Salessi v. Shadab

Filed 9/30/08 Salessi v. Shadab CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from a judgment and an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, James P. Gray, Judge. Affirmed.

Kareem Salessi, in pro. per.; Knickerbocker Law Corporation, Richard L. Knickerbocker and Gregory G. Yacoubian for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Bassiri Associates and Michael H. Bassiri for Defendants and Respondents Michael Shadab and Alpha Appraisals.

Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez and Darin L. Wessel for Defendants and Respondents First Team Real Estate-Orange County, Tamzi Richardson and Cameron N. Merage.

* * *

I. INTRODUCTION

Kareem Salessi bought a house in Laguna Niguel in late 2002. It is safe to say he was dissatisfied with it. Representing himself, he sued 19 separate persons, alleging various combinations of claims against them for having induced him into buying the property. He even included a RICO claim against the Orange County Assessors office.

This appeal, though, involves only two sets of defendants.[1] They are (1) the appraisers, consisting of an appraisal firm, Alpha Appraisals and its owner, Michael Shadab, and (2) the sellers brokers, consisting of First Team Real Estate-Orange County, Tamzi Richardson, and Cameron N. Merage. Moreover, under the rule that issues not included in the appellants opening brief are waived (In re Marriage of Sheldon (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 371, 381 [We begin our analysis with the well-settled proposition that an appellate court may consider as waived any issues not raised in the appellants opening brief.]), we find that the number of issues involving these two sets of defendants are limited as well. Both sets of defendants obtained judgments in the wake of motions for judgment on the pleadings, which came after previous demurrers had whittled down the causes of action against them. Thus, the opening brief raises only two issues as to the appraisers: Whether the complaint states (or could be amended to state) causes of action for (1) negligent misrepresentation or (2) common counts. It raises only one issue on the merits as to the sellers brokers: Whether the complaint states (or could be amended to state) a cause of action for false advertising under the unfair competition laws or UCL (Bus & Prof. Code,  17200 & 17500 et seq.). (It also raises, in regard to the sellers brokers, a procedural issue concerning a recusal motion, which we address anon.)

We now explain that, given the narrative of events as told in Salessis own words in the third amended complaint, judgments on the pleadings in both instances were correct, and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in not giving Salessi leave to amend. Basically, Salessi alleged facts in his complaint that obviated the element of reliance in regard to both sets of defendants.

II. THE THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

The complaint -- that is, the third amended complaint that has been included in the appellants appendix -- is a desultory document to say the least. It is over 119 pages, not counting the table of authorities and exhibits. It also presents some difficulty to a judge who seeks to extract what actual facts it alleges, as distinct from conclusions and argument, because of Salessis tendency to make legally conclusory statements in passing. Said the court in Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298: The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. (Italics added.)

Whats more, beginning at paragraph 84, the third amended complaint strays into conspiratorial matters beyond the purview of the courts, making allegations concerning the machinations of international bankers reminiscent of the famous poet Ezra Pound, who made radio broadcasts from Italy on that topic during World War II.[2] Indeed, in paragraph 110, in the context of a discussion of the RICO claim against the county tax assessor, Salessi has managed to work in a reference to the events of September 11, 2001, being the product of a White House conspiracy.[3]

Indeed, conspiracy is the riff of the third amended complaints basic narrative, which is, essentially, that his own buyers agent, the sellers brokers and agents, the sellers themselves, his own loan broker, an appraisal company hired by a prospective lender, the eventual lender and, indeed, the county tax assessor were all in on some sort of grand plot to saddle him with a complete dog of a house on Aloma Avenue in Laguna Niguel.

Here is the story from Salessis complaint, though one must remember that the complaint is sometimes indefinite in terms of the exact chronology:

In early July 2002, Salessi was in the market to buy a house, and found a good one on San Sebastian. However, his buyers agent, Nick (Ali) Roshdieh, showed him a very colorful flyer on the Aloma property, and mentioned that we have just received this and it has not even entered the MLS, so there is no MLS sheet for this house yet.

Roshdieh and Salessi arrived at the Aloma residence; the house was smaller than Salessi wanted, but Roshdieh insisted there was simply too much furniture stuffed into the house so it only looked small. Roshdieh insisted the house met Salessis minimum 1,800 square foot criteria. By carrying on about cabinets and new carpeting in the garage, Roshdieh lured Salessi into making an offer on the Aloma property.

After the offer, Salessi was told by his own agent, Roshdieh, and Roshdiehs boss Tom Abercrombie, that there were other good offers on the Aloma house, including some above Salessis offer. Abercrombie explained that the Aloma house was still not in the multiple listing service, falsely represented to Salessi that the house was built in the early 1980s (when in reality it was built in the early 1970s), falsely told Salessi that the tract had been graded out of hills (in reality it was on fill land) and made a point that the fireplace was built without a permit, which was really the only concern Salessi could possibly encounter.

In any event, Tom Abercrombie managed to convince Salessi to accept the terms of a counter-offer from the sellers, the price being $443,000. Salessi signed the counter-offer on August 17, 2002.

One or two days later, Roshdieh and Salessi went to the Aloma house in the hope of trying to convince the owners (Patrick and Deborah Ortiz) to accept the offer he had made. Patrick Ortiz falsely told them that the house was built in the early 1980s, and also falsely told them that the house was around 1,800 square feet (though Salessi alleges that Roshdieh, and Ortizs agent Tamzi Richardson, already knew the house was considerably smaller, and staged the interview to mislead Salessi about the square footage).

Salessi contacted Farrokh Peimani, an acquaintance of 20 years and sometime mentor, to act as a loan broker for him. Peimani advised Salessi to send him a check for $500 for the origination of the loan process. Later -- the complaint does not say when -- Salessi found out that Peimani paid $400 of the $500 to Alpha Appraisals.

Abercrombie had Salessi engage Dana Ballard to inspect the house. While Ballard visited the house on August 24, 2002, Ballard failed to discover (indeed, Salessi alleges that Abercrombie instructed Ballard not to discover) major problems with the home, including toxic mold in the attic, and foundation cracks.

Around August 26, Salessi called Roshdieh to have Roshdieh measure the square footage of the Aloma house. Roshdieh said he didnt have the time, but said he would give Salessi the exact area in the final purchase contract.

Meanwhile, Salessi left on a trip to Germany. While in Germany, about a couple of weeks into September, Salessi received emails from Abercrombie and Roshdieh to the effect that Peimani the loan broker could not come up with the loan at all and that Salessi should seek a loan from a firm known as United, which is otherwise not included in the third amended complaint but appears to have been somehow connected to Abercrombie. Apparently both the sellers agent Tamzi Richardson and Ortiz were calling Peimani to pressure him to have the loan released to this United firm. Tamzi Richardson emailed him directly to ask for an address to which she could send the closing documents.

Salessi returned to California in late September, and took up residence at a Holiday Inn while waiting for the deal to close. He got a visit from Tamzi Richardson asking if anyone had been trying to change [his] mind about the house.

Roshdieh called to complain that Peimani still could not get the loan, so this United entity should do it, lest Salessi have to stay in the hotel for ever. Then Abercrombie called, to say that he had an agent with a ready to go loan from World Savings, but Peimani would have to take his name off the loan documents or United could not process it. Abercrombie proposed that Salessi offer Peimani $500 to release the loan, and that World Savings had approved the loan several weeks ago.

Peimani called the next day, angry that seller Ortiz had called him the day before offering him $1,000 to release the World Savings loan to United. Meanwhile, Salessi met Roshdieh for a viewing of the Aloma house. Salessis wife mentioned that the house looked too small, but Roshdieh dismissed the comment by attributing the smallness of the house to clutter. Salessi soon asked Tamzi Richardson for a property appraisal report and a tax bill. Richardson faxed over a tax-bill but with no area details. At the same time, Salessi was talking to Peimani on a daily basis, asking for an appraisal report every time I talked to him, but, over the course of several weeks, Peimani put Salessi off with a number of prevarications (saying he would email to the hotel, saying he would arrange to have the lender send it, etc.).

Indeed, it appears from the complaint that Salessi never got the appraisal report, since Salessi alleges that Peimanis various prevarications were part of a scheme to prevent Salessi from discovering two items of information about the Salessi house: (1) It was built in 1971, not the early 1980s, and (2) its true square footage was 1,300.

Having eventually received the report, Salessi has now alleged that it was faulty. Specifically, Alpha Appraisals report was based on the floor plans of another structure. Later -- after the escrow had closed -- when Salessi met defendant Shadab, Shadab allegedly admitted the appraisal was based on an old appraisal report of a similar house.

In any event, by mid-October Abercrombie was telling Salessi that the sellers had other buyers waiting, and wanted to cancel the escrow; indeed, they wanted a non-refundable $1,000 from Salessi not to cancel the escrow.

Salessi declined that chance to get out of the deal.

Abercrombie also indicated, as did Tamzi Richardson about the same time, that they had inside information that World Saving had already approved the loan.

Soon Salessi called up Peimani, complaining about the sellers threats to cancel the escrow. At that point, Salessi himself was willing to pull out of the deal, but Peimani reacted with despair and said that the loan process would have to begin again. Salessi was really frustrated, feeling [he] was stuck in the middle of a shark-field.

But, the day before Halloween 2002, Abercrombie called Salessi to his office and presented him with a three-page cancellation from the sellers. The document recited the buyers breach of contract.

Salessi heaved a sigh of relief. But Abercrombie told Salessi that he should not react to the document, but wait and see what happens. (Salessi now alleges this document was itself a ruse between Abercrombie, Peimani and Tamzi Richardson to prevent Salessi from bailing out of the purchase of Aloma.)

Later that afternoon, Salessi spoke with Peimani, but Peimani also told him to ignore it. When Salessi said he could now move on to the better house he had wanted, Peimani told him that was not possible because the existing loan on Aloma could not be used for that better house.

On the next day, or maybe the next after that, Tamzi Richardson called Salessi to tell him that Peimanis loan had finally come through, and we should quickly make an appointment for the final walk-through. Salessi was now confident the previous cancellation scenario had been a bluff. When Salessi told Tamzi Richardson of the cancellation, she simply flaunted it (though it is not wholly clear whatever the complaint means by that phrase). Salessi did not think of consulting an attorney at this juncture; he now says that had he done so, he would have probably walked out of this doomed deal.

And so, a final walk-through took place on November 4, 2002. Salessi asked for a pest control report. He was told the property appraisal was Peimanis responsibility. Tamzi Richardson showed Salessi the first page of a pest control report, but didnt let him see the rest of it. Debra Ortiz was present, and Salessi told Tamzi Richardson where was termite infested, but Richardson insisted he not do that, then rushed into the bedroom and then came back claiming that Ortiz did not know anything about it whatsoever. When Salessi asked about leaking backyard faucets, Richardson wrote a note to the effect that the buyer had confirmed the repairs have been made and had Salessi sign it.

But Salessi was, however, capable of reading things and refusing to sign them on this walk-through as well. At the end, Richardson handed him a rent-back agreement to sign, but this time he declined, saying it was out of the question.

Later that day, Salessi got a call from the escrow company manager to have him come in the next day and sign the loan papers, and the escrow closing documents, plus bring in a cashiers check of $40,000. Salessi told the escrow manager that at that point I did not have a valid contract any more since Ortiz had cancelled it in writing and that a new contract would thus be necessary. The escrow manager said that it will all be there the next day by the time I arrived, suggesting she didnt hear or register what Salessi had just said.

And, sure enough, despite his protestation that he didnt have a valid contract any more, Salessi showed up that November 5th (ironically, a day historically identified with nefarious plots) at the escrow company. An escrow employee -- actually, the receptionist -- put a package of loan papers in front of [him[ to sign.

While there was some colloquy about the documents with the receptionist, the clear import of Salessis complaint (though he cant quite bear to say so in so many words) is: He signed the documents.

That day or the next day Salessi stopped by Abercrombies office to take a look at his unsigned copies of loan-papers, to see if there were any impurities involved. Abercrombie found that the rent-back agreement was something different than he expected, and Salessi had Abercrombie call the escrow office, and in fact said that escrow pulled a fast one on you. (The precise dynamics of the rent-back provision, and how Salessi was cheated in that regard, are not clear from the complaint.)

Salessi left Abercrombies office with anger. Salessi called the escrow receptionist to tell her to tell the manager that she should consider my entire purchase contract cancelled, due to their cheating. On November 7, Salessi faxed over to the escrow office a letter confronting the manager with the lies she and [Richardson] had fed me two days earlier. Later that day, a lady named Cindy called Salessi to ask Salessi of his final decision. Salessi reconfirmed my cancellation of the rent-back altogether and faxed a cancellation that evening as well.

One week after closing, Salessi got the keys and came by the house. He discovered it was filthy, and found that certain fixtures in the garage, such as a work bench, had been removed. The house was, in fact, so filthy that Salessi delayed moving in until November 19, 2002. Upon moving in, he discovered that the house was only 1,300 square feet, not 1,800. He contacted home inspector Ballard, and asked for a second inspection for a fee, which he subsequently did (the time frame is not precise).

In early 2003 Salessi contacted World Savings to attempt to get a copy of the appraisal report, which they sent to him after he made a formal request in writing.

At this point the third amended complaint trails off into banking conspiracies. However, one further item requires mentioning. The complaint charges that Abercrombie lied about there being a multiple listing service document for the Aloma property, and that Salessi was able to retrieve Alomas MLS sheet in 2003, and found a number of inaccuracies, including this huffing and puffing description of the property: Drop dead gorgeous beautiful remodel single story emotional home, remodeled home. Thousands spent in upgrades! French doors and windows everywhere, crown moldings, upgraded baseboards, crackling fireplace, gutted redone kitchen and baths!! To [sic] many upgrades to mention!! Huge lush yard great for huge parties, thousands spent in fabulous used brick . . . come and sweep this one away subject to the successful cancellation of current escrow, we need a fast escrow, hurry wont last.

III. ENSUING PROCEEDINGS

Both the appraisers and sellers brokers were able to obtain dismissals of the case on motions for judgment on the pleadings after various causes of action had been dismissed in earlier proceedings. Those final judgments resulted in this appeal.

The notice of appeal, filed while Salessi still represented himself, is from judgments or orders entered on 10/16/06, 10/25/06, and 11/6/06. The 10/16/06 document is a judgment in favor of the appraisers. The 10/25/06 document is a judgment dismissing World Savings. (The appeal concerning World Savings has since been dismissed for untimely filing). The 11/6/06 document is an order (as distinct from a judgment) dismissing the appraisers after a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. As such, that order would appear to be redundant given the earlier judgment.

There is also a document, not mentioned in the notice of appeal, filed on November 7, 2006, which is a judgment in favor of the sellers brokers. That judgment was also obtained after a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. It is obvious from the opening brief that Salessi wishes to challenge that judgment, as distinct from the redundant order of November 6. Accordingly, we construe the notice of appeal liberally so as to encompass the judgment of November 7, 2006 so as to consider the merits of the appeal against the sellers brokers.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Appraisers

We address the appeal from the judgment in favor of the appraisers first. The issue (discussed below in more detail) of the trial judges ruling on the merits of their motion on the day a recusal motion was leveled against the trial judge does not affect the appraisers. Their motion for judgment on the pleadings was held September 7, 2006 and the recusal motion was filed October 12, 2006.

Confusing as the complaint is, the complaint is clear that Salessi never relied on the appraisal. In fact, a major thrust of the complaint is that the appraisal was kept from him until it was too late.

It is true that real estate appraisers can be sued by some third parties for negligent misrepresentation in their appraisals. In Soderberg v. McKinney (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1760, a mortgage broker contacted investors about investing in a certain second deed of trust on a residence in Redondo Beach; as part of the effort, appraisers had prepared a report showing a value of $670,000. Relying on the appraisal, an investor invested $50,000 in the second trust deed. After default, however, the investor learned that the true value of the property was between $450,000 and $500,000, leaving no equity to protect the investors investment, which was eventually lost. (Id. at p. 1763-1764.)

The investor sued, with the appraisers arguing they owed no duty to the third party investor. Relying on Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, which allowed a case against a companys auditors to proceed even though investors in the company had not hired the auditors, the Soderberg court reversed a summary adjudication in favor of the appraisers. The Soderberg court quoted language from Bily that a suppler of information is liable for negligence to a third party only if he or she intends to supply the information for the benefit of one or more third parties in a specific transaction or type of transaction identified to the supplier. (Soderberg, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1766, quoting Bily, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 392, Soderbergs italics deleted.)

In the present case, Salessi cannot claim to stand in the shoes of investors who, as in Bily, relied on audited company financial statements before buying stock, or as in Soderberg, appraisers from loan brokers before investing in second trust deeds. He bought the house without seeing the appraisal, while Alpha Appraisers did not prepare the appraisal for the benefit of an indefinite class of unknown investors, but for the benefit of only one entity.

The opening brief suggests that Salessi might have a claim for common count on the theory that Salessi should at least get his loan initiation fee money back. But, as we have mentioned, Alpha Appraisals was hired by Century via Peimani. (According to the complaint Century is in default; at oral argument Salessi informed the court that he had already obtained a $75,000 judgment against it.) Peimani operated as an independent loan broker -- he might have flogged Salessis loan to any number of potential lenders who in turn would be expected to protected themselves by hiring their own appraisers. If Salessi has any basis to get his $500 back, it is from Peimani or Century, not Alpha Appraisals.

B. The Sellers Brokers

1. The Recusal Motion

In July 2006, the sellers brokers brought a motion for summary judgment on the one remaining cause of action alive against them at that point -- false and deceptive advertising under Business and Professions Code section 17200. We will call this the UCL (for unfair competition law) claim. Again, we emphasize that the opening brief does not challenge the propriety of the dismissals of causes of action eliminated earlier; also, the motion would be granted as a judgment on the pleadings.)

The false advertising claim is based on the sellers brokers flyer, which misled him concerning the house, including having a fountain, having designer perfect remodeled baths plus some of the fixtures that were removed upon the sale.

On October 12, 2006, the day that the motion for summary judgment was to be heard, Salessi filed a for cause recusal motion against Judge Gray under section 170.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (All further statutory references are to that code.) Gray was supposedly prejudiced because he had already ruled in favor of other defendants. Gray immediately denied the recusal motion, but then said, in fact I will refer this to Department 1, and then proceeded to hear, and grant (albeit as a motion for judgment on the pleadings) the motion brought by sellers brokers.

The recusal motion was later denied by Judge Stock, noting that there were no facts to show prejudice, only conjecture. On appeal, now, though, Salessi asserts that Judge Grays ruling on the motion for summary judgment before consideration by another judge renders his summary judgment ruling void ab initio.

The argument has been waived, however. Section 170.3, subdivision (d) is plain that the determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding. The statute goes on to say the petition shall be filed and served within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the courts order determining the question of disqualification. Since Salessi never sought writ review on the disqualification issue, he cannot seek review of the issue now on appeal. The case of Collins v. Nelson (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 42 (referred to in Salessis brief as Collins v. Wilson) is inapposite, since the case predates section 170.3 subdivision (d), which was enacted in 1984 (Stats. 1984 ch. 1555,  7). Collins assumed the issue was directly appealable, but the Legislature eliminated that possibility in 1984.

2. The UCL 17200 Claim

The basis for the motion is that the sellers brokers could not be responsible for the removal of fixtures that, after all, really did exist at the time they were described in a flyer. On appeal, Salessis theory is that the sellers brokers should have known that the sellers would remove those fixtures, and exercise reasonable care to make the removal plans known.

Proposition 64, approved in 2004, has added language requiring that a plaintiff making a UCL claim must show a injury in fact as a result of the underlying violation, here allegedly false advertising. (Bus. & Prof. Code,  17204.) In short, there is a causation requirement for such claims. (Hall v. Time, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 847, 855-856). That is, we are back to the question of reliance, for if Salessi did not rely on the flyer or the MLS listing, he could not show any injury in fact as a result of them.

The MLS listing was obtained in 2003, so, of course, no causation can be laid at its feet.

The flyer requires some more analysis, since Salessi did see it beforehand, on his way to his first view of the Aloma property. His legal theory is that the sellers brokers should have known that the Ortizs planned to remove various fixtures (including items in the garage) when the flyer was prepared, and disclosed that plan.

The theory, however, founders on the lack of any facts that the Ortizs ever gave any indication to their agents or brokers that they intended to remove the fixtures. Ordinarily, fixtures being fixtures, the brokers could assume that they would be left behind. (Civil Code,  660 [A thing is deemed to be affixed to land when it is attached to it by roots . . . or permanently attached to what is thus permanent, as by means of cement, plaster, nails, bolts or screws.].) Without some facts that would indicate the brokers were on notice of the sellers nefarious intentions, or some provision to that effect in the contract (see Civ. Code,  1013 [things affixed to land of another . . . belongs to the owner of the land absent agreement to contrary]), the normal presumption would be that the brokers would not know about any plans to remove any fixtures. (See Civ. Code,  3548 [presumption that The law has been obeyed.].)

Moreover, any other result would be untenable, because it would make agents and brokers who act for sellers the equivalent of sureties. They would be, in essence, warranting that their principals would not misbehave.

We now turn to the question of leave to amend. Given that Salessi already had tried four times to state facts against the sellers brokers, it can hardly have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to grant leave to amend. (See Del Paso Recreation & Park Dist. v. Board of Supervisors (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 483, 502 [In view of the fact that plaintiffs have not, after three attempts, pled facts which present a justiciable issue, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer, without leave to amend.].)

We note in this regard that even in this appeal Salessi does not state how the complaint might be amended to state a cause of action. As the Rutter treatise on civil procedure states, It is not up to the judge to figure out how the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action. Rather, the burden is on the plaintiff to show in what manner he or she can amend the complaint, and how that amendment will change the legal effect of the pleading. (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2007) 7:130, p. 7-51.) In Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 711, the court said: While such a showing can be made for the first time to the reviewing court [citation], it must be made. No such showing has been made here.

V. DISPOSITION

The judgments in favor of the appraisers and the sellers brokers are affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs on appeal.

SILLS, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, J.

ARONSON, J.

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[1] A third defendant, the lender, World Savings (now Wachovia) is now out of the case, this court having dismissed the appeal. In that regard, footnote 1 of the appellants opening brief (prepared by retained attorneys) notes that this court had already dismissed an appeal against World in another appeal, G037918, and stated that Salessi does not appeal now from the trial courts October 25, 2006, judgment dismissing World. Salessis erstwhile appellate attorneys wisely knew not to raise what would have been a patently frivolous appeal against World, which might have exposed him to sanctions.

[2] To quote paragraph 85: The counterfeiting of fiat money was reportedly rooted over two hundred years ago in the European countries, and in this country, by well-known European bankers. The United States Government lost multiple battles with such bankers by abolishing their schemes (banks), until they finally took the government and population of this country hostage by their insidious creation of the Federal Reserve Bank Corporation, and its offshoots, printing fiat money, credit, and the creation of gigantic credit-lines in favor of whomever they choose.

[3] The paragraph provides in part: I am informed, and believe, and thereupon that information and belief allege that foundation for this immunity had been laid for the fear of indictments against a majority of high government officials, particularly in executive branches, whose routine activities entail conspiracies and racketeering, inside and outside the country. A current example is a multi-billion dollar civil RICO action brought by counsel Stanley Hilton (Senator Doles counsel), on behalf of the people of the United States, in which he allegedly documents proof of a White-House executive order authorizing the 9/11/2001 air-raids. Also, based upon readily available information (Google) Mr. Hiltons lawsuit has been allegedly dismissed on the grounds of Sovereign Immunity, as I understood it to mean: once you are in the white house you can do anything, and everything you plan.