Ratliff v. EMC Mortgage

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 12/5/13  Ratliff v. EMC Mortgage CA1/3

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California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 

FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT

 

DIVISION
THREE

 

 
>

LONNIE RATLIFF, JR.,             Plaintiff and Appellant, v. EMC MORTGAGE, LLC, et al.,             Defendants and Respondents.

A132886               (Alameda County               Super. Ct. No. RG10511310)

 

            Lonnie
Ratliff, Jr., (appellant), in propria persona, appeals from judgments entered
after the trial court sustained EMC Mortgage’s (EMC) demurrer without leave to
amend, sustained Robert J. Jackson, Esq., and Robert J. Jackson and Associates’s
(together, the Jacksons) demurrer without leave to amend, and granted the
Jacksons’s special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section
425.16.  Appellant contends the trial
court erred in ruling that:  (1) the
doctrine of res judicata barred his
claims against EMC; and (2) he failed to state a valid cause of action
against the Jacksons.  We reject the contentions and affirm the
judgments.

Factual and Procedural Backgroundhref="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]

            Appellant,
the owner of a real property located in Oakland,
California, (the Property) obtained a
$630,000 residential loan (the Loan) against the Property from Mortgage Store
Financial, Inc. (Mortgage Store), and a Deed of Trust was recorded on October 24, 2003.  The Deed of Trust identified Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as the beneficiary and First
American Title Insurance Company as the Trustee.  A Substitution of Trustee was recorded on July 22, 2005, substituting
Executive Trustee Services, Inc. (ETS), as the Trustee. 

            Thereafter,
appellant defaulted on the Loan and a Notice of Default was recorded on February 7, 2006, providing that
appellant was in arrears in the amount of $26,222.37.  A Notice of Trustee’s Sale
in connection with the Deed of Trust was recorded on August 20, 2007, setting a non-judicial
foreclosure sale for September 11,
2007.  In a letter dated August 20, 2007, GMAC Mortgage,
the servicing agent for the mortgage, notified appellant that EMC was going to
be the new servicing agent effective September 4,
2007.  

            Appellant
attended the foreclosure sale of the Property, which took place on October 2, 2007.  Appellant told the auctioneer agent that he wished
to buy back the Property, and the agent said he was willing to sell it back to
appellant for $620,000 if appellant could procure a loan within a certain
period of time.  Based on that
representation, appellant worked on procuring a loan, only to find out a few
weeks later that a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale had recorded on October 12, 2007, providing
that EMC was the high bidder at the October 2,
2007 foreclosure sale and had purchased the Property for $620,000.

            While
attempting to take possession of the Property, and in an effort to evict
appellant, EMC initiated an unlawful detainer
action on November 19, 2007.  EMC thereafter voluntarily dismissed the
action.  EMC filed a second unlawful
detainer action on February 8,
2008, and the Jacksons
were substituted in as counsel for EMC in the action.  The trial court dismissed the action without
prejudice on August 6, 2008.  EMC, still represented by the Jacksons,
filed an unlawful detainer action against an individual named Steve Jones “even
though,” according to appellant, “no [such person] lived on the
[P]roperty.”  The Jacksons
voluntarily dismissed this action on August 14,
2008.  The trial court found that
EMC’s action against Jones was a “ â€˜fraudulent filing,’ â€ and
sanctioned the Jacksons
$1,500. 

>The Prior Action

            After
two opportunities to amend his original complaint to state a cognizable cause
of action, appellant filed a second amended complaint on May 5, 2009, asserting claims against Mortgage
Store, MERS, EMC, and ETS.  He alleged
that the foreclosure sale that took place on October 2, 2007 was void or voidable because the
auctioneer agent made a false promise to him, and because ETS, as the trustee
that oversaw the sale, failed to comply with laws requiring notice to the
mortgagor prior to foreclosure sale, and also violated its duties and
obligations as trustee.  He alleged the following
five causes of action against all defendants: 
(1) setting aside foreclosure; (2) cancellation of deed; (3)
civil conspiracy; (4) fraudulent, illegal, and unfair business practices; and
(5) quiet title.

            EMC
filed a demurrer to the second amended complaint, and on July 30, 2009, the trial court, Judge Ronni
MacLaren, sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.  The trial court ruled, “All of [appellant’s]
claims are based on the allegation that there was irregularity in the
foreclosure sale that resulted in EMC obtaining title to the [P]roperty.  [Appellant] claims that if EMC had not
acquired title to the [P]roperty, it would have gone to an unidentified bank,
and [appellant] might have been able to repurchase it from the bank.  [Appellant] claims he was told by the
auctioneer that he would be able to repurchase the property, but he does not
allege that the auctioneer had authority to speak for the bank or EMC.  The facts do not show that [appellant] has
any enforceable right to reaquire the [P]roperty . . . [Appellant]
cannot establish the element of causation, which is fatal to all of his claims
based on loss of the [P]roperty.”  The
trial court further found that it was not reasonably likely appellant would be
able to state a viable claim against EMC if leave to amend was granted.  The trial court dismissed the second amended
complaint with prejudice, and appellant did not appeal the trial court’s
decision. 

>Instant Action

            On
April 23, 2010, appellant
filed a new complaint (the Instant Action) against EMC and MERS, seeking to undo
the October 2, 2007 foreclosure
sale.  On June 9, 2010, appellant voluntarily dismissed MERS
from the action.  Appellant then filed
the operative first amended complaint (FAC) on March 14, 2011, naming EMC and the Jacksons as
defendants. 

            Appellant
alleged in his FAC that EMC conducted an illegal trustee’s sale and sold the
Property back to itself without providing proper notice to appellant.  He alleged that EMC made “promises and
representations” “that they would abide by the laws of the State of California,”
“with the intent to induce [appellant] to (1) enter the Note and Deed of
Trust and (2) refrain from taking legal action to prevent [EMC] from
selling his home at any future trustee’s sale.” 
He alleged as to the Jacksons
that they “conspir[ed] among[] themselves and out of frustration and a desire
to quickly obtain the eviction of [appellant] from the [Property], filed an
Unlawful Detainer against a party named ‘Steve Jones,’ . . . [knowing]
. . . there was no ‘Steve Jones’ in the [Property].  They intentionally filed a bogus case and
actually succeeded in the process as far as having a Writ of Possession
issued.” 

            Appellant
alleged nine causes of action against EMC: 
(1) breach of contract; (2) breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing; (3) fraud and deceit; (4) wrongful
foreclosure; (5) abuse of process; (6) unfair business practices; (7) declaratory
relief; (8) injunctive relief; and (9) quiet title.  He alleged three of those causes of action — abuse
of process, unfair business practices, and injunctive relief — also against the
Jacksons.

            On
April 18, 2011, EMC filed
a demurrer to appellant’s FAC on various grounds, including the ground that all
of appellant’s claims against EMC were barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  On April 20,
2011, the Jacksons filed
their own demurrer to appellant’s FAC and a special motion to strike the FAC under
Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.  On July 20,
2011, the trial court issued a ruling on both demurrers and the Jacksons’s
motion to strike.  In sustaining EMC’s
demurrer without leave to amend, the trial court stated, “Each of the reasons
proposed by [EMC] in its moving papers has merit and the Court could have
granted [EMC’s] motion on any one of the grounds presented.  However, the most significant ground was that
[appellant] has already had the issues in our present case decided by Judge
MacLaren.  Although [appellant] has
changed some of the theories and structure of his complaint, the relief sought
and the issues in dispute were resolved by Judge MacLaren’s order.”

            In
sustaining the Jacksons’s demurrer without leave to amend and granting their motion
to strike, the trial court stated, “In addition to the grounds described in
their moving papers each of which has merit and could justify sustaining the
demurrers, the most significant basis for the demurrer and motion to strike is
that [appellant] is suing these [d]efendants because they filed a lawsuit on
behalf of their clients to obtain possession of the property after [appellant’s]
default.  That action of using the court
to obtain relief is protected activity.”

            The
trial court ordered EMC and the Jacksons to prepare and submit proposed orders
and judgments consistent with its order within 10 days of its order.  On July 26, 2011, the trial court signed
an order sustaining the Jacksons’s demurrer to the FAC without leave to amend
and granting their motion to strike.  On
August 2, 2011, the trial court signed EMC’s proposed order and judgment
granting EMC’s demurrer, dismissing the FAC with prejudice, and entering
judgment in favor of EMC.  On August 8,
2011, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal and checked the box indicating he was
appealing from a “Judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer.”  Judgment was entered in favor of the Jacksons on
March 2, 2012.

Discussion

>1. Demurrer Standard

            When reviewing a judgment dismissing
an action after an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend, we
review “ ‘the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient
to state a cause of action under any legal theory, such facts being assumed
true for this purpose. 
[Citations.]’  [Citation.]”  (Committee
for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48
Cal.4th 32, 42; Akopyan v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortgage, Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 120, 130–131.)  “[W]e treat the demurrer as admitting the
complaint’s well-pleaded allegations of material fact, but not its contentions,
deductions or conclusions of law.”  (>Ross v. RagingWire Telecommunications, Inc.
(2008) 42 Cal.4th 920, 924.)  “In
addition, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and read it in
context.”  (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074,
1081.)  “We will affirm the ruling if
there is any ground on which the demurrer could have been properly
sustained.  [Citation.]”  (Intengan
v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1052.)

            When
a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a
reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be,
the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse.  [Citation.]” 
(City of Dinuba v. County of
Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.) 
“ ‘[W]here the nature of the plaintiff's claim is clear, and under substantive
law no liability exists, a court should deny leave to amend because no
amendment could change the result.’ 
[Citation.]”  (>San Mateo Union High School Dist. v. County
of San Mateo (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 418, 441.)  “ ‘[T]he burden of proving a reasonable
possibility exists that a complaint’s defects can be cured by amendment rests
“squarely on the plaintiff.” ’ 
[Citation.]”  (>Whittemore v. Owens Healthcare–Retail
Pharmacy, Inc. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1199.)

>2. EMC

>a. Res judicata

            Appellant
contends the doctrine of res judicata did not bar his claims against EMC.  We disagree.

            “ â€˜Under
the doctrine of res judicata, a valid, final judgment on the merits is a bar to
a subsequent action by parties or their privies on the same cause of action.’ â€
 (Villacres
v. ABM Industries Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 562, 575.)  â€œ â€˜ â€œ â€˜If the matter was within
the scope of the action, related to the subject matter and relevant to the
issues, so that it could have been
raised, the judgment is conclusive on it. . . .  The reason for this is manifest.  A party cannot by negligence or design
withhold issues and litigate them in consecutive actions.  Hence the rule is that the prior judgment is
res judicata on matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters
litigated or litigable. . . .’ â€ â€™  [Citation.]”  (Id.
at p. 576; see Bullock v. Philip
Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 543, 557 [“[r]es judicata not only
precludes the relitigation of issues that were actually litigated, but also
precludes the litigation of issues that could have been litigated in the prior
proceeding”]; Federal Home Loan Bank of
San Francisco v. Countrywide Financial Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1520,
1529 [same].)

            “ â€˜The
doctrine of res judicata rests upon the ground that the party to be affected,
or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity
to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment
and vexation of his opponent.’  [Citation.]”
 (Pollock
v. University of Southern California (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1427.)  â€œThe application of the doctrine in a given
case depends upon an affirmative answer to these three questions:  (1) Was the issue decided in the prior
adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?  (2) Was there a final judgment on the
merits?  (3) Was the party against
whom the plea is asserted a party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
[Citations.]”  (Levy v. Cohen (1977) 19 Cal.3d 165, 171; see In re Marriage of Modnick (1983) 33 Cal.3d 897, 904, fn. 6.)

            This
case yields “yes” answers to each of these three questions.  First, the issues as to EMC in the Instant
Action were the same as those in the Prior Action.  In both actions, appellant sought to set
aside the foreclosure sale and cancel the deed, and alleged that EMC had
engaged in fraudulent or unlawful acts in order to obtain title to the
Property.  Both actions involved the same
Loan and Deed of Trust, the same 2007 foreclosure sale, and the same real
property.  Moreover, the primary right at
issue was the same:  appellant’s right to
reacquire title to the Property.  (See >Le Parc Community Assn. v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1170 [“California law defines a
‘cause of action’ for purposes of the res judicata doctrine by analyzing the
primary right at stake”].)

            Second,
the judgment in the Prior Action was a final judgment on the merits.  An order sustaining a demurrer without leave
to amend is on the merits and will have res judicata effect unless “the
pleading defects are ‘technical or formal’ and can be corrected by a new
pleading. . . .”  (>Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th
171, 184.)  A judgment will support the
application of res judicata where the judgment follows the sustaining of a
demurrer “on a ground of substance” or “where the demurrer sets up the failure
of the facts alleged to establish a cause of action, and the same facts are pleaded
in the second action.”  (>Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar.
Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 52; see Keidatz
v. Albany (1952) 39 Cal.2d 826, 828 [judgment is “on the merits to the
extent that it adjudicates that facts alleged do not constitute a cause of
action, and will, accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the
same facts”]; Pollock v. University of
Southern California, supra, 112
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1427–1428 [“fact that the [judgment in the prior
action] resulted from the sustaining of a general demurrer does not preclude
application of the res judicata doctrine”].) 
The judgment in favor of EMC in the Prior Action followed orders
sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend on the ground that appellant had
no “enforceable right to reacquire the [P]roperty,” and that he could not
“establish the element of causation.” 
Thus, the judgment in the Prior Action was a final judgment on the
merits. 

            Third,
EMC was a party in the Prior Action. 
Because all three criteria for application of res judicata were
satisfied, the trial court did not err in ruling that the Prior Action operated
as res judicata to bar the Instant Action against EMC.

>b. Claims
against EMC

            Even
assuming the doctrine of res judicata did not bar all of appellant’s causes of
action against EMC, we would conclude the trial court did not err in sustaining
EMC’s demurrer without leave to amend. 
Appellant challenges the trial court’s order sustaining EMC’s demurrer
only as to several causes of action—fraud and deceit, wrongful foreclosure,
unfair business practices, and abuse of process.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">>[2]  We will briefly address each of appellant’s
arguments.

            First,
appellant asserts he stated a valid cause of action for fraud and deceit based
on the alleged misrepresentation EMC made regarding its “intent to comply with
California law as required by the [Deed of Trust].”  While liability for fraud may be based on a
promise that is made without any intention of performing it (Civ. Code,
§ 1710, subd. (4)), a plaintiff seeking to establish a cause of action for
false promise must also plead facts showing an intention by the promisor, at
the time of the promise, not to keep it. 
(Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 148, 156.) 
Here, appellant not only failed to allege in his FAC that EMC intended
not to keep a promise, but he also failed to identify what promise EMC made and
how EMC failed to keep that promise.  He
also did not allege that EMC was a party to the Deed of Trust and therefore
bound by it.  On appeal, he does not
state how he can amend his complaint to allege sufficient facts to support the
cause of action.  Thus, the trial court
did not err in ruling that EMC’s demurrer as to the fraud and deceit cause of
action should be sustained without leave to amend.

            Second,
appellant argues he alleged sufficient facts to support a cause of action for
wrongful foreclosure.  A condition
precedent to any cause of action arising from an alleged wrongful foreclosure
is that the borrower must tender or offer to tender a sum sufficient to cure
the default.  (United States Cold Storage v. Great Western Savings & Loan Assn.
(1985) 165 Cal.App.3d. 1214, 1222.)  “It
would be futile to set aside a foreclosure sale on the technical ground that
notice was improper, if the party making the challenge did not first make full
tender and thereby establish his ability to purchase the property.”  (Id.
at p. 1225.)  Here, appellant failed
to allege—and does not assert that he can amend the FAC to allege—that he was
willing and had the present ability to tender the full amount of indebtedness that
was outstanding under the Deed of Trust. 


            Relying
on Onofrio v. Rice (1997) 55
Cal.App.4th 413, 424, for the proposition that tender “ â€˜may not be
required where it would be inequitable to do so,’ â€ appellant suggests
that tender was not required in this case. 
The case, however, does not support his position.  There, the court stated that tender may not
be required where “the person making the claim has a counter-claim or set-off
against the beneficiary,” such that “they offset each other,” or where “the
action attacks the validity of the underlying debt.”  (Id.
at p. 424.)  Here, it was undisputed
that appellant had defaulted on the Loan, and there was no allegation that the
debt was in any way invalid, such that requiring tender would be
inequitable.  The trial court did not err
in sustaining appellant’s cause of action for wrongful disclosure without leave
to amend.

            Third,
appellant contends he stated a valid cause of action for unfair business practices.  In his FAC, appellant alleged in a conclusory
manner:  “The callous insensitive,
reckless, and illegal manner in which the Defendants treated [him] and the
Court . . . constitute unfair competition and a violation of the
Unfair Business Practices Act.”  A
plaintiff alleging unfair business practices, however, must state “with
reasonable particularity” the facts supporting the violation.  (Khoury
v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 619.)  Demurrer was properly sustained as to this
cause of action because the FAC identified no particular section of the
statutory scheme that was violated and failed to describe with any reasonable
particularity the facts supporting any violation. 

            Fourth,
appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling as to the cause of action for
abuse of process in which he alleges that EMC engaged in abuse of process by
filing a “bogus” unlawful detainer action against him.  As set forth in detail below in our
discussion of the same cause of action as to the Jacksons, who represented EMC
in the unlawful detainer action, all of EMC’s acts in filing the unlawful
detainer action were protected by the litigation privilege of Civil Code
section 47.  The trial court did not
err in sustaining EMC’s demurrer without leave to amend as to this cause of
action.

>3. The Jacksons

>a. Propriety of the appeal

            Preliminarily,
we address the Jacksons’s argument that the appeal must be dismissed as “entirely
defective and improper as against [them]” because appellant did not specify in
his Notice of Appeal that he was appealing from a judgment entered in favor of
the Jacksons.  As noted, the trial court
ordered EMC and the Jacksons to prepare proposed orders and judgments within
ten days of its July 20, 2011 order, yet only EMC complied by submitting a
proposed judgment, which the trial court signed on August 2, 2011.  The Jacksons submitted only a document
entitled proposed “order,” which the trial court signed on July 26, 2011.  Thus, as the Jacksons correctly point out,
there was no “judgment” against the Jacksons at the time appellant filed a
Notice of Appeal on August 8, 2011 and checked the box indicating he was
appealing from a “Judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer.”  

            A
Notice of Appeal, however, is to be liberally construed in favor of its
sufficiency, “so as to protect the right to appeal if it is reasonably clear
what appellant was trying to appeal from and where the respondent could not
possibly have been misled or prejudiced.” 
(Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d
54, 59; Geffcken v. D’Andrea (2006)
137 Cal.App.4th 1298, 1307.)  Here, the
trial court heard EMC’s demurrer and the Jacksons’s demurrer and motion to
strike on the same day and issued one ruling that resolved all issues among all
parties.  Thus, when appellant stated he
was appealing from a “Judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a
demurrer,” and did not specify a date of any order or judgment, it was
reasonably clear that he was appealing from the trial court’s order disposing
of all of the issues among the parties, i.e., its order sustaining the parties’
demurrers without leave to amend, and the Jacksons’s motion to strike.  There is nothing in the Notice of Appeal
suggesting that appellant intended to appeal only as to EMC.  He served all parties with the Notice of
Appeal and his opening brief in which he addressed his claims against both EMC
and the Jacksons.  The Jacksons in turn
filed a respondents’ brief in which they addressed the merits of the appeal.  Accordingly, we liberally construe
appellant’s Notice of Appeal to have incorporated the trial court’s orders as
to the Jacksons.

            The
Jacksons also assert the appeal as to them was premature because judgment was
not entered in their favor until March 2, 2012, and appellant filed the
Notice of Appeal on August 8, 2011.href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">>[3]>  We reject this argument and will construe the
Notice of Appeal to have been filed after the judgment in favor of the Jacksons
was entered.  (Calif. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(d)(2) [“The reviewing court may treat a notice of appeal filed
after the superior court has announced its intended ruling, but before it has
rendered judgment, as filed immediately after entry of judgment”].) 

>b. Claims against the Jacksons

            Turning
to the merits of appellant’s appeal as to the Jacksons, we conclude the trial
court did not err in sustaining the Jacksons’s demurrer without leave to amend
and granting their motion to strike.  Appellant
first contends he stated a valid cause of action for abuse of process against
the Jacksons for their behavior in “fil[ing] a bogus unlawful detainer
complaint” against Steve Jones.  However,
the statute of limitations for an abuse of process cause of action is one
year.  (See Code Civ. Proc., § 340,
subd. (c); Cantu v. Resolution Trust
Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 886.) 
The alleged abuse of process occurred on July 7, 2008, when the
Jacksons filed the unlawful detainer action against Steve Jones, yet appellant
did not assert his abuse of process claim against the Jacksons until
March 14, 2011.  The claim is
therefore time-barred.href="#_ftn4"
name="_ftnref4" title="">[4]

            Second,
appellant asserts for the first time in his reply brief that the trial court
erred in ruling that all of his claims against the Jacksons were barred by the
litigation privilege.  When an opening
brief fails to present pertinent or cognizable legal argument, discussion by
the reviewing court is unnecessary.  (>Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist.
(1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699-700.) 
Even assuming, however, that the issue is properly before us, we would
reject the contention.

            Communications
in a “judicial proceeding” are subject to the “absolute” privilege of Civil
Code section 47, subdivision (b). 
(Hagberg v. California Federal
Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360-361.) 
The filing of pleadings in judicial actions falls squarely within the
litigation privilege of the statute.  (>Navellier v. Sletten (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 763, 770.)  Moreover,
“communications made in connection with litigation do not necessarily fall
outside the [litigation] privilege simply because they are, or are alleged to
be, fraudulent, perjurious, unethical, or even illegal.  This is assuming, of course, that the
communications are ‘logically related’ to the litigation.”  (Kashian
v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 920.)  In Kashian
v. Harriman, the court concluded the communications in that case were
privileged because they were “not only related to the litigation, [but] they >were the litigation, or more accurately,
the pleadings in the litigation.”  (98
Cal.App.4th at p. 920.)  Similarly,
here, because appellant did not allege any conduct by the Jacksons other than
their communications of filing an allegedly “bogus” unlawful detainer action, the
trial court did not err in ruling that all of appellant’s claims against the
Jacksons were barred by the litigation privilege.




 

Disposition

            The
trial court’s judgments in favor of EMC and the Jacksons are affirmed.  Respondents EMC and the Jacksons shall
recover their costs on appeal.

 

 

                                                                                    _________________________

                                                                                    Jenkins,
J.

 

 

We concur:

 

 

_________________________

McGuiness, P. J.

 

 

_________________________

Siggins, J.