P. v. Stiles
Filed 12/4/13 P. v. Stiles CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as
specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DARREN KEITH STILES,
Defendant and Appellant.
C072976
(Super. Ct. No. 11F3774)
Defendant Darren Keith Stiles pleaded
guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm
and admitted allegations that he had a prior strike conviction and served a prior
prison term. The trial court sentenced
defendant to five years in prison (the middle term of two years, doubled for the
prior strike, plus one year for the prior prison term), and awarded presentence
credit as follows: 513 days of actual
credit and 256 days of conduct credit, calculated at the rate in existence when
defendant committed the offense. The
rate for calculating conduct credit in existence on July 5, 2011, was to divide the number of days actually
served by four, truncate any remainder, and then multiply the quotient by
two. (People v. Culp (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1278, 1283.)
Defendant now contends
presentence conduct credit calculated at the enhanced rate provided by the
Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 (the Realignment Act) for his days in
custody from October 1, 2011, to January 10, 2013, the date of sentencing.
For the reasons set forth in
211 Cal.App.4th 42 (Rajanayagam)
(review den. Feb. 13, 2013), the contention lacks merit.
We will affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends equal protection
principles entitle him to presentence conduct credit calculated at the enhanced
rate provided by the Realignment Act. Operative
October 1, 2011,
the Realignment Act amended Penal Code section 4019 to increase the rate at
which prisoners could earn conduct credits to two days for every two days actually
served (amended Pen. Code, § 4019, subd. (f)). The Realignment Act also added subdivision
(h) to section 4019, providing: “The
changes to this section enacted by the act that added this subdivision shall
apply prospectively and shall apply to prisoners who are confined to [specified
facilities] for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011. Any days earned by a prisoner prior to October
1, 2011, shall be
calculated at the rate required by the prior law.â€
“The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim
under the equal protection clause is a
showing the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more
similarly situated groups in an unequal manner. . . . If the first prerequisite is satisfied, we
proceed to judicial scrutiny of the classification[s at issue]. Where, as here, the statutory distinction at
issue neither touches upon fundamental interests nor is based on gender, there
is no equal protection violation if the challenged classification bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. [Citations.]
Under the rational relationship test, a statutory classification that
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional
rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for
the classification. [Citation].†(Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 53.)
In Rajanayagam, the Court of Appeal concluded that prisoners who
committed their offenses prior to October 1, 2011, but were in presentence
custody after that date, were, for the purpose of Penal Code section 4019,
equally situated with prisoners who committed their offenses on or after October
1, 2011, and served time in presentence custody. (Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 53-55.)
The court in Rajanayagam then addressed whether there was a rational basis for
treating the two groups differently. “[I]n
choosing October 1, 2011, as the effective date [of the Realignment Act], the
Legislature took a measured approach and balanced the goal of cost savings
against public safety. The effective date
was a legislative determination that its stated goal of reducing corrections
costs was best served by granting enhanced conduct credits to those defendants
who committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011. To be sure, awarding enhanced conduct credits
to everyone in local confinement would have certainly resulted in greater cost
savings than awarding enhanced conduct credits to only those defendants who
commit an offense on or after the amendment’s effective date. But that is not the approach the Legislature
chose in balancing public safety against cost savings. [Citation.]
Under the very deferential rational relationship test, we will not
second-guess the Legislature and conclude its stated purpose is better served
by increasing the group of defendants who are entitled to enhanced conduct
credits when the Legislature has determined the fiscal crisis is best
ameliorated by awarding enhanced conduct credit to only those defendants who
committed their offenses on or after October 1, 2011.†(Rajanayagam,
supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 55-56.)
Defendant disagrees with the
reasoning in Rajanayagam, arguing that
“[c]ost savings is not the issue here.
Unequal treatment of similarly situated prisoners is the issue.†But defendant misses the point. “ ‘ “The ‘standard formulation of
the test for minimum rationality’ [citation] is whether the classification is
‘rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.’ †’ †(People
v. Shields (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 323, 333.) Cost savings in enacting legislation is clearly
“a legitimate governmental purpose.†(See
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group
(1985) 38 Cal.3d 137, 160 [the Legislature’s conclusion “that it was in
the public interest to attempt to obtain some cost savings . . . [is]
rationally related to a legitimate state interestâ€]; American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital (1984)
36 Cal.3d 359, 372-373 [no violation of equal protection principles where the
Legislature’s enactment of statute was “rationally related†to the Legislature’s
legitimate intent to reduce costs of medical malpractice insurance];
80 Cal.App.4th 262, 273 [reducing the costs of workers’ compensation
coverage by eliminating the number of successful fraudulent claims is a
legitimate purpose].) Because cost
savings constitutes a rational basis for treating the two groups of prisoners
differently, defendant’s equal protection challenge lacks merit.
The courts in People v. Kennedy (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 385 and
991 also rejected the position espoused by defendant, but on different grounds
than the court in Rajanayagam. Defendant disagrees with the holdings in
this case based on the Rajanayagam
rationale, we need not address defendant’s arguments regarding
Defendant also relies on the holdings
in In re Kapperman (1974)
11 Cal.3d 542 and People v. Sage
(1980) 26 Cal.3d 498. But those
cases are inapposite because they do not address whether cost savings provides a
rational basis in this context.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
MAURO , J.
We concur:
HULL , Acting P. J.
MURRAY , J.
