Shafer v. Santa Catalina Island Co.
Filed 1/5/11 Shafer v. Santa Catalina Island Co. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
| SAMANTHA SHAFER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SANTA CATALINA ISLAND COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent. | B222644 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. NC042935) |
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Patrick T. Madden, Judge. Affirmed.
De Simone & Huxster, Gerry De Simone, and Peter K. Huxster for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Archer Norris and Joseph V. Macha for Defendant and Respondent.
__________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Samantha Shafer appeals from three orders of the superior court. She first contends that the superior court erred in granting respondent Santa Catalina Island Company’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. She also contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for leave to file a first amended complaint and in denying her motion to withdraw some admissions. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 9, 2009, Shawn O’Neill, Samantha Shafer, and Jeffery A. Tucker, Jr., filed a complaint for damages against respondent. The complaint alleged that respondent’s negligence caused a traffic accident which resulted in serious injuries to Tucker and death to Nicholas Shafer (decedent). Shawn O’Neill, decedent’s mother, and Samantha Shafer, decedent’s sister, and the appellant herein, sought damages for the wrongful death of Nicholas Shafer. They alleged that “Decedent NICHOLAS SHAFER had no other heirs or surviving relatives with a right to bring a wrongful death action at the time of his death other than plaintiffs SHAWN O’NEILL and SAMANTHA SHAFER.” They further alleged that they were “individuals residing in the County of Ventura, State of California” and that decedent “was at all times herein a resident of the County of Los Angeles, State of California.” Samantha Shafer also alleged that she “was receiving economic support from Decedent at the time of his death.”
Respondent filed a general denial to the complaint. Respondent subsequently served a set of request for admissions on appellant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.010.[1] On October 21, 2009, appellant filed her response to the request for admissions. In response to request for admission No. 11, she admitted “that [she] did not legally reside with [decedent] within six months prior to August 27, 2008.” In response to request for admission No. 14, she admitted “that [she] did not legally reside with [decedent] on August 27, 2008.”
On November 6, 2009, respondent filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings against appellant. Respondent contended that based upon the allegations in the complaint, Samantha Shafer had no standing to bring a wrongful death action under section 377.60.
Appellant opposed the motion on the ground that she qualified under section 377.60, subdivision (b) as a financially dependent sibling. In the alternative, she sought leave to amend the complaint to add her minor children as plaintiffs. In support of this remedy, she alleged that decedent was a commercial fisherman and that decedent’s residence was in Ventura County when he was on land.
Concurrently, appellant also filed (1) an application and order for appointment as a guardian ad litem for her minor children, (2) a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint and a proposed first amended complaint that removed appellant as an individual plaintiff and added as a new plaintiff, Samantha Shafer as guardian ad litem for her minor children, and (3) a motion to withdraw admissions. The motion to withdraw admissions sought to withdraw appellant’s answers to request for admissions Nos. 11 and 14. Appellant sought to withdraw the admissions on the ground that she was mistaken about the phrase “legal residence,” believing it meant where a person sleeps on a daily basis.
The superior court granted appellant’s application to become the guardian ad litem for her minor children. The court, however, ruled against appellant on the three outstanding motions. It granted respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend and “without prejudice to plaintiffs’ attorneys bringing an appropriate motion to join Samantha’s minor children as plaintiffs.” The trial court denied appellant’s motion to file a first amended complaint, finding (1) that the evidence showed decedent did not reside with the minor children for the six months prior to his death, and (2) that appellant failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324 by failing to file a declaration showing when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered and why the amendment was not made earlier. Finally, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to withdraw admissions as moot.
At the hearing on the motions, appellant’s counsel stated that “the statute of limitations is not gone on these children. We can file another complaint and we can battle that out there.” After the trial court tentatively ruled that it would deny leave to amend, counsel stated that “[w]e will be filing a claim on behalf of the minors as the statute is not gone,” and asked the court whether the court “would . . . like us to bring a motion to consolidate that” The trial court responded that it “usually suggest[s] filing a motion to consolidate” when counsel believes that there are related actions.
Following the court’s ruling, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
An appellate court independently reviews the trial court’s order on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 146.) We determine based upon the face of the challenged pleadings and from any matter of which we are required to take judicial notice, whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the respondent. (§ 438, subds. (b), (c), (d).) Where the trial court’s order also denies plaintiff leave to amend the challenged pleading, we review whether the trial court abused its discretion in doing so. “Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion by showing in what manner it can amend its complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of its pleading. [Citation.]” (Von Batsch v. American Dist. Telegraph Co. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 1111, 1118.)
Here, the trial court’s order dismissed appellant from the wrongful death action on the ground that she lacked standing to bring an action for the wrongful death of her brother under section 377.60. We agree.[2]
“‘In California, an action for wrongful death is governed solely by statute, and the right to bring such an action is limited to those persons identified therein.’ [Citation.]” (Scott v. Thompson (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1510-1511.) Section 377.60 identifies three classes of people (other than decedent’s personal representative) who have standing to bring a wrongful death action. Section 377.60 provides in relevant part that:
“A cause of action for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another may be asserted by any of the following persons or by the decedent’s personal representative on their behalf:
“(a) The decedent’s surviving spouse, domestic partner, children, and issue of deceased children, or, if there is no surviving issue of the decedent, the persons, including the surviving spouse or domestic partner, who would be entitled to the property of the decedent by intestate succession.
“(b) Whether or not qualified under subdivision (a), if they were dependent on the decedent, the putative spouse, children of the putative spouse, stepchildren, or parents. As used in this subdivision, ‘putative spouse’ means the surviving spouse of a void or voidable marriage who is found by the court to have believed in good faith that the marriage to the decedent was valid.
“(c) A minor, whether or not qualified under subdivision (a) or (b), if, at the time of the decedent’s death, the minor resided for the previous 180 days in the decedent’s household and was dependent on the decedent for one-half or more of the minor’s support.”
Appellant does not allege that she is decedent’s personal representative. Thus, she has standing to bring a wrongful death action only if she falls within one of the three classes of persons described in section 377.60. Because she is decedent’s sister and not a minor, appellant would have standing to bring a wrongful death action only under section 377.60, subdivision (a) or (b).
Under section 377.60, subdivision (a), whether a plaintiff has legal standing to bring a wrongful death action is determined by the intestate succession rules, which are set forth in Probate Code section 6402. Under Probate Code, section 6402, appellant would be entitled to decedent’s intestate estate only if decedent had no surviving issue or parent. (Prob. Code, § 6402, subd. (c).) Here, the complaint alleges that decedent has a living parent -- plaintiff Shawn O’Neill. Therefore, appellant presently lacks standing to bring a wrongful death action because Shawn O’Neill has exclusive standing to bring a wrongful death action under section 377.60, subdivision (a). (See Scott v. Thompson, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1510 [“California’s wrongful death statute vests priority and exclusive standing in a decedent’s surviving parent over a surviving sibling.”].)[3]
Appellant next contends that she has legal standing under section 377.60, subdivision (b) because she was financially dependent upon decedent. (See Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1445 [the term “‘dependent’” in § 377.60, subd. (b), refers to financial dependence].) According to appellant, section 377.60, subdivision (b) confers standing on any person financially dependent on a decedent, as well as on “a putative spouse, children of the putative spouse, stepchildren, or parents.” We disagree with appellant’s interpretation of section 377.60, subdivision (b) for three reasons.
First, appellant’s interpretation is inconsistent with prior legal precedents holding that persons specifically listed in section 377.60, subdivision (b) must be financially dependent to have standing to bring a wrongful death action. (See, e.g., Chavez v. Carpenter, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1445 [parents must be financially dependent to have standing under § 377.60, subd. (b)].)
Second, appellant’s interpretation does violence to the language of the statute, which lists those persons who have standing. The qualifying phrase “if they were dependent on the decedent,” immediately precedes the enumeration of the persons to which the phrase applies. Unless the phrase modifies what follows, it makes no grammatical sense. In order to construe the statute as appellant suggests, we would have to substitute the words “anyone who was” for “if they were.” We decline to rewrite the statute.
Finally, appellant’s interpretation would render section 377.60, subdivision (c) superfluous. (See Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 459 [“Where reasonably possible, we avoid statutory constructions that render particular provisions superfluous or unnecessary.”].) Section 377.60, subdivision (c) provides that minors who do not qualify for legal standing under section 377.60, subdivisions (a) or (b) may qualify under section 377.60, subdivision (c) “if, at the time of the decedent’s death, the minor resided for the previous 180 days in the decedent’s household and was dependent on the decedent for one-half or more of the minor’s support.” If section 377.60, subdivision (b) were construed to grant standing to any person who is financially dependent upon decedent, section 377.60, subdivision (c) would be superfluous.
We thus reject appellant’s interpretation of the phrase “dependent on the decedent” in section 377.60, subdivision (b). We conclude that that phrase does not denote an additional category of persons with legal standing to bring a wrongful death action. Instead, the phrase “dependent on decedent” is descriptive and applies to any putative spouses, children of putative spouses, stepchildren, or parents of decedent who wish to bring an action for the wrongful death of decedent. Although appellant was financially dependent on her brother, she is not among the persons specifically listed in section 377.60, subdivision (b). Accordingly, the trial court was correct in determining that the complaint did not state a cause of action for wrongful death on the part of appellant.
We also conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant leave to amend the complaint. Appellant proposed to amend the complaint by removing herself as an individual plaintiff and substituting herself as a guardian ad litem on behalf of her minor children. An individual plaintiff and a guardian ad litem, however, are two distinct legal entities. The proposed amendment would not have conferred standing on appellant to bring a wrongful death action on her own behalf. Thus, there is no “reasonable possibility” that appellant could amend the complaint “to allege the necessary facts to state a valid cause of action for [wrongful death].” (Von Batsch v. American Dist. Telegraph Co., supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 1120.) Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant leave to amend the complaint.
B. Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint.
Appellant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her leave to file a first amended complaint that removed herself as an individual plaintiff and substituted herself as a guardian ad litem for her minor children’s wrongful death claim. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1047 [The trial court’s “discretion should be exercised liberally in favor of amendments, for judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters in the same lawsuit.”].) We find no abuse of discretion.
First, appellant failed to file the required supporting declaration with her motion to file a first amended complaint. (See California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(b) [“A separate declaration must accompany the motion [to file an amended pleading] and must specify: [¶] . . . [¶] (3) When the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and [¶] (4) The reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”].)
Second, the trial court’s order did not result in the dismissal of the wrongful death cause of action because decedent’s mother remained a viable plaintiff for that claim. (Cf. Mayo v. White (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1083, 1087, 1092 [where complaint for wrongful death was brought on behalf of improper plaintiffs who were decedent’s siblings, trial court abused its discretion in denying decedent’s personal representative leave to amend complaint to substitute the proper heirs as plaintiffs].)
Finally, the trial court’s orders did not prejudice appellant’s minor children. At the hearing on the motions, plaintiffs’ counsel indicated that the children’s claims were not barred by the statute of limitations and that counsel would be filing a claim on behalf of the children. Although the trial court denied appellant leave to amend the complaint, it contemplated allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to consolidate a wrongful death action brought on behalf of the minor children with the instant action.[4]
In light of the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision denying appellant leave to file a first amended complaint.
C. Motion for Leave to Withdraw Admissions.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in denying her leave to withdraw her admissions in response to respondent’s request for admissions Nos. 11 and 14. We review the trial court’s order for an abuse of discretion. (See New Albertsons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403.)
Under section 2033.300, subdivision (a), “[a] party may withdraw or amend an admission made in response to a request for admission only on leave of court granted after notice to all parties.” Appellant, however, was no longer a party to the wrongful death action after the trial court granted respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as moot.
DISPOSITION
The superior court’s orders are affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
MANELLA, J.
We concur:
WILLHITE, Acting P. J.
SUZUKAWA, J.
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[1] All further statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise stated.
[2] At oral argument, appellant’s counsel abandoned the claim that appellant had individual standing. Nevertheless, we will address the substance of the argument as it was raised and extensively discussed in appellant’s opening brief.
[3] We reject appellant’s argument that the trial court erred in granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings because (1) the motion “depended upon a showing that the decedent died intestate” and (2) the complaint does not show on its face that decedent died intestate. We disagree that the motion for judgment on the pleadings could be granted only if decedent died intestate, or died without a valid will. Section 377.60 does not limit itself to those situations where the decedent died intestate. Rather, it defines the three classes of people who can bring a wrongful death action and uses the rules of intestate succession to determine one of those classes of people.
[4] We note that the proposed first amended complaint is not, as suggested by appellant’s counsel during oral argument, the complaint that would be filed on behalf of the minor children because the proposed first amended complaint includes Shawn O’Neill as a plaintiff. It was contemplated that appellant would file a separate action on behalf of the children and move to consolidate the new action with the instant action. At oral argument, respondent’s counsel agreed that consolidation of the two actions was mandatory and stated that counsel had previously proposed that appellant file a new complaint on behalf of the minor children.
