P. v. Valencia
Filed 6/4/13 P.
v. Valencia CA5
REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
>
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUSTIN JESUS VALENCIA, Defendant and Appellant. | F064730 (Super. Ct. No. BF139680B) |
THE COURT
name="_ftnref1" title="">*
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court of
Julia
Freis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Charles A. French and John G.
McLean, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant challenges the rate at which he was awarded
conduct credits for time spent in county jail prior to commencement of his
sentence. We find no error and affirm.
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December
9, 2011, a complaint was filed charging defendant with felony offenses that
occurred on June 16, 2011.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[1] Defendant remained in the custody of the
sheriff during the pendency of the trial court proceedings. On February 9, 2012, defendant pled guilty to
one count in an amended complaint, on condition he would receive the upper term
of three years in county jail, and the other counts were dismissed. Defendant subsequently moved to be granted
presentence conduct credit at the rate of two days for every two-day period of
confinement, pursuant to Penal Code section 4019,
section 2933. The motion was
denied. Defendant appeals, contending
the current version of section 4019, properly interpreted, entitles him to two
days of conduct credits for every two-day period of confinement, and to
interpret it otherwise would violate equal
protection.
DISCUSSION
of Review
“‘The
interpretation of a statute and the determination of its constitutionality are
questions of law. In such cases,
appellate courts apply a de novo standard of review.’ [Citations.]â€
(Valov v. Department of Motor
Vehicles (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1120.)
Construction
Section
4019 governs credit to be given to a defendant convicted of a felony for time
spent in county jail “from the date of arrest to the date on which the serving
of the sentence commences.†(§ 4019,
subd. (a)(1).) Under a prior version of
section 4019, in operation from September 28, 2010 to October 1, 2011,
presentence conduct credits accrued at a rate of two days for every four days
of actual custody. (Stats. 2010, ch.
426, § 2; People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385, 395 (Kennedy).) By amendments that became operative on
October 1, 2011, the Legislature changed the accrual rate of conduct
credits. (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482;
Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53; Stats. 2011–2012 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 12, § 35.) Under the current version of the
statute, two days of conduct credit may be earned for each two days of actual
custody. (§ 4019, subds. (b), (c);
991, 993 (Verba).)
The current
version of the statute provides that it applies prospectively, “to prisoners
who are confined to a county jail … for a crime committed on or after October
1, 2011. Any days earned by a prisoner
prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior
law.†(§ 4019, subd. (h).) The former sentence expressly makes the
amended statute applicable when the crime was committed on or after October 1,
2011. Although the latter sentence is
less clearly expressed, we interpret it to mean that conduct credit for other
prisoners is governed by prior law. As
stated in People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42 (Rajanayagam): “‘“A statute should be construed so that
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy
another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.â€â€™ [Citations.] Therefore, we cannot read the second sentence
to imply any days earned by a defendant after October 1, 2011, shall be
calculated at the enhanced conduct credit rate for an offense committed before
October 1, 2011, because that would render the first sentence
superfluous.†(Id. at p. 51.) Defendant’s
offense was committed before October 1, 2011.
By the terms of section 4019, he was not entitled to the benefit of the
October 1, 2011, version of that section.
Consequently, the trial court properly calculated his conduct credits in
accordance with prior law, at the rate of two days of conduct credit for every
four days of actual custody.
Protection
“The
Fourteenth Amendment to the
States Constitution and article I, section 7, subdivision (a) of the
California Constitution both prohibit the denial of equal protection of the
laws.†(People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664, 674.) “The concept of equal protection recognizes
that persons who are similarly situated with respect to a law’s legitimate
purposes must be treated equally.
[Citation.] Accordingly, ‘“[t]he
first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is
a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly
situated groups in an unequal manner.â€â€™
[Citation.] ‘This initial inquiry
is not whether persons are similarly situated for all purposes, but “whether
they are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.â€â€™ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Brown (2012)
54 Cal.4th 314, 328.) Prisoners who were
placed in jail on or after October 1, 2011, and who committed an offense on or
after that date are similarly situated to prisoners who were placed in jail on
or after October 1, 2011, and who committed the same offense before October 1,
2011, for purposes of earning conduct credits under section 4019. (Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 53–54.)
Both classes were presumably aware of the conduct credit provisions and
those provisions acted as an incentive to perform assigned work and comply with
applicable rules and regulations. (
Defendant’s
offense was committed prior to October 1, 2011, but he was not arrested and
placed in custody until December 2011.
Consequently, he served all of his presentence custody time after
October 1, 2011. Consistent with
to prisoners whose offenses were committed after October 1, 2011, for purposes
of application of section 4019 conduct credits.
If the
persons differently affected by the statute are similarly situated, we must
determine whether the statute’s classifications violate equal protection. A statutory classification that neither
proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights is
analyzed under the rational basis test.
(People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37
Cal.4th 1185, 1200–1201.) Under this
test, which applies to conduct credits, we inquire whether the “classifications
between those to whom the state accords and withholds substantial benefits
[are] reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose.†(In re
Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542, 545–546; In re Stinnette (1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 800, 805.) The statutory classification “must be upheld
against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state
of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.†(Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.)
While “the purpose of section
4019’s conduct credits generally is to affect inmates’ behavior by providing
them with incentives to work and behave, [the purpose of the October 1, 2011,
amendment of section 4019 was] ‘to reduce recidivism and improve public safety,
while at the same time reducing corrections and related criminal justice
spending.’[Citation.] †(Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 54–55.) Rational basis review of an equal protection
challenge is deferential; we may not intrude on the Legislature’s policy
judgments, or “second-guess the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the law.†(People
v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74, 77.)
“When conducting rational basis review, we must accept any gross
generalizations and rough accommodations that the Legislature seems to have
made.†(Id. at p. 77.)
We agree
with the Rajanayagam court that
the Legislature’s classification bears a rational relationship to its
stated purposes.
“Preliminarily, we note the
California Supreme Court has stated equal protection of
the laws does not forbid statutes and statutory amendments to have a beginning
and to discriminate between rights of an earlier and later time.…
“More importantly, in choosing
October 1, 2011, as the effective date of Assembly Bill No. 109, the
Legislature took a measured approach and balanced the goal of cost savings
against public safety. The effective
date was a legislative determination that its stated goal of reducing
corrections costs was best served by granting enhanced conduct credits to those
defendants who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011. To be sure, awarding enhanced conduct credits
to everyone in local confinement would have certainly resulted in greater cost
savings than awarding enhanced conduct credits to only those defendants who
commit an offense on or after the amendment’s effective date. But that is not the approach the Legislature
chose in balancing public safety against cost savings. [Citation.]
Under the very deferential rational relationship test, we will not
second-guess the Legislature and conclude its stated purpose is better served
by increasing the group of defendants who are entitled to enhanced conduct
credits when the Legislature has determined the fiscal crisis is best
ameliorated by awarding enhanced conduct credit to only those defendants who
committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011.†(Rajanayagam, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 55–56; accord,
996-997.)
The
Legislature is also permitted to make incremental changes, as it tries to
determine the best means to achieve its purposes. (Kennedy, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.) Because the classifications used by the
Legislature bear a rational relationship to the purposes of the statutory
amendment, we find no violation of the constitutional right to equal
protection.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
name="_ftn1" title="">* Before Hill, P. J., Wiseman, J. and
Levy, J.
name="_ftn2" title="">[1] Because the facts of the offenses and the exact nature
of the charges are not pertinent to the issues raised in defendant’s appeal, we
will not discuss them in any detail.
