Ringgold-Lockhart v. Sankary

Filed 11/13/09 Ringgold-Lockhart v. Sankary CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Aviva K. Bobb, Judge. Dismissed. Sanctions imposed.

Nina Ringgold for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Andrea Lynn Rice and Andrea Lynn Rice for Defendant and Respondent.

Oldman, Cooley, Sallus, Gold, Birnberg & Coleman, Marshal A. Oldman and Mary-Felicia Apanius for Respondent Andre-Paul Summers Chaussier, as Successor Trustee of the Summers Family Trust.

Law Office of Marc L. Edwards and Marc L. Edwards for Respondents Marc L. Edwards and Ernest Gordon Saunders, as Trustees of the Mary Louella Saunders Supplement Needs Trust.

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Justin Ringgold-Lockhart purports to appeal from the following: a nunc pro tunc order approving an ex parte petition for preliminary partial distribution; an order authorizing the retaining of appellate counsel and payment of fees; and a statement of decision. The law firm of Oldman, Cooley, Sallus, Gold, Birnberg & Coleman, LLP, Andre-Paul Summers Chaussier as successor trustee of the Summers Family Trust, and Myer J. Sankary, successor trustee of the Aubry Family Trust have moved to dismiss Mr. Ringgold-Lockharts appeal. We have previously repeatedly held in connection with this current probate proceeding that Mr. Ringgold-Lockhart has no right to appeal as he has no standing. (Ringgold-Lockhart v. Sankary (Oct. 27, 2009, B212797) [nonpub. opn]; Ringgold-Lockhart v. Sankary (Jan. 13, 2009, B202858) [nonpub. opn].)

In our most recent opinion we explained: An interested person within the meaning of section 48 has standing to participate in probate proceedings. (Estate of Loring (1946) 29 Cal.2d 423, 428; Estate of Davis (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 663, 668.) [Probate Code section] 48 provides in part: (a) Subject to subdivision (b), interested person includes any of the following: [] (1) An heir, devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding. [] . . . [] (b) The meaning of interested person as it relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding. The Court of Appeal has held: Subdivision (a) of section 48 does not purport to provide an exclusive list of recognizable interests. Rather, it permits the court to designate as an interested person anyone having an interest in an estate which may be affected by a probate proceeding. Subdivision (b) allows the court to determine the sufficiency of that partys interest for the purposes of each proceeding conducted. Thus, a party may qualify as an interested person entitled to participate for purposes of one proceeding but not for another. (Estate of Davis, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 668; accord, Estate of Maniscalco (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 520, 523-524.) The Court of Appeal has explained: [S]tanding for purposes of the Probate Code is a fluid concept dependent on the nature of the proceeding before the trial court and the parties relationship to the proceeding, as well as to the trust (or estate). This means that before the issue of standing can be resolved, we must understand the nature of the proceedings so that we may determine the parties relationship to it. As a practical matter, standing and the merits are closely tied, and it is often necessary to come to terms with the substantive claim before the issue of standing can be satisfactorily resolved. (Arman v. Bank of America (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 697, 702-703.) The requirement that only an interested person has standing to participate in probate proceedings: prevents delays in settling estate matters; gives the probate court control over proceedings and parties; and thus ensures the orderly administration of the estate. (Estate of Maniscalco, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 523; see Estate of Powers (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 715, 719.) (Ringgold-Lockhart v. Sankary, supra, typed opn. at pp 4-5.)

In our most recent opinion, we continued: We interpret unambiguous trust provisions as a matter of law. (Burch v. George (1994) 7 Cal.4th 246, 254; Gardenhire v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 882, 887, fn. 4; Burkett v. Capovilla (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1449.) We must first ascertain and, if possible, give effect to the makers intent. (Newman v. Wells Fargo Bank (1996) 14 Cal.4th 126, 134; Estate of Gump (1940) 16 Cal.2d 535, 548; Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, 205-206; Gardenhire v. Superior Court, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 888; Crook v. Contreras (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1205.) We review the trial courts standing determination for an abuse of discretion. (Estate of Prindle (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 119, 126; Arman v. Bank of America, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 702 ; Estate of Maniscalco, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 525.) [] Plaintiff argues he is an interested person because he is a successor in interest after his mother with a future interest in the trust and he has a current right to trust principle as the issue of an income beneficiary, Ms. Ringgold. We have reviewed the trust provisions and find no support for plaintiffs assertions. Plaintiff has not shown he is a beneficiary of the trust. Plaintiff has not established his mother, Ms. Ringgold, is an income beneficiary of the trust. Plaintiff might inherit trust property from his mother in the future, but that possibility does not give him a property right in or claim against the trust estate that may be affected by the probate proceeding. ( 48, subd. (a)(1); Estate of Maniscalco, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at pp. 523-524; Estate of Davis, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 668.) Moreover, on December 16, 2005, the probate court entered an order determining distribution rights. Pursuant to the December 16, 2005 order, the remainder of the trust was to be distributed in the following percentages: Eunice Aubry-Summers, 25 percent; Ms. Ringgold, 8.25 percent; issue of Milterine Hines, 22.25 percent; issue of Carrie Belle Williams, 22.25 percent; and Mary Louella Saunders, 22.25 percent. The December 16, 2005 order was affirmed on appeal as to Ms. Ringgold. (Saunders v. Sankary (Jan. 29, 2007, B188155 [nonpub. opn.]).) Plaintiff has no interest in the trust under the December 16, 2005 distribution order. That order supersedes the trust provisions and is the conclusive determination of the trusts validity, meaning, and effect. (Estate of Callnon (1969) 70 Cal.2d 150, 156; Keating v. Smith (1908) 154 Cal. 186, 191; Meyer v. Meyer (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 983, 992; Estate of Russell (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 758, 764-765.) (Ringgold-Lockhart v. Sankary,supra, pp. 5-6.)

Also, Mr. Chaussier has moved for the imposition of monetary sanctions against Mr. Ringgold-Lockhart and his attorney of record, Nina Ringgold. We have given notice we are considering the imposition of sanctions a required by California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(c). The sanctions motion is granted as the contention now for the third appeal that Mr. Ringgold-Lockhart is an interested party thereby having standing to appear and appeal the probate courts orders is frivolous and any reasonable attorney would believe the appeal totally and completely without merit. (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 649-650; In re Marriage of Economou (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 97, 106.) Our reasons in this regard are those set forth above in terms of the standing issue. We need not address the issue of whether monetary sanctions should be imposed because the appeal is prosecuted for an improper purpose. We fully credit the declaration of Mary-Felicia Apanius and find the correct amount of monetary sanctions to impose is $10,720.

The appeal of Justin Ringgold-Lockhart is dismissed. The law firm of Oldman, Cooley, Sallus, Gold, Birnberg & Coleman, LLP, Andre-Paul Summers Chaussier as successor trustee of the Summers Family Trust, and Myer J. Sankary, successor trustee of the Aubry Family Trust shall recover their costs incurred on appeal. Monetary sanctions are imposed in the sum of $10,720 in favor of Andre-Paul Summers Chaussier as successor trustee of the Summers Family Trust jointly and severally against Justin Ringgold-Lockhart and his attorney of record, Nina Ringgold.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TURNER, P. J.

We concur:

ARMSTRONG, J.

FLIER, J.*

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* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.