P. v. Valdez

Filed 6/30/08 P. v. Valdez CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

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Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, 1538.5),^[1]defendant Robert Martinez Valdez pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property (Pen. Code,  496d, subd. (a)). The trial court suspended imposition of defendants sentence and placed him on five years formal probation under various conditions, including a requirement that he serve 120 days in county jail. He appeals, contending the motion to suppress was wrongly denied. ( 1538.5, subd. (m).) We shall correct an error in the minute order and affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Consistent with the established standard of review, we assume every fact in the record that supports the ruling of the trial court. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.)

At 2:00 a.m. on August 14, 2007, Stockton City Police Officer John Black responded to the report of a trespass at a vacant apartment on Mariners Drive. Officers Afanasiev and Deacon also responded. [A]t some point after determining the apartment in question was secure, Officer Black noticed defendant standing near a Toyota Matrix in the parking lot. Officer Black noted that the car was not properly parked in the stall and there were two people inside the car. He watched [defendant] for a little bit and realized [defendant] was walking away from the car . . . .

Officer Black then got out of his patrol car to talk to defendant. As he did, Officers Afanasiev and Deacon parked their patrol car. Officer Black asked defendant to come over and talk to him; he also asked the other officers to speak with the people still inside the Matrix. Officer Black then handcuffed defendant and placed him in the back of Afanasiev and Deacons patrol car.

Following Officer Blacks direction, Officer Afanasiev approached the Matrix. He saw there were two women inside, one in the front passenger seat and one in the back seat. Officer Afanasiev asked them who the vehicle belonged to, but they were unable to tell him. He could not use the license plates to identify the owner because the vehicle had paper plates on the rear, similar to those you would see from a dealership.^[2] One of the officers ran the [vehicle identification number or] VIN, which they were able to see through the windshield on the drivers side of the dashboard, and learned the car was stolen.

Defendant was subsequently arrested and charged with the unlawful taking of a vehicle in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a), and receiving stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a).

Defendant initially pleaded not guilty to both counts and filed a section 1538.5 motion to suppress the evidence obtained, without identifying precisely which evidence he sought to suppress. The trial court denied defendants motion.

Defendant then changed his plea, pleading guilty to the charge of receiving stolen property in exchange for dismissal of the remaining charge and dismissal of a separate action (case No. SM258585). Pursuant to his plea, defendant was placed on five years formal probation and sentenced to 120 days in county jail. Defendant appeals the trial courts denial of his motion to suppress.

Discussion

The standard of appellate review of a trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial courts factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362.)

On appeal, defendant contends that he was unlawfully detained when Officer Black handcuffed him and put him in the back of a patrol car. Thus, he argues, any evidence discovered after his detention is fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been suppressed. In response, the People contend that the trial courts ruling was correct because [defendant] lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy to contest the search of the stolen vehicle. Neither argument is persuasive.

If the challenged police conduct is shown to be violative of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule requires that all evidence obtained as a result of such conduct be suppressed. [Citations.] [] Such evidence includes not only what was seized in the course of the unlawful conduct itself--the so-called primary evidence [citations]--but also what was subsequently obtained through the information gained by the police in the course of such conduct--the so-called derivative or secondary evidence [citations]. Thus, the fruit of the poisonous tree, as well as the tree itself, must be excluded. [Citation.] (People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1299 (Williams).)

As for secondary evidence, the defendant bears the burden of making a prima facie case that such evidence was tainted by--i.e., causally linked to--the primary illegality. (Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1300.)

To succeed, the defendant must show more than that the challenged evidence would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police; rather, [the defendant] must establish that it has been come at by exploitation of that illegality . . . . (Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1300, italics added by Williams.) Defendant failed to meet his burden.

At trial, defendant failed to establish that the VIN obtained by police, which led to the officers learning the car was stolen, was causally linked to the claimed unlawful detention. Indeed, discovery of the VIN was a wholly separate event from Officer Blacks detention of defendant because Officers Afanasiev and Deacon saw the VIN in plain view, through the windshield of the Matrix, at approximately the same time that Officer Black was detaining defendant.

Thus, regardless of whether defendants detention was unlawful, discovery of the VIN was not fruit from the poisonous tree. (See Williams, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1299.) Accordingly, defendants claim fails.

Defendant also contends that the courts minute order, dated September 14, 2007, erroneously includes the following probation conditions, which were not included in the courts oral pronouncement of judgment: (1) that defendant seek and maintain employment and notify the probation officer of any change[,] and (2) that defendant not own, have possession, custody or control of firearms. Defendant asks that we direct the trial court to strike these provisions from its written order.

The People concede the minute order is in error and should be corrected. Having reviewed the record, we accept the Peoples concession. We shall direct the trial court to correct the minute order.

Disposition

The trial court is directed to correct the minute order by striking the following provisions: (1) that defendant [s]eek and maintain employment and notify [the] probation officer of any change[,] and (2) that defendant not own, have possession, custody or control of . . . firearms[,] and to forward a certified copy of the corrected minute order to the probation authorities. The judgment is affirmed.

DAVIS, Acting P.J.

We concur:

HULL, J.

ROBIE , J.

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^[1] Hereafter, undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

^[2] While walking around the Matrix, the officers also saw a license plate on the front seat, another license plate under the front passenger seat, and a third license plate under the paper plate affixed to the rear of the Matrix. The plate found under the passenger seat actually belonged to another Toyota Matrix found in the same parking lot.