P. v. Woulldar
Filed 1/10/13 P. v. Woulldar
CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
BERNARD LEANDRA WOULLDAR,
Defendant
and Appellant.
E055746
(Super.Ct.No. RIF1102770)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of
County. Gary B.
Tranbarger, Judge. Affirmed.
Renée Paradis,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
On November 29,
2011, an information charged defendant and appellant Bernard Leandra Woulldar
with fleeing from police in a motor vehicle with willful and wanton disregard
for safety of persons and property under Vehicle Code section 2800.2 (count 1);
and violating a protective order under Penal Code
(a) (count 2). The information also
alleged that defendant had two prior convictions resulting in prison terms
under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and one prior serious or violent felony
conviction under sections 667, subdivisions (c) and (e)(1), and 1170.12,
subdivision (c)(1).
On January 23, 2012, before jury trial began, the trial court granted the prosecution’s
motion to dismiss count 2. Trial
continued through January 26, 2012. The following day, January 27, the jury found
defendant guilty of count 1.
Trial on
defendant’s priors was bifurcated; defendant waived his right to a jury trial
on the priors. On January 30, 2012, a trial on the priors was held.
The court found the priors true as alleged.
At the sentencing
hearing on February
24, 2012, the trial court denied
defendant’s motion to dismiss his strike prior under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The court then sentenced defendant to the
upper term on count 1, doubled under the three strikes law, for six years. Defendant was sentenced to an additional two
years for the two prison priors, for total of eight years.
On February 27, 2012, defendant filed his notice of
appeal.
I
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prosecution Case
Nikki Love is
defendant’s estranged wife. On May 13, 2011, defendant attempted to make contact with her outside her cousin’s
house. Love drove off without speaking
to defendant; he followed her in his girlfriend’s car, a gray Taurus or
Mercury. It was approximately 7:00 or
8:00 p.m. Love became scared and
called the police to report that defendant was following her. While Love was on the phone with 911,
defendant had left his car and was approaching her vehicle on foot. Love reported the license plate of the car
defendant was driving by reading the license plate number directly off the
car. Love testified that she had filed
for divorce prior to the incident happening; their marriage had lasted one
week, and she had one child with defendant.
Later, Love was impeached with divorce papers indicating that she had
filed for divorce on May 27, after the incident occurred.
On May 13, 2011, Deputy Sheriff Maurice Daugherty was assigned to patrol. He responded to the 911 call made by
Love. He began following a silver
Mercury Sable that matched the license plate given to him by dispatch. He activated his lights and sirens once he
identified the car. At one point, the
silver car made a U-turn and passed the patrol car head-on, allowing the deputy
to see the driver’s face illuminated by his own car’s headlights. He identified the driver as defendant. During the chase, defendant did not have his
headlights on; was driving in excess of 80 miles per hour; was driving at least
40 miles in a 25-mile zone; ran at least four stop signs; and ran at least
three red lights at two heavily trafficked intersections. After defendant ran a red light at East Nuevo Road
and Ruby Drive, the deputy decided that, in the interests of public safety, he
would terminate the chase. Deputy
Daugherty turned off his lights and siren and continued to follow
defendant. At Perris Boulevard and Nuevo Road, three additional patrol cars encountered defendant and began to
follow him, with lights and sirens. With
four patrol cars in pursuit, defendant got onto Interstate 215, heading
north. Defendant accelerated above 80
miles per hour, as he swerved onto the shoulder and around cars to evade
pursuit.
At some point, the
lead deputy lost visual contact with the silver car, believing that the car had
exited at Harley Knox
Boulevard. Two of the deputies exited there, including
Deputy Daugherty. They located the
silver car driving on Harley
Knox Boulevard. Defendant turned onto Indian Street
and accelerated up to 80 miles per hour again; Deputy Daugherty reactivated his
lights and siren. Defendant ran another
red light. As defendant approached a
dead end, he pulled into a parking lot and stopped. Deputy Daugherty parked his car and exited
his vehicle, along with his fellow deputy Harold Odom. Defendant put his car in reverse and passed
the deputies, then exited the parking lot and headed back toward Harley Knox Boulevard. As he did so, Deputy
Daugherty was able to once again see defendant’s face. Deputy Daugherty got back into his patrol car
and resumed the chase. Defendant
accelerated back up and reentered Interstate 215, heading north. Once on the freeway, defendant accelerated to
over 100 miles per hour and resumed using the shoulder. At the intersection of Interstate 215 and Highway
60, defendant made a last minute lane change to go east on Highway 60, cutting
off a semi-truck, fending off his pursuers.
Deputy Daugherty was unable to locate defendant again, and a helicopter
called to the scene was also unable to locate the car.
Deputy Odom
believed that the chase began approximately between 9:45 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. He joined it at Harley Knox Boulevard near Perris
Boulevard. He followed defendant as he turned off Harley
Knox onto a side street, which ran into a dead end. Deputy Odom got out of his car after
defendant stopped his car in the parking lot and saw defendant, who looked
directly at the deputy. After defendant
drove out of the lot, Deputy Odom resumed the pursuit with Deputy Daugherty. Deputy Odom followed defendant onto the
freeway, where they stopped the pursuit.
Deputy Odom had picked defendant as the driver of the car out of a
six-pack photo array prior to testifying, and identified him again in court.
Candace Harper
lives in Riverside and dated defendant from late 2010 to March or April of 2011. She owns a silver Mercury Sable; the license
plate matches the license plate of the car that was in pursuit. She testified that on May 13, 2011, her car
was in her garage.
Nikki Love
testified that in December 2011, Harper had called Love to tell her that Harper
planned to testify untruthfully at trial—that defendant did not have her
car. Harper also encouraged Love to use
the marital privilege to refuse to testify against defendant.
Defense Case
Latasha Hilt is
defendant’s aunt. On May 13, 2011, she
was caring for her mother in Compton.
Hilt resides in Long Beach. She
was at her mother’s house between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. Defendant was at the house the entire time
Hilt was there.
David Taylor is a
deputy sheriff in Riverside. At
approximately 10:00 p.m. on May 13, 2011, he was dispatched to a residence on
Neptune Drive to respond to a call regarding the violation of a restraining
order. He spoke with Love, who told him
she had been married to defendant for three years and separated for six
months. Love also told him that she and
defendant had no children together. That
information was contained in the report he had filed about the incident.
Three stipulations
were also entered into evidence. First,
a protective order prohibiting defendant from making negative contact with Love
was in effect on May 13, 2011. Second,
Love and defendant were married on April 28, 2011. Third, Love filed for divorce on May 27,
2011.
II
ANALYSIS
After defendant appealed, and upon his request, this
court appointed counsel to represent him.
Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 setting forth a statement
of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues and
requesting this court to undertake a review of the entire record.
We offered
defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he has done
so. Pursuant to the mandate of
we have independently reviewed the record for potential error. In his six-page supplemental brief, defendant
seems to argue that his case should be overturned because the trial judge,
deputy district attorney, deputies Odom and Daugherty, and Love all lied and
were corrupt. We hereby address
defendant’s contentions.
First, defendant
contends that the trial judge was corrupt “because of discrepancy/bias and
improper sentence.†In support,
defendant seems to argue that the court improperly inflicted “a harsher
punishment on the defendant for exercising the constitutional right to trial or
the privilege against self-incrimination.â€
Defendant, however, fails to support his contention with reference to
the record. We have reviewed the record
and find nothing to support defendant’s contention that the trial court imposed
a harsher sentence because he did not testify at trial.
Next, defendant
contends that the deputy district attorney was guilty of
“corruption/discrepancy/bias†because she relied on false documents by the
deputies. In support, defendant seems to
argue that deputies Odom and Daugherty deliberately lied. Again, there is nothing in the record to
support defendant’s contention that the deputies had lied in their reports or
on the stand. In fact, the deputies had
testified at trial. The jurors heard the
deputies’ testimonies and, as the triers of fact, were able to assess the
deputies’ credibility. The jurors
obviously believed in the deputies as they found defendant guilty. Similarly, defendant contends that Love
deliberately lied during the 911 call.
Again, the jurors heard Love’s testimony. On appeal, “we do not reweigh the evidence, resolve
conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.†(People
v. Cortes (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 62, 71.)
Finally, defendant
appears to be arguing that his case should be overturned because the
prosecution failed to provide the defense with the police reports in a timely
manner to investigate or talk to witnesses to “investigate the serious
corruption†with the judge, deputy district attorney, and the two
deputies. In reviewing the augmented
reporter’s transcript attached to defendant’s personal brief, it appears that
Deputy Odom’s identity was not revealed to defense counsel until one day after
trial had commenced. The parties and the
court discussed this issue at length.
The prosecutor in the case learned of Deputy Odom’s ability to identify
defendant the night before the hearing on whether his testimony should be
allowed. As soon as the prosecutor
learned of Deputy Odom, she informed defense counsel right away. In response to this late discovery, the trial
court continued the trial. The court
directed that an interview between the defense investigator and Officer Odom
occur that afternoon. Therefore, the
court gave defendant an opportunity to interview Officer Odom prior to resuming
the trial. Moreover, we note that the
main purpose of Deputy Odom’s testimony was to identify defendant as the person
who committed the crime on May 13, 2011.
Even without his testimony, Deputy Daugherty was able to identify
defendant. Moreover, other evidence
clearly showed that defendant was the person driving the car evading the police
officers.
We have now concluded our independent review of the
record and find no arguable issues.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
MCKINSTER
J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
Acting
P. J.
RICHLI
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All statutory references are
to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
