mother. Nevertheless, his claim is easily rebutted by reference to the record. At the time of the original dispositional hearing in October 2013, the social worker met with father, informed him of his case plan requirements (domestic violence/anger management counseling, individual therapy, and outpatient substance abuse treatment and testing), and described the time limits for reunification. During the extended reunification period that followed, however, father showed little interest in participating in any of the elements of his reunification plan, other than some sporadic visitation with C.M. Instead, he repeatedly informed the social worker that he did not have a problem and did not need services. He claimed that his only “issues” were with the Agency.
Despite father’s recalcitrance, in our view, the social worker in this case did an exemplary job, repeatedly trying to engage father in resources to address his treatment needs and providing him with funding and administrative assistance where appropriate. In addition, she was actively engaged in ensuring that C.M. became an enrolled member in both the Cherokee Nation and the Delaware Tribe and was in close communication with both tribes throughout these proceedings. Moreover, in an attempt to provide father with culturally sensitive services, the social worker contacted the Native American Health Center to inquire about domestic violence, substance abuse, therapeutic, parenting, and visitation services and suggested that organization to father as a resource. She also contacted the American Indian Child Resource Center to inquire about culturally appropriate services and referred father to an individual therapist with ties to Native American culture. Yet father responded to the social worker’s efforts on several occasions with name calling, profanity, and litigation threats. Instead of participating in services during the reunification period, he was convicted of battery in February 2016 and missed the end of the contested hearing here at issue after a June 2016 arrest for commercial burglary.
Under such circumstances, to conclude—as the social worker did in this case—that “efforts to provide the father with culturally appropriate services have been impeded by his refusal to collaborate with this worker in choosing programs to remediate the issues of removal” is the grossest of understatements. Father’s issue in these extended proceedings was never a lack of culturally sensitive efforts on the Agency’s part. Rather, father’s reunification failures were caused by his utter rejection of the numerous and varied attempts made by the Agency to engage him in the services that he so clearly needed in order to be in a position to parent his son. We see no error.
B. Mother’s Writ Petition
As for mother, she first argues in her writ petition that C.M. should have been returned to her care under a family maintenance plan at the contested hearing at issue. We acknowledge that the juvenile court was required at that hearing to order the return of the minor to the physical custody of his parents unless it found that such return “would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1) [6-month review], subd. (f)(1) [12-month review], 366.22, subd. (a)(1) [18-month review], 366.25, subd. (a)(1) [24-month review].) Moreover, the burden was on the Agency to establish such detriment, although “[t]he failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.” (§§ 366.21, subds. (e)(1) & (f)(1), 366.22, subd. (a)(1), 366.25, subd. (a)(1).)
In this case, the juvenile court made the requisite detriment finding and determined that mother’s progress with respect to her case plan was “partial.” Mother now contends that the juvenile court’s findings were insufficiently supported by the evidence. Specifically, she argues that she made substantial progress in her case plan by completing a residential treatment program and further claims that, since C.M. was removed at birth, there is no evidence that her substance use or mental health issues ever actually harmed her son. We are not persuaded. Indeed, we find it somewhat incredible that mother attempts to debate at this stage whether C.M.—a minor who was diagnosed at birth with moderate fetal alcohol syndrome and who had to be given morphine to treat his Vicodin withdrawals as he was irritable, crying, and could not breathe—was ever harmed by her addictions. Further, although we applaud mother for the progress that she did make over the last several years in treating her deeply entrenched and long-standing substance abuse issue, we have no problem upholding the juvenile court’s detriment finding in this case, regardless of whether that progress is dubbed “substantial” or “partial.” (See In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1143 [mere compliance with reunification plan not determinative; juvenile court must consider a parent’s progress and capacity to meet plan objectives].)
The unfortunate facts here are that mother has a very significant problem with drugs and alcohol that she has simply been unable to ameliorate, despite repeated efforts at treatment over the course of years. Even prior to the detention hearing in this matter, in April 2013, the social worker made clear to mother that it was “imperative” that she actively engage in substance abuse treatment and maintain her sobriety. Mother initially entered residential treatment at Shepard’s Gate on May 6, 2013, but was “exited” from that program on July 17, 2013, due to unauthorized contact with father. She then resumed drinking. Mother next entered Project Pride—reportedly her residential program of choice—on August 14, 2013, but left on August 29. She then tested positive for amphetamines and benzodiazepines in September 2013. Although mother subsequently reentered Project Pride in December 2013 and initially appeared motivated to complete treatment, she reportedly used methamphetamine on at least three occasions before leaving the program with father on February 24, 2014. Next, between February and September 2014, mother declined to drug test and failed to follow through with either inpatient or outpatient substance abuse assessment or treatment. During this time frame, an August 2014 police report indicated that mother had recently been drinking alcohol and was inconsistent in taking her medications, contributing to decompensation and violent arguments with family members.
Mother finally reentered treatment in October 2014 at North County Serenity House, a residential substance abuse program located in Southern California. During her early months at this program, she had periodic unexcused absences from treatment, missed drug tests, lapses in compliance with psychiatric medications, angry outbursts, and continued involvement with father. However, as of April 2015, mother began making dramatic progress in treatment and appeared to be distancing herself from father. By August 2015, the Agency was recommending that C.M. be returned to mother’s care under a family maintenance plan. To this end, she was having expanded and unsupervised visitation with C.M. However, the Agency was forced to change its recommendation almost immediately when mother admitted to using methamphetamine in August 2015. Despite this relapse, and reports that mother was using other people’s urine to pass her drug tests, mother graduated from North County Serenity House on October 8, 2015, and returned to the Bay Area. In late October, mother indicated that she did not want any further residential treatment and that she had not engaged in any aftercare since graduating from North County Serenity House. Thereafter, mother required psychiatric hospitalization in late November 2015 and again in mid-January 2016. She admitted that her relapse continued “off and on” through January. On January 26, 2016, mother entered a residential dual diagnosis program at Walden House but left less than a month later, on February 20. She reentered Walden House on February 29, only to again exit without completing the program in mid-March. Finally, during testimony in the contested hearing on June 28, 2016, mother stated that she had been accepted to another dual diagnosis residential program, Center Point, and believed that engaging in that program would be helpful to her. However, after she entered Center Point on July 6, she left two days later because she did not like the way that staff were treating her.
It is difficult to conclude anything from this chronology other than that mother has a continuing substance abuse problem that has proved intractable, despite numerous and varied treatment approaches. Although, at one point, she came close to reunifying with C.M., she was unable to maintain her sobriety or successfully recommit to treatment after relapse. As a result, after over 30 months of services, mother was back to having only weekly, supervised contact with her son. At the conclusion of the contested hearing in this matter, the Cherokee Nation representative succinctly summarized the fundamental problem in this case when, after opining that the Agency had made active efforts, she stated: “[M]other has clearly shown that she cannot maintain sobriety and we’re three years into this case and it appears that we’re no closer to reunification now than we were when the child was removed.” Under these circumstances, the detriment inherent in returning C.M. to mother was patent.
Mother next complains about the sufficiency of the years of reunification services that she received in this matter, arguing that they were not reasonable and did not constitute active efforts because: the case plan was either nonexistent or too generic; services failed to adequately address mother’s significant mental health needs; mother was not referred to domestic violence treatment, nor assisted with finding housing or employment; and her visitation with C.M. was unnecessarily limited. An underlying theme of mother’s argument is that she was improperly forced to find services on her own and that there was a lack of oversight and follow-through on the part of the Agency. We deal with the existence of the case plan below. As for mother’s other claims, we simply disagree with her reading of the record.
First, we do not view mother’s case plan as “generic.” Rather, it required mother to engage in services that addressed the issues which led to C.M.’s initial removal, including substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence treatment. Further, it is clear that the Agency was aware of mother’s mental health problems from the start and supported her in tackling those issues in all of the different situations mother placed herself in throughout her extended reunification period. A May 2013 letter from Shepard’s Gate indicated that mother was addressing her mental health needs while in that program. A July 2013 report from the same program states that mother “chooses to be proactive in seeking help to address her mental health issues.” She was attending all doctor appointments and taking all prescribed medication. During this time frame mother had a comprehensive psychiatric/medication assessment. In December 2013, she had transitioned to a new psychiatrist and was engaged in biweekly therapy. She was diagnosed at that time with bipolar disorder and polysubstance dependence. The social worker planned to determine, with the help of these providers, whether further psychological evaluation would be helpful. After mother left Project Pride and revealed her mental health issues while in that program, the social worker urged mother in April 2014 to re-engage in outpatient treatment and speak to the intake advisor regarding her dual diagnosis needs. She helped mother reconnect with a psychiatrist and spoke with Project Pride about mother’s dual diagnosis issues. In May 2014, the social worker again urged mother to have her dual diagnosis needs assessed and—because mother appeared wary of any Agency recommendation—gave her a number of provider choices. During mother’s 12 months at North County Serenity House from October 2014 to October 2015, she was consistently engaged in mental health treatment and had stabilized to the point that she no longer required psychotropic medication. Although mother now laments the Agency’s failure to require a dual diagnosis residential treatment program from the start, it is clear that mother was choosing which programs she was willing to attend. Moreover, when mother did enter two different dual diagnosis programs in 2016, she was unable to maintain in either one. We see no error in the Agency’s response to mother’s mental health concerns in this case. Rather, the problem seems to have been mother’s inability to remain consistent in treatment.
As for domestic violence, mother received treatment for these issues in her various residential programs, as mother herself acknowledged. Indeed, after noting early on that she was still determining what domestic violence treatment would be best for mother, the social worker concluded after mother entered North County Serenity House that as she “participates in residential treatment recovery groups, outside Narcotics Anonymous meetings and therapy at the local mental health clinic she will have opportunities to process any history of violence.” Thus, no separate referral was required. Mother’s complaints with respect to visitation are similarly unfounded, as the scope of visitation throughout these proceedings was appropriately tied to mother’s success in recovery. When mother was stable in her Southern California program, visitation was increased, supervision was lifted, and overnights leading to placement were being contemplated when mother relapsed. After mother graduated from North County Serenity House, however, she never effectively re-engaged in treatment—despite continuing to use and twice being psychiatrically hospitalized—and thus increased and/or unsupervised contact with C.M. would not have been warranted. Moreover, because mother was either in or between residential programs throughout these proceedings, employment and housing assistance were, understandably, not a priority. In the end—and mother’s extensive arguments to the contrary notwithstanding—it is abundantly clear that the social worker in this case was very much involved with mother’s services and provided necessary assistance and oversight throughout the extended reunification period. We conclude therefore that mother’s services were more than adequate.
In a final effort to delay permanency planning for C.M., however, mother argues at length that she should be granted additional reunification services because the Agency failed to provide a case plan for her at the original dispositional hearing in this matter in October 2013. It is true, as mother strenuously asserts, that there is no indication of a case plan in the court’s records until April 2014, when a case plan was attached to the social worker’s six-month review report. Thus, there is no evidence in the record that the juvenile court was aware of mother’s specific reunification plan requirements when it ordered mother “to participate in all aspects of the case plan” at disposition and found that the Agency had complied with that case plan. Of course, the original dispositional orders in this case were final many years ago and, as mother acknowledges, are no longer subject to appeal. (See In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 692 [“ ‘Generally . . . a parent may not attack the validity of a prior appealable order for which the statutory time for filing an appeal has passed.’ ”].) Mother attempts to overcome this obstacle by arguing that her dispositional counsel was ineffective for failing to object to, or appeal from, the absence of a case plan and that this fact, along with the fundamental nature of the juvenile court’s error, creates a “special circumstance” which justifies review in this court. (See In re A.O. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 145, 148 [“It is only in very rare and ‘ “special circumstances constituting an excuse for failure to [timely appeal]” ’ that an appellate court may grant review of an appealable order by way of extraordinary writ after the deadline to appeal has passed.”].) While we are not necessarily convinced by mother’s reasoning, we will reach the merits of this issue based on the unusual procedural posture of this matter, both to lay to rest any lingering concerns regarding the validity of the proceedings below and because mother’s contention can be quickly rejected.
We do not dispute the importance of the case plan in juvenile dependency proceedings and concede that conducting the original dispositional hearing in juvenile court without the inclusion of a case plan in the record was clear error. (See § 358, subd. (b)(1) [before determining the appropriate disposition, the court must admit social study into evidence and state that it has been read and considered; social study “shall include” the case plan developed pursuant to section 16501.1]; § 16501.1, subds. (a)(1) & (g)(10); Rule 5.690(c).) Moreover, we agree that this error was exacerbated by the atypical procedural trajectory of this case, in which the six-month review hearing was repeatedly continued over the course of many months without resolution. However, we have no trouble concluding that, pursuant to any possibly applicable legal standard, the error was harmless under the facts of this case.
First, although the case plan was not included in the dispositional materials, the record reveals that it existed and that its requirements were communicated to mother at the time of the dispositional hearing. Specifically, the April 2014 six-month review report states that the social worker “met with the parents at the courthouse on 10/23/13 and informed them of their case plan requirements and time limits for reunification.” That same report also sets forth the requirements of mother’s case plan in detail and indicates that the plan was effective as of October 2013. Further, the iteration of the case plan attached to the April 2014 report indicates that it is an “update,” and a later report confirms that the attachment was, in fact, a March 2014 amendment of the initial October 2013 case plan. Thus, this is in no way a situation where a case plan did not exist. (See In re John B. (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 268; see also In re Kristin W. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 234, 254–255.) To the contrary, mother was clearly put “ ‘on notice as to what must be accomplished to reunite the family.’ ” (In re John B., at p. 274.) Indeed, she admitted as much.
Moreover—given the time it took to get to disposition in this matter—the court and all involved parties were well aware by the dispositional hearing that residential treatment was the recommended plan to assist mother in maintaining her sobriety. Indeed, mother had already tried and failed in two different residential settings. Further, an attachment to the July 2013 dispositional report indicated that mother was at that time participating in a number of Agency “Requirements for Reunification” while in her first residential program, including substance abuse treatment, mental health services, parenting classes, and visitation. Most importantly, however, the record in this case is replete with exhaustive details regarding the extensive efforts made by the social worker over the course of years following the dispositional hearing to assist mother in achieving her case plan goals, the vast majority of which related to maintaining her sobriety and stabilizing her mental health. The problem in this case was not that mother failed to receive an appropriate roadmap. Rather—despite that roadmap, the able assistance of her social worker, and some sincere efforts on her part—mother simply proved incapable of staying on the road. It is now more than time to provide permanency for this young minor.
III. DISPOSITION
The petitions are denied on their merits. (See § 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C), (4)(B).) This opinion is final as to this court immediately, and our previously imposed stay of the permanency planning hearing in this matter is lifted. (Rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)





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REARDON, J.


We concur:


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RUVOLO, P. J.


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STREETER, J.