P. v. Yelverton

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 7/19/13  P. v. Yelverton CA3

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

 

 

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(Sacramento)

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,                           Plaintiff and Respondent,               v.   JEFFREY CRAYTON YELVERTON, SR.,                           Defendant and Appellant.

C068748   (Super. Ct. No. 10F02094)

 

 

name="_BA_ScanRange">            Defendant
Jeffery Crayton Yelverton, Sr., was involved in a fatal car accident.  As a result, the People filed an information
charging defendant with voluntary manslaughter
(
ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 27 s HPOJUA000001 xpl 1 l "Pen. Code, §
192, subd. (a)" Pen. Code, § 192,
subd. (a))href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1] and hit and run ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 18 s HPOJUA000002
xpl 1 l "Veh. Code, § 20001" Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subd. (b)(2)). 
Following trial, a jury found defendant guilty of both crimes.  Finding the offenses were committed pursuant
to separate criminal objectives, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term
of six years on the voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive eight months on
the hit and run.  Defendant appeals the
sentence imposed, contending:  (1) his
sentence for hit and run should have been stayed under  ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 11 s HPOJUA000023 l "section 654" section 654; and,
(2) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive
sentences.  We find no error and affirm
the judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

            For
about a year prior to the accident, defendant played poker every Sunday morning
at Capitol Casino on 16th Street.  One
Sunday afternoon in March 2010, Massimo Marini, Mike Rios, and Bill Deollas
were outside the Loaves & Fishes complex where they worked.  Standing on the corner of a cul-de-sac off of
12th
Street,
Marini and David Toney heard an engine revving. 
The car was approaching them from 16th Street. 
Marini recognized the car and defendant as the driver, as he had
repeatedly sped through the area on numerous Sundays.  The car passed the men, traveling at an
unsafe speed, approximately 35-40 miles per hour.  At the end of the cul-de-sac, it slowed, made
a U‑turn and came back.  As the car
headed back toward 16th Street, it began to accelerate again reaching
speeds of 35-40 miles per hour.  Marini
and Deollas raised their arms and all three men spread out into the street,
signaling for the driver to slow down. 
Instead, the car sped up and headed at Rios.  Rios was holding a walkie-talkie and pointed
the antenna at the driver.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]  At
the last moment, Rios jumped out of the way of the oncoming vehicle and the car
swerved into Deollas.  Deollas jumped,
but was hit by the car.  He hit the
windshield, was thrown about 10 feet in the air, rolled off the top of the car,
and landed face down on the pavement. 
The driver made no attempt to stop; rather he sped up and left the
area.  Rios ran to the fire station to
get help for Deollas.  Marini called 911.

            Toney,
who witnessed the accident, got on his bicycle and followed the car towards 16th Street.  The
car turned the wrong way on a one-way street and wove in and out of traffic,
changing lanes and passing cars.  The car
drove past Capitol Casino, where multiple police vehicles were parked in plain
view.  The car continued toward Richards Boulevard, passing multiple businesses.  Toney got the attention of a Sacramento police officer and told him what had
happened.  The officer went in pursuit of
defendant, but was not able to find defendant.

            After
leaving the scene of the accident, defendant continued on to Arden Fair Mall
and called his wife.  Defendant told her
that on leaving the casino he had planned to go to the mall to buy a gift for
their daughter, but someone tried to rob him. 
The person was armed with a gun and defendant hit him with the car.

            Defendant
then called 911 from the mall parking lot. 
In the 911 call, defendant claimed someone had attempted to rob him in
the downtown area.  He had hit the person
with his car and was waiting for officers at the mall.

            Sacramento
Police Officer Bohrer spoke with defendant at the mall.  Bohrer observed defendant’s car had been
damaged, the roof had a large dent on it and the windshield had “matter” on
it.  Defendant told police he had been in
an accident.  He stated he had made a
wrong turn, when three men jumped in the street and blocked the road.  He thought one of the men had a gun.  He panicked. 
He was afraid to get robbed or shot, so he “floored” it.  The men did not get out of the way, and he
hit one of them.  He was panicking and
just kept driving.  After being >Mirandized,href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] defendant stated he had been playing poker
at the casino, as he does every Sunday. 
He left the casino, decided to cut across 16th Street on a side street and got lost.  Defendant stated he did not know the area
well, but knew it was “bad.”  After he
turned down one street, he saw a group of men and they were yelling at him,
when he turned around in the cul-de-sac three of the men were standing in the
street yelling at him.  He thought one of
them had a gun and they were going to rob him. 
He got scared and “gunned it . . . drove straight towards” the
men.  He knew he had hit one of the men
and that man had to be injured.  He
panicked and left the scene.  Although he
passed the casino, he did not stop there because he was panicked.  Bohrer determined defendant was not under the
influence of drugs or alcohol.  Defendant
denied using drugs and denied he had been in the area to purchase drugs.  Subsequent testing revealed that defendant had
ingested marijuana within the last 48 hours.

            Deollas
was taken to U.C. Davis Medical Center.  He
was unconscious and had a severe open skull fracture.  He remained in a coma for about six weeks and
then he died.  The cause of death was
determined to be blunt force head injury.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

            An
information charged defendant with voluntary manslaughter ( ADDIN BA xc <@$st> xl 16 s
HPOJUA000001 xpl 1 § 192, subd. (a))
and failing to stop at the scene of an accident resulting in an injury ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 32 s
HPOJUA000003 xpl 1 l "Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2)" Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subd. (b)(2)).  As to
the voluntary manslaughter, the information further alleged defendant had fled
the scene as an enhancement ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 29 s
HPOJUA000004 xpl 1 l "Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)" Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subd. (c)).  The
enhancement allegation was dismissed on the People’s motion.  Following trial, a jury found defendant
guilty on both counts.

            The
trial court denied defendant probation and sentenced him to six years in prison
for voluntary manslaughter and a consecutive term of eight months for fleeing
the scene.  In reaching this sentence,
the court considered the probation report, victim impact statements, letters
from the victim’s family, defendant’s statement in mitigation which included
letters of support, argument from counsel, and a statement from defendant.  The court found “In this matter I have been
privy to all of the information conveyed in the trial and very aware of the
factual underpinnings of the case.  I do
not find this to be a case appropriate for probation in light of the factual
circumstances and the manner of commission of the crime.  [¶] 
While I agree with the defense that I don’t consider this a crime of
planning or sophistication, the characterization of that particular factor in
probation is not -- the Court does not adopt that, but I do find that the
confluence of all the facts surrounding this particular crime to be very
aggravating, senseless, and while inexplicable, certainly not excusable because
we don’t understand the motivation. 
[¶]  The jury rejected the
defendant’s version of facts, as does the Court, based on the evidence
presented in this trial.  And in finding
that conclusion further finds, therefore, that the defendant lied to cover up
his own crime.  And I do take that into
account as well.  [¶]  This was a -- not just a loss of life, as the
friends and family here know, this was a life stolen from them.
. . .  [¶] . . .
[¶]  And it is the judgment and sentence
of this Court that for the crime that you have committed in Count One, the
crime of voluntary manslaughter, the Court will imprison you, order that you be
imprisoned in the state prison for the middle term of six years.  [¶] 
Additionally, for the crime of hit and run, the Court will order a
consecutive sentence as the Court finds that to be a distinct and different
offense on the facts of that case, your leaving Mr. Deollas on the street to
suffer the pain that he did and have ultimately a painful, slow death in the
hospital, but you left him helpless there. 
It is appropriate in the Court’s view that you be imprisoned
additionally and consecutively for that separate offense for eight months.”

            The
trial court ordered defendant to pay $15,077 in victim restitution and $1,200
to the restitution fund.  The trial court
imposed additional fines and penalties and awarded defendant 26 days of actual
credits with conduct credits to be determined.

DISCUSSION

I

            Defendant
contends the trial court erred sentencing him to consecutive sentences in
violation of  ADDIN BA xc <@osdv> xl 13 s
HPOJUA000024 l "section 654’s" section 654’s
prohibition against multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course
of conduct.  He argues there was “no
divisible course of conduct based on [his] intent and objective.  He held one single and ultimate objective -
to get out of a dangerous situation and find a place of safety.”  As such, he claims he should not have been
“punished twice for the same course of conduct . . . .”

             ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 28 s HPOJUA000025 l "Section 654, subdivision
(a)" Section 654,
subdivision (a) provides, in pertinent part, “[a]n act or omission that is
punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished
under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of
imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more
than one provision.”   ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 11 s HPOJUA000023 Section 654 is
intended “to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his
culpability.”  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 41 s
HPOJUA000005 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People
v. Perez (1979)23 Cal.3d 545, 552" People v. Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 552.)  The statute bars multiple punishment for both
a single act that violates more than one criminal statute and multiple acts,
where those acts comprise an indivisible course of conduct incident to a single
criminal objective and intent.  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 45 s
HPOJUA000006 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People
v. Latimer (1993)5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208" People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208;  ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 51 s HPOJUA000007 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Neal v. State of California
(1960)55 Cal.2d 11, 19" Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19.)  Conversely, where a defendant commits
multiple criminal offenses during a single course of conduct, he or she may be
separately punished for each offense that he or she committed pursuant to a
separate intent and objective.  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 45 s
HPOJUA000008 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People
v. Beamon (1973)8 Cal.3d 625, 637-639" People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 637-639.)  Multiple criminal objectives may “be a
predicate for multiple punishment only in circumstances that involve, or
arguably involve, multiple acts.  The
rule does not apply where . . . the multiple convictions at issue
were indisputably based upon a single act.” 
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 41 s HPOJUA000009 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Mesa (2012)54
Cal.4th 191, 199" People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, 199.)  The trial court may find separate objectives
“when the objectives were either (1) consecutive even if similar or (2)
different even if simultaneous.”  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 42 s
HPOJUA000010 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People
v. Britt (2004)32 Cal.4th 944, 952" People v. Britt (2004) 32 Cal.4th 944, 952.)  A trial court’s finding that “a defendant
harbored a separate intent and objective for each offense will be upheld on
appeal if it is supported by substantial evidence.  [Citation.]” 
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 46 s HPOJUA000011 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People
v. Blake (1998)68 Cal.App.4th 509, 512" People v. Blake
(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 509, 512.) 


            Voluntary
manslaughter and fleeing the scene of an accident are separate and distinct
acts.  (See  ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 51 s HPOJUA000012 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Butler (1986)184
Cal.App.3d 469, 471-474" People
v. Butler (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 469, 471-474 ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 6 s
HPOJUA000012 xpl 2 Butler);
see also  ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 42 s
HPOJUA000013 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People
v. Jones (2012)54 Cal.4th 350, 358" People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 358.)  The criminal act in voluntary manslaughter is
an act that causes the death of another person ( ADDIN BA xc <@$st> xl 16 s
HPOJUA000001 xpl 1 § 192, subd. (a));
in this case, hitting Deollas with the car. 
In contrast, “ â€˜[t]he gravamen of a [ ADDIN BA xc <@ost> xl 12 s
HPOJUA000026 xpl 1 l "Vehicle Code" Vehicle Code]  ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s HPOJUA000002 section 20001
offense . . . is not the initial injury of the victim, but leaving
the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid.’  [Citation.]” 
(
ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 47 s HPOJUA000014 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Harbert
(2009)170 Cal.App.4th 42, 59" People v. Harbert (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 42, 59.)  “Although a violation of [ ADDIN BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s
HPOJUA000026 xpl 1 Vehicle Code]  ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 13 s HPOJUA000002 section 20001 is popularly denominated
‘hit-and-run,’ the act made criminal thereunder is not the ‘hitting’ but the
‘running.’ â€  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 48 s HPOJUA000015
xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People v.
Corners (1985)176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148" People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148.)  Accordingly, the trial court was required to
determine whether these separate acts were part of an indivisible course of
conduct.

            Whether
the acts of which a defendant has been convicted constituted an indivisible
course of conduct incident to a single objective or multiple criminal
objectives is primarily a factual determination made by the trial court.  “ â€˜This determination will not be
reversed on appeal unless unsupported by the evidence presented at trial.’  [Citations.]” 
(
ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 38 s HPOJUA000012 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Butler, supra,184 Cal.App.3d at p. 473;  ADDIN
BA xc <@$cs> xl 43 s HPOJUA000009 xhfl Rep xpl 1 People v. Mesa, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 199.)

            Defendant
played poker every Sunday at the Capitol Casino and had a history of driving
through the area too fast.  On the day of
the accident, he revved the engine and sped down the cul-de-sac.  Upon reaching the end of the cul-de-sac, he
turned around and headed back down the street, accelerating and driving
straight at Rios, Marini, and Deollas as they tried to slow him down.  He swerved into Deollas, hit him, and fled
the scene.  Although he passed by police
officers at Capitol Casino, a location he was familiar with, he did not stop
there to report the accident or get help. 
Nor did he stop at any of the businesses along the way to the mall.  Instead, he continued on to the mall, as he
had originally planned to do upon leaving the casino.  After calling his wife, he called 911 and
reported he had gotten lost and, in evading what he thought was an attempted
armed robbery, had hit someone.  He
repeated that claim to Bohrer. 

            Defendant
claims his “ultimate objective was to get himself out of danger.”  This argument rests on his version of events,
under which he thought Deollas and his friends were going to rob or shoot
defendant and he panicked, hit Deollas, and kept driving because he was afraid
for his life.  Both the jury and the
trial court rejected these claims. 
Indeed, the trial court specifically found defendant lied to cover up
his crime.  As a reviewing court, we do
not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness’s credibility.  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 46 s
HPOJUA000016 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People
v. Albillar (2010)51 Cal.4th 47, 59–60" People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59–60.) 

            As
in  ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 6 s
HPOJUA000012 Butler, here, in
committing the voluntary manslaughter
defendant was acting with general intent; he was recklessly driving down the
street at a high speed and intentionally drove straight at Deollas, Marini, and
Rios consciously disregarding the risk. 
In so doing, he caused a fatal accident. 
He then intentionally left the scene of the accident instead of
remaining, rendering aid, and providing identification as required by law.  This was an independent and separate criminal
act, the intent and objective of which was to attempt to avoid responsibility
for his crime.  ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 39 s
HPOJUA000012 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Butler, supra,
184 Cal.App.3d at p. 474.) 
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the
voluntary manslaughter and hit and run offenses were committed pursuant to
separate criminal objectives.  Therefore,
separate punishment for each offense was not barred by  ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 11 s HPOJUA000023 section 654.

            Furthermore,
such a finding is consistent with the purpose underlying the prohibition on
multiple punishment; to insure punishment is commensurate with
culpability.  “If multiple punishment is
prohibited in this case . . . there would be no incentive for a
person who causes an accident to stop and render aid as required by  ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 26 s HPOJUA000002 Vehicle Code section
20001.  In fact, noncompliance would
be rewarded.  A defendant would suffer no
greater criminal liability if he took his chances on escaping than if he stopped
and rendered aid.  Our Legislature could
not and did not intend such an absurd result.” 
(
ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 39 s HPOJUA000012 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Butler, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at
p. 474.) 

II

            Defendant
next contends even if the trial court did not err in refusing to stay the
sentence under  ADDIN BA xc <@$osdv> xl 11 s
HPOJUA000023 section 654, the trial court abused its
discretion in imposing consecutive terms in accord with the  ADDIN
BA xc <@ru> xl 37 s HPOJUA000017 l "California Rules of Court,
rule 4.425" California Rules of
Court, rule 4.425.href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">[4] 
Relying on the arguments made in his section 654 claim, he argues
because “the crimes and their objectives were not independent of each other and
undoubtedly constituted a single period of aberrant behavior . . .
the results [of the section 654] analysis should have dictated an election of
concurrent terms . . . .” 
Alternatively, defendant argues counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to the court’s sentencing decision.

            A
trial court has discretion to determine whether several sentences are to run
concurrently or consecutively.  We will
not disturb that determination absent a clear showing of abuse.  ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 41 s
HPOJUA000018 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People
v. Bradford (1976)17 Cal.3d 8, 20" People v. Bradford (1976) 17 Cal.3d 8, 20.)  An abuse of discretion is shown when the
court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.  ( ADDIN BA xc <@$id> xl 5 s ID xpl
1 Ibid.)

            The
criteria applicable to the trial court’s discretion are set forth in  ADDIN
BA xc <@ru> xl 10 s HPOJUA000019 l "rule 4.425" rule 4.425, which
states that in imposing consecutive sentences a trial court may consider:  (1) whether the “crimes and their objectives
were predominantly independent of each other”; (2) whether the “crimes involved
separate acts of violence or threats of violence”; and (3) whether the “crimes
were committed at different times or separate places, rather than being
committed so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of
aberrant behavior.”  ( ADDIN BA xc <@ru> xl 20 s
HPOJUA000020 xpl 1 l "Rule 4.425(a)(1)-(3)" Rule 4.425(a)(1)-(3).)  However, these criteria are not
exclusive.   ADDIN
BA xc <@ru> xl 13 s HPOJUA000021 l "Rule 4.408(a)" Rule 4.408(a)
states:  “[T]he enumeration in these
rules of some criteria for the making of discretionary sentencing decisions
does not prohibit the application of additional criteria reasonably related to
the decision being made.  Any such
additional criteria must be stated on the record by the sentencing judge.”

            We
have reviewed above the trial court’s determinations regarding the
inapplicability of  ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 11 s HPOJUA000023 section 654, and
conclude the court’s findings regarding the independent criminal objectives for
each of defendant’s crimes were supported by substantial evidence.  On that basis alone, we conclude that the
court did not exceed “the bounds of reason” when it also imposed consecutive
terms.  (See  ADDIN
BA xc <@$cs> xl 35 s HPOJUA000018 xhfl Rep xpl 1 Bradford, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 20.)

            The
court considered the probation report, victim impact statements, statements
from the members of the victim’s family, defendant’s statement in mitigation
with included letters of support, defendant’s statement at the hearing, and
arguments of counsel.  The court stated
the criteria it was using in choosing consecutive terms.  The court found the offenses were separate
and distinct.  The court was aware of the
full evidentiary record and facts of the case. 
The court reflected defendant left Deollas “on the street to suffer the
pain that he did and have ultimately a painful, slow death in the hospital, but
you left him helpless there.”  The court
also found the offense “very aggravating, senseless, and . . . not
excusable . . . .”  The
court explicitly joined the jury in rejecting defendant’s version of the facts
and found that the defendant “lied to cover up his own crime.  And I do take that into account
. . . .”  The court also
considered defendant’s lack of a prior record, his age, standing in the
community, and his letters of reference. 
Based on all of these criteria, the court found it appropriate to impose
a consecutive term.  On the record before
us, this decision was not an abuse of discretion.

DISPOSITION

            The
judgment is affirmed.

 

 

                                                                            BLEASE                             , Acting
P. J.

 

We concur:

 

 

                MAURO                             , J.

 

 

                DUARTE                            , J.