P. v. Stewart
Filed 1/15/10 P. v. Stewart CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A121972
v. (MendocinoCounty
Super. Ct. No. SCUK
SYLVIE G. STEWART, CRCR0357413)
Defendant and Appellant.
________________________________________/
Sylvie G. Stewart appeals from a judgment entered after she pleaded guilty to first degree murder. (Pen. Code, 187, 189.)[1] She contends the trial court erred when it denied her request to withdraw her guilty plea. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion and will affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 4, 2003, around noon, appellant spoke with her ex-husband Jeffery Stewart on the telephone and told him she had just shot her boyfriend Aaron Foss. Stewart could hear Foss in the background laboring to breathe. Steward asked appellant whether she had called an ambulance. Appellant said no, but that friends were coming to help. Stewart called appellant back several times to check whether appellant had called an ambulance. Each time, appellant said no. Finally, Stewart asked why appellant was not calling an ambulance. She replied, Well, you know, he wasnt very nice. Stewart decided to call for help himself. He drove to a phone booth and had a friend call 911.
Appellant also called Daniel Zavaro for help that day. When Zavaro arrived at appellants house, appellant indicated that Foss had tried to commit suicide by shooting himself in the mouth. Zavaro was skeptical. He told appellant, You dont miss if you put a gun in your mouth. Appellant then admitted that she shot Foss. Zavaro went inside and found Foss on the floor moaning. Zavaro told appellant to call an ambulance. Appellant said she could not do that because the police would take her marijuana. Appellant then pretended that she had reconsidered. She gave the marijuana to Zavaro and told him she would call an ambulance. She never did.
Mendocino County Deputy Sherriff Jason Cox was on duty that afternoon when he received a call that someone had been shot. Cox went to the address indicated and found Foss lying on the living room floor convulsing. He appeared to have two holes in his forehead. No one else was home and there were no signs of a struggle. Foss was airlifted to a hospital were he died of a single gunshot wound to the head. What appeared to be a second bullet hole was in fact a blunt-force trauma wound.
Appellant fled to Canada, where she was arrested in February 2004. Ultimately, appellant was extradited to the United States.
Based on these facts, an information was filed charging appellant with murder. ( 187.) The information also alleged appellant personally used a firearm and caused a death within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d).
The case proceeded to a jury trial where the prosecution presented the evidence we have set forth above. The prosecution buttressed its case with additional testimony from Stewart who said he spoke with appellant by telephone approximately six times on the day of the crime. According to Stewart, appellant never said that Foss had been violent, never said that Foss had threatened her, and never said that she had acted in self-defense. Stewart also described an incident in August 1999 where appellant fantasized about killing somebody. The comment disturbed Stewart and made the hair on the back of his neck stand up.
The prosecution also presented testimony from a police detective who said the injuries Foss had sustained indicated that he had been shot from behind while looking in the opposite direction.
Appellant testified in her own defense. She admitted that she shot Foss, but claimed she did so in self-defense. Appellant was a Canadian citizen who was raised in Quebec speaking French. Her father was physically abusive, and she was raped by a friend when she was 12 years old. When appellant reported the rape, she was abused by the police who called her a whore.
Appellant said Foss was her boyfriend. On the date of the crime, Foss was staying at appellants home. Appellant had a headache and she asked Foss to go into town and get some Tylenol. Foss became angry and he refused to go. He grabbed appellants shirt, called her names, and threatened to kill her. Appellant remembered being raped when she was 12 and she decided she had to do something. About 20 minutes after Foss grabbed her, and after spending time in her kitchen and bedroom, appellant approached Foss from behind and shot him in the head as he sat on the couch looking the other way.
Appellant fled the house leaving Foss behind. She went to a womens center in San Francisco and asked for help. The people at the center recommended that appellant return to Ukiah and speak to a lawyer. Appellant tried to talk to a lawyer in Ukiah. When she was unsuccessful, she fled to Canada.
Appellant also presented testimony from three mental health experts. One, Dr. Vanessa Kelly, said appellant fit the criteria for major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress, and panic disorder. Another, Dr. Kevin Kelly, testified that appellant probably was diagnosable as having a schizoid personality and likely was the victim of a traumatic rape at an early age. A third mental health expert, Linda Barnard, testified appellant was a battered woman who would display hypervigilance in her relationships with men.
The case was submitted to the jurors who began their deliberations. However, before the jurors could render a verdict, appellant accepted a plea agreement. She pleaded guilty to first degree murder and agreed to a sentence of 25 years to life. In exchange, the gun allegation was dropped.
Appellant obtained a new attorney, and two months later, she filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea. New counsel also informed the court that he had doubts about appellants competency. The trial court suspended the proceedings so appellant could be evaluated.
A jury trial to determine appellants competence was conducted. Two psychologists testified. The first, Dr. John Greenhalgh, said appellant suffered from schizoaffective disorder. He believed appellant had the ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against her, but that appellant was not competent to assist her counsel. The other psychologist, Dr. Thomas Cushing, testified that appellant understood the nature of the proceedings and was fully capable of assisting in her defense. The jurors apparently believed the latter testimony was more persuasive and found appellant to be competent.
After the competence issue was resolved, the trial court conducted a hearing on appellants motion to withdraw her guilty plea and denied it.
Subsequently, the court sentenced appellant to the 25 year to life term that she had agreed to as part of her plea agreement.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Whether Appellant was Given Enough Time
Appellant contends the trial court should have granted her request to withdraw her guilty plea because she did not have enough time to consider the prosecutions plea offer. To put this argument into context, further background is necessary.
At the conclusion of their second day of deliberations when considering appellants guilt, the jurors informed the court that it was hung between first and second degree murder. Although the court had told the jurors not to say which way they were leaning, the jurors said that 11 of them had voted to convict appellant of first degree murder, and that one believed appellant was guilty of second degree murder. In light of this split, the prosecutor offered appellant a plea deal. He would dismiss the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) firearm enhancement if appellant would plead guilty to first degree murder. This would limit appellants sentence to 25 years to life. If appellant did not accept the deal, the prosecutor said he would dismiss the first degree murder charge leaving the jury to decide whether appellant was guilty of second degree murder with a firearm enhancement. The sentence for second degree murder with a firearm enhancement was 40 years to life.
The attorneys representing appellant told her about the prosecutors proposal. Both believed that it was certain appellant would be convicted of second degree murder with a firearm enhancement if she did not accept the deal. Because a 25-year sentence is better than a 40-year sentence, both encouraged appellant to take the deal. When appellant and her attorneys were asked during a later hearing how much time they had to consider the prosecutors proposal, they had differing recollections. Appellant testified it was only 5 minutes. One of appellants attorneys estimated they had 20 minutes . The other attorney estimated they had 10 minutes to discuss the deal. Regardless of how much time it was, appellant and her attorneys testified they did not have enough time.
Appellant decided to accept the proposal. The court and counsel then reconvened to take appellants plea. The court explained the precise terms of the agreement including the fact that appellant would plead guilty to first degree murder and that she would be sentenced to a term of 25 years to life. Among other things, appellant specifically told the court that she had enough time to discuss the proposal with her attorneys and that she had not been threatened or intimidated in any way. Convinced that appellant understood what was being proposed, the court accepted appellants plea of guilty to first degree murder.
Appellant now contends the trial court erred when it denied her request to withdraw her guilty plea because she did not have enough time to consider whether she should accept the prosecutors offer.
A defendant may move the trial court to set aside a guilty plea for good cause at any time before the entry of judgment. [Citation.] Good cause means mistake, ignorance, fraud, duress or any other factor that overcomes the exercise of free judgment and must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. [Citation.] The grant or denial of such a withdrawal motion is within the sound discretion of the trial court and must be upheld unless an abuse thereof is clearly demonstrated. [Citation.] We are required to accept all factual findings of the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] (People v. Ravaux (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 914, 917.)
There is no precise standard that governs how much time a defendant must be given to decide whether to accept a plea deal. Rather, case law holds that a defendant must be given a reasonable period of time[.] (People v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173, 183.) What is reasonable of course, depends upon the facts of the case. The facts of this case indicate the relatively brief amount of time that appellant was given was more than enough to decide whether she should accept the deal that was offered.
The offer in this case came after a lengthy trial had been conducted and while the jurors were deliberating. Importantly, appellant and her attorneys knew the status of the jurors deliberations. Eleven of them had voted to find appellant guilty of first degree murder. One believed appellant was guilty of second degree murder. If the prosecutor had gone ahead with his plan to dismiss the first degree murder charge, a conviction on second degree murder was a virtual certainty. Furthermore, since appellant admitted she had used a gun to shoot Foss in the head, a true finding on the gun use enhancement also was a virtual certainty. Therefore, if appellant did not accept the prosecutors deal, it was highly likely that she would face a sentence of 40 years to life in prison. Thus, appellant was faced with a relatively simple choice. She could accept the prosecutors offer and accept a sentence of 25 years to life, or she could roll the dice on the jurys deliberations and take the 40 years to life sentence that was likely to follow. Given these facts, appellants choice was not really a choice at all. Because a sentence of 25 years is better than a sentence of 40 years, it would have been foolish to reject the prosecutors offer. We conclude the relatively brief amount of time that appellant was given to make her choice was reasonable under the circumstances. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellants request to set aside her plea on this ground.
None of the arguments appellant advances convinces us the trial court erred. Appellant contends the time provided was inadequate because English is her second language. While that may be true, appellant admitted at trial and she admitted at the hearing on her motion to withdraw that she was comfortable testifying in English. Whatever language problems appellant faced were not pivotal.
Appellant also contends the time she was provided was not adequate given the mental problems she was experiencing such as chronic anxiety, post-traumatic stress syndrome and battered partners syndrome. The trial court was well aware of the mental challenges appellant was facing and it gave careful attention to that fact. However, the court was also aware that appellant had been found competent after a trial, and that neither of her trial attorneys had indicated any concerns about her ability to enter into the plea. This factor too is not determinative.
Furthermore, appellants arguments on this point miss a critical analytical point. The factors appellant has cited are important and they may well have supported the trial courts ruling if it had decided to set aside appellants plea. However, the court decided not to set aside appellants plea, and its decision is fully supported by the record. The fact that the record also contains other evidence that might have supported a different conclusion is irrelevant. (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 655.)
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined appellants request to withdraw her guilty plea on this ground. (People v. Ravaux, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 917.)
B. Whether Appellant Understood the Consequences of Her Plea
Appellant contends the trial court should have allowed her to withdraw her guilty plea because she did not understand the consequences of her plea. Specifically, appellant contends she did not understand she was agreeing to a sentence of 25 years to life in prison. According to appellant she believed the most she would serve was 25 years and no one told her she could be imprisoned for the rest of her life.
A plea may be withdrawn if a defendant did not fully understand the consequences of her act (People v. Campos (1935) 3 Cal.2d 15, 17), and here conflicting evidence was presented as to whether appellant understood the consequences of her plea. Appellant testified that she understood the most she would serve would be 25 years. According to appellant if she had known that she might spend the rest of her life in prison, she would not have taken the deal.
By contrast, both of appellants trial attorneys testified that they told her if she accepted the prosecutors proposal, she would be sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Indeed, one of appellants trial attorneys stated that the words to life were used at all times when sentences were discussed. Appellants other trial attorney testified specifically that he told appellant she would be eligible for parole after 25 years, but that she could spend the rest of her life in prison if she was not granted parole. The transcript of the plea hearing also demonstrates that appellant was told repeatedly that under the proposed deal, she would be sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. The trial court considered this conflicting evidence and impliedly concluded that appellant was told and she understood that if she accepted the deal that had been proposed, she would be sentenced to 25 years to life in prison. Because the courts ruling on this point is supported by substantial evidence, we must affirm. (People v. Ravaux, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 917.)
Again, none of the arguments appellant makes convinces us the trial court erred. Appellant cites several passages from the hearing where the court accepted her plea. For example, at one point while the court was explaining the consequences that would flow from appellants plea, the following colloquy occurred:
[The Court] You should understand that at some point you will be released on parole. The period of parole as I understand it, would be for life.
[The Defendant] Yes.
[The Court] Do you understand?
[The Defendant] Yes. (Italics added.)
At another point appellant asked the court if she could be paroled before 25 years. The court said appellant would have to serve 25 actual years. (Italics added.)
At another point, the court explained to appellant that the crime she was admitting was a strike under the three strikes law. The court went on to add, As a strike, it means once you are paroled, if you commit another felony offense, any time thats associated with that new offense would be doubled . . . . (Italics added.)
The court also told appellant that because she was not a citizen, there were immigration consequences to her plea. At that point, appellants trial counsel added, I think she does understand that when shes released on parole shell be deported. (Italics added.)
According to appellant, the remarks we have italicized suggested to her that she would be released on parole at some point and thus made reasonable her belief she was not putting herself at jeopardy for a life term.
Again, appellants arguments on this point are substantial and the evidence she cites might well have supported the trial courts decision if it had decided to grant appellants motion. However, that is not how the trial court ruled. The trial court declined to set aside appellants plea, and its decision is fully supported by substantial evidence. The fact the record also contains other evidence that might have supported a different conclusion is irrelevant. (People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 655.)
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to set aside appellants plea on this ground.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Jones, P.J.
We concur:
_________________________
Simons, J.
_________________________
Needham, J.
Publication courtesy of California free legal advice.
Analysis and review provided by Carlsbad Property line attorney.
San Diego Case Information provided by www.fearnotlaw.com
[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all further section references will be to the Penal Code.
