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STATE OF FLORIDA vs. CAMPBELL

STATE OF FLORIDA vs. CAMPBELL
03:07:2007

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STATE OF FLORIDA vs. CAMPBELL 


 


 


 


 


Supreme Court of Florida


 


 


____________


 


No. SC05-1844


____________


 


STATE OF FLORIDA,


Petitioner,


 


vs.


 


GREGG CAMPBELL,


Respondent.


 


[January 25, 2007]


 


PER CURIAM.


We initially accepted jurisdiction to review State v. Campbell, 911 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal certifying a question to this Court as one involving great public importance. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. However, during oral argument, the parties conceded that the facts as outlined in the Fourth District's decision are materially different from those depicted in the trial court record. Neither of the parties filed a motion for rehearing with the Fourth District to address these materially disparate facts. We conclude that reviewing a case under such circumstances would place the instant proceeding in the procedural posture of a rehearing. This Court lacks jurisdiction to rehear a decision issued by a district court; therefore, we exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed.


It is so ordered.


LEWIS, C.J., and ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.


PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion.


WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.



NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.




PARIENTE, J., concurring.


I concur in the decision to exercise our discretion to discharge jurisdiction. The certified question is premised on the assumption that the officer retained Campbell's driver's license and obtained consent to search his car after completing the warrant check. We now know this scenario is inconsistent with the testimony during the suppression hearing. Our discretionary review of district court decisions certifying questions of great public importance under article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, is limited to decisions that rule on the questions certified. Salgat v. State, 652 So. 2d 815, 815 (Fla. 1995). We should not use our certified question jurisdiction to correct errors of fact on which a certified question is based and then compose our own question of great public importance based on the actual facts. Issues involving temporary detentions and warrant checks are reaching us with such frequency that it is unlikely the question certified by the Fourth District will long evade our review. See, e.g., Golphin v. State, 31 Fla. L. Weekly S845 (Fla. Dec. 14, 2006); State v. Frierson, 926 So. 2d 1139 (Fla.), cert. denied, 75 U.S.L.W. 3294 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2006); State v. Baez, 894 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2004); State v. Diaz, 850 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 2003). I would prefer to reach that question when it actually comports with the facts.


Further, I strongly disagree with Justice Wells' view that this is a case in which, assuming a Fourth Amendment violation, application of the exclusionary rule would be in question. Justice Wells relies on statements concerning the societal costs of excluding evidence as a penalty for Fourth Amendment violations in Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006), and in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). Neither case supports the broad rollback of exclusionary rule jurisprudence suggested in his dissent.


In Leon, the Court held that, subject to several qualifications, the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence acquired in reasonable reliance on a search warrant later ruled invalid. 468 U.S. at 921-22. This is a very narrow exception to the exclusionary rule, one that rests on the â€





Description Court initially accepted jurisdiction to review State v. Campbell, 911 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), a decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal certifying a question to this Court as one involving great public importance. See art. V, S 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. However, during oral argument, the parties conceded that the facts as outlined in the Fourth District's decision are materially different from those depicted in the trial court record. Neither of the parties filed a motion for rehearing with the Fourth District to address these materially disparate facts. Court conclude that reviewing a case under such circumstances would place the instant proceeding in the procedural posture of a rehearing. This Court lacks jurisdiction to rehear a decision issued by a district court; therefore, court exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction. Accordingly, this review proceeding is dismissed. It is so ordered.

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