Filed 1/19/18 P. v. Wion CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BRAD C. WION,

Defendant and Respondent.
C079589

(Super. Ct. No. 13F4630)


In exchange for defendant Brad Craig Wion’s no-contest plea to misdemeanor counts of receiving stolen property, the parties agreed certain identified cases and “[r]emaining cases” would be “dismissed w/ Harvey waiver[ ] and/or not filed.” Unknown to the deputy district attorney who approved the plea agreement, separate narcotics and firearms charges were in the works against defendant based on a search warrant executed at defendant’s home six days prior; a different deputy district attorney had reviewed and approved the warrant application. Nevertheless, in response to defendant’s motion for specific performance of the plea agreement, the trial court dismissed those felony narcotics and firearms charges.
The People now contend they never meant to make dismissal of the felony narcotics and firearms charges part of the plea agreement.
We recognize it may be difficult to ensure that deputy district attorneys are apprised of relevant information when they are granted authority by their office to enter into plea agreements on behalf of the People. Nevertheless, because finality and certainty are of considerable importance in plea agreements, deputy district attorneys must be deemed to have constructive knowledge of the information known by members of their office. As a result, the plea agreement in this case is binding and encompasses the felony narcotics and firearms charges against defendant. We will affirm the trial court’s dismissal order.
BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement on June 17, 2013, defendant pleaded no contest to three counts of receiving stolen property. In handwriting on a pre-printed form, the agreement said: “[r]emaining cases dismissed w/ Harvey Waiver and/or not filed.” Defendant’s home had been searched the prior week; it was his understanding that the plea agreement would resolve any case that might arise from the search. However, the deputy district attorney who approved the plea agreement (the plea deputy) did not know about the search of defendant’s home or the related investigation. Another deputy district attorney in his office (the narcotics deputy) served as the vertical prosecutor for the Shasta Interagency Narcotics Task Force and had signed the request for a warrant to search defendant’s home, but did not make the plea deputy aware of the search.
The narcotics deputy learned on June 25, 2013, that defendant had entered a plea in the stolen property cases and that judgment and sentencing were pending, but she did not discuss the matter with the plea deputy. Instead, the narcotics deputy signed a new complaint against defendant on July 19, 2013, which included, among other things, numerous narcotics and firearms charges. After defendant was arraigned on the new complaint, he moved for specific performance of the June 17, 2013 plea agreement.
The People argued the new complaint did not amount to a breach of the plea agreement; rather, there was ambiguity or mistake of fact or fraud in the formation of the plea agreement. But the trial court determined relevant facts had been available to the People at the time of the plea agreement which would have allowed them to understand that new criminal charges were likely. The trial court said deputy district attorneys work for an elected official and have constructive knowledge of information known to their office. The trial court also found that defendant was aware of the totality of the circumstances, received a benefit from his plea bargain, and thus allowing defendant to simply withdraw his plea would not provide him with an adequate remedy.
The trial court acknowledged that the new charges were significant and should have been expressly addressed in the plea agreement, but said that because the charges were viable at the time the plea was entered, the narcotics and firearms case was among the remaining cases the People agreed to dismiss or not file as part of the plea agreement. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSION
In its essence, a plea agreement is “ ‘a contract between the defendant and the prosecutor to which the court consents to be bound.’ ” (People v. Ames (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1217.) Courts construe the terms of a plea agreement by applying general contract principles with the fundamental goal of giving effect to the intent of the parties. (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 767.) If contract terms are clear and explicit, they govern, but if they are ambiguous, statutory rules of construction apply to their interpretation. (Civ. Code, §§ 1637, 1638.) “[T]he threshold determination of ambiguity is subject to independent review.” (Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165.) Different standards of review may apply to evidentiary issues, but when the extrinsic evidence is undisputed, we independently construe the written agreement. (Ibid.)
The People contend there was no meeting of the minds with regard to the matters the People agreed to dismiss. They argue defendant had knowledge of the search and the possible new charges but the plea deputy did not, hence the plea deputy could not have intended to dismiss those charges. In approving the plea, the trial court added the word “ ‘known’ ” in referencing the “[r]emaining cases” to be dismissed, and at the hearing on the motion for specific performance, the trial court recognized that the plea deputy did not know about the search or the possible charges. But the trial court said there “had been some fanfare” and facts were known within the district attorney’s office that could give rise to a potential new criminal case. The trial court said deputy district attorneys have constructive knowledge of information known to their office.
The People acknowledge the plea deputy should have specifically identified the pending cases he intended to include in the agreement, but they argue such an oversight should not bind the People to a deal with no meeting of the minds. However, we do not agree with the People’s characterization of the circumstances. This is not an instance of ambiguity and no meeting of the minds; this is an instance where there was an insufficient effort within the district attorney’s office to identify the totality of the charges pending against defendant. Under these circumstances, we ask the People to honor their commitment. (Santobello v. New York (1971) 404 U.S. 257, 260-262 [30 L.Ed.2d 427, 432-433] (Santobello).) The trial court found that the phrase “[r]emaining cases” in the plea agreement included the felony narcotics and firearms charges.
Due process applies to the implementation of a plea bargain and violation of a bargain raises a constitutional right to a remedy. (People v. Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860.) The remedy should redress the harm without prejudicing either party or curtailing a court’s normal sentencing discretion. (Ibid.) A trial court has discretion to decide whether specific performance or withdrawal of a plea is the appropriate remedy for a prosecutor’s breach. (Santobello, supra, 404 U.S. at pp. 262-263.) In this case, defendant would have been prejudiced by adoption of the prosecutor’s proposal to renegotiate an agreement because the prosecutor said she would have insisted on a prison term instead of probation. The trial court determined specific performance was the proper remedy.
A California court recently relied on the principles outlined here when a prosecutor sought to revoke a plea bargain based on a purported mistake of fact. (Amin v. Superior Court (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1395, 1401.) In that case, a defendant entered a guilty plea to misdemeanor charges arising from video recordings he made beneath women’s skirts and agreed to register as a sex offender and attend counseling; his agreement was made in exchange for the resolution of all “ ‘charged & uncharged’ ” incidents referenced in a police report. (Id. at p. 1397.) The police report described similar uncharged incidents but it also identified defendant as a person of interest in an investigation of child molestation, a fact the prosecutor missed in a cursory review of the report; she later argued that defense counsel misled her by telling her the other incidents were “ ‘similar.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1397-1399.) The Court of Appeal, noting the dearth of California precedent, cited cases from numerous other jurisdictions holding that if a prosecutor had the ability to ascertain a fact before entering a plea bargain, the prosecutor’s purported ignorance of or mistake about that fact does not justify voiding the agreement. (Id. at p. 1405.) Finding “no reason in logic or the law to afford prosecutors preferential treatment when it comes to determining the enforceability of plea agreements that are allegedly based on mistake of fact,” the court dismissed the pending child molestation charges. (Id. at pp. 1410-1411.)
Defendant urges us to follow the reasoning of Amin and some of the authorities on which it relies. The People counter that because defense counsel in this case added the “[r]emaining cases” phrase, defendant “should not receive a windfall for drafting an ambiguous agreement.” But here, adding the phrase beneficial to defendant amounted to good negotiation, not a windfall. As we have explained, defendant knew why he wanted the added language, while the People did not exercise sufficient diligence to determine what their agreement to the language encompassed before they agreed.
The trial court properly enforced the terms of the plea agreement.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s dismissal order is affirmed.



MAURO , J.



We concur:



ROBIE , Acting P. J.



DUARTE , J.