Filed 2/27/18 Sahagun v. Morales CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



ROSA ELENA SAHAGUN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ROGELIO V. MORALES,

Defendant and Appellant.


E067093

(Super.Ct.No. RIC1609607)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Gary B. Tranbarger and Daniel A. Ottolia, Judges. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Law Office of Bryan S. Owens and Bryan S. Owens for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Leonard Cravens for Defendant and Appellant.
Plaintiff and appellant Rosa Elena Sahagun filed a petition under the civil harassment statute Code of Civil Procedure section 527.16 (Petition) to enjoin defendant and appellant Rogelio V. Morales from contacting or harassing her and seeking a stay-away order. It alleged one cause of action of harassment, which was based on conduct by Morales posting threatening messages on her Facebook page and for using Facebook accounts under the name of Cali Rave Cartel to post threatening messages. In response, Morales filed his special motion to strike petition for civil harassment restraining orders pursuant to section 425.16 (anti-SLAPP motion). The trial court stated that it was “granting” the anti-SLAPP motion in part and denying it in part. It found that posts by Morales himself were protected communication but found that posts from Cali Rave Cartel were not protected communication. It did not strike the only cause of action in the Petition and granted the restraining order against Morales to have no contact with Sahagun. The trial court denied the stay-away order.
Sahagun appeals the partial grant of the anti-SLAPP motion based on the trial court erroneously determining that background information she provided in her declaration in support of the Petition that Morales had harassed her under his own social media accounts was the reason for the restraining order. Further, Sahagun appeals the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,500 to Morales arguing he was not the prevailing party and was therefore not entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (c).
Morales appeals the partial denial of his anti-SLAPP motion arguing that the trial court improperly relied on inadmissible evidence and protected communication to deny his anti-SLAPP motion. Further, Sahagun failed to establish she had a probability of prevailing on the Petition by clear and convincing evidence.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PETITION FOR CIVIL HARASSMENT RESTRAINING ORDER
On July 27, 2016, Sahagun filed her Petition against Morales seeking to enjoin any contact with her. She also sought a stay-away order for herself, her home, her workplace, her clients while at court and her social media accounts. Sahagun recognized that since they were both attorneys they would be in court at the same time but this was acceptable because of security, but she requested that he have no verbal or physical contact with her.
Sahagun submitted a declaration. The first portion of her declaration was entitled “Background.” She was an attorney and a community activist. Her main office was located in Riverside. She stated that in July 2016, local minority-owned businesses had reached out to her regarding gender discrimination lawsuits that were being filed by Morales. The lawsuits involved Mireya Arias, defendant’s girlfriend. Although Sahagun did not represent any of the business owners, she had organized the community to call attention to the lawsuits, which she alleged were orchestrated by Morales and Arias. Sahagun, aggrieved business owners and other community members protested outside of Morales’s place of business on July 17, 2016. They also staged a protest on the courthouse steps in Riverside and there were media outlets present. Sahagun also shared information regarding the lawsuits filed by Morales on her social media page. She had shared a video of Morales and Arias at a place of business. Morales began posting comments on her page.
Sahagun continued in the Background section that Morales had posted comments under his name on her Facebook page, including posting an altered photograph of her with Spanish words, which, translated, stated that she was upset because she was in love. Morales sent Sahagun a private message on Facebook stating, “U seem obsessed with me lol.” Morales posted another photograph of Sahagun on her page and wrote “[t]hank you to all that support gender discrimination” in Spanish. She ignored the posts. Sahagun stated that Morales had a person attend a protest planning meeting on the morning July 19, 2016 and record the meeting. The audio was posted on Morales’s law firm’s Facebook page and also on Sahagun’s page. Morales labeled the post as “Attorney incites riot against rival attorney.”
In the Background section, Sahagun stated that Morales posted another photograph of her on her Facebook page and accused Sahagun of being a fraud who supported gender discrimination. Sahagun also attached an exhibit showing Morales had posted on her page numerous other times but the comments were no longer visible.
Sahagun had another section in her declaration entitled “Threatening Posts/Conduct.” On July 21, 2016, she noticed posts on her Facebook page from an account named Cali Rave Cartel. One of the messages was written in Spanish and she provided the following translation: “Fucking whore attorney! Is a fraud! Will get your justice! We can hear your voice idiot! I am going to your office.” There no photographs on the Cali Rave Cartel Facebook page but it was identified by a graphic of a decorated skull with the words Cali Rave Cartel. Another post was made to her page by the Cali Rave Cartel, which included “Fucking Whore Attorney” and “Fucking Bitch Whore.”
On the same day as the posts, someone called Sahagun’s office and asked if she would be in the office. The caller was not interested in setting up an appointment. Further, one of Sahagun’s followers indicated he or she had somehow seen a message from Cali Rave Cartel indicating “she will pay this bitch attorney.”
Sahagun searched the Instagram account for Cali Rave Cartel. A photograph of Arias was posted and she was wearing a t-shirt that had the distinctive skull insignia and the words Cali Rave Cartel. The post included the message “@mireari rocking our first ever #caliravecartel t-shirt.” Arias made comments on the post from her own Instagram account; Sahagun reasoned that Morales therefore must by the owner of the Cali Rave Cartel account. Sahagun also presented that a Twitter account for Cali Rave Cartel included a post that had a link to Morales’s Instagram account.
Morales contacted Sahagun’s office and asked to speak with her “because things could get a lot worse for both of us.” Sahagun advised him to relay all communication in writing and hung up. Morales sent a request on Facebook as to whether he could call her but Sahagun ignored the request.
Sahagun concluded that Morales’s “pervasive and constant postings from the page with his name although irritating did not alarm. THE POSTS FROM THE CALI RAVE CARTEL HAVE ME EXTREMELY WORRIED FOR MY SAFETY.” She was concerned because Morales apparently tried to hide his identity by posting under Cali Rave Cartel. She did not feel safe and sought to have Morales restrained from contacting her or engaging in any internet harassment.
B. ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
On August 1, 2016, Morales filed his anti-SLAPP Motion in propria persona. He sought to strike the Petition. He insisted that the Petition was based on communication and conduct in furtherance of his rights to petition and free speech under the federal and California Constitutions in connection with a public issue. Further, Sahagun could not show that she had a probability of prevailing on the Petition. Morales sought attorney’s fees should the Motion be granted.
Morales stated that all of the communications made by him were in relation to the gender discrimination lawsuits filed by Morales, and were made in furtherance of his right to free speech. Further, any statements made from the Cali Rave Cartel were also in furtherance of the person’s free speech rights. Morales insisted there were no allegations of past physical violence or threats of physical violence that were attributed to Morales. Morales insisted that all of the communication was protected and Sahagun had not shown a probability of prevailing on the claim.
Morales submitted his declaration. He was an attorney admitted to practice law in California. He stated that there was no evidence of past incidents of violence or threats of violence. Further, all of the communication was protected. He stated, “Additionally, it appears clear to me that Sahagun is simply upset with the exercise of my right to petition and right to free speech.”
C. SAHAGUN’S OPPOSITION TO THE ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
Sahagun filed her opposition to the Motion. She insisted that Morales’s activities as alleged in the Petition were not protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. She alleged that the anti-SLAPP statute did not protect illegal activity.
The opposition again provided the background that Sahagun helped organize business owners and community members to protest the filing of gender discrimination lawsuits by Morales and his girlfriend. The opposition referred to protests that occurred outside Morales’s office on July 17, 2016. The opposition also outlined the direct communication by Morales on Sahagun’s Facebook page. The opposition emphasized that Sahagun only became concerned for her safety when she saw the posts by the Cali Rave Cartel and the call(s) made to her office inquiring if she would be in the office.
The opposition provided that speech constituting “harassment” pursuant to section 527.6 is not constitutionally protected and the victim of harassment can obtain injunctive relief. Further, there was no legitimate purpose for Morales’s repeated harassment against Sahagun. The photographs, links and comments made directly by Morales calling her a fraud and in favor of gender discrimination would cause any reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. Further, the insinuation that Sahagun was in love with Morales constituted harassment. Morales’s pattern of harassment grew into threats of violence through the vulgar and derogatory comments posted under the social media of the Cali Rave Cartel. The threats included that Sahagun would pay and that someone would arrive at her office to show her justice.
Sahagun also argued there was a probability that she would prevail on the merits. She only needed to show that Morales knowingly or intentionally communicated a threat. This was shown by connecting Morales to the Cali Rave Cartel. Such comments caused her to fear for her safety and to suffer from emotional distress. Sahagun submitted the same declaration and exhibits as submitted with the Petition.
D. REPLY TO OPPOSITION TO ANTI-SLAPP MOTION
Morales, represented by counsel, submitted a reply to Sahagun’s opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion on August 23, 2016. Morales argued that the statements made on Facebook were protected activity. He contended that although some of the posts used “colorful” language, none of the posts were threatening in nature. All of the statements related to Sahagun’s attempts to stop Morales’s gender discrimination lawsuits. The statements that someone would come to her office was not a threat of violence. His phone call and message on Facebook seeking to talk to Sahagun were not threats of violence. Further, they were in connection with his lawsuits for gender discrimination. The statements made by the Cali Rave Cartel were statements made in regards to pending litigation and were only comments on Sahagun’s role as an attorney trying to stop his lawsuits; they were not threats.
Moreover, Sahagun would not prevail on the merits because (1) she had shown no acts of violence; (2) there were no statements knowingly and willfully made that constituted threats of violence; (3) the statements were protected activity; and (4) Morales had a legitimate purpose in contacting her.
Morales filed an accompanying objection to all of the exhibits submitted by Sahagun arguing the evidence was not admissible. He objected to all of the exhibits on the grounds of lack of authentication, relevance (they contained no threatening statements that would be relevant to the claim of harassment because they did not involve violence), and hearsay because they involved out-of-court statements. Further, Sahagun had failed to establish the postings from the Cali Rave Cartel were from Morales.
E. HEARING AND RULING ON ANTI-SLAPP MOTION AND PETITION
On August 30, 2016, the matter was heard by Judge Gary Tranbarger. The trial court explained it was going to send the parties to mediation on the Petition. The trial court indicated a restraining order was relatively easy to resolve and normally did not involve attorneys. As such, the trial court noted that at the end of the proceeding, no one was going to be awarded attorney’s fees. The trial court stated, “It’s not reasonable to spend a lot of attorneys’ fees on a request for civil harassment.”
The parties did not settle. The matter was recalled on both the anti-SLAPP motion and the Petition. Sahagun indicated she had more evidence she could provide that Morales was in charge of the Cali Rave Cartel Facebook page. Morales’s counsel objected to the trial court considering the Petition before ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court stated that either way it was conducted it was going to ask Morales some questions and he was going to answer the questions.
The trial court asked Morales if he was connected to the Cali Rave Cartel page. Morales’s counsel again objected asking for a ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court overruled the objection. Morales responded that once an anti-SLAPP motion was filed, discovery was stayed. Morales could not provide any further information. The trial court responded, “Everything that was done in your name I’m granting the motion. As for everything done in the name of this mystery account I’m denying the motion.” The trial court asked Morales again if he was connected to the Cali Rave Cartel. Morales’s counsel asked for clarification on the ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court again stated that it was granting the anti-SLAPP motion to the extent it was based on acts performed in Morales’s name. Those items would not be the subject of a restraining order. The trial court further stated, “I’m denying the request to have this case dismissed to the extent that this request for a restraining order is based on the activities of a person or persons involving this Twitter account, Instagram account and . . . Facebook.” The trial court was going to have a hearing to determine Morales’s involvement with these accounts.
Morales testified that he was not the one who sent the messages on the Cali Rave Cartel account. He knew who had sent the messages but that person had sought counsel from him so the information was privileged. The trial court inquired of Morales if he participated in the creation of the Cali Rave Cartel. Morales admitted that he and several other people created the business. Other persons had access to the social media accounts. Morales denied he sent the messages and could not disclose who sent the messages.
Morales’s counsel asked why the trial court was considering the Petition when it had granted the anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court responded, “We aren’t discussing the petition. I did not grant the motion to strike as to the petition related to the comments made by people involved behind that account.”
Morales was asked several questions by Sahagun’s counsel regarding when he formed Cali Rave Cartel and his involvement in the account. Morales responded to each question that he could not remember.
The trial court first noted, “Mr. Morales, by your testimony and lack of candor today you have convinced me that you are indeed responsible for the statements that are made by that account and that you are a person who cannot—notwithstanding your admission to the Bar, you are a person who I’m not going to trust that’s going to behave yourself absent a restraining order. I’m going to issue a one-year restraining order.”
Morales asked if the anti-SLAPP motion was denied. The trial court responded, “The SLAPP motion was granted as to everything that was done in your name. It was denied as to the statements in that account, and I have found after this evidentiary hearing that you are indeed responsible for the statements made in the account; I find they are of a threatening nature; and I find that the civil harassment order is appropriate.”
According to the minute order from the hearing, the trial court ruled as follows: “Motion is granted as to anything done openly and in Rogelio Morales name. [¶] Motion denied in part. [¶] Motion is denied as to anything done involving Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook.”
The trial court signed the restraining order, which was set to expire on August 30, 2017. The “Personal Conduct Orders” were granted in that Morales was not to harass or intimidate Sahagun or contact her by any means. The “Stay-Away Orders” were denied. No attorney’s fees were granted.
F. ATTORNEY’S FEES
Morales filed a request for attorney’s fees on September 9, 2016. He requested fees in the amount of $18,839.25 pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (b). He indicated that after filing the anti-SLAPP motion, he hired counsel to represent him. He insisted that his anti-SLAPP motion was granted “in part.” He attached a billing statement from his counsel.
Sahagun filed opposition to the motion for attorney’s fees. She argued that Morales was not the prevailing party on the anti-SLAPP motion because he failed to strike the only cause of action. The only victory was striking the Background information, which was not relied upon by Sahagun in seeking the restraining order. Moreover, if Morales could be considered the prevailing party, the fees requested were inflated. She also filed objections to the evidence and declarations in support of the motion for attorney’s fees.
Morales filed a reply arguing that “23 out of 25” statements were struck and that Sahagun’s restraining order did not include the stay-away orders requested. He argued his anti-SLAPP motion was “92%” successful and he should receive 92 percent of the fees.
Morales also filed a general peremptory challenge against Judge Tranbarger contending he was biased against him. He also filed a peremptory challenge that Judge Tranbarger should not be allowed to decide the attorney’s fees issue. Sahagun filed opposition to the motion to disqualify Judge Tranbarger. Judge Tranbarger recused himself on September 14, 2016, finding: “While I harbor no bias against Rogelio Morales in any fashion, a reasonable person reading the transcript of my pre-hearing remarks regarding the subject of attorney’s fees might conclude that I have prejudged this case on the issue of attorney’s fees. Since the only remaining issue in this matter is the possible awarding of attorney’s fees, I am hereby recusing myself from deciding any motion for attorney’s fees, should such a motion be made.”
On September 16, 2016, Morales filed a motion to set aside the trial court’s rulings of August 30, 2016. Morales insisted that Judge Tranbarger was biased against him because of the gender discrimination cases filed by Morales, some of which were heard by Judge Tranbarger. On October 4, 2016, Sahagun filed opposition to the motion to set aside the August 30, 2016, orders.
On October 25, 2016, Morales filed a notice of appeal based on “an order or judgment under . . . section 904.1(a)(3)-(13).” Morales submitted a notice of stay of proceedings. He explained, “Stay applies to motion to set aside only. Attorney fee motion not subject to stay.”
On November 3, 2016, a hearing was conducted on the attorney’s fees motion in front of Judge Daniel Ottolia. The transcript of the hearing has not been made part of the record. According to the minute order, the parties argued the issue. The minute order states, “Court awards $2500 on SLAPP motion to respondent.”
On November 10, 2016, Sahagun filed a notice of appeal from the August 30, 2016, order granting the anti-SLAPP motion in part, and the award of attorney’s fees on November 3, 2016.
DISCUSSION
A. MORALES’S APPEAL
We first address the issues raised by Morales on appeal. Morales first claims the trial court erroneously denied the anti-SLAPP motion because it improperly considered his credibility in resolving the motion. Further, the Cali Rave Cartel Facebook posts should have been excluded because they were irrelevant, lacked foundation, lacked authentication and were inadmissible hearsay. In addition, Sahagun did not show a probability of prevailing on the merits. Finally, he argues the Cali Rave Cartel’s Facebook posts were protected under the “public interest prong of the anti-SLAPP statute because they were statements made in the public interest on a public forum.”
“A special motion to strike under section 425.16 is a procedural device that allows a defendant to obtain early dismissal of a lawsuit that qualifies as a SLAPP.” (San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611, 621.) “In 1992, the Legislature enacted section 425.16 in an effort to curtail lawsuits brought primarily ‘to chill the valid exercise of . . . freedom of speech and petition for redress of grievances’ and ‘to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance.’ [Citation.] The section authorizes a special motion to strike ‘[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States [Constitution] or [the] California Constitution in connection with a public issue . . . .’ [Citation.] The goal is to eliminate meritless or retaliatory litigation at an early stage of the proceedings.” (Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1395-1396, fn. omitted.) An act in furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech includes “any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3).)
“The analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion generally involves two steps. First, the defendant has the burden to show the defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct was ‘in furtherance of’ its free speech or petition rights and that the cause of action arose from this protected conduct. [Citation.] Second, if the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a probability of prevailing. The plaintiff must “ ‘ “ ‘demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” ’ ” (San Diegans for Open Government v. Har Construction, Inc., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 622.) “ ‘Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.’ ” (Thomas v. Quintero (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 635, 645 (Thomas).)
In Thomas, the court determined that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to section 527.6 proceedings. (Thomas, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 646-647.) “Review of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 is de novo.” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3; see also Gallimore v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1396 [“[w]hether section 425.16 applies and whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing are both legal questions which we review independently on appeal”].)
As to Morales’s first claim, the trial court considered Morales’s credibility in determining the validity of the Petition, not the anti-SLAPP motion. It appears the trial court first determined the anti-SLAPP motion and then considered the Petition. It noted that it was granting the anti-SLAPP motion as it related to Morales’s personal posts, but was denying the anti-SLAPP motion as it related to the posts by Cali Rave Cartel. It then took evidence on the restraining order assessing whether Morales made the statements. The trial court must take relevant testimony to determine whether there has been unlawful harassment. (Schraer v. Berkeley Property Owners' Assn. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 719, 733.) It is reasonable to conclude that the trial court determined the statements made by the Cali Rave Cartel were not protected speech as the statements were threats, i.e. resolved the anti-SLAPP motion and then examined Morales in deciding whether to grant the Petition.
“[S]peech that constitutes ‘harassment’ within the meaning of section 527.6 is not constitutionally protected, and the victim of the harassment may obtain injunctive relief. ‘Harassment’ is defined as ‘unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the plaintiff.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Credible threat of violence” is a knowing and willful statement or course of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.’ ” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1250.) “ ‘Violence and threats of violence . . . fall outside the protection of the First Amendment because they coerce by unlawful conduct, rather than persuade by expression, and thus play no part in the “marketplace of ideas.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1250.)
The threats to Sahagun posted by the Cali Rave Cartel, calling her a “fucking whore attorney,” claiming that she would get her justice, and that someone was coming to her office, were not in the public interest and were not protected speech as they constituted threats to her safety. Morales argued in the anti-SLAPP motion that his speech was protected because it was in regards to the public issue of his gender discrimination lawsuits. He presented only his declaration stating there was no showing of threats or past violence. The trial court disagreed and found the posts were threats. The trial court properly determined this communication was not protected, denying the anti-SLAPP and leaving the one cause of action intact.
Morales next contends that the trial court erred by relying on the evidence of the Cali Rave Cartel postings because they constituted inadmissible evidence. Where a party fails to obtain a ruling from the trial court, the objections generally are not preserved on appeal. (Bussard v. Minimed, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 798, 801, fn. 1, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 675.) Here, Morales never sought a ruling on the evidentiary objections during the hearing and the trial court never ruled on the objections. The trial court necessarily relied upon the exhibits in reaching its decision. As such, by failing to obtain a ruling in the trial court, Morales has waived the issue on appeal.
Finally, Sahagun showed a probability of prevailing on the merits because the trial court granted the Petition. Success on the merits of the injunction satisfies the plaintiff’s burden in opposing the special motion to strike. (Thomas, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 664 [“the granting of injunctive relief can[not] be viewed as anything other than a judicial finding that the petitioner has proved a likelihood of prevailing on the claim, a prerequisite for injunctive relief”].) Sahagun proved that the civil harassment cause of action had merit. Although the trial court denied the stay-away order, this was merely the denial of a remedy sought by Sahagun, not a denial of her cause of action. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the anti-SLAPP motion as Sahagun showed a probability of prevailing on the merits of her civil harassment claim.
B. SAHAGUN’S APPEAL
Sahagun contends that the trial court erred by granting the anti-SLAPP motion in part. She insists that the Background information provided in the Petition was not meant to support the cause of action for civil harassment. The trial court erred by finding that the request for the restraining order was based on this activity. Sahagun further contends the trial court erred by granting Morales’s attorney’s fees because he was not the prevailing party.
We need not address Sahagun’s first claim as she has not provided how the results of this case would have been different should we reverse the finding by Judge Tranbarger. It is not the duty of the appellate court to declare principles of law where no substantial rights can be affected by the decision. (See Keefer v. Keefer (1939) 31 Cal.App.2d 335, 337.)
However, we conclude under the facts of this case Morales was not entitled to attorney’s fees as the anti-SLAPP motion had no significant impact on this case. “[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs.” (§ 425.16, subd. (c).) “A ‘prevailing defendant’ within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (c), includes a defendant whose anti-SLAPP motion was granted as to some causes of action but not others.” (Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267, italics added.) The decision to award attorney’s fees lies within the discretion of the trial court and we review the record to determine if the trial court abused its discretion. (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 340.)
“Where a trial court has discretionary power to decide an issue, we are not authorized to substitute our judgment for that of the trial judge; the trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. [Citations.] The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason, resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we have no authority to substitute our decision for that of the trial court. Reversible abuse exists only if there is no reasonable basis for the court’s action. [Citations.] The burden is on the complaining party to establish an abuse of discretion. The showing on appeal is insufficient if it presents a state of facts which simply affords an opportunity for a difference of opinion.” (Gilbert v. National Corp. for Housing Partnerships (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1250.)
Sahagun is correct that although Morales was able to successfully defend against the allegations in the Petition as to the postings on Facebook in his name, the trial court concluded that the Cali Rave Cartel postings supported the cause of action. The trial court did not dismiss the only cause of action in the Petition, and granted the restraining order. Although Judge Tranbarger stated the anti-SLAPP motion was “granted” in part, it did not dismiss the only cause of action and granted the restraining order.
“ ‘[A] fee award is not required when the motion, though partially successful, was of no practical effect. [Citation.] “[A] party who partially prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion must generally be considered a prevailing party unless the results of the motion were so insignificant that the party did not achieve any practical benefit from bringing the motion. The determination whether a party prevailed on an anti-SLAPP motion lies within the broad discretion of [the] trial court.” ’ ” (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 782; see also Morrow v. Los Angeles Unified School District (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1446; Moran v. Endres (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 952, 955.)
Here, it is not entirely clear on what the trial court based its decision to grant attorney’s fees on the anti-SLAPP motion, as Sahagun has failed to provide the reporter’s transcript from the proceeding below. However, based on the record in this case, no trial court could have concluded that Morales was entitled to attorney’s fees. The result of the anti-SLAPP motion was “ ‘ “so insignificant’ ” ’ that Morales did not receive any “ ‘ “practical benefit from bringing the motion.” ’ ” (City of Colton v. Singletary, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at p. 782.) The only cause of action alleged in the Petition was not struck and the Petition was sustained by the trial court. The trial court never stated that the decision to deny the stay-away order was related to the anti-SLAPP motion. It was a clear abuse of discretion to grant attorney’s fees in this case. As such, we reverse the trial court’s order granting Morales $2,500 in attorney’s fees.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting Morales $2,500 in attorney’s fees is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


MILLER
Acting P. J.


We concur:


CODRINGTON
J.


SLOUGH
J.