P. v. Turner
Filed 2/5/13 P. v. Turner CA2/8
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and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
TREAUNA TURNER,
Defendant and Appellant.
B231352
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. BA355456)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County. Rand S. Rubin,
Judge. Affirmed.
Chris R. Redburn, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General,
Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Chung L. Mar and Corey J. Robins, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Treauna Turner
was convicted of the murder of Yolanda Kennard (Pen. Code,
appeals her conviction on multiple grounds.
We affirm.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During a public altercation
in 2009 Turner stabbed Yolanda Kennard,
Turner’s mother Pamela Johnson was charged with assaulting Yolanda’s mother
Denise Kennard with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1).)
A.
Prosecution Case
At trial, witnesses for the prosecution told of a
conflict between Turner and Denise over a man, Frederick Reddix. Reddix had been dating Denise for nine years
but had a sexual relationship with Turner on and off for the past four or five
years. Denise and Turner had known each other
for many years and were friendly until Reddix began seeing Turner. At that time, Turner began to act angry with
Denise. As of April 2009 Reddix and
Denise had broken off their relationship and Reddix and Turner were in a
relationship.
On April 12, 2009, Reddix was with Turner when he
received a call on his mobile phone from a female caller. Turner became angry and broke Reddix’s phone
in half, then asked him to leave. Reddix
refused to leave and Turner called the police.
Reddix was escorted away by the police.
Later that day, he returned to Turner’s home. He was again asked to leave; refused to
depart; and the police again removed him from Turner’s apartment.
On April 14, 2009, Turner expressed to Ivan Williams
her hostility toward the Kennard family:
she said “[S]he didn’t like no bitches, she didn’t want them bitches at
her house, [and] for [Ivan] to never let them come over there.†Turner also said that she was going to “kill
them bitches.†She said the Kennards
were the devil. Williams warned the
Kennards of what Turner had said.
Later that day, a fight broke out between the
families. Yolanda’s sister Britney
Kennard and her friend Christina Pye were engaged in an altercation with Turner
and her daughter, Breauna Clay.
Prosecution witnesses described Clay as initiating the violence at
Turner’s urging. Neither Britney nor Pye
had threatened or attacked Turner or Clay prior to the fight.
The following morning, April 15, 2009, Turner came to
Denise’s home while Denise, her daughters Teresa and Britney, and Reddix were
there. According to Denise, Turner was “outside
the house on the sidewalk on our street in front of my building, hollering my
name, [‘]Denise, come outside, bitch, come outside right now. I’m out here by myself, bring your ass
outside.[’]†Turner was upset and very
angry. Reddix went outside to speak with
Turner. She called out, “Denise, bitch,
come outside, that’s okay, I’m going to kill everybody in your family one by
one. . . .†Teresa
recounted that Turner sounded mad and yelled loudly that she would kill
everyone in the house. Reddix testified
that Turner left after shouting that she would kill all of them, one by one.
Jason Sykes testified that he saw Turner on the
morning of April 15, 2009. She was very
angry, and said, “‘These motherfuckers got me fucked up. I’m going to come back and kill
somebody.’â€
Later that day, while Denise, Yolanda and Teresa were
at home, their neighbor Williams called out to Yolanda that his niece had been
attacked or was in a fight on a bus.
Williams headed down the street, followed by Yolanda, who was friends
with the niece. Teresa followed
immediately, and the group grew to include Denise, Reddix and at least seven
other people, some of whom arrived by car.
The group went to the bus stop but did not find Williams’s niece. They did, however, encounter Turner, Johnson,
and two other women.
Yolanda and her party stopped when they saw Turner and
her companions. Turner, who used a
wheelchair, approached the group, rolling herself rather than being
pushed. As Turner and her companions
approached, they were making gestures that suggested, “Come on.†When Turner was approximately three feet away
from Teresa, Yolanda asked Turner, “Treauna, where is your daughter?†Yolanda was standing still. She did not attack, threaten, hit, or make a
hostile motion toward Turner. Turner
said nothing and immediately lunged at Yolanda, stabbing her with a knife.
Yolanda told her mother, “That bitch stabbed me,†and
then collapsed. Turner turned her
wheelchair and began to wheel away.
Reddix stopped Turner and pushed her from the wheelchair. The knife fell from the wheelchair. Turner scooted her body toward the fallen
knife. She beat Reddix to the knife; he
took the wheelchair and hit her with it twice.
People surrounded Turner so she could not leave.
A knife recovered from the
scene had Yolanda’s blood on the blade and Turner’s DNA on the handle.
B.
Defense Case
Turner admitted stabbing Yolanda but claimed to have
acted in self-defense. The defense
presented evidence that she had reason to fear Yolanda and others in her group
and that Yolanda was the aggressor prior to the stabbing.
Turner testified that she and Reddix were
intermittently intimate. She knew he was
in a relationship with Denise but he had said in 2009 that he was not with
Denise anymore. On April 12, Reddix came
to Turner’s home smelling of liquor.
They argued, and Reddix called Turner a bitch. She told him he was drunk and “trippin’†and
he had to leave. Reddix refused to
leave. As Turner started to move herself
from a couch to her wheelchair, Reddix grabbed the wheelchair from her. Turner slipped and landed on her hand,
hurting it. She began to call 911 but
Reddix pulled the cord from the wall, preventing her from calling. Turner eventually called the police and the
police escorted Reddix out.
Turner testified that Reddix returned to her home
later that day and forced his way in.
Reddix again refused to leave and was again removed by police. According to Turner’s daughter Breauna Clay,
Reddix threatened them: “He stated, ‘I’m
going to get you, Blood, I’m going to get you bitches.’â€
The defense presented evidence that on April 10
Britney came to Turner’s apartment when Turner and Reddix were there. Although Turner told Britney not to return,
Britney came back on April 14 with Pye. Turner
told Britney, “‘Didn’t I tell you not to come back to my house? Frederick Reddix do not live here.’†According to Turner, Britney responded,
“‘Bitch, you can’t tell me where to come.
This is my ’hood.’†Clay told
Britney not to speak to her mother disrespectfully, and Britney attacked
Clay. Turner and Pye became involved in
the fight, Turner trying to end the conflict.
The women were swearing and “saying all garbage†at each other. Turner was not injured; Clay had scratches
and bruises on her face.
After the fight Turner was outside when two cars drove
by. Denise was a passenger and was
“hanging out†of the car, saying to Turner, “‘You crippled bitch, he love me,
don’t love you, you crippled bitch.’â€
Other occupants of the car were calling Turner a “crippled bitch†as
well, and they threatened Turner. Clay
testified that Denise yelled, “‘I’m going to get you, bitch.’†Turner feared the car would stop and its occupants
would start a fight, so she went indoors.
Britney was in the car with Denise, and Reddix was a passenger in the
other vehicle.
The defense presented the encounter between Turner and
Denise on the morning of the stabbing as an effort by Turner to de-escalate the
tensions between the families and to make Denise aware of her daughter
Britney’s conduct. Turner testified that
she went to Denise’s house “to talk to her and, you know, let her know what’s
going on with her daughter coming to my house.â€
Turner felt things were “getting too out of hand†with Britney coming
over and calling her names. She
testified, “I just wanted to go talk to her and see what’s going on and tell
her—tell her daughter to stop coming to my house. She done jumped on my daughter. My daughter is a child. Two grown women came over and jumped on my
daughter, and it’s just getting out of hand.â€
Turner described her emotional state that morning: “I was pissed, no lie. I was pissed.
I slept on it, woke up, thought about it, and I wasn’t—I wasn’t mad no
more, but I wanted—I wanted to tell Denise what’s going on with her daughter
and what’s going on, why is she coming to my house, are you sending her? I just wanted to know. I needed to talk to her because this was her
child.â€
As she approached Denise’s home, she saw Reddix
outside. He went inside the apartment
when he saw her. Turner stopped at the
front gate and began yelling Denise’s name.
Denise responded, “‘What, that cripple bitch outside?’†Turner said, “‘Denise, come outside, come
outside, I want to talk to you.’†Reddix
left the apartment. Turner called
Denise’s name again, and Denise refused to come outside. Turner told Denise to “‘come to the
motherfucking . . . top of the stairs and talk to
me.’†Denise was “cussing and
hollering.†Turner told Denise that she
was there to talk with her about Britney:
“I need to talk to you about your motherfucking daughter coming to my
house. Tell your daughter stop coming to
my motherfucking house. She jumped on my
daughter yesterday, her and her homegirl.â€
Denise told Turner, “‘Fuck you, bitch.
I ain’t got shit to say to you.’â€
Turner left. She did not threaten
Denise or any member of her family.
Both Turner and Latonya Hicks, one of the people with
Turner at the time of the confrontation, testified about the stabbing later
that day. Hicks testified that she,
Turner, Johnson, and a family friend were walking to the store. She saw a group of people as they
walked. Her attention was drawn to the
group because of “[t]he colors, the yelling, people.†She heard a woman yell, “‘There go those bitches.’†There were a lot of people in the group and
they approached, walking quickly. Hicks
heard people say, “‘F’ them bitches up,’†and “‘Knock her out of her
wheelchair.’â€
Hicks testified that one person in the approaching
group drew her attention, a person she described as “[p]igtails, baggy clothes,
dark, a little taller than me, about my height.†At first she thought it was a boy but then
realized that it was a girl. The group
approached Johnson first. A lady walked
up to Johnson, called her a bitch and hit her, and they started fighting. Johnson had done nothing before being
hit.
According to Hicks, the person she had first thought
was male but then realized was female “ran in and out the crowd to
[Turner]. When she first ran upon
[Turner], I heard her saying, [‘W]here are [sic]
your daughter?[’] And then she ran back
in the crowd. She came back to [Turner]
and said, [‘]I’ll take that fate with your daughter.[’] Then she ran back in the crowd and came back
up [to Turner], and that’s when I took off focus because to get Pamela Johnson
from fighting with the lady because they’re fighting with the lady while this
is happening.†The girl had been
agitated and excited when she addressed Turner.
Turner did not respond.
Hicks testified that she saw the girl grab Turner by
her shirt and pull her from her wheelchair with the help of three others. Turner had not moved except to tip from her
chair. Turner fell on her face on the
ground. After Turner fell from her
chair, the girl jumped up and ran. Hicks
said that she stumbled and appeared to be injured. Hicks saw nothing in Turner’s hand.
Hicks tried to break up the fight and to help Turner
back into her wheelchair. Turner kept
reaching behind her, which confused Hicks, but then she turned and saw that two
women and two men, one of whom was Reddix, were kicking and socking
Johnson. Turner told Hicks not to leave
Johnson. After Turner was back in her
wheelchair, Reddix attempted to attack her.
He threw a bottle and a brick at her.
Turner testified that on the afternoon of the
incident, she was on the way to the store for milk. She took a knife with her when she left
because, she said, “It was [sic] been
a lot of friction between me and Denise with Britney coming jumping on my
daughter with her friend. It’s—it was
just a lot of friction, so I knew that we was [sic] going to end up probably bumping into them because that was
around the time everybody [was] hanging out after school hours.†Turner ordinarily carried a pocketknife and
pepper spray. She took a kitchen knife
because she could not find her pepper spray or pocketknife. She concealed the knife in her wheelchair.
As they crossed the street on the way to the store,
Turner saw a lot of people standing at the corner. Turner continued to “roll and talk, laughingâ€
with her mother and her sister. She
heard Denise say, “‘There go them bitches, there go that cripple bitch right
there.’†She had not felt threatened
before Denise spoke, but Denise’s words caught Turner’s attention and she began
to focus on the crowd. She saw Reddix
and Britney in the group.
Turner and her companions stopped, and the crowd began
to approach them. A lady wearing baggy
clothes came forward in front of the group.
The people were walking quickly.
The person in front “was the one, you know, doing all the fighting
motion, and she was coming faster, walking, like going back and forth and
jumping up and, you know, doing all this.â€
Turner did not know her, but she later learned it was Yolanda.
Turner testified that Yolanda “just came to us like
walking and she doing all of this, and we stopped. And my mom on the side of us, she approached
my mom first, like she got in my mom’s face doing with her fist balled up and
asking my mama, ‘[W]here you all motherfucking daughter at? I want that fate with that bitch. Where your daughter at?’†Turner said that Johnson just looked at
Yolanda, and then the woman turned to Turner and “got in my face.†Yolanda asked, “‘Where y[’a]ll motherfucking
daughter at?’†and “‘What up with you, bitch, fucking with my man?’†Her fists were balled up and in Turner’s
face, and she was moving them in a circular motion. Yolanda took off her shirt and threw it. Turner testified that “when she took off her
shirt, I was like, I know you going to put the jump on me and my motherfucking
mama.â€
Yolanda got angrier when Turner and Johnson said
nothing. Turner kept her hand on her
knife because she was scared. Turner was
frightened by the way Yolanda came toward them, how she was in their faces
talking loudly and with balled fists.
Turner believed that she was going to try to hurt her. Yolanda grabbed at Turner’s sweater or
hoodie. Turner testified, “I had my
knife right here, and I had my hand on it at all times when I seen the crowd coming
toward. I had my hand on it at all
times. And when she went to grab—when
she went to grab at me (indicating), I stuck her and dropped it. And when I realized I stuck her, I dropped
the knife (indicating).†Turner
described Yolanda as being “in a rage†and explained, “When she grabbed me, I
stuck her.†Turner stabbed Yolanda
because “she put her hands on me and she—she went to hurt me, and I was
protecting myself.†Turner denied
intending to kill Yolanda.
Denise, who had moved behind Turner, grabbed the back
of Turner’s wheelchair and tipped Turner out.
Turner curled into a fetal position because she was being kicked and
hit. Reddix threw her wheelchair into
the street. He did not hit her with
it.
Turner lied to the police when she denied that she had
a knife. She did not tell them that she
acted in self-defense; she lied because she was scared. She knew she had knifed Yolanda and she did
not want to admit it. She also lied to
the police about her relationship with Reddix and her relationship with Denise
and claimed not to know that someone had been injured. She lied because she did not trust them with
her “real testimony on what happened even though I know that I was protecting
myself to my best ability and I was attacked.â€
Turner testified that she was not Denise’s rival over
Reddix. Reddix had told her he was no
longer with Denise and she had believed him “a little bit,†but he lied so
often that she did not know what to believe from him. She claimed she was not angry about his relationship
with Denise. When asked whether it
bothered her if he was sexually intimate with Denise, she responded that Reddix
“ha[s] women all over Los Angeles. He
loves—he don’t love none of us.â€
Turner reported that she did not have friction with
the Kennard family or dislike them as of April 12, but that she was dating
Reddix and did not feel comfortable with members of the Kennard family coming
to her door. She had not told Britney
that she did not like her mother or her.
She claimed that even after the fight among Clay, Britney, and Pye, she
was not angry with Denise. When she went
to speak with Denise, they spoke disrespectfully to each other, but she had
nothing against Denise even then. She
had nothing against Denise for calling her a crippled bitch. She maintained she had no anger at all toward
Denise. Turner said she was angry at
Britney about the fight, “but I didn’t hold it against her.†She admitted being angry at Reddix “for lying
and kicking up a gang of mess.â€
The jury was instructed on first degree murder, second
degree murder, voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense, and
justifiable homicide in self-defense or defense of another. Turner was convicted of
DISCUSSION
I. Failure
to Declare a Mistrial After the Spectator Outburst
During the first day of testimony, a male spectator
who was believed to be Teresa’s boyfriend interrupted Teresa’s testimony,
shouting, “Murderer. You’re a
murderer. You killed that baby
girl. You killed that little girl. Murderer—.â€
The court immediately ordered the jury into the jury room and called for
a break. When court resumed outside the
presence of the jury, the court immediately granted Turner’s counsel’s request
that the spectator be excluded from the courtroom. The court advised the parties that it planned
to discuss with the jury that individuals can become emotional during a trial,
that this was not evidence, and that jurors need to concentrate on the evidence
in the case. The court said, “And then
we’ll see if there’s a problem with anyone.
The only thing is that means that the people that don’t want to be here
can say[, ‘Y]eah, I have a problem now.[’]
But I think we have to inquire.â€
The prosecutor agreed, Johnson’s counsel said, “Okay,†and Turner’s
counsel said, “Thank you.â€
The court advised the jury, “Ladies and gentlemen, I
just want to tell you, this is a homicide trial and it’s a very emotional
homicide trial for both sides, for the family of the lost member and the family
that’s in court charged with the crime.
But whatever happens out there in the audience is not evidence in the
case. . . . You need to decide the case based on the
evidence. That’s what you hear from the
witnesses on the witness stand. That’s
the documents marked and admitted. Does
anyone have a problem with that, because we had an outburst in the
courtroom? And that person is gone and
will not be back in this courtroom. But
is there anyone that has a problem deciding this case based on the evidence, on
what you hear from witnesses, on documents marked and admitted, because someone
had an outburst in the courtroom?†Each
juror and alternate juror denied that the outburst would interfere with judging
the case based on the evidence. The
trial resumed without objection. The
following morning, Turner moved for a mistrial.
The court found the motion untimely and denied it.
Turner argues that the court should have granted her
mistrial motion. “A spectator’s
misconduct constitutes ground for mistrial only if the misconduct is of such a
character as to prejudice or influence the jury. [Citation.]
‘[T]he mere fact that a spectator is guilty of some misconduct . . . does
not mandate the declaration of a mistrial, . . . especially
where the judge takes immediate action to avert possible juror prejudice.†[Citation.]
Moreover, the trial court has wide discretion in determining whether the
spectator’s conduct is prejudicial and the court’s determination will not be
overturned in the absence of an abuse of discretion. [Citations.]â€
(People v. Miranda (1987) 44
Cal.3d 57, 114 (Miranda), disapproved
on another ground in People v. Marshall
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4.)
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion for a mistrial.
Although dramatic, the outburst was brief and the court’s response
prompt and thorough. The court
acknowledged the emotional intensity of the trial but admonished the jurors to
decide the case only on the evidence presented.
The court then questioned each juror individually as to whether the
outburst would interfere with the juror’s ability to judge the case based on
the evidence alone. Each juror denied
that the outburst would prevent him or her from carrying out his or her duty to
judge the case based on the evidence, and only then did the trial resume. As the brief misconduct was promptly remedied
by admonition and polling, and there is no indication in the record that the
outburst could have possibly affected the verdict, the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. (Miranda,
supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 114.)
Turner argues, however, that
this case is akin to Parker v. Gladden
(1966) 385 U.S. 363, and that a mistrial was constitutionally required. In Parker,
the bailiff told one member of a sequestered jury in the presence of other
jurors that the defendant was guilty and that any error would be corrected by
an appellate court. (
because the speaker was a court and state officer who carried great weight with
the jury by virtue of his official role and his attendance upon the sequestered
jury for eight days, as well as because one juror testified to being influenced
by the bailiff’s comments. (
is factually inapposite. Here, the
speaker was not a court officer in charge of the jury attempting to influence
jurors outside the courtroom with private talk, but a stranger sitting in the
court audience who was immediately removed from the courtroom after his
interjection. Moreover, when the court
inquired of the jurors here, each juror denied being influenced by the
outburst. Parker does not govern this case.
II. Evidentiary
Issues
A.
Adoptive Admission
Teresa Kennard, Yolanda’s sister, testified that after
Turner had been arrested for stabbing Yolanda, she (Teresa) had said to Turner,
“‘Tree-Tree, what if that was your daughter?’â€
Teresa testified that in response, Turner said nothing, but “sat there
with a smirk on her face.†Over
relevance and Evidence Code section 352 objections, the trial court admitted
the evidence of this exchange.
The trial court erred when it analyzed the
admissibility of Turner’s smirking silence under the adoptive admission
framework, but the evidence was nonetheless properly admitted. The adoptive admission exception to the
hearsay rule did not apply here because none of this evidence was hearsay. Teresa’s question to Turner how she would
feel if that had been her daughter was not an out of court statement offered
for its truth. (Evid. Code,
§ 1200.) Turner’s silence or smirk
cannot therefore be interpreted as manifesting the adoption of or belief in the
truth of any statement, as required for an adoptive admission, because Teresa
had not made any factual assertion or accusation. While no direct accusation is necessary in
order for a silence to constitute an adoptive admission, Teresa’s statement was
not “a statement in the presence of a party to an action under circumstances
that would normally call for a response if the statement were untrue.†(People
v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 661.)
Nothing could be true or untrue about Teresa’s statement, for the
question about how Turner would feel if it was her daughter who had been
stabbed was designed not to convey factual information or to present any kind
of scenario to which she would be expected to respond. Instead, it was an attempt to confront Turner
with what it would be like to be the mother of the victim.
Turner’s silent smirk in
response to Teresa’s question, however, was admissible as conduct probative of
her state of mind shortly after the incident.
Turner contends that “the only reason†the evidence was admitted was to
make her “look bad†and that it was not probative of any disputed fact, but
this is not the case. Turner’s apparent
self-satisfaction soon after the stabbing was relevant to the state of mind she
had during the incident, which was the central issue in the case. Turner’s smirk in response to the question of
how she would feel if it had been her daughter who was injured or killed tends
to suggest that she was not displeased with what had happened, suggesting that
Turner acted with malice when she stabbed Yolanda.
B.
Turner’s Prior Convictions
Prior to Turner’s testimony her counsel asked the
trial court to sanitize Turner’s 2007 convictions for grand theft person and
used for impeachment because they reflected on Turner’s honesty or veracity and
they were so recent that Turner remained on probation; additionally, the
conduct involved was not substantially similar to the conduct at issue in the
present case. Turner contends that the
court erred by not sanitizing her prior offenses; asserts that the jury should
simply have been informed that she had been convicted of felonies of moral
turpitude; and contends that the damage to her credibility from this evidence
was compounded by the fact that the records of two prosecution witnesses were
sanitized.
In exercising its discretion to
determine whether prior criminal conduct evidence is more prejudicial than
probative so as to be excluded under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court
considers the factors identified by the California Supreme Court in People v.
Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 453 to determine the admissibility of prior
convictions: “(1) whether the prior
conviction reflects adversely on an individual’s honesty or veracity; (2) the
nearness or remoteness in time of a prior conviction; (3) whether the prior
conviction is for the same or substantially similar conduct to the charged
offense; and (4) what the effect will be if the defendant does not testify out
of fear of being prejudiced because of the impeachment by prior
convictions. [Citation.]†(People v. Mendoza (2000) 78
Cal.App.4th 918, 925 (Mendoza).)
The record
shows that the trial court performed the balancing of factors required by
Evidence Code section 352. Applying
these factors in our review, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to sanitize Turner’s prior convictions. Theft-related offenses and resisting a police
officer are both offenses that reflect adversely on honesty. (Mendoza,
supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 925
[theft offenses]; People v. Williams
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1462-1465 [resisting a police officer].) The offenses were very recent. Grand theft person and resisting an officer
are not similar to homicide, so the prior crimes did not involve similar
conduct to the conduct alleged here. The
final Beagle factor, the effect if
the defendant does not testify, is not present here, for Turner did testify at
trial. There was no abuse of
discretion.
C.
Exclusion of Evidence
Turner argues that the court
excluded a great deal of probative evidence that ultimately left the jury with
an incomplete understanding of what occurred and improperly enhanced
prosecution witness credibility. She identifies
nine separate types of evidence that she contends created these
misimpressions. We consider each in
turn, reviewing the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Alvarez
(1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201.)
1.
Exclusion of “Gang Overtonesâ€
Prior to the commencement of testimony, the prosecutor
advised the court that Turner, Reddix, and Williams were members of a
P-Stones but that he did not believe the matter to be a gang case, and he asked
the court to clarify what references to gangs could be made during trial.
Co-defendant Johnson’s attorney believed gang
membership to be relevant to “the fear that both the [defendants] fought†and
why they would have been carrying knives at the time of the incident. She explained that although the dispute had
generally been thought to concern two women fighting over a man, a gang-related
statement had been made during the incident:
they asserted that the phrase “crab bitch†had been called out and that
this phrase referred to a member of the Crips gang (although the gang the three
were alleged to have been affiliated with here was a Bloods-related gang). Also, gang membership was relevant because Turner
and Johnson had called the police to have Reddix removed from their home, and
“in certain areas you don’t call the police on other people in those areas,
especially when you know who they are.
And once you do that, it puts you in a dangerous position.†The court ruled that the evidence that
Turner, Reddix, and Williams were affiliated with a gang would not be admitted
“unless you [defense counsel] want to provide me at some point in time with
some prior bad acts that would indicate that your client knew something about
this victim that would cause her to arm herself.â€
During the defense case, Hicks testified that
Yolanda’s group had been speaking as the two groups neared each other. She heard the Kennard group say, “‘F’ them
bitches up, knock her out of her wheelchair, so what, fuck that Blood’—they
start talking gang stuff.†The
prosecutor objected and the court struck the testimony.
A police officer testified that the name of the
neighborhood in which the events occurred and the participants resided was “The
Jungle.†Turner’s counsel asked the
significance of the name, and he responded, “It’s what the gang within that
neighborhood calls that area.†The
prosecutor objected and the court struck the answer. On redirect examination, the prosecutor
elicited testimony that the name “The Jungle†originated in the 1950s or 1960s
because the area had been planted with many bushes and palm trees and looked
tropical.
Turner asserts that with these rulings the court
excluded evidence that the Kennard group made gang threats immediately before the
knifing and that the area in which the events occurred had a gang name, and she
contends that those facts would have supported Turner’s reasonable belief that
she was in danger as well as showing that it was reasonable for her to have
left her home armed.
The trial court did not
abuse its discretion. There was no
evidence or offer of proof of inter-gang rivalry here—the evidence before the
court was that Turner, Williams, and Reddix were all members of the same Bloods
gang. At the start of trial defense
counsel asserted that the Kennard group called Turner a “crab bitch,â€
supposedly a reference to a Crips gang, but the evidence at trial was that they
called her a “crippled bitch,†which carried no gang associations. As the defense made no offer of proof
sufficient to demonstrate that gang membership was relevant to the dispute, the
trial court properly excluded the references to gangs during trial.
2.
Exclusion of Denise’s Police Interview
Prior to Denise taking the stand, the prosecutor
advised the court of the existence of a poor-quality recording of Denise being
interviewed by the police. The
prosecutor told the court that there was no transcript and that he had been
unable to understand much of it, but “apparently the defense attorneys heard
during the interview her say something about her daughter in the ’hood,
something about fighting or something about breaking someone’s jaw.†The prosecutor asked that the defense not be
permitted to examine Denise about the “’hood†or about breaking jaws. The court observed that without a transcript,
the interview could not be used in court, and asked what relevance the
purported jaw-breaking would have if it occurred two or three years
earlier. The court reminded the defense
attorneys that trial was not the time for a fishing expedition, and asked, “You
tell me, when has she busted jaws?†The
prosecutor noted that Yolanda had no arrest record. The court ruled that under Evidence Code
section 352 no questions could be asked about “busting jaws and [being] loved
by the ’hood†unless a witness opened the door to them.
During the defense case, counsel sought to recall
Denise to testify about her police interview.
According to counsel, Denise had told the police that Yolanda “is in the
’hood and shit and is trying to do too much, she is trying to be a gangbanger,
trying to do too much, but she can hold her own, nobody’s going to mess with
her, and she has grown people scared of her.â€
Defense counsel offered to omit the gang-related part of that statement
but wanted the statement that grownups were scared of Yolanda to be presented
to the jury. The court responded, “I
don’t think it matters. It’s that this
person is scared of her. Isn’t that what
matters?†Turner’s attorney conceded
that the court was correct, and the court continued, “If you want to call her
and ask her how her daughter acted toward your client, that’s fine. If you want to try and bring in that she
broke someone’s jaw and grownups—it doesn’t matter what anyone thinks. It matters what your client thinks, and your
client just testified and she didn’t testify about any of that.â€
Defense counsel maintained that statement was relevant
to self-defense, because it related to fear.
The court countered that Yolanda’s conduct was relevant only if Turner
knew about it, and because Turner had testified she did not know Yolanda and
had never seen her before, Yolanda’s past acts were irrelevant. The court said, “What you need [Denise] for
is you want to show [that Yolanda was] a bad person†and that the defense was
attempting to put on evidence that “she’s a bad person, very aggressive in the
past.†The court ruled excluded the
evidence as irrelevant to the issue of self defense.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. How Yolanda behaved in other instances was
not relevant in the absence of any information that Turner was aware of
it. Turner claimed not to know who
Yolanda was, so Yolanda’s behavior and reputation were not relevant to and
could not have informed Turner’s state of mind.
Turner argues that the
evidence was admissible “to show that Yolanda Kennard approached appellant
aggressively on the street on April 15, 2009,†but the statements Turner sought
to introduce did not pertain to Yolanda’s conduct on April 15, 2009. She also contends that “Evidence that
appellant knew or feared that the person who approached her was associated with
someone who wished her harm, be it Reddix or Denise Kennard, was admissible
whether or not there was evidence that she knew Yolanda Kennard was dangerous.â€
but the excluded evidence did not tend to demonstrate that Turner “knew or
feared that the person who approached her was associated with someone who
wished her harm.†Yolanda’s presence
leading a group of people that Turner had reason to believe wished her ill
tended to show Yolanda’s association with them, but that evidence was admitted,
and the excluded evidence did not pertain to association. Turner also claims that the evidence that
Yolanda had broken an unidentified person’s jaw at an unspecified time in the
past was admissible as evidence of her motive, intent, and plan when she
approached Turner, but the fact of one violent act at an undetermined date
under unknown circumstances is not sufficient to permit a conclusion that she
approached Turner with the intent to harm her.
Turner has not demonstrated any abuse of discretion.
3.
Exclusion of Williams’s Testimony Concerning Yolanda’s Shorts
Uncontroverted evidence at
trial demonstrated that Yolanda was wearing baggy clothing at the time of the
incident. Turner, however, complains
that the court, while permitting her to testify to Yolanda’s clothes, did not
allow a prosecution witness to do so.
Williams had testified that Yolanda had been wearing a t-shirt,
basketball shorts, and basketball shoes on the day she was killed. Turner’s counsel asked whether the shoes and
the shorts were oversized or large, but the prosecutor’s objection was
sustained to both questions. Even
assuming that the court erred in prohibiting this inquiry, Turner cannot establish
any prejudice from the ruling because she was able to present evidence that
Yolanda wore baggy clothes that sagged “real low.â€
4.
Evidence of Denise’s Criminal History
During cross-examination, Denise said that she did not
know where Turner lived in April 2009 because she (Denise) had just been
released from jail. On redirect
examination, the prosecutor questioned Denise about the incarceration she had
mentioned. Denise testified that she had
been in county jail for drug possession.
Johnson’s counsel asked the court at sidebar for permission to ask
further questions about Denise’s criminal history, contending that the
prosecutor had made it appear as though the only thing Denise ever had been
imprisoned for was drug possession, when that was not accurate. The prosecutor explained that he was not
asking broad questions about her criminal history but only asking a specific
question about the particular incarceration Denise had mentioned so as not to
“leave it open.†The court denied
permission to inquire more broadly into Denise’s criminal history, concluding
that the prosecutor had merely cleared up an answer and had not opened up her
criminal history overall.
The trial court did not
abuse its discretion. One specific
instance of incarceration was mentioned during Denise’s testimony, and the
prosecutor elicited the nature of the offense that had led to that
incarceration. Denise never denied other
incarcerations, and neither her testimony nor the prosecutor’s questions left
the impression that this drug offense was the only offense she had ever
committed. Accordingly, no presentation
of additional criminal history was required to clear up a misimpression. Moreover, at the time the issue was raised
with the trial court, defense counsel failed to present evidence to the court
to permit it to assess the admissibility of the four battery offenses it sought
to introduce: defense counsel did not
know whether Denise had been convicted.
Turner’s counsel acknowledged that Denise’s record did not appear to
contain any battery convictions. For
each of these reasons, individually and together, Turner has not demonstrated
any error here.
5.
Evidence of Reddix’s Criminal History
Prior to Reddix’s testimony the court addressed his
prior criminal history. Reddix had been
convicted in 2010 of possessing PCP for sale (Health & Saf.,
§ 11378.5); in 1997 of vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a));
in 1995 of spousal abuse (§ 273.5); and in 1993 of robbery (§ 211). The court concluded that the 1993 and 1995
convictions were too remote but authorized impeachment with the 1997 and 2010
offenses “so the jury doesn’t think that this is a person that’s completely
crime-free.â€
Johnson’s counsel informed the court that Reddix also
had four misdemeanor convictions for violating court orders (§ 166). The court asked for the dates of the
convictions, and Johnson’s counsel characterized them as recent. Johnson’s counsel advised that these convictions
arose from disobeying a gang injunction.
The court said, “The problem is, on the gang injunction, I understand
it’s disobeying a court order, but the purpose of the prior convictions are
really two groups. One, dishonesty, like
a vehicle theft, you know, and readiness to do evil, which is the Health and
Safety Code [section] 11378.5 [conviction], possession for sale of PCP. Once served with a gang injunction, your
conduct can be standing on the street corner.â€
Arrest reports on the violations of court orders
revealed, according to counsel, that two of the disobedience incidents involved
associating outdoors, while the third one was connected to a drug arrest and
involved Reddix being in an area where he was not supposed to be. Johnson’s counsel argued that these
convictions “go[] toward his credibility, that he doesn’t listen to court
orders, he continues to violate, so I think it kind of shows how serious[ly]
he’s taking this.â€
The court observed that the conduct involved was
“standing on the street that his girlfriend lives on.†“[W]e also have to look at this in regard to
[Evidence Code section] 352 and I think there is a risk of undue prejudice
because it’s going to infuse gangs into this case. Do you want the jury to know that this is an
individual that’s violating a gang injunction . . . ? The court found that the offenses did not
evidence dishonesty or a readiness to do evil; that their probative value was
minimal; and that the evidence would have prejudicial impact.
Turner contends the court erred by excluding the
oldest two convictions because they were admissible and because they reflected
Reddix’s “lifetime of criminal behavior.†She complains that the sanitization
of Reddix’s criminal history gave the jury a false view of Reddix’s record and
credibility.
We find no abuse of
discretion. The trial court reasonably
determined that the convictions dating from 1993 and 1997 were too remote in
time to be particularly probative. The
court concluded that the use of his two more recent felony offenses for
impeachment would be sufficient to convey to the jury that Reddix was a
convicted felon. As far as the
misdemeanor convictions, the court reasonably concluded that Reddix’s wrongful
conduct was minimal and that the negligible probative value of those
convictions was outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice from introducing
gang-related matters into the trial.
Turner has not established any abuse of discretion here.
6.
Evidence of Reddix’s Abuse of Turner
Turner testified that on April 12, Reddix had come to
her home unannounced and smelling of liquor.
They argued, with Reddix calling Turner a profane name and Turner
telling him to leave. Reddix refused,
and he grabbed Turner’s wheelchair, causing her to slip and hurt her hand. She screamed at Reddix to leave and
threatened to call the police. Turner
tried to call 911 but Reddix prevented her from calling. Turner eventually reached the police and the
police escorted Reddix from her home.
Turner’s counsel attempted to elicit testimony
pertaining to Reddix’s violence, but the prosecutor’s objections were sustained. When Turner’s counsel asked whether Turner
had ever had to call the police on Reddix, the court conferred with counsel at
sidebar. The court authorized inquiry
about the days leading up to the incident, but not broad questions about the
entire history of the couple’s relationship.
Turner’s counsel wanted to show that Reddix was violent when he had been
drinking and that he was drunk that day, and so Turner had asked him to leave
based upon how he treats her when he drinks.
The court responded, “If you want to get into, well,
there have been 50 times in the past when he drinks—I don’t want to go into 50
times. I think under [Evidence Code
section] 352 it’s too much, and if it’s less than that, if it’s just once or
twice—I’m sure there’s times he’s been drunk that he doesn’t get violent. I think under [Evidence Code section] 352
it’s just too much. But the bottom line
is, I think what you want is she asked him to leave and he wouldn’t leave. She called the police, police got him out of
there, and he came back.â€
Turner argues on appeal that
evidence of “Reddix’s treatment of appellant was highly relevant to her state
of mind when she saw the crowd of people†before the incident and that Reddix
was among them. “Evidence that he had
abused her previously,†she contends, “would heighten her fear and render her
response to the crowd reasonable.â€
Therefore, she concludes, the evidence was wrongly excluded. Turner’s conclusory argument ignores the fact
that the court did not exclude all evidence of Reddix’s conduct toward
Turner. The court reasonably limited the
testimony to events in the days leading up to the incident while prohibiting
broad inquiries covering the entire history of the lengthy relationship. Turner was permitted to testify to the details
of the April 12 incident, including that he pulled the wheelchair from her,
causing her to fall and be hurt; pulled the phone from the wall; and was
removed from her home twice by the police in a single day. To the extent that Reddix’s treatment of Turner
impacted her state of mind, Turner was not precluded from presenting that to
the jury. Turner has not demonstrated
any abuse of discretion here.
7.
Evidence that Hicks Thought Someone Passed an Item to Yolanda
During her testimony, Hicks testified that when
Yolanda walked back to the group, then approached Turner again, Yolanda’s back
and forth movements made her think that “somebody probably would have passed
[her] something.†The court struck this
testimony because Hicks’s state of mind was irrelevant, and what she thought
“probably†occurred was pure speculation.
Hicks was permitted to testify that when she saw Yolanda moving back and
forth, it caused her fear or concern for her well-being.
Although Turner argues that
Hicks’s assertion that Yolanda had probably been handed something was not
speculative “because it explained why Hicks was frightened by Yolanda Kennard’s
movements between the two groups,†Hicks’s assessment as to what had “probablyâ€
happened was speculation. While the
court properly observed that Hicks’s state of mind was not at issue at trial,
to any extent that her state of mind could be considered relevant to Turner’s
state of mind, Turner was permitted to establish Hicks’s state of mind by
eliciting her testimony that Yolanda’s back and forth movements made her fear
for her life. There was no error
here.
8.
Evidence that Turner Said She Had Been Jumped
On redirect examination, Turner’s counsel sought to
introduce evidence that after the stabbing and once the police arrived and
arrested her, Turner telephoned Clay and told her that she had been attacked or
jumped and was being taken to jail.
Counsel claimed that this statement qualified as an exception to the
hearsay rule under Evidence Code section 1240 as a spontaneous statement. The court found that the statement was not a
spontaneous utterance under Evidence Code section 1240, stating, “I take it
that she would protect her daughter in any way she can. I agree, I don’t see it as a spontaneous
statement, and I don’t see a lot of relevance to it since it’s afterwards.â€
Turner now argues that the court abused its discretion
when it rejected her argument that the statement was admissible as a
spontaneous utterance. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion. Turner’s
offer of proof did not permit the conclusion that her statement to her daughter
about the stabbing was made spontaneously while she was under the stress of the
excitement caused by the stabbing.
Turner made her statement well after the stabbing. After the stabbing, the California Highway
Patrol arrived and took charge of the scene.
Then the Los Angeles Police Department responded to the scene and the
Highway Patrol left. Ultimately the Los
Angeles Police Department arrested Turner, and as she was being removed from the
scene she made the telephone call in question.
Turner also asserts on
appeal that the statement should have been admitted as a prior consistent
statement. As she did not argue in the
trial court that the statement was admissible on that ground, she has forfeited
this contention.
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3]
specifically raise a ground for admissibility of evidence is precluded from
raising issue on appeal].)
9.
Impact of Alleged Evidentiary Errors
In three separate subdivisions of her opening brief,
Turner argues that evidentiary errors here require reversal. First, she contends that the “sheer quality
and quantity†of these alleged evidentiary errors deprived her of due process
and rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.
Next, Turner argues that when considered cumulatively, the evidentiary
errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have only found one of Turner’s arguments
of evidentiary error to have any possible merit, these cumulative error arguments
necessarily fail.
Finally, Turner argues that
“[t]o the extent that appellant’s counsel did not make a proper objection to
the inadmissible evidence, he provided constitutionally ineffective assistance
of counsel.†As we have not held any of
Turner’s evidentiary challenges to have been forfeited based on a failure to
properly object to inadmissible evidence, this argument is inapplicable and
Turner has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel.
III. Late
Discovery of Prosecution Witness Jason Sykes
During trial, on Monday, November 22, 2010, Turner’s
counsel advised the court that the late the prior Friday the prosecution had
identified a new witness, Jason Sykes.
Sykes had been interviewed telephonically on Wednesday, November 17, and
police had tried to contact him the prior day.
During the interview Sykes related an account of Turner’s threats to
Denise on the morning of the stabbing; how he came to be at the site of the
stabbing; that Turner had said, “I’m going to kill somebody†the morning of the
killing; that gestures may have been made right before the stabbing; that he
(Sykes) attempted to remove the knife from Johnson’s hand; and that someone had
recorded the incident.
Turner’s counsel claimed not to be aware of this
witness, but the court noted that “Well, all knew there was a Jason there. The name Jason’s come up throughout the
trial.†Turner’s counsel said that
knowing about Jason Sykes as early as the prosecution had reason to know about
him would have impacted his cross-examination of previous witnesses. He claimed that the prosecution should have
alerted the defense to Sykes the prior Tuesday, November 16, and asked for a
mistrial based upon the late discovery.
The prosecutor gave a lengthy explanation of the events
relating to Sykes and his statement.
First, he said, the prosecution had no recording of the incident and did
not know whether it existed. Sykes first
came up when a member of the Kennard family told the police “[v]ery recentlyâ€
that there was another person present and that his name was Jason. He had been referred to as “Jay Breezyâ€
earlier. Denise disclosed that she knew
where he lived, and the prosecution had been trying to find him. The prosecutor learned of the interview on
Friday morning and immediately telephoned Johnson’s attorney, who promised to
contact Turner’s attorney. “This wasn’t
late discovery,†the prosecutor said.
“And, in fact, this wasn’t anything withheld and, in fact, the defense
was aware for a while that there was this additional person there. We learned during the trial that this person,
in fact, got involved, disarmed Ms. Johnson, stepped on her hand to get the
knife away from her and in fact, that’s what Jason says he did. He says he saw this. He pulled over and he stepped on her hand and
he got involved in it. And so, yes, we
found an additional witness in the course of our investigation during the
trial.â€
During his testimony, Sykes said that the first time
he spoke to detectives about the case was in the summer of 2009. Denise brought detectives to his home and
they spoke about the incident. After
that he had not spoken to the police until a few days earlier when he was
interviewed.
Outside the presence of the jury, Sykes related that
in 2009 Denise brought three plain clothes officers to his apartment. The officers asked questions about the
stabbing incident. It was a brief
conversation; at least one of the officers was writing something down during
the interview. He did not remember their
names. The court asked, “Are you sure
that you were told they were police detectives and not investigators? These are possibly investigators?†Sykes responded, “It could have been
investigators. Ain’t they all the same,
detective and investigators?†“Not to
me,†replied the court. Sykes said they
were wearing holsters and had badges at their waistbands.
Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the
failure to disclose interviews of Sykes to the defense. The court observed that there was some
question about who the men were who spoke to Sykes in the past; observed that
Sykes added very little to the existing evidence; and said, “I don’t see what
knowing this witness’s name or address would have been something
different. I don’t see it in this
case. So the witness was pretty much
consistent with everyone else in the case.
You had a chance to talk . . . to him. You cross-examined him. I think there’s certainly other remedies
besides mistrial.†The court denied the
mistrial motion.
Turner contends that the
court should have granted a mistrial based on the late disclosure of Sykes to
the defense. The court, however, found
that there was no discovery violation.
It was not convinced that Sykes had spoken to law enforcement in 2009
and concluded that Sykes’s identity and the interview with him had been turned
over promptly once the prosecution located him.
Even assuming a late disclosure, however, mistrial is not the only
remedy for late discovery (People v.
Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 299) and Turner has not demonstrated that a
mistrial was required under the circumstances here, where the court concluded
that the prosecutor had not committed misconduct; the existence and general
identity of the witness was known all along to both sides; the prosecutor had
not tried to gain any advantage; the prosecutor had promptly disclosed the
witness and the interview once the witness had been located and interviewed;
and the witness’s information was largely corroborative. The trial court gave defense counsel time to
speak with Sykes before he took the witness stand, and Turner has not shown
that this was insufficient to cure any harm that resulted from any delayed
discovery. (See, e.g.,
289-290 [trial court need not grant mistrial for a discovery delay when there
is no showing that a less severe remedy is insufficient to cure any
harm].) Turner has not demonstrated that
her chances of receiving a fair trial were irreparably damaged by any discovery
delay here (Ayala, at p. 282),
and she has therefore not demonstrated that a mistrial should have been
granted.
IV. Failure to Instruct on Heat of Passion
The jury was instructed on
the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect
self-defense. Turner did not request
that the trial court instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of
voluntary manslaughter based on sudden quarrel or heat of passion but contends
on appeal that the trial court should have so instructed the jury sua sponte. She argues that the stabbing was the result
of a sudden, unexpected quarrel and that this case is similar to
142, 164 (Breverman), in which the
California Supreme Court found that on the facts of that case the trial court
should have instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of
passion in addition to the instruction given on manslaughter based on imperfect
self-defense.
Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142, however,
concerned a very specific circumstance in which there was evidence of heat
of passion beyond the perceived need for self-defense, and the Supreme Court
has subsequently rejected the interpretation that Breverman requires that heat of passion instructions be given
whenever a jury is instructed on imperfect self-defense. As the California Supreme Court explained in
555, “Nothing in Breverman suggests
an instruction on heat of passion is required in every case in which the
self-defense is the circumstance that a defendant is attacked and consequently
fears for his life.†In
defendant panicked in the face of an attack on his car and home by a mob of
angry men and had come out shooting, and continued shooting, even after the
group had turned and ran.†(
In Moye, in contrast, the
evidence was that the defendant “acted deliberately in seeking to defend
himself from each successive advance from the victim, who, defendant claimed,
turned and attacked him once defendant chased him down and cornered him,†so
of passion instruction was required. (
This case is much more akin to Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th
537, than to Breverman,
passion or strong emotion demonstrated by the evidence at trial. By the defense account, Yolanda approached
and spoke aggressively and profanely; her fists were balled up and in Turner’s
face, and she moved her hands in circles.
Yolanda took off her shirt and threw it, causing Turner to believe that
she was going to attack. Turner was
frightened by Yolanda’s approach, her fists, and her aggressive and loud
voice. She believed that Yolanda was
going to try to hurt her. When Yolanda
grabbed at Turner’s sweater or hoodie, Turner struck her once because Yolanda
“went to do harm to me.†Turner then
dropped the knife. Turner said, “I was
protecting myself to my best ability and I was attacked.†At no time did Turner describe any passion or
any violent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion beyond the specific
fear that Yolanda was going to harm her.
There was no evidence of panic or a continuous, chaotic response to
events, as in Breverman; instead the
evidence here of heat of passion or any strong emotion was limited to the
circumstance that Turner was attacked and feared for her life, as in
Accordingly, we conclude that under Moye,
no heat of passion instruction was required.
Even if it were error to
fail to instruct the jury on a heat of passion theory of voluntary
manslaughter, moreover, any error would be harmless under the test set forth in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836 because it is not reasonably probable that Turner would have obtained
a more favorable outcome if the jury had been so instructed. (Moye,
supra, 47 Cal.4th at
pp. 555-556.) In performing the
harmless error analysis, we “assume the jury considered all of the defense
evidence bearing on defendant’s state of mind and the question of whether [s]he
harbored malice when it entertained and
rejected h[er] claims of reasonable and unreasonable (or imperfect)
self-defense.†(Id. at p. 556.) Here,
the jury rejected Turner’s account that she stabbed Yolanda out of either an
actual or perceived need to defend herself.
Once the jury had rejected Turner’s claims of reasonable and imperfect
self-defense, there was nothing else before the jury to support a finding of
heat of passion. As the court in
the jury rejected defendant’s claims of reasonable and imperfect self-defense,
there was little if any independent evidence remaining to support h[er] further
claim that [s]he killed in the heat of passio
| Description | Treauna Turner was convicted of the murder of Yolanda Kennard (Pen. Code,[1] § 187). She appeals her conviction on multiple grounds. We affirm. |
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