etc. San Francisco
Filed 2/13/13 Richardson v. City etc. San Francisco CA1/2
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
TWO
MARVETIA
LYNN RICHARDSON,
Appellant,
v.
CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.
Respondents;
CITY AND
COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.
A133300
(San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. CPF-10-510288)
After 16 years as
a member of the San Francisco police force, Inspector Marvetia Lynn Richardson
was terminated by the San Francisco Police Commission (Commission) for
misconduct arising out of three separate incidents. Richardson filed a petition for writ of
Francisco Superior Court seeking reinstatement, back pay, and damages. The court affirmed the Commission’s decision
in all regards. Richardson appeals,
asserting numerous challenges to the court’s order denying her petition. We affirm.
In February 2007, Dwayne
Jackson
filed a complaint with the San Francisco Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC),
alleging that Richardson had obtained confidential information on him and his
wife through improper computer searches.
The matter was referred to the San Francisco Police Department’s (SFPD)
Management Control Division (MCD), which conducted an investigation and
discovered that between January 1, 2006, and March 2007, Richardson had run 48
unauthorized searches on the SFPD’s CLETS computer system. The subjects of her searches were Samonia
Nelson (her girlfriend), Jackson (Nelson’s ex‑boyfriend), and Orlandis
Caleb (Nelson’s ex-husband).
On March 15, 2007,
MCD forward the matter to the SFPD’s Special Investigations Division (SID),
which received the file on March 22, 2007.
On May 7, 2007,
Lieutenant Daniel J. Mahoney of SID returned the file to MCD with a memorandum
advising: “This incident involves
computer queries made by Inspector Richardson regarding Duane Jackson. An anonymous letter was sent to Mr. Jackson’s
wife (Mrs. Dee Jackson) in Antioch. [¶]
Currently, Insp. Richardson is under investigation by Antioch Police Department
for allegations of theft by check fraud and it was believed that the
unauthorized computer usage was linked.
After conferring with Antioch PD, it is apparent that the two cases are
not linked and are separate incidents.
[¶] At this time, SID is not conducting an investigation into the
unauthorized computer usage as a criminal
violation.†The memorandum
concluded: “There is no criminal
investigation being conducted on the matter of unauthorized computer usage by
Insp. Marvetia L. Richardson #1246. This
case is being sent back to Management Control Unit for administrative action.â€
On August 9, 2007,
Richardson was interviewed by investigators from MCD. She admitted conducting the improper
searches, offering excuses for having done so, but denied having divulged
confidential information obtained during the searches.
On January 8,
2008, Lieutenant Lynette A. Hogue, Commanding Officer of MCD, sent a memorandum
to then Chief of the SFPD Heather Fong.
Concerning the SID evaluation of the complaint, the memorandum
summarized: “On March 22, 2007, the
Special Investigations Unit received and reviewed the information contained in
the OCC complaint and determined that they would not conduct a criminal
investigation at this time. On May 7,
2007, the Special Investigative [sic]
Division referred the complaint back to Management Control Division with their
recommendation.â€
Shortly after the
improper CLETS transactions came to light, Richardson was the subject of
another investigation, this one of a serious criminal nature involving multiple
police jurisdictions.
As will be
discussed in greater detail below, Richardson owned a home in Antioch, part of which
she rented to a tenant, Bridget Reed.
Reed was involved in a relationship—the nature of which was described
variously by different witnesses—with a young man named Jason Metz.
steal checks from the checkbooks of both his mother and father, who owned a
real estate business in Antioch, and forge their signatures. Metz then gave the checks to Richardson, who
deposited the checks into her checking account, giving Metz and Reed some cash
back and keeping the rest for herself.
The checks were in the following amounts, with the following
descriptions noted on the memoranda lines:
$800 for “rent,†$6,500 for “trip for Bridgette birthday/deposit,â€
$3,100.50 for “rent/deposit,†$6,400 for “school/tuition,†$4,500 for “car
repair,†$4,250 for “promise ring for Bridgette,†and $4,500 for “car
purchase.â€
In late March
2007, Metz’s parents discovered that unauthorized checks totaling over $28,000
had been written on their accounts. Of
that amount, all but $1,000 or $2,000 had been written to Richardson. Richardson’s checking account was
subsequently frozen due to suspected check fraud.
Richardson would
later testify that Metz told her he worked for his parents’ real estate company
and that he had authority to write the checks.
According to Richardson, Metz would give her a check with the
understanding that she would cash it and give Reed the cash, keeping some for
herself to cover rent and a deposit that Reed owed her. Despite that she was an inspector in the
SFPD’s fraud unit, Richardson claimed she never suspected Metz did not have the
authority to write the checks.
The check fraud
allegations against Richardson came to the attention of the SFPD by April 9,
2007. At that time, the Antioch Police
Department (Antioch PD) was conducting an investigation, which lasted until May
2007, when the investigation was turned over to the Brentwood Police Department
(Brentwood PD).
On September 14,
2007, Brentwood Police Detective M. Estrada prepared a report in which he recommended
that the “case be forwarded to the District Attorney’s Office for review and
issuance of a complaint against the three responsibles
. . . .†As to Richardson
in particular, Detective Estrada recommended charging her with seven counts of
grand theft and seven counts of fraud.
The report originally indicated that the case was “Closed,†although a
subsequent hand-written notation indicated that on November 1, 2007, it was
reopened for follow-up investigation into the original checks for forgery evaluation.
On December 18,
2007, Detective Estrada prepared a supplemental report advising that he was
unable to obtain the original checks. As
such, his ability to evaluate the checks for forgery was limited. The report identified the case status as
“Closed.â€
On December 16,
2008, the Brentwood PD faxed a document titled “Request for Prosecution†to
Lieutenant Rob O’Sullivan of the SFPD.
It advised that prosecution of Richardson for the check fraud was
declined due to “Insufficient Evidence.â€
A Contra Costa County deputy district attorney had signed the document
the previous day. The accompanying fax
cover sheet noted, “Per your request.â€
Shortly after 1:00
a.m. on the morning of June 7, 2007, Antioch police dispatch broadcast a call
regarding a disturbance at a residence in Antioch. The residence was a five-bedroom home owned
by Richardson, who rented the three upstairs bedrooms to Bridget Reed and her
three children. That night, Richardson
had numerous houseguests—three adults, two teenagers, and two young
children—all of whom were planning to go to Six Flags Discovery Kingdom the
following day. Samonia
Nelson—Richardson’s girlfriend and one of the subjects of her improper CLETS
searches—was one of the houseguests.
Antioch Police
Officers Jason Vanderpool and Santiago Martinez responded to the call.
officers could hear a “verbal argument between people†and “screamingâ€
emanating from the house. They knocked
on the front door, and Nelson opened it, allowing them to come inside. When they entered, they saw Reed, who had
recently been served an eviction notice by Richardson, walking down the
stairs. She told the officers that
Richardson’s houseguests were being loud, which was making it hard for her
daughter to fall asleep. Her requests
that they quiet down had been ignored, and she feared it was going to turn
violent.
At Martinez’s
request, Nelson went to get Richardson, who entered the living room from the
downstairs master bedroom. Vanderpool
described Richardson as “agitated†that they “were inside of her house.†According to Vanderpool, when Richardson told
Martinez that she was the homeowner, he responded that she wished she owned the
home.
Vanderpool, Richardson “was just uncooperative with us. And we were explaining why we were there and
she said something to the fact that remember I do the same thing that you do
and called [Martinez] a broke ass security†in a tone that Vanderpool
considered “assertive.â€
Vanderpool
testified that as he and Martinez were leaving, Martinez told Richardson that
she “set a great example for [her] agency.â€
Richardson responded by telling him to “fuck off†and slamming the door
behind them.
title="">[7]
Not surprisingly,
Richardson’s version of the events painted a much more favorable portrait of
her behavior. She testified that when
she came into the living room, she asked the officers what was going on. Martinez asked if she was the homeowner, and
when she answered that she was, he retorted that she wished that she was.
she was evicting Reed, he responded, “I don’t care. If I have to come back, everybody is going to
be arrested . . . for disturbance of the peace.†Richardson replied, “[D]on’t forget [that] I
do the same thing you do, Officer Martinez, you don’t have to threaten me with
the Penal Code. I’ve been telling you
what’s going on and you’re questioning me about homeownership. Totally out of bounds here.†Martinez told her, “[W]ell, if I got to come
back, I’m going to arrest you. You’re
fired anyway. You’re not even a cop. You’re fired.
You’re fired. You’re an alleged
homeowner.†Richardson responded, “I
[can] see this conversation is not going to go anywhere. You’re very unprofessional. You’re acting like a security guard. Please leave my home and come back with a
warrant and your sergeant.†She then
escorted the officers to the door and closed it behind them. After that, she told her guests to settle
down and go to bed, and she went into her bedroom, shut the door, and went to
sleep. She denied ever calling Martinez
“broke ass security,†swearing at any officer, or slamming the door behind
them.
After they left
the house, the officers walked back to their patrol cars, discussing what had
happened. As they were talking, they
“heard some more screaming upstairs, sounded like someone may have been slammed
into the wall and heard a female voice scream to call the police.†Because they could hear some kind of physical
altercation, they requested backup.
While they were waiting for additional units to arrive, Reed and her
daughter ran out of the house. As Vanderpool
described it, “They were shaking. Her
daughter was very upset. She might have
even been crying.†Reed told the
officers that someone inside the house threatened to kill them and they were
afraid to go back inside.
Within minutes,
Officer Jason Joannindes and Sergeant Tom Furhmann arrived. They found Martinez and Vanderpool standing
in front of the house, speaking with Reed and her daughter. With four officers now there, they returned
to the house. From the time they left
the house following the first visit and approached the house the second time,
approximately 15 minutes had elapsed.
While Joannindes
walked back and forth watching the house, Vanderpool, Martinez, and Furhmann
approached the front door, knocked very loudly several times, and rang the
doorbell multiple times, repeatedly announcing that they were from the Antioch
PD. Through the closed door, they could
hear someone inside whispering, “If you don’t answer the door, they’ll go
away.†They also requested that dispatch
attempt to call the residence, but dispatch was apparently unable to find a
phone number. Their efforts to contact
someone inside lasted “well over five minutes†in Vanderpool’s estimation and
“[s]omewhere between 10 and 15 minutes†in Furhmann’s estimation.
Twenty-two minutes
after he arrived on the scene, Furhmann authorized forced entry, and Vanderpool
kicked the front door open, a process that took a couple of minutes and caused
significant damage to the door. The
officers entered the house and announced their presence. Vanderpool had his gun in “low ready
position,†and Furhmann also had his weapon drawn. As they walked into the house, calling for
people to come out, two small children, whom Furhmann described as “Just little
things. Little tykes. They were quite upset and shaken,†came down
from upstairs. After the children were
seated in the living room, Nolan Satterfield, an adult male who had been
sleeping on a couch in the family room, walked in and put his hands up. In a downstairs bedroom, they found two
teenagers who were, by Vanderpool’s testimony, “acting as if they were asleep
in the bed.†They were detained in
handcuffs and turned over to Joannindes.
Vanderpool,
Martinez, and Fuhrman then approached the master bedroom, Martinez carrying a
Taser in his hand and the other two carrying their service weapons. The bedroom’s French doors were closed, and
they very loudly announced, “Antioch PD, open the door†several times. Eventually, Richardson opened one of the
doors, although she stood partially behind the door, with her right side,
including her right hand, obscured and only the left side of her body visible
to the officers. According to
Vanderpool, they were aware that Richardson was a police officer and were
concerned that she was concealing a firearm behind the door.
Richardson was
instructed multiple times to come out of her bedroom and show her hands. Furhmann asked Richardson where the dogs
were, and she responded, “Out in the back.â€
Because she was still not showing her hands, he reached in and grabbed
her by the crook of her left elbow, trying to pull her away from the door. He yanked her out of the room enough that her
right hand was visible, and they could see that she did not have a gun in
it. Richardson reacted by pulling away from
him and moving back into the bedroom.
Martinez then activated his Taser, striking Richardson on the left side
of her body.
A digital recorder
that Martinez was carrying in his pocket captured the following exchange:
“OFFICER: Come on out.
Come on out.
“OFFICER: Come on out.
“RICHARDSON: Why you guys here?
“MARTINEZ: Come here.
“OFFICER: Come on out.
Now.
“MARTINEZ: Let me see your hands.
“RICHARDSON: [Unintelligible—sounds like
“MARTINEZ: Let me see the other hand. Let me see the other hand.
“OFFICER: Ma’am, you’re going to get tazed. Come on out.
Now.
“OFFICER: Come on.
Come on.
“RICHARDSON: Samonia, wake up.
“OFFICER: Where’s the [unintelligible—sounds like
“RICHARDSON: Out in the back. What’s going on?
“OFFICER: [Unintelligible—sounds like
Now.
[Taser firing
sound; electrical pulses.]
“RICHARDSON: [Screaming sound.]
“OFFICER: Get up.
“RICHARDSON: Aw, you did that on purpose, dude.
“OFFICER: [Unintelligible.]
“MARTINEZ: Turn around.
Turn around. Turn around. Turn around.
“OFFICER: Get on your stomach.
“RICHARDSON: How do you justify that?
“OFFICER: Shows us your hands. That’s all you gotta do.
“RICHARDSON: I did.
You know I’m not armed.
[Unintelligible—sounds like Samonia].
“FEMALE: What?
“RICHARDSON: Call my attorney. Tell him they tazed me. I’m unarmed.
I’m in my pajamas.â€
According to
Vanderpool, Richardson was then helped off the ground and, in handcuffs, moved
to the dining room. Furhmann made the
decision to cite Richardson for resisting arrest. Vanderpool prepared the citation and
requested that Richardson sign it, which would have allowed her to remain in
the house. Rather than sign it, however,
Richardson attempted to write “tased†on it.
The officer told her not to, instructing her only to sign her name on
the signature line. Again, she attempted
to write “tased.†Richardson was then
taken into custody.
Again, Richardson
described the incident differently. She
testified that she was asleep when she heard some “beeping
sounds . . . .†She
opened her bedroom door and “with a clear unobstructed view [saw] Sergeant
Furhmann, Martinez, and Vanderpool standing in very close proximity next to
each [other] pointing gun[s] and tasers at me.â€
As she described it, “I was standing in the doorway clearly on the wood
portion or the wood frame, exposing my hands, head and body.†She was “very groggy,†“[s]leepy and dazed,â€
and she heard the officers shout “all kind[s] of things†at her. Fuhrmann asked where the dogs were, and she
responded that they were in the backyard.
She vehemently denied that her hand was hidden behind the door,
explaining that as a police officer, she was very aware of officer safety
issues and would not have put Nelson and her daughter, who were still asleep in
the bed, in harm’s way by trying to hide behind the door.
After Richardson
responded to the dog inquiry, Fuhrmann suddenly grabbed her left arm and pulled
her towards him, and Martinez fired his Taser at her. As she described it: “I fell to the ground. I started shaking. I felt volts of electricity going through
me. I felt urination running down my leg
and I fell to the ground. I said, oh,
dude, you did that on purpose. How you
going to justify that, Martinez? How you
going to justify that?â€
According to
Richardson, Vanderpool then handcuffed her while she was still on the ground,
yanked her up off the floor, and walked her into the dining room. He wrote a citation for resisting arrest and
then asked her to sign it. When she
attempted to write “tasered†on it, he told her she could not do that and to
just sign the citation. After she again
attempted to write “tasered,†he took it away, telling her she was going to go
to jail. Richardson testified that she
would have signed the citation had he permitted her to write “tasered†on
it. At Richardson’s request, an
ambulance was called so she could be taken for a medical evaluation because she
was concerned for her health: “I
urinated on myself. I was despondent. I was shaken up. I was a wreck.â€
When asked at the
evidentiary hearing why she did not respond to the commands to show her hands,
Richardson explained, “Three officers were talking to me at the same time. Show me your hands. It was all confusing. I’m asleep.
It all happened so quickly. I
couldn’t concentrate on one particular officer at that particular one point in
time aside from Sergeant Fuhrmann.â€
A complaint filed
June 13, 2007 by the Contra Costa District Attorney charged Richardson with
harboring felons (Pen. Code, § 32) and obstructing a police officer (Pen. Code,
§ 148, subd. (a)(1)), while others in the house, including Nelson, were brought
up on additional charges.
name="_ftnref9" title="">[9]
On August 6, 2007,
Sergeant Jennifer Dorantes of MCD interviewed Richardson regarding the events
of June 7. According to Dorantes, during
the interview, Richardson was evasive in her answers and told her that the
Antioch police officers never issued any commands or a warning that she was
going to be tased. According to
Richardson, however, she advised Dorantes that she did not recall the officers issuing any commands or warnings.
On June 14, 2007,
the SFPD filed a complaint (case no. ALW C07-076) with the Commission. It contained one specification that related
to the Antioch incident, charging Richardson with “Resisting, delaying or
obstructing an officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his
or her office or employment, conduct which undermines the good order,
efficiency and discipline of the Department and which brings discredit on the
Department . . . .â€
A first amended
complaint followed on March 13, 2008, this one containing nine
specifications. Specification nos. 2
through 4 involved the Antioch incident.
no. 1 in the original complaint. No. 3
alleged that Richardson engaged in “Unofficer like conduct toward the Antioch
Police Department which reflects discredit upon the Department . .
. .†And no. 4 charged
Richardson with “Making statements that are not truthful during the MCD
interview, when Members are required to answer all questions truthfully and
without evasion . . . .â€
Specification nos.
6 through 9 involved the CLETS transactions.
Nos. 6, 7, and 8 charged Richardson with “Bringing discredit on the
Department [by using her] position as member of Department to obtain
confidential information . . . through unauthorized CLETS
transactions,†one specification pertaining to each of the three victims of her
CLETS searches. No. 9 alleged that
Richardson divulged confidential information obtained during those improper
transactions.
On February 19,
2009, the SFPD filed new disciplinary charges against Richardson (case no. ALW
C09-004), these arising out of the check fraud incident. The two specifications charged her with
“Conduct Unbecoming an Officer, conduct which undermines the good order,
efficiency and discipline of the Department and which brings discredit on the
Department . . . .â€
and Check Fraud Charges
On April 8, 2009,
Richardson filed a lawsuit in the San Francisco Superior Court against the City
and County of San Francisco, the SFPD, and then Chief of Police Heather Fong,
seeking to enjoin them from pursuing the CLETS and check fraud allegations on
the ground that the charges were barred by the statute of limitations. (Case no. 487077.) First amended and second amended complaints
followed.
On June 25, 2009,
Richardson filed an unsuccessful ex parte application in her civil action for a
temporary restraining order to
preclude the SFPD from pursuing the allegedly time-barred specifications. That same day, she filed with the Commission
a “Motion to Exclude All Evidence and Dismiss All Charges Related to
Allegations That Are Barred by the Statute of Limitations.†Again, the motion sought dismissal of the
CLETS and check fraud specifications on statute of limitations grounds.
An evidentiary
hearing on the specifications against Richardson commenced on July 8, 2009, before
Police Commissioner David Onek, the designated hearing officer. At the outset of the hearing, Richardson
moved to exclude all evidence of what happened during the Antioch PD’s second
entry into her home. The Commission
denied the motion without prejudice on the ground that it had not yet heard
evidence on the circumstances surrounding the entry.
Commissioner Onek
then took evidence over the course of eight days in July. Sworn testimony and documentary evidence was
presented by both parties. The SFPD
presented testimony from Officer Vanderpool, Sgt. Fuhrmann, Sgt. Durantes,
Lt. Kenwade Lee, Sgt. Paget Mitchell, Sgt. Steven Ford, Lt. Edward Santos,
Jason Metz, Gayle Metz, Wayne Metz, and Lt. Robert O’Sullivan. Richardson testified on her own behalf, and
also called as witnesses Officer Sylvia David, Samonia Nelson, Nolan
Satterfield, Betty Marsden, and Sgt. Ronald Reynolds. During the hearing, Richardson admitted three
of the specifications (nos. 6, 7, and 8 involving the CLETS transactions).
Also during the
evidentiary hearing, counsel for Richardson, Quinton Cutlip, expressed concern
that the City Attorney’s office had a conflict of interest because it was
advising the Commission in the case against Richardson, while at the same time
representing the SFPD in Richardson’s civil case. Commissioner Onek responded to this concern
by saying, “I understand your concern, Mr. Cutlip. There is a wall between different parts of
the city attorney’s office when they have potential conflicts like this.†When pressed by Mr. Cutlip for “some kind of
documentation of this wall,†the Commissioner declined the request, explaining,
“[T]his is not the venue for this concern. . . .†Mr. Cutlip persisted, asking that the
Commission recuse itself from the case, which request Commissioner Onek denied.
On July 14, 2009,
in the midst of the evidentiary hearing, Richardson moved for nonsuit on the
specifications arising out of the Antioch incident. As to specification nos. 2 and 3, Richardson
argued that she could not be found guilty of the Antioch related charges
because the Antioch PD’s entry into her house was unconstitutional and she
could not be punished for peaceful resistance to the officers’ unlawful
conduct. As to specification no. 4, she
contended that the evidence presented by the SFPD, specifically the testimony
of Dorantes who conducted the MCD interview, demonstrated that she never made
false statements during the interview.
She also renewed her motion to exclude evidence regarding the Antioch
incident.
On November 4,
2009, the Commission denied Richardson’s June 25 motion to dismiss the CLETS
and check fraud allegations on statute of limitations grounds.
On December 9,
2009, the full Commission considered the record of the evidentiary
hearing. Following deliberations, it
sustained specification nos. 2 and 3 (the Antioch incident) and 6 through 8
(the unauthorized CLETS searches) in case no. ALW C07-076, and
specification nos. 1 and 2 (the check fraud scheme) in case no. ALW C09‑004. Following argument from counsel for the
parties in the subsequent penalty phase, the full Commission again deliberated
and unanimously voted to terminate Richardson from employment with the SFPD. In announcing its decision, it stated that
the check fraud charges alone warranted termination. The Commission’s decision was adopted a week
later in resolution no. 126-09, which ordered that Richardson be terminated
effective immediately.
Also on December
9, the Commission issued a decision denying Richardson’s July 14, 2009
motion for a nonsuit. Richardson’s
motion to exclude evidence of what transpired during the Antioch incident was
likewise denied.
On June 2, 2010,
the Commission adopted three additional resolutions. Resolution No. 61-10 adopted findings of fact
and conclusions of law supporting the Commission’s November 4, 2009 decision
denying Richardson’s motion to dismiss the allegedly time‑barred
specifications. As to the CLETS charges,
it stated:
“A. The Commission finds that the one-year
Government Code §3304(d) statute of limitations for notifying an officer of
proposed discipline was tolled for 53 days as to these CLETS charges, during
the Special Investigations Division (SID) investigation of the allegations as
possible crimes. (Government Code
§3304(d)(2).)
“On February 21,
2007 an Office of Citizen’s Complaints (OCC) investigator’s letter first
notified Management Control Division (MCD) of possible CLETS violations by
Inspector Richardson. MCD investigates
possible administrative disciplinary charges against officers. On March 15, 2007, MCD referred the matter to
the Special Investigations Division for investigation as possible crimes. The statutory time for bringing disciplinary
charges was tolled during that SID investigation of possible crimes, pursuant
to Government Code §3304(d)(1). On May
7, 2007 SID returned the matter to MCD for follow-up as an administrative
disciplinary (not criminal) matter. Fifty-three
(53) days had elapsed during that Government Code §3304(d)(2) tolling period,
while the matter was being investigated by SID.
“B. The Commission finds that the Specifications
6, 7, 8 and 9 allegations of CLETS violations are not time-barred by the
Government Code §3304(d) one-year statute of limitations as argued in Inspector
Richardson’s Motion to Dismiss, since Inspector Richardson was served March 13,
2008 with notice of proposed discipline on these charges, which was within one
year plus 53 (tolled) days after the February 21, 2007 notice to the Department
of possible CLETS violations.â€
Concerning the
check fraud charges, the resolution provided:
“A. The Commission finds that the one-year
Government Code §3304(d) statute of limitations for notifying an officer of
proposed discipline was continually tolled as to these fraudulent check charges
until December 16, [2008], during investigation as possible crimes by two other
police departments and during the time the District Attorney considered
criminal charges. (Government Code §3304(d)(2).)
“(i) The Antioch Police Department investigated
during April and May 2007. In April 2007
the San Francisco Police Department learned of the Antioch investigation. Inspector Richardson does not dispute that
time was continuously tolled during the Antioch Police Department Investigation.
“(ii) The Antioch investigation led to further
investigation by the Brentwood Police Department during May and June 2007,
which further continuously tolled the time.
Inspector Richardson does not dispute that time was continuously tolled
during this time period as well.
“(iii) Brentwood Police Department referred the
matter to the Contra Costa District Attorney for possible
declined to prosecute, and so notified the Brentwood Police Department on
December 16, 2008.
“(iv) The Commission finds that the Government
Code §3304(d) one-year time period for notifying Inspector Richardson of
proposed discipline on the fraudulent check charges was continuously tolled
from April 2007 when the San Francisco Police Department first learned of the
Antioch Police Department investigation, until the District Attorney completed
its part of the process in December 2008.
(Government Code §3304(d)(2).)
“B. The Commission finds that the Case No.
C09-004 (Specifications 1 and 2) allegations of check fraud violations are not
time-barred by the Government Code §3304(d) one-year statute of limitations as
argued in Inspector Richardson’s Motion to Dismiss, since Inspector Richardson
was served February 18, 2009 with notice of proposed discipline on these
charges, which was well within one year after the continuous tolling period
ended on December 18, 2008.â€
The second
resolution, No. 62-10, adopted the Commission’s findings and conclusions
supporting the December 9, 2009 decision sustaining the specifications
concerning the Antioch incident, the CLETS transactions, and the check fraud
incident. As pertinent here, in support
of the Antioch charges the Commission found that “Inspector Richardson delayed
and obstructed members of the Antioch Police Department in the discharge and
attempted discharge of their duties when she refused their order to show both
hands, which reflected discredit on the San Francisco Police Department.†As to the CLETS charges, the Commission found
that Richardson admitted the allegations of conduct the improper computer
searches. Lastly, concerning the check
fraud, the Commission found that Richardson’s testimony was not credible and
that she engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer when she deposited numerous
checks belonging to Wayne and Gayle Metz without their permission.
Finally,
Resolution No. 63-10 adopted the Commission’s findings and conclusions
supporting its December 9, 2009 decision denying Richardson’s motion for
nonsuit.
Mandamus
On March 8, 2010,
Richardson filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the San
Francisco Superior Court. The petition,
filed against the Commission, identified as real parties in interest the City
and County of San Francisco, the SFPD, Police Chief George Gascon, and former
Police Chief Heather Fong.
The petition
challenged the Commission’s decision sustaining the specifications against
Richardson. As to the specifications
pertaining to the Antioch incident, Richardson argued that the decision was
invalid for multiple reasons: the
Commission improperly excluded a memorandum prepared by Sergeant Furhman
regarding the forced entry into Richardson’s home; it improperly considered
evidence of what happened after the police illegally entered her home in
violation of the Fourth Amendment; it abused its discretion because its
findings were not supported by the evidence; and the penalty was excessive as a
matter of law.
As to the CLETS
and check charges, Richardson claimed they were barred by the statute of
limitations, and the decisions regarding those specifications were not
supported by the evidence. As to the
CLETS charges, she contended the penalty was excessive as a matter of law.
The petition also
alleged that the Commission had a conflict of interest. According to the petition, during the July
2009 hearing, Commissioner Onek consulted with the City Attorney’s office on a
variety of matters, and an attorney from the City Attorney’s office was present
during the December 9, 2009 hearing before the full Commission. At the same time, the City Attorney’s office
was representing the City and County of San Francisco and the SFPD in
Richardson’s civil lawsuit. This,
Richardson contended, deprived her of a fair trial.
Richardson prayed
for a peremptory writ of mandate directing the Commission to set aside its
decisions of November 4 and December 9, 2009 and reinstate her with
backpay. She also sought damages in the
form of lost wages and benefits, compensation for the damage to her reputation,
and attorney fees.
After respondents
answered, the matter was assigned to the Honorable Ronald E. Quidachay for all
purposes. Judge Quidachay set a briefing
schedule for the motion for peremptory writ, with the motion to be heard July
11, 2011.
On April 25, 2011,
Richardson filed her of notice of motion and motion for peremptory writ of
administrative mandamus, reiterating the claims asserted in her petition. In support of her motion, Richardson filed a
request for judicial notice of the decision in Richardson v. City of Antioch, supra, 722 F.Supp.2d 1133, and
numerous documents in her civil case.
Respondents filed
opposition on May 16, 2011. In support,
they submitted a declaration of Marie C. Blits, a deputy city attorney in the
City Attorney’s office. Blits’s
declaration detailed the City Attorney’s office’s due process screens, and
testified that she was the sole deputy district attorney who advised the
Commission with respect to Richardson’s hearing and that she did not discuss
Richardson’s civil case with any attorneys handling it, other than some
possible scheduling matters.
After Richardson
filed a reply and a second request for judicial notice (this one seeking
judicial notice of certain pleadings she claimed demonstrated the conflict of
interest), Judge Quidachay heard lengthy argument on the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, he took the
matter under submission.
On July 20, 2011,
after Richardson’s motion was heard, she filed a third request for judicial
notice. This time, she sought judicial
notice of an “Order for Sealing and Destruction of Arrest Records†entered that
day by the Contra Costa County Superior Court.
Per that order, the court had found “that no reasonable cause exist[ed]
to believe that [Richardson] committed the offense for which she was arrestedâ€
and it ordered all records of her arrest sealed and destroyed. According to Richardson, the order was “one
more example of a Court ruling that Insp. Richardson did not resist or obstruct
the Antioch Police Department during the June 7, 2007 incident at her home.â€
On July 25, 2011,
Judge Quidachay entered his “Order/Judgment Denying the Petition for the Writ
of Administrative Mandamus.†As to the
Antioch incident, he found that “the evidence [did] not support a conclusion
that respondent’s findings regarding the events surrounding the Antioch
incident should be overturned.†He
explained: “The witness depositions from
both parties show that there is a dispute over whether petitioner used
profanity against Antioch police offers [sic]
during the first entry, and whether petitioner failed to show her hands during
the second entry. [Citations.] Due to the fact that there was no audio
recording during the first entry to resolve the disputed profanity issue, and
because the transcript of the audio recording during the second entry indicates
petitioner was not showing her hands after repeated requests by the officers on
the scene [citation], deference is given to respondent’s findings regarding
both entries. [¶] Thus, petitioner
failed to comply with the SFPD General Orders, which require high standards of
behavior during both on and off-duty conduct.â€
Turning to the exclusionary rule, Judge Quidachay concluded that because
the proceeding was civil in nature and no exceptions applied, the rule did not
bar the admission of evidence of the Antioch incident. And lastly, he concluded that Richardson’s
conduct was not protected by the First Amendment.
Turning to the
check fraud and CLETS charges, Judge Quidachay concluded that they were timely
filed. As to the CLETS charges, he
stated: “[T]he Court concludes that SID
did not end its investigation of the CLETS issue until May 7, 2007. Based on the fact that the first memorandum
was written by a member of SID, the dates from this memorandum are used in the
determination of this matter. While the
second memorandum may indicate that the SID investigation concluded on March
22, 2007, this second memorandum was written not by a member of SID, but by a
member of MCD, a separate department.
Furthermore, the second memorandum was written eight months later on
January 8, 2008. It defies reason to
believe that a member of a separate department who is interpreting a document
from outside its own department is better able to ascertain the conclusion of
an investigation within that separate department, particularly when the
document is not composed until several months later. [¶] Thus, using the dates from the first
memorandum, it is determined that because the SID investigation did not
conclude until May 7, 2007, the statute of limitations was tolled from the time
MCD referred the matter to SID on March 22, 2007, until May 7, 2007, a period
of 53 days. This supports respondent’s
finding that the CLETS charges were timely filed on March 12, 2008.â€
As to the check
charges, Judge Quidachay rejected Richardson’s claim that evidence of an
“actual†pending investigation was required to toll the statute of limitations
under Government Code section 3304, subdivision (d)(2)(A). He noted that Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th
1064 (Breslin) did not support this
proposition, nor did Richardson cite any other “case law requiring the investigative
entity to provide as detailed of an ‘actual’ investigatory activity as
petitioner desired.†In the absence of
any evidence showing that the Contra Costa County District Attorney did not
conduct an investigation, the December 15, 2008 document evidencing its
decision not to prosecute supported the Commission’s conclusion that the
statute of limitations was tolled until that decision.
Lastly, Judge
Quidachay rejected Richardson’s conflict of interest claim. He noted that to determine the procedural
fairness of an administrative hearing, a court may consider evidence not
presented at the administrative hearing if it is relevant to the petitioner’s
claim. Here, Deputy City Attorney Blits
submitted a declaration that detailed the screens that were in place in the
City Attorney’s office, evidence clearly relevant to Richardson’s conflict of
interest claim. And based on that
evidence, he concluded the claim was without merit.
With that, Judge
Quidachay denied Richardson’s petition.
Richardson’s notice
of appeal followed on September 19, 2011.
Richardson’s Contentions
Richardson’s appeal raises
numerous challenges to Judge Quidachay’s denial of her writ petition. As to the charges stemming from the Antioch
incident, Richardson presents four arguments:
(1) Judge Quidachay improperly upheld the specifications based in part
on the profanities she allegedly directed to the Antioch police officers during
the first entry, even though the Commission never made any findings on that
issue; (2) her statements to the officers were constitutionally protected and,
as such, it was an abuse of discretion to terminate her career based upon such
statements; (3) her career should not have been terminated over her conduct
during the second Antioch police department entry, because she had no
obligation to show her hand since the officers were in her home unlawfully and
evidence of what transpired during that entry should have been excluded ; and
(4) termination based upon the events during the second entry was
excessive and an abuse of discretion.
Turning to the
CLETS charges, Richardson’s arguments are threefold: (1) there was no substantial evidence
supporting the ruling by the Commission and Judge Quidachay that the charges
were timely filed; (2) Commissioner Onek deprived her of a fair hearing by
denying her request to examine MCD investigator Santos about the investigation
conducted on the CLETS charges; and (3) it was excessive and an abuse of
discretion to terminate her for her first offense of misusing the CLETS system.
As to the check
fraud charges, Richardson argues only that there was no substantial evidence
that the statute of limitations was tolled after the Brentwood PD closed its
criminal investigation.
The final issues
Richardson raises on appeal concern her conflict of interest claim. She contends that Judge Quidachay improperly
considered the Blits declaration and its attachment in rejecting her conflict
of interest argument. She also submits
that there was no substantial evidence that the City Attorney’s office had
complied with its policy of establishing screens.
We address
Richardson’s challenges out of order, beginning with her statute of limitations
claims.
CLETS and Check Fraud Charges Were Timely Filed
Public Safety Officer’s Procedural Bill of Rights Act
The statute of limitations
governing the CLETS and check fraud charges is set forth in the Public Safety
Officer’s Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.), which was
created by the Legislature to stop abusive practices by police departments
against police officers. (Gov. Code, §
3301.) As our colleagues in Division
Four described it in Breslin, supra, 146
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1074-1075:
“The act is
primarily a labor relations statute, cataloging the basic rights and
protections that must be afforded to all peace officers by the public entities
that employ them. [Citations.] Effective law enforcement depends on the maintenance
of stable public employer-public safety employee relations—relations that
benefit the public as well as public safety officers. [Citations.]
“One protection
codified in section 3304 is the speedy adjudication of conduct that could
result in discipline. [Citations.] The act provides that disciplinary charges
against a public safety officer must be filed within one year, subject to
certain statutory exceptions. . . . It seeks to balance competing interests—the
public interest in maintaining the integrity and efficiency of the police force
with the individual officer’s interest in receiving fair treatment.†(See also Parra
v. City and County of San Francisco (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 977, 988-989 (
purpose].)
As noted,
Government Code section 3304 provides for a one year statute of limitations,
which begins to run when the misconduct is discovered. (Gov. Code, § 3304, subd. (d)(1);
Cal.4th 313, 321.) It is, however,
subject to certain tolling and extension provisions. As applicable here, Government Code section
3304, subdivision
(d)(2)(A) provides for tolling during a criminal investigation: “If the act, omission, or other allegation of
misconduct is also the subject of a criminal investigation or criminal
prosecution, the time during which the criminal investigation or criminal
prosecution is pending shall toll the one-year time period.†(See also Parra,
supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 989.)
Indeed, tolling under such circumstances is mandatory: “The act requires
the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations while a criminal
investigation is pending if the misconduct is the subject of that
investigation.†(Breslin, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1078.)
Standard of Review
Legal issues
involving the interpretation of Government Code section 3304 are reviewed de
novo. (Breslin, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1077.) As to factual issues, “we determine whether
the record provides substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s factual
findings. [Citations] Applying the substantial evidence test on appeal,
we may not reweigh the evidence, but consider that evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court, indulging in every reasonable inference in favor
of the trial court’s findings and resolving all conflicts in its favor. [Citations.]
The question on appeal is whether the evidence reveals substantial
support—contradicted or uncontradicted—for the trial court’s conclusion that
the weight of the evidence supports the commission’s findings of fact. [Citation.]
We uphold the trial court’s findings unless they so lack evidentiary
support that they are unreasonable. We
may not uphold a finding based on inherently improbable evidence or evidence
that is irrelevant to the issues before us.
[Citation.]†(
Applying this standard
of review here, we conclude that substantial evidence supports Judge
Quidachay’s determination that the CLETS and check fraud allegations were not
barred by the statute of limitations.
The CLETS Violations
As detailed above,
Richardson’s CLETS violations came to SFPD’s attention on February 1, 2007,
when Dwayne Johnson filed a complaint with the OCC. On February 20, the complaint was
forwarded to Lieutenant Lynette Hogue, Commanding Officer of MCD. On March 15, MCD requested that SID conduct a
criminal investigation into the alleged CLETS violations, and SID received the
file on March 22. On May 7, Lieutenant
Mahoney of SID returned the file to MCD for administrative action, advising
that SID was not conducting a criminal investigation. Based on the foregoing records, both the
Commission and Judge Quidachay found that the criminal investigation did not
conclude until May 7, 2007, and that the statute of limitations was tolled from
the time SID received the matter on March 22 until May 7, 2007, a period of 53
days. As such, the statute of
limitations did not run until April 14, 2008, rendering the CLETS charges filed
on March 13, 2008 timely.
According to
Richardson, this conclusion was wrong because the evidence showed that SID
actually never performed a criminal investigation. As a result, her argument runs, the tolling
provision of Government Code section 3304, subdivision (d)(2)(A) did not apply
at all and the statute of limitations ran on February 21, 2008, one year after
MCD received notice of the allegations.
This was 21 days before the SFPD filed the amended complaint asserting
the CLETS specifications. Alternatively,
she argues that if the statute of limitations was tolled at all, it was tolled
for only the seven days between March 15, 2007, when the file was referred to
SID, and March 22, 2007, when SID received it and decided not to
investigate. Even assuming a one-week
tolling, the charges, according to Richardson, were still 12 days too late.
In claimed support
of her argument that SID did not conduct an investigation, and thus there was
no tolling, Richardson relies on three documents. The first is the May 7, 2007 Mahoney
memorandum returning the file to MCD with the comment, “There is no criminal
investigation being conducted on the matter of unauthorized computer usage by
Insp. Marvetia L. Richardson #1246.â€
Richardson also relies on a January 8, 2008 memorandum from Lieutenant
Hogue of MCD to Chief Fong advising: “On March 22, 2007, the Special
Investigations Unit received and reviewed the information contained in the OCC
complaint and determined that they would not conduct a criminal investigation
at this time.â€
title="">[11] According to Richardson, the memorandum
“confirms that the SID only looked at the OCC complaint, and it dispels the
myth that the SID waited until May 7, 2007 to make a determination not to do a
investigate by March 22, 2007—only
materials to SID on March 15, 2007.â€
Lastly, Richardson cites a “Chronological Record of Investigationâ€
maintained by MCD which contains the following entry summarizing the Mahoney
memorandum: “Lieutenant Dan Mahoney,
SID, wrote a memorandum stating that SID will not conduct criminal
investigation re: Inspector Richardson’s alleged CLETS violation.†We reject Richardson’s reading of the record,
and conclude instead that the documents provide substantial evidence for Judge
Quidachay’s finding that the CLETS charges were timely.
Most
significantly, and contrary to Richardson’s argument, the Mahoney memorandum
that SID investigated the CLETS abuse into May, when it returned the file to
the MCD. It advised MCD that Richardson
was under investigation by the Antioch PD for check fraud and it was initially
suspected that the unauthorized CLETS searches might have been related to the
check fraud. But the check fraud did not
surface until after March 22, 2007,
the date Richardson claims SID decided not to investigate the computer
queries. It necessarily follows that SID’s investigation could not have been
completed by the date Richardson asserts, and absolutely refutes her claim that SID did not conduct any
investigation into the improper CLETS charges.
Instead, reason dictates that as the check fraud came to the attention
of the SFPD by early April, SID investigated the CLETS searches and any
possible connection to the check fraud in April. By May 7, as supported by the Mahoney
memorandum, SID concluded there was no connection, and returned the CLETS file
to MCD for administrative action.
Further, we—like
Judge Quidachay—reject the notion that the MCD memorandum to Chief Fong
controls when the SID investigation concluded.
A memorandum prepared by MCD in January 2008 suggesting that SID
received the file on March 22, 2007, and determined that very same day that it
would not conduct a criminal investigation was not as reliable as the
contemporaneous memorandum written by SID actually closing the criminal
investigation. As Judge Quidachay aptly
stated, “Based on the fact that the first memorandum was written by a member of
SID, the dates from this memorandum [May 7, 2007] are used in the determination
of this matter. While the second
memorandum [January 8, 2008] may indicate that the SID investigation concluded
on March 22, 2007, this second memorandum was written not by a member of SID,
but by a member of MCD, a separate department.
Furthermore, the second memorandum was written eight months later on
January 8, 2008. It defies reason to
believe that a member of a separate department who is interpreting a document
from outside its own department is better able to ascertain the conclusion of
an investigation within that separate department, particularly when the
document is not composed until several months later.†The third document Richardson cites—MCD’s
“Chronological Record of Investigationâ€â€”is unpersuasive for the same reason.
In sum, the record
contains substantial evidence to support the determinations by the Commission
and Judge Quidachay that the statute was tolled from March 22, 2007 when SID
received the file and opened its investigation, to May 7, 2007 when SID closed
that file. The Department received the
CLETS-related complaint on February 20, 2007, and filed charges against
Richardson one year and 22 days later, on March 13, 2008.
limitations period was tolled, the CLETS charges were timely.
4.
The Check Fraud Charges
The check fraud
allegations against Richardson came to the SFPD’s attention by April 9,
2007. At that time, the Antioch PD was
conducting an investigation, which lasted until May 2007, at which point it
turned the investigation over to the Brentwood PD.
On September 14,
2007, Brentwood PD investigating officer Detective Estrada prepared a report in
which he requested that “this case be forwarded to the District Attorney’s
Office for review and issuance of a complaint against the three
responsibles . . . .â€
As to Richardson in particular, he recommended charging her with seven
counts of grant theft and seven counts of fraud. In the report, the case status was initially
noted as “Closed,†although on November 1, 2007, it was apparently reopened for
follow-up investigation into the original checks for forgery evaluation.
On December 18,
2007, Estrada prepared a supplemental report noting that he was unable to
obtain the original checks and, as such, his ability to evaluate the records
for forgery was limited. The case status
was noted as “Closed.†Estrada’s
supervisor approved the report the following day.
On December 16,
2008, the Brentwood PD faxed a document titled “Request for Prosecution†to the
SFPD. The document, signed by a Contra
Costa County deputy district attorney the previous day, advised that the
district attorney’s office declined to prosecute Richardson due to
“Insufficient Evidence.†The
accompanying fax cover sheet noted, “Per your request.†Judge Quidachay concluded that the district
attorney’s consideration of possible criminal prosecution tolled the
limitations period until it communicated its final decision on December 16,
2008.
Richardson
concedes that the statute of limitations was tolled for eight months while the
Antioch PD and then the Brentwood PD investigated the matter. She contends, however, that the tolling ended
on December 19, 2007, when Detective Estrada prepared his supplemental report
and “closed†the file, not on December 16, 2008 when the SFPD was advised that
Richardson would not be prosecuted. As
she describes it, “That note was written almost one year after the [Brentwood PD] closed its investigation. It only says that there was ‘insufficient
evidence’ to prosecute. There is no
evidence that any district attorney ever conducted a criminal investigation
after the [Brentwood PD] closed its files on December 19, 2007. The note from the district attorney only
confirms that there was no prosecution and appears to have been written at the
behest of the SFPD. The facsimile cover
sheet that was attached to the note and addressed to the SFPD says, ‘per your
request.’ †According to Richardson,
this was insufficient to toll the statute of limitations, because
Government Code section 3304,
subdivision (d)(a)(A) requires that there be an “actual and active investigation
or prosecution†pending in order for the tolling to apply. In support of Richardson’s proposed “actual
and active investigation†requirement, she relies on Breslin, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 1064. Breslin is
not as helpful as Richardson would have it.
The facts of
surveilling a known fugitive. Two of
them fired into the car in which he was attempting to flee, killing an innocent
passenger. The officers claimed they had
acted in self‑defense. Two
criminal investigations followed: one by
the OCC in response to a citizen complaint filed on June 10, 1998, and the
other by the district attorney, which commenced on the day of the shooting and
concluded on February 10, 1999.
Ultimately, the two officers who shot at the vehicle were charged with
murder and attempted murder, and all four officers were the subject of
disciplinary action. The trial court
concluded that the tolling and extension provisions sets forth in four
different subdivisions of Government Code section 3304 (including the criminal investigation
provision) combined to toll the statute of limitations such that charges filed
over four years after the incident were timely. (Breslin,
supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1069-1073.)
The Court of
Appeal reversed, concluding that the charges were untimely. But not on any ground that provides solace to
Richardson. As to the criminal
investigation tolling provision at issue here, the Court of Appeal simply held
that it did apply: “The facts relating
to the criminal investigation tolling provision are undisputed. From May 13, 1998, until February 10,
1999, the district attorney conducted a criminal investigation into the conduct
of all four of the officers involved in this shooting incident. The same incident was the subject of the June
10, 1998 complaint to the OCC. As all
the requirements of the criminal investigation tolling provision are met, we
find that this statute required that the one-year period for filing
disciplinary charges against each of the four officers be tolled from the time
that the OCC investigation began on June 10, 1998, through February 10, 1999,
when the criminal investigation formally ended.†(Breslin, supra, 146 Cal.4th at pp. 1078-1079.) Nowhere in the discussion of the criminal
investigation tolling provision is there any mention of an “actual and active
investigation†requirement, a point conceded by Richardson, who observes that
“there was no discussion about the amount or quality of evidence necessary to
support a decision about the tolling of the statute of limitations based upon a
criminal investigation. It was not an
issue.â€
Faced with this
deficiency, Richardson turns to another provision at issue in
extension†set forth in Government Code section 3304, subdivision (d)(2)(D).
the evidence supporting the commission’s decision establish that the city was
actually and actively investigating multiple
employees . . . .†(
1086.) Richardson invites us to
“interpret the criminal investigation and criminal prosecution tolling
provision in Government Code § 3304(d)(2)(A) the same
way . . . .†We
decline the invitation.
As a preliminary
matter, we note that the Breslin court
offered no authority for its “actual and active†requirement. Most definitely, it was not derived from the
statutory language, which offers no guidance on the nature of the investigation
that is sufficient to trigger the tolling provision, other than that it must
“involve[] more than one employee and require[] a reasonable extension.†(Gov. Code, § 3304, (d)(2)(D).) Nor does the language of the criminal
investigation tolling provision suggest such a requirement, as it simply
requires that a criminal investigation must be “pending.â€
More
significantly, the imposition of a requirement that the investigation must be
“actual and active†would simply be unworkable.
As respondents correctly explain in their brief, “Richardson’s proposed
‘active investigation’ standard would require a police department’s
disciplinary investigators, and later the courts, to monitor and oversee each
step of a separate criminal unit’s investigation to determine whether the
investigation is sufficiently ‘active’ to invoke section 3304(d)(2). That would be particularly unworkable where,
as here, the criminal investigation was conducted in another county whose
district attorney’s office may be unwilling to provide detailed activity
report
| Description | After 16 years as a member of the San Francisco police force, Inspector Marvetia Lynn Richardson was terminated by the San Francisco Police Commission (Commission) for misconduct arising out of three separate incidents. Richardson filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus in the San Francisco Superior Court seeking reinstatement, back pay, and damages. The court affirmed the Commission’s decision in all regards. Richardson appeals, asserting numerous challenges to the court’s order denying her petition. We affirm. |
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