Seibold v.
Angeles
Filed
7/23/13 Seibold v. County of Los Angeles CA2/3
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
GUNTER SEIBOLD,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
COUNTY
OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Appellant.
B243510
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. SC107640)
APPEALS
from a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Richard E. Rico, Judge. Dismissed and remanded with directions.
David
M. Shaby II & Associates and David M. Shaby II for Plaintiff and Appellant.
John
F. Krattli, County Counsel,
and Albert Ramseyer, Principal Deputy County Counsel for Defendant and
Appellant.
_______________________________________
Gunther Seibold seeks a refund from
the County of Los
Angeles of possessory interest taxes relating to
a ground lease and a hangar at the Santa Monica
Municipal Airport. The trial court concluded that the ground
lease was taxable but the hangar was not and entered a judgment awarding
Seibold $738.06 plus interest and costs.
The court denied Seibold’s motion to set aside the judgment and enter a
new judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 663).
Both sides appealed.
The
county contends the hangar is a real property improvement and is assessable to
Seibold as its owner. Seibold disputes
this and contends he is entitled to a refund of all taxes illegally assessed
through 2012. He also contends the
judgment entered by the trial court fails to resolve all of the issues raised
by his operative complaint. We agree
with Seibold that the judgment fails to adjudicate his count for declaratory
relief and therefore is not a final appealable judgment. We therefore will dismiss the appeals by both
parties as premature.
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Seibold
leases from the City of Santa Monica
a hangar site at the Santa Monica Municipal
Airport. The county notified him in December 2008 that
it was imposing an escape assessment for tax years 2005 through 2008 as a
result of a change in the assessed value.
The notices stated that the escape assessment was based on
“a creation, renewal, or assignment of your lease, or the addition or
alteration of land and/or improvements occurring on your possessory interest as
of December 26, 2005.†Seibold paid the taxes, applied to change the
assessment and sought a refund. The
Assessment Appeals Board rejected his challenge to the assessment.
Seibold
filed his initial complaint against the county in April 2010 and filed
a first amended complaint (the operative complaint) in September
2010. He alleges that he has no taxable
possessory interest in the hangar under Property Tax Rule 20
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 18, § 20) because he owns the hangar and
it is not publicly owned. Seibold also
alleges that he has no taxable possessory interest in the leased ground. He seeks (1) a refund of possessory
interest taxes paid for the hangar; (2) a refund of possessory
interest taxes paid for the leased ground; and (3) a declaratory
judgment resolving the issue of whether he owns a taxable possessory
interest in the hangar and the leased ground.
Seibold
moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication. The trial court, in an order dated December 6, 2010, concluded that
Seibold’s possessory interest in the hangar was “exempt†from taxation pursuant
to Property Tax Rule 20 because he owned the hangar and it would not become the
property of a public entity after his possession. With respect to his leasehold interest, the
court concluded that Seibold had failed to show that his interest was not
taxable. The court therefore denied the
motion for summary judgment and granted summary adjudication as to the first
count only. The court entered
a “Judgment,†and the county appealed (No. B231248).
dispose of all counts alleged in the complaint and therefore dismissed the
county’s appeal on October 17,
2011.
A
nonjury trial took place on June 12,
2012. Seibold timely
requested a statement of decision.
The trial court filed a Tentative Statement of Decision on June 20, 2012, stating that the
court previously had granted summary adjudication in favor of Seibold with
respect to the hangar. It also stated
that Seibold’s ground lease was taxable and that he was entitled to declaratory
relief against taxation of the hangar.
It ordered the parties to provide a calculation of the amount to be
refunded and interest on that amount. It
concluded, “The above is the court’s proposed statement of decision subject
[to] a party’s timely objections under Cal Rules of Court 3.1590(g).â€
The
county filed a calculation showing a total of $738.06 due to be refunded for
tax years 2005 through 2008 for taxes paid attributable to the hangar, and
presented a proposed judgment. On
July 30, 2012, the trial court signed and entered the county’s proposed judgment
as its “Final Judgment.†It states: “Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff
Gunter Seibold, who shall be refunded and recover from the County of
Los Angeles, et al., the principle sum of $738.06 plus legal interest
pursuant to Rev. & Tax Code § 5151, and his costs in the sum of
$640. The judgment amount reflects a
refund of property taxes paid attributable to [Seibold’s] hangar for assessment
years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008.â€
Seibold
then filed “Objections†to the judgment stating that it did not include
a ruling on the taxability of the ground lease and failed to address his
count for declaratory relief or his entitlement to attorney fees. He requested that the trial court, “at the
very least, adopt[] its Statement of Decision as the final judgment to permit
an appeal from its rulings.†On August
10, 2012, he filed a motion to set aside the judgment and enter a new judgment
(Code Civ. Proc., § 663) He argued
in the motion that the judgment was not a final, appealable judgment because it
did not address all of the issues raised in this litigation and that the trial
court should file a final judgment resolving all of the contested issues
and a final statement of decision conforming to the judgment.
The
trial court filed a Statement of Decision on August 20, 2012,
approximately two weeks after entry of the “Final Judgment,†stating: “The court has received Plaintiff’s
objections. The court adopts the
tentative Statement of Decision previous[ly] filed as its final Statement of
Decision and affirms the Final Judgment previous[ly] signed on July 30[,]
2012.†The court filed an order denying
the motion to set aside the judgment on September 24, 2002, “on the grounds
that the Court’s Statement of Decision, entered on August 20, 2012 sets forth
the reasoning behind the Judgment. The
Court granted Plaintiff’s request to file a memorandum of costs for attorneys
fees under Rev & Tax Code § 5152.â€
The
county timely appealed the judgment.
Seibold appealed the judgment and the denial of his motion to set aside
the judgment. Seibold also moved to
strike the county’s opening brief and dismiss its appeal and for an award of
monetary sanctions against the county for filing a frivolous appeal. He argues in his motion that the county
mischaracterizes the judgment, asserts no meaningful legal argument and invited
any error by proposing the judgment. We
denied Seibold’s motion to strike the county’s opening brief and dismiss its
appeal, and deferred ruling on his motion for sanctions.
The county contends in its appeal
the hangar is an assessable real property improvement and is taxable to Seibold
as its owner.
Seibold
contends in his appeal (1) the judgment does not specify the issues
adjudicated, provides no declaratory relief, is unenforceable, and fails to
award all costs, interest and attorney fees to which he is entitled, so a
revised judgment should be entered; (2) he is entitled to a refund not only for
tax years 2005 through 2008, but also for later tax years through 2012;
and (3) he is entitled to 3 percent prejudgment interest on all illegally
collected taxes and 10 percent postjudgment interest on all costs and fees
awarded in the judgment.
An
appealable final judgment must fully dispose of all causes of action between
the parties. (Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 697;
Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743.) Absent
either an appealable final judgment disposing of all causes of action between
the parties or an appealable order, we have no jurisdiction to decide an
appeal. (Griset, supra, at
pp. 696-697.)
The
“Final Judgment†is silent as to the declaratory
relief count, does not dispose of that count and therefore is not an
appealable final judgment. Although the
Tentative Statement of Decision stated that Seibold was entitled to declaratory
relief against taxation relating to the hangar, the “Final Judgment†does not
adjudicate the declaratory relief count and provides no declaratory
relief. It also fails to address the
count for a refund of possessory interest taxes relating to the ground
lease.
The
Tentative Statement of Decision was a tentative decision that was neither final
nor binding on the trial court at the time of entry of the “Final
Judgment.†(Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1590(b).) The Tentative
Statement of Decision did not state that it would become the statement of
decision unless a party timely specified additional issues to address or made
proposals not included in the Tentative Statement of Decision (see
not become the statement of decision in that manner.
The
Statement of Decision filed on August 20, 2012, stated that the trial court was
adopting the Tentative Statement of Decision as its final statement of
decision. We need not decide whether the
court had the authority to issue a statement of decision after entry of a final
judgment because we conclude that the “Final Judgment†was not a final
judgment, as stated. Absent any jurisdictional
bar to adopting a final statement of decision on August 20, 2012, we conclude
that the Tentative Statement of Decision became the final statement of decision
on that date. The court retains the
authority to modify its statement of decision at any time before the entry of a
final judgment, which has not yet occurred here, or on a motion for new trial.
states that Seibold is entitled to declaratory relief and that the ground lease
is taxable, the judgment is incomplete because it fails to expressly adjudicate
the count for declaratory relief and the count for a refund of possessory
interest taxes relating to the ground lease.
“ ‘ “Interlocutory
appeals burden the courts and impede the judicial
process in a number of ways:
(1) They tend to clog the appellate courts with a multiplicity of
appeals. . . . (2) Early resort to the appellate
courts tends to produce uncertainty and delay in the trial
court. . . . (3) Until a final judgment is rendered
the trial court may completely obviate an appeal by altering the rulings from
which an appeal would otherwise have been taken. [Citations.]
(4) Later actions by the trial court may provide a more complete record
which dispels the appearance of error or establishes that it was harmless. (5) Having the benefit of a complete
adjudication . . . will assist the reviewing court to
remedy error (if any) by giving specific directions rather than remanding for
another round of open-ended proceedings.â€
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]†(Dana
Point Safe Harbor Collective v. Superior Court (2010) 51 Cal.4th 1, 5-6.)
We
conclude based on the authorities cited above that this court lacks appellate
jurisdiction because the purported judgment does not dispose of all causes of
action between the parties. Accordingly,
the appeals will be dismissed with directions to the trial court to vacate the
“Final Judgment†filed on July 30, 2012, and conduct further proceedings
consistent with the views expressed herein.
Seibold’s motion for sanctions is denied as moot. Apart from our conclusion that the purported
judgment is not an appealable final judgment, we express no opinion as to the
merits of the parties’ contentions on appeal.
The county’s appeal and Seibold’s
appeal are dismissed, and Seibold’s motion for sanctions is denied as
moot. The matter is remanded to the
trial court to vacate the “Final Judgment†filed on July 30, 2012. In order to avoid any further interlocutory
appeals, the trial court should take care to ensure that any subsequent
“Judgment†filed in this case is an appealable final judgment that expressly
adjudicates each count alleged in the complaint. Each party shall bear its own costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS
CROSKEY,
Acting P. J.
We Concur:
ALDRICH, J.
HEESEMAN, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1]
The trial court filed a
“Judgment on Ruling on Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment and/or Summary
Adjudication†on February 2, 2011.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2]
a written judgment is required, the trial court must sign and file a judgment
within 50 days after the announcement or service of the tentative decision,
whichever is later, or within 10 days after a hearing on objections to a
proposed statement of decision or proposed judgment, if a hearing is held. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 3.1590(l).) The time may be
extended for good cause in a written order.
(Id., rule 3.1590(m).)
