Santoyo v. Snyder

Filed 7/16/10 Santoyo v. Snyder CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gerald G. Johnston, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Ronald A. Litz and Ronald A. Litz and Michael Antin for Objector and Appellant Michael Antin.

No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent.

* * *

Objector Michael Antin appeals from the trial courts orders awarding him attorney fees for representing Jose Santoyo as the trustee of a trust set up by a husband and wife before the wifes murder, and for representing Santoyo as the guardian of the estate of the couples three minor children. Santoyo is not a party to the appeal. Antin asserts the trial court abused its discretion by awarding him less in attorney fees than he requested. His appellate claim is largely forfeited. In a record approaching 1500 pages, he fails to identify the specific fee request(s) or supporting documentation of hours he claims the trial court arbitrarily disregarded. To the extent his appellate briefs included a required pinpoint citation, the cited page includes, for example, a general, block-billed entry for $20,000 as simply Fees incurred for a date range of almost five months, without any breakdown of hours worked or services performed. In the absence of the requisite supporting documentation, which enables the computation of a lodestar fee, Antins challenge to the trial courts award at a lower hourly rate and for fewer hours than he requested rings hollow, as does his claim of judicial bias. We therefore affirm the fee orders.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The trust and guardianship matters arose in the trial court following the tragic slaying of Yolanda Snyder on April 7, 2007, by her estranged husband, Terry Snyder, Jr., who violated a restraining order, confronted her in her home, placed her in a headlock as her three young boys fled to a neighbors house, and stabbed her to death with a knife. The Orange County Social Services Agency took custody of the children, who were eventually placed with the victims brother, Santoyo, and Santoyos wife as prospective adoptive parents. The trial court appointed Santoyo, with Antin as his attorney, as the successor trustee of a living trust created by the ill-fated couple, and as the guardian of the minors estate.

Antin contacted the decedents life insurance provider and secured the payout of $400,000 in life insurance proceeds. Antin also secured an additional $200,000 payment from the insurance company based on the policys accidental death benefit. Noting that murder does not appear to fit the common meaning of an accident, Antin cites the $200,000 payout as an example of his extraordinary lawyering skills, warranting substantial attorney fees. Antin, however, fails to provide in the record, or at least does not provide a citation to, the terms of the accidental death benefit to support his claim. (See generally Byars v. SCME Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1134, 1140-1141 [facts and arguments must be supported by required record references, including providing exact page citation].)[1]

Antin claims in his appellate briefing he is entitled to more than $180,000 for his services in the trust and guardianship matters. The two matters appear to have culminated in a settlement among all parties in early June 2008, including the childrens grandparents. The compromise was apparently uncontested for most of the year-long proceedings, except the only item in dispute, as Antin explains regarding a typical hearing, was the amount of attorneys fees requested by counsel for Mr. Santoyo, which stretched the proceedings out another six months after the settlement. According to Antin, although the parties ultimately settled, The complexities in these matters included having Mr. Santoyo serve in the face of the Will naming as Executor and Guardian, the imprisoned husband, and the grandparents; the Successor[]Trustee named in the Snyder Family Trust was the imprisoned husband . . . and then his parents, i.e., the grandparents. The trial court, however, had appointed Antin in these roles early in the proceedings, after the father relinquished the positions within three weeks of the murder.

The trial court concluded Antins fee submissions did not warrant the attorney fees he requested.[2] In the guardianship, instead of the $77,000 sum it appears Antin requested at a rate of $400 an hour for approximately 190 hours, the court approved $30,000 in attorney fees, explaining it determined 120 hours of work at an hourly rate of $250 constitutes appropriate compensation. The courts order noted that despite prior requests, counsel for the [g]uardian has failed to provide adequate documentation and detailed records regarding the fees requested. In addition, the documents which were submitted include billing for frequent contact with family members and friends for the purpose of keeping these interested parties informed of the status of the [g]uardianship proceedings. These individuals are not Mr. Antins clients. There has been no showing these communications benefitted the guardianship estate.

The trial court awarded Antin $10,000 in attorney fees for representing Santoyo in the trust matter, approving 40 hours of work at an hourly rate of $250, contrary to Antins much higher fee request. The courts order explained that, despite prior requests, counsel for the [t]rustee has failed to provide adequate documentation and detailed records regarding the fees requested. Additionally, the court determined portions of the work for which Antin claimed compensation did not benefit the trust.

II

DISCUSSION

Antin contends the trial court abused its discretion by paring his attorney fee requests. We disagree. A trial court may not rubber stamp a request for attorney fees, but rather must determine the number of hours reasonably expended. (Donahue v. Donahue (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 259, 271, original italics (Donahue).) The court tabulates the attorney fee touchstone, or lodestar, by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate prevailing in the community for similar work. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1321 (Christian Research).) The trial court retains discretion to award attorney fees in an amount less than the lodestar tabulation. (Id. at pp. 1321-1322.) Indeed, as our Supreme Court has observed, To the extent a trial court is concerned that a particular award is excessive, it has broad discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee altogether. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.)

When the trial court substantially reduces a fee or cost request, we infer the court has determined the request was inflated. (Christian Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323; see Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 817 (Levy) [substantial fee reduction indicat[ed] Levy improperly inflated his claimed attorney fees]; accord, Maughan v. Google Technology, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1251-1252.) An attorney fee dispute is not exempt from generally applicable appellate principles: The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct; all intendments and presumptions are indulged to support the judgment; conflicts in the declarations must be resolved in favor of the prevailing party, and the trial courts resolution of any factual disputes arising from the evidence is conclusive. (Christian Research, at p. 1322.) In sum, While the concept abuse of discretion is not easily susceptible to precise definition, the appropriate test has been enunciated in terms of whether or not the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered. . . . [Citations.] [Citation.] A decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge. [Citations.] . . . (Maughan, at pp. 1249-1250.)

The attorney seeking fees has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. (Levy, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 816.) Given this burden, the attorneys fee request should include documentation allow[ing] the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. (Christian Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.) As we noted in Donahue, attorney fee requests should be documented with particular care in trust matters, based on their sensitive fiscal and fiduciary nature. (Donahue, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 268). Given its similar nature, an estate guardianship requires the same care in documenting a fee request. (See ibid. [While recordkeeping is important in all aspects of administration, it is imperative to trust litigation that records support the contentions of the trustee and others that the trust should pay the disputed compensation and fees].) The court may reduce compensation based on the attorneys failure to maintain appropriate time records. (Christian Research, at p. 1320.)

Here, as noted, like the appellant in Evans, Antin egregiously violated the rule requiring specific page citations. (Evans, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pp. 166-167 [To the extent they did provide citations, too many times it was to hundreds of pages . . . , referring to an entire document rather than a specific page].) The violation largely forfeits Antins appellate claim because, on appeal, we presume the judgment is correct. (Christian Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322.) We will not search the record for a reason to overturn the trial court. (Ibid.) For all we know, in the absence of reference to the specific fee requests, the trial court granted all or substantially all of Antins fee request. Given Antins appeal, that is unlikely, but the point is that without specification of the particular fee request(s) and supporting hourly documentation on which the appellate challenge is predicated, it is impossible to review Antins claim of error, which he bears the burden to demonstrate (ibid.; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564), with specific record citations to enable review (Evans, at pp. 166-167).

We conclude Antins claim is not entirely forfeited because a specific page citation near the last page of his voluminous, opaque and duplicative briefing to page 277 of 500 pages in the clerks transcript in the trust matter reveals a request for approximately $57,000 in attorney fees in the trust proceeding. As noted, because Antin never identifies on appeal the particular, documented fee amount to which he claims he was entitled, we do not know if this $57,000 figure constitutes the sum he contends the court erroneously slashed.[3]

In any event, we are uncertain if the $57,000 request identified at page 277 is the final, purportedly documented fee request in the trust matter, for which the trial court approved $10,000. But if it is, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. More than half of the $57,000 amount requested consists of three block-billed entries, one for $20,000 for Fees incurred since 12/5/07 through 4/30/08, without any further specification, plus two separate entries of $4,800 each. Those $4,800 entries are for preparation of unspecified documents, an ex parte hearing of unspecified duration on an unspecified date for which Antin did unspecified work, two inscrutable entries denominated simply etc., and work Antin admittedly had not done at the time he sought to be reimbursed for time expended, i.e., estimated additional time. None of these already vague entries are allocated by hours. A computation of time spent on a case is fundamental to a determination of an appropriate attorneys[] fee award. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) Absent documentation adequate to review the attorneys time spent on the matter, there is no way to determine whether the hours were reasonably expended, let alone whether they were expended at all. (Christian Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320; see Bell v. Vista Unified School Dist. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 672, 689 [blocked-billing entries render it virtually impossible to break down hours on a task-by-task basis].)

Since Antin fails to cite adequate documentation for our review of his claim, there is no basis for us to overturn the trial courts fee order. Based on the record cited to us for our review, there is no basis for us to restore the $20,000 and twin $4,800 entries it appears the trial court pared. Perusing the first few pages of the record also reflects that Antin attempted to surcharge other parties in the trust matter with 20 hours of work he performed, though they were not his clients. This supports the trial courts conclusion Antin billed for more remuneration than the actual services he performed for the trustee, Santoyo, and there is no indication Antin ever excised these hours from his fee request. (See Christian Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322 [appellate court must review record in light most favorable to trial courts ruling].) As we noted in Christian Research, An attorneys chief asset in submitting a fee request is his or her credibility, and where vague, blockbilled time entries inflated with noncompensable hours destroy an attorneys credibility with the trial court, we have no power on appeal to restore it. (Id. at pp. 1325-1326; see also Vella v. Hudgins (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 515, 524 [The trial court is not bound by an attorneys evidence in support of his requested fee].)

Reduced in this manner by excising unsupported fee amounts of $20,000, two entries of $4,800, and 20 hours of work for other parties at $400 an hour, Antins $57,000 fee request drops to below $20,000, even at Antins desired rate of $400 an hour. We cannot say the trial courts approval of a $10,000 award at $250 an hour constitutes an abuse of discretion when the trial court was entitled to deny a fee altogether, based on the excessive amount claimed in light of the documentation cited for our review. (Christian Research, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1321-1322.)

On page 20 in his appellate brief in the guardianship matter, Antin claims he requested $76,600 in attorney fees for representing Santoyo as the guardian of the childrens estate, but he provides no citation to a fee request in that amount, nor to supporting documentation of itemized work he performed or hours expended to warrant the fee. At Antins requested rate of $400 an hour, the $76,600 figure translates to about 190 hours of attorney labor. But in the absence of specific, required record citations, the $76,600 figure appears, for appellate review purposes, to have been drawn out of thin air. Accordingly, we cannot say the trial court erred in awarding Antin $30,000 for 120 hours of compensable work instead.

Antin complains that the trial court reduced his hourly fee from $400 to $250, but it was Antins burden to justify his rate in light of prevailing economic conditions for attorneys in the practice area. (Morano v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1115.) He failed to do so. He rebuffed the common practice of providing the declarations of other local attorneys confirming a similar rate for similar work, and instead relied on his estimate of his own value, which the trial court was not required to accept. Unlike in Morano, there was no evidence the trial court was attempting to hold the line by awarding a rate lower than the prevailing market rate. (Ibid.) Instead, apart from Antins unsupported claims, the evidence suggested a market rate of $225 an hour for similar work a rate the trial court exceeded with its award to Antin of a $250 hourly rate. Based on the foregoing, we discern no basis in the record cited to second‑guess the trial courts fee award, nor to support Antins charge of bias.

III

DISPOSITION

The trial courts attorney fee orders are affirmed.

ARONSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

SILLS, P. J.

IKOLA, J.

Publication Courtesy of San Diego County Legal Resource Directory.

Analysis and review provided by El Cajon Property line attorney.

San Diego Case Information provided by www.fearnotlaw.com

[1] Antins failure to provide specific page references in a voluminous record is a consistent problem that undermines his appeal by obscuring the proceedings below.

[2] The specific amount Antin requested in the trial court remains something of a mystery. He never identifies final requests in either the trust or guardianship matters with corresponding record citations. The $180,000 total figure he recites on appeal appears to include his appellate attorney fees and costs, which of course had not yet arisen at the time of the trial courts fee determination. Though it is not our responsibility to do so (see Evans v. CenterStone Development Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 151, 166-167 (Evans), our search of the record suggests Antin claimed approximately $57,000 in attorney fees for representing Santoyo in the trust matter, plus approximately $77,000 for the estate guardianship, for a total of roughly $135,000.

[3] Compounding our confusion, Antin states in his appellate brief that his fee request in the trust matter reached $79,100 by August 31, 2008. But, as documentation for this purported August 2008 figure, he provides a record citation to a May 2008 filing. Absent time travel, we are unable to fathom how the $57,000 amount Antin claimed on one page in May 2008 grew to $79,100 on the very next page during summer months of 2008 that had not yet occurred. Further muddling matters, Antin apparently provided the trial court with only the bare, unsupported $79,100 figure, with no itemization of work performed or hours allocated to any particular tasks.