P.
v. Springle
Filed
10/19/12 P. v. Springle
CA3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DAVID MICHAEL SPRINGLE,
Defendant and Appellant.
C070077
(Super.
Ct. No. 11F06825)
Defendant David
Michael Springle appeals the sentence imposed following his plea of no contest
to transporting heroin. (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a).)
Defendant contends: (1) he should
have been granted Proposition 36 probation, as there is not substantial
evidence that he did not transport the heroin for personal use; and (2) there
is not substantial evidence he had the ability to pay the booking and jail
classification fees. As a result of
defendant’s plea agreement, we find he
is barred from raising the issue of his entitlement to Proposition 36 probation
on appeal. We further find the statute
under which the criminal justice administration fees were imposed in this case
does not require a finding of an ability to pay. Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was
charged with possessing heroin for sale (
§ 11351), possessing methamphetamine for sale (ibid.), possessing oxymorphone for sale (ibid.), possessing alprazolam for sale (id., § 11375, subd. (b)), transporting heroin (
transporting methadone (ibid.), and
transporting oxymorphone (ibid.). Defendant entered into a negotiated plea
whereby he pleaded no contest to transporting heroin in exchange for a low term
sentence of three years in county jail.
The remaining counts were dismissed with a
waiver.
Prior to
entering his plea, defense counsel
noted “[j]ust for the record, we did discuss the possibility of Prop 36 based
on the facts and based on the facts that were brought out in chambers before
court was in session.†The court
acknowledged the discussion: “The Court
has foreclosed that, yes. It is
factually not appropriate or legally.â€
There was no further discussion on the
36. After being advised of his rights
and the consequences of his plea, defendant pleaded no contest to transporting
a total weight of 5.45 grams of heroin.
DISCUSSION
I. Evidence re
Transportation of Heroin
Defendant
contends there is not substantial evidence that he did not transport the heroin
for personal use and, accordingly, he must be granted Proposition 36
probation. Relying on
107 Cal.App.4th 691, 699, he also contends he did not waive this argument
by failing to request Proposition 36 probation, because “it is mandatory unless
he is disqualified by other statutory factors.â€
It is true that
in general, “[w]hen a defendant is eligible for Proposition 36 treatment, it is
mandatory unless he is disqualified by
other statutory factors, including refusing drug treatment. ([Pen. Code,] § 1210.1, subd.
(b)(4).)†(People v. Esparza, supra,
107 Cal.App.4th at p. 699.)
However, the reasoning in Esparza
does not apply in this case, as Esparza
did not involve a bargained-for sentence.
In this case, defendant pleaded guilty and agreed to a disposition
outside the mandates of Proposition 36, in exchange for dismissal of multiple
additional counts that would have exposed him to additional prison time and
precluded the application of Proposition 36 probation. (People
v. Chatmon (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 771, 773.) He has not presented any facts or evidence
challenging the validity of his plea.
Having received the benefit of his bargain to a stipulated sentence,
defendant is barred from raising this issue on appeal. (Chatmon,
at p. 773; People v. Hester
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 [defendants are estopped from complaining of
sentences to which they agreed].)
II. Evidence re
Ability to Pay Fees
Defendant also
contends there is not substantial evidence supporting a finding that he has the
ability to pay the booking and classification fees, as required by Government
Code section 29550.2.
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3] The People respond that the fees were not
imposed under section 29550.2, but rather under section 29550.1, which does not
require a finding of an ability to pay.
We agree with the People that the unstated statutory basis for the
imposition of the criminal justice administration fees was section 29550.1.
The Government
Code provides for imposition of criminal justice administration fees to
reimburse arresting agencies for the cost of booking and processing arrested
persons. (§§ 29550-29550.2.) Which particular statutory provision applies
to a defendant is determined by the identity of the entity whose employees
arrested the defendant: section 29550.1
authorizes the fee for local arrestees; and, section 29550.2
authorizes the fee for arrestees not covered in sections 29550 and 29550.1,
such as state arrestees.
In imposing the
booking and classification fees, the court did not identify the statutory basis
of the fees. The record reflects
defendant was arrested by Citrus Heights police
officers. Accordingly, the fees must
have been imposed under section 29550.1.
Fees imposed under section 29550.2 expressly require that the defendant
have the ability to pay. In contrast,
section 29550.1 provides for payment of the fees by a convicted person but
omits the language that refers to an ability to pay. (See fns. 4 and 5, ante.) Thus, section 29550.1
does not require a finding of an ability to pay before these fees are
imposed. Defendant’s contention
fails.
We note that the
preprinted Judicial Council abstract of judgment form offers only section
29550.2 as a possible statutory basis for these fees. As explained above, it is not. We order the trial court to correct the
abstract of judgment to reflect the correct statutory basis for the imposition
of the fees, section 29550.1.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is
affirmed. The court is ordered to
correct the abstract of judgment to reflect that the booking fee and
classification fee were imposed pursuant to section 29550.1 and to forward a
certified copy to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
BUTZ , Acting P. J.
We concur:
MURRAY , J.
DUARTE , J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Because of our resolution of the claims on
appeal, a detailed recitation of the underlying factual and procedural history
of this case is not necessary.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] People
v. Harvey
