P. v. Stewart

Filed 12/17/09 P. v. Stewart CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mark E. Petersen, Judge. Affirmed.

Jared Phil Hanson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch, and Marissa Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

On June 24, 2008, the Riverside County District Attorney filed an information charging defendant and appellant Aaron Maurice Stewart with (1) vehicle theft, in violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a) (count 1); (2) buying or receiving stolen property, in violation of Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a) (count 2); and (3) possession of drug paraphernalia, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11364 (count 3). The information also alleged defendant suffered a prior strike and two prison priors within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667.5, subdivision (b), 667, subdivision (e)(1), and 1170.12, subdivision (c)(1).

On September 17, 2008, defendant pled guilty to count 3, possession of drug paraphernalia. The following day, a jury trial commenced on counts 1 and 2. On September 22, 2008, a jury found defendant guilty of receiving stolen property (count 2), and not guilty of vehicle theft (count 1). On September 24, 2008, the trial court found defendants prior allegations true.

On November 7, 2008, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of six years in prison: two years in prison for count 2, doubled per his strike prior, plus one year for each of the two prison priors.

On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction for receiving stolen property (count 2) must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 21, 2008, Officer Sandra Valle of the Murrieta Police Department was on routine patrol when she drove into the parking lot of Vista Murrieta High School. The officer observed defendant on the basketball court. When defendant saw Officer Valle, he walked toward her at a very rapid pace and asked her, Whats the problem? What did I do? I didnt do anything. Officer Valle asked defendant whether the vehicle parked in the handicap space was his. Defendant replied, Yeah, is there something wrong with that?

At some point, Officer Valle searched defendant. She found a set of car keys in defendants front pant pocket. The keys opened the vehicle that was parked in the handicap space. The vehicle did not have any license plates.

In order to confirm that defendant was the owner of the vehicle, Officer Valle searched the vehicle for documents or other evidence identifying defendant as the owner; nothing was found. Subsequently, a check of the vehicle identification number revealed that the vehicle was registered to a Vicki Sviderjol, not defendant.

Ms. Sviderjol testified that she was contacted by the police department. An employee from the police department asked Ms. Sviderjol where her vehicle was. Ms. Sviderjol stated that her vehicle was supposed to be at the Perris Valley Dodge dealership; she took it there for repairs. The employee informed Ms. Sviderjol that her vehicle was at a high school in Murrieta. Ms. Sviderjol went to the high school to retrieve her vehicle. Once at the school, Ms. Sviderjol noticed that the vehicle was not in the same spotless condition she had left it. She noticed that the vehicle was dirty on the inside, filthy on the outside, had dents and scratches on it. Moreover, the registration, insurance card, and dashboard cover were missing. Ms. Sviderjol testified that she never gave defendant permission to operate her vehicle.

Chris Gehlen, the general manager of Perris Valley Auto Center, testified that on March 21, 2008, his service manger received a call from Ms. Sviderjol. She told the manager that her vehicle had been stolen. When Mr. Gehlen checked the mechanic stall to investigate, he discovered that the vehicle as missing. In addition, the vehicles keys were missing from the premises. Mr. Gehlen testified that the vehicles keys are usually kept in the vehicle when a mechanic is working on the vehicle. Mr. Gehlen could not state exactly when the vehicle was taken. He, however, believed that the vehicle was taken during business hours, possibly during the lunch hour when the employees were on break.

Upon an investigation of the employees working the day in question, Mr. Gehlen testified that there was no evidence indicating that an employee was involved in the theft of Ms. Sviderjols vehicle.

II

ANALYSIS

Defendants sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for receiving stolen property. Specifically, defendant contends that there was no evidence that he knowingly received stolen property.

A.     Standard of Review

In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidenceevidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid valuesuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.] (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) The standard of review is the same in cases in which the People rely mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of facts findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] [Citation.] Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792-793.)

B.     The Verdict Is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Penal Code section 496d, subdivision (a), states, in pertinent part:

Every person who buys or receives any motor vehicle . . . that has been stolen or that has been obtained in any manner constituting theft or extortion, knowing the property to be stolen or obtained, or who conceals, sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding any motor vehicle . . . from the owner, knowing the property to be so stolen or obtained, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months or two or three years . . . .

[T]he knowledge element [of receiving stolen property] is inferred from the defendants failure to explain how he came to possess a stolen item or his offer of an unsatisfactory explanation or from suspicious circumstances attendant upon his possession of the item. [Citations.] (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1019-1020.)

Here, there was sufficient evidence presented for the jury to conclude that defendant knew the vehicle was stolen. First, there was no question that defendant was in possession of the stolen vehicle. Second, defendants possession was accompanied by suspicious circumstances. As Officer Valle testified, there was not a single document in the vehicle that demonstrated that defendant owned the vehicle. Third, Ms. Sviderjol testified that her registration and insurance documents were missing when she arrived at the scene to retrieve her vehicle. Hence, there was nothing in the vehicle indicating ownership of the vehicle. Fourth, defendant expressly informed the officer that he was the owner of the vehicle yet failed to provide anything to show such ownership. Fifth, defendants contentious reaction to Office Valle when defendant first saw her and during the investigation exhibited a consciousness of guilt.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we must, we conclude that the suspicious circumstances justified an inference that defendant knew the car was stolen. Because substantial evidence supported the jurys finding, no reversal is required.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

/s/ McKinster

J.

We concur:

/s/ Ramirez

P.J.

/s/ King

J.

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