P. v. Ryles

 

 

 

 

Filed 1/31/14  P. v. Ryles CA4/2

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

 

 

 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),
prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified
for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b).  This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA>

 

FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT

 

DIVISION TWO

 

 

 
>

THE PEOPLE,               Plaintiff and Respondent,   v.   AMOS TERRILL RYLES,               Defendant and Appellant.

E057564               (Super.Ct.No. RIF1104027)               OPINION

 

            APPEAL
from the Superior Court of Riverside
County.  Edward D. Webster,
Judge.  (Retired judge of the Riverside
Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.)  Affirmed.

            John
F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 


            Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney
General, Eric A. Swenson, and Laura A. Glennon, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

I

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Amos
Terrill Ryles appeals from judgment entered following a jury conviction for
making criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422;href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">^[1] count 1). 
The jury also found true allegations that defendant had been convicted of
a serious or violent felony (§§ 1170.12, subd. (a)(1), and 667, subds. (c)
& (e)(1)), and served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (a)).  The jury found defendant not guilty of trying
to prevent an executive officer from performing her duty (§ 69; count 2).  The trial court sentenced defendant to 11
years in prison.

Defendant
contends the introduction into evidence of an inordinate amount of prejudicial
evidence of defendant’s uncharged misconduct violated his constitutional href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.us/">rights to due process and a fair
trial.  We disagree and affirm the
judgment.

II

FACTS

            Carey
Haidl was designated as defendant’s parole agent and began supervising him in
February 2011, after his release from prison on a parole violation.  As defendant’s agent, Haidl was provided with
defendant’s case file containing information on his conduct in prison and his
criminal history.  One of defendant’s
conditions of parole was that he was to attend mandatory counseling at the href="http://www.sandiegohealthdirectory.com/">Parole Outpatient Clinic
(POC).  Defendant’s case was classified
as “zero tolerance,” which meant that any violation of parole would be
addressed by the parole board. 

            On September 19, 2011, a POC psychologist advised
Haidl that defendant had failed to attend one of his required counseling
sessions.  After missing the scheduled
mandatory session, defendant appeared at Haidl’s office at 2:45 p.m., on September 19, 2011.  While defendant was waiting in the lobby, Haidl
met with her supervisor, Calvin Holmes, and they decided that, because of the
zero-tolerance policy, defendant would be arrested for missing the href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.us/">mandatory counseling session, in
violation of his parole.  Holmes arranged
for a car to take defendant to jail.  Parole
agents Corry Logan, Carlos De La Torre, and Halmar Flores went into Haidl’s
office to assist with apprehending defendant. 


Haidl went out to
the lobby and escorted defendant to her office. 
On the way to her office, defendant told Haidl he missed his counseling
session because his girlfriend wrote down the wrong time for his counseling
appointment.  Haidl told defendant he was
being arrested for missing his counseling session.  When they entered her office, she asked
defendant to face the wall and place his hands behind his back.  Defendant complied.  Haidl then handcuffed him. 

As defendant was
being handcuffed, he became very upset, hostile, and angry.  Defendant yelled, “Fuck you, Haidl, you’re a
fucking white bitch,” and told Haidl he was “going to catch a murder case on
you.  You better carry your gun on you at
all times.”  He repeated this twice.  As defendant was escorted down the hall to a
vehicle that would transport him to the jail, he continued to tell Haidl he was
going to kill her, that he had ties to two prison gangs, the Black Guerrilla
Family and the Black Panthers, and that she should carry her gun at all times.  Holmes, Logan, De La Torre, and Flores
assisted Haidl in escorting defendant out to the car.  As defendant was placed in the car, he
continued yelling, “Fuck you, Haidl,” and then said he was “going to take a
shotgun to your head and blow [Haidl’s] fucking brains out.”  He said this at least twice.  He also said he was going to kill Haidl and
her family, “and
everything you [Haidl] stand for.”

Haidl did not go
with defendant to the jail.  She was told
not to because defendant was so upset with her. 
Holmes and Flores transported defendant to the jail.  Logan and De La Torre followed in another car
because defendant was so agitated. 
Because defendant was hostile, angry, aggressive, and threatening, Logan concluded it was
necessary to use additional staff to transport defendant to the jail.

During the drive
to the jail, defendant remained upset and hostile. Defendant continued making
threats against Haidl.  He said he knew
“murderers inside,” Haidl was going to have him “catch a murder case,” and he
was going to “blow her fucking brains out.” 
Defendant claimed he knew murderers and was affiliated with prison
gangs.  At the jail, after Logan removed defendant
from the car, defendant said, “Fuck all these white mother fuckers” and, “If I
had a shotgun, I’d blow the mother fucker’s head off.”

Haidl testified at
trial that she believed defendant had threatened her when she arrested him on September 19, 2011.  She took his threats to her life very
seriously.  His threats made her fearful
of him.  She feared defendant would kill
her and her family.  Her fear was based
on her awareness of defendant’s criminal record, gang affiliations, and reports
that defendant had threatened and committed battery on correctional officers.  In addition, defendant had disregarded his
parole conditions and the law.  Haidl was
also aware of a prior threat defendant had made in September 2010, in which he
threatened to beat up his previous parole agent, James Crabtree.  Haidl testified that defendant’s threats had
affected her lifestyle by making her fearful.

Crabtree
testified that, while he was arresting defendant, defendant threatened to beat
him up.  Defendant told Crabtree he had
beaten up correctional officers before, and had “pull on the inside and
outside” to the Black Guerrilla Family. 
Crabtree felt threatened and feared for his safety because defendant was
a documented Crips gang member.  As a
consequence, defendant’s supervision was transferred from San Diego to Riverside County and, as an
additional parole condition, defendant was prohibited from contacting Crabtree and
the parole office in San Diego.

III

EVIDENCE OF
UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT

            Defendant
acknowledges that normally the failure to raise an evidentiary objection to
inadmissible evidence is forfeited if not raised in the trial court.  Defendant nevertheless argues that, in the
instant case, his objection to evidence of his uncharged misconduct, raised for
the first time on appeal, was not forfeited because the People’s unwarranted
introduction of the excessive, prejudicial evidence violated his constitutional
rights to due process and a fair trial.  As
defendant notes, this court “can still consider whether an unfairness so gross
has occurred as to deprive defendant of due process of law,” where the trial
court “failed to adequately protect the defendant from the damaging effect of
prejudice-arousing evidence.”  (>People v. Burns (1969) 270
Cal.App.2d 238, 252.)

A.  Background Facts

The People moved
in limine for admission of evidence of (1) prior threats by defendant made to
parole agent James Crabtree; (2) post-incident threats by defendant made
against Haidl while defendant was being transported to jail; and (3)
defendant’s criminal history.  The trial
court ruled the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code sections 352 and
1101, subdivision (b).  The court
concluded the evidence was relevant to show defendant’s intent, Haidl’s state
of mind, her fear, and whether her fear was reasonable.  Defendant’s trial attorney did not object to
the evidence, other than on hearsay grounds when Haidl was asked whether she
knew of defendant’s threat against Crabtree. 
The trial court overruled the objection.

Regarding the
admissibility of defendant’s criminal history, the court stated, “You are more
afraid of a person who has a documented history of violence than not.  You are more reasonably afraid of a person
who is in prison [or on] parole than a person who has no criminal record.  Those are all matters of common sense.  You’ll be allowed to introduce that.”  The trial court, however, excluded evidence
of defendant’s conviction for oral copulation when he was 15 years old and his
sexual offender status, as unduly prejudicial and not relevant to the criminal
threats charge. 

At the end of the
trial, the court instructed the jury on using caution when considering
statements made by defendant after he left Haidl’s office on September 19, 2011 (CALCRIM No. 358).  The court also instructed the jury to use
caution when considering evidence of uncharged offenses, such as defendant’s
threats toward Crabtree (CALCRIM No. 375). 
The court admonished the jury not to consider evidence of uncharged
offenses “for any other purpose except for the limited purpose of its effect,
if any, on Agent Carey Haidl’s state of mind. 
[¶]  Do not conclude from this
evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit
crime.”

B.  Discussion

        Defendant’s challenge to the uncharged
misconduct evidence introduced against defendant lacks merit.  The probative value of the evidence outweighed
its prejudicial effect.  The evidence was
highly probative in proving the charged offense of making a criminal
threat.  The elements of the crime of making a criminal threat
(§ 422) are:  (1) The defendant willfully threatened to
commit a crime that would result in death or great bodily injury to another
person; (2) defendant intended the statement to be perceived as a threat, even
if the defendant did not intend to follow through with the threat; (3) the threat
was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate,
and specific that it conveyed a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
the threat being executed; (4) the threat caused the victim to be in sustained
fear for his or his family’s immediate safety; and (5) the victim’s fear was
reasonable under the circumstances.  (People
v. Wilson (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 789, 805.)  

Evidence of
defendant’s uncharged misconduct was admissible under Evidence Code section
1101, subdivision (b), to show defendant’s intent and the victim’s state of
mind (elements 2, 3, 4, and 5).  name=SearchTerm>Under
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), “evidence of a person’s character
or a trait of his or her character . . . is inadmissible when offered to prove
his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), however, provides that name="SR;1551">other-crimes evidence is
admissible to prove “some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, . . .) other than his or her
disposition to commit such an act.”  For name="SR;1581">evidence to be admissible to
prove intent, the least degree of similarity between the uncharged act and the
charged offense is necessary; that is, the uncharged misconduct is sufficiently similar to support the
inference a defendant likely harbored the same intent in the charged offense.  (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th
1, 23; People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 402.) 

            The
admissibility of other-crimes evidence also depends on three principal factors:
 â€œ(1) the materiality of the fact sought
to be proved or disproved; (2) the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove or
disprove the material fact; and (3) the existence of any rule or policy
requiring the exclusion of relevant evidence, e.g., Evidence Code section 352.  [Citations.]” 
(People v. Sully (1991)
53 Cal.3d 1195, 1224.)  The evidence of
uncharged misconduct in the instant case included evidence relating to defendant’s
prior robbery and drug convictions, parole violations, in-prison discipline, threats
made to other correctional officers, and post-incident threats defendant made
while being transported to the jail and at the jail.  This evidence was material and highly
relevant to establishing defendant’s intent that Haidl perceive his statements as
threats, and that Haidl reasonably feared defendant’s threats would be carried
out.

Much of the uncharged
misconduct evidence in the instant case concerns threats similar to the charged
criminal threats.  In both instances in
which defendant threatened Haidl and Crabtree, defendant’s threats were made
when the correction officers were apprehending defendant and he became
outraged.  Defendant angrily threatened
to kill or cause great bodily harm to Crabtree and Haidl, and to either carry
out his threats himself or through other gang members with whom he was
affiliated.  The evidence of defendant
threatening Crabtree was sufficiently similar to the charged offense for
purposes of introducing it as evidence of defendant’s intent that Haidl perceive
his statements as threats.  

Evidence of
defendant’s uncharged misconduct was also admissible to prove that (1) the
threats caused Haidl to be in sustained fear for her and her family’s immediate
safety and (2) Haidl’s fear was reasonable under the circumstances.  Haidl testified that defendant’s threats
against her caused her to experience sustained fear for her and her son’s
safety.  She installed an alarm system,
put sticks in all her doors and windows, always carried a gun, and slept with a
gun under her pillow.  Haidl changed jobs
in September 2012, and was no longer a parole agent because of the dangerous
nature of the job.  While testifying
concerning her fear, she began to cry, indicating she had been traumatized by
the threats.  Haidl testified that when
defendant made the threats, she believed he was serious and was actually
threatening her life. 

Evidence of
Haidl’s awareness of defendant’s criminal history, parole violations, in-prison
misconduct, and post-incident threats was admissible to show that Haidl’s fear
was reasonable.  Such evidence included
evidence that, when defendant threatened Haidl, she was aware of defendant’s
criminal history and his threats made to Crabtree.  Haidl testified she was also aware of
defendant’s numerous parole violations (eight), which reflected defendant’s
willingness to disregard the law.  Haidl
was aware of defendant’s involvement with gang members who were capable of
carrying out defendant’s threats.  Likewise,
Crabtree testified that, when defendant threatened him, defendant was not just
“talking shit,” or joking.  He was
serious when he made the threats.  Crabtree
said he actually felt threatened, in part because of Crabtree’s awareness of
defendant’s criminal history and gang affiliations.  As a result of defendant’s threats against
Crabtree, defendant’s case was transferred from Crabtree, in San Diego County, to a parole
agent in Riverside County. 

Defendant argues
that, even though the evidence may have been relevant and he did not object to
it, allowing the evidence resulted in a grossly unfair trial, in violation of
his due process rights, because the evidence was excessively prejudicial and
unnecessarily redundant.  We
disagree.  “The admission of relevant
evidence will not offend due process unless the evidence is so prejudicial as
to render the defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.”  (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th
903, 913, citing Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 70.)  Here, the evidence of defendant’s uncharged
misconduct was highly relevant to establishing defendant’s intent and its
effect on Haidl’s state of mind, key elements of the charged criminal-threat
offense, and defendant has not demonstrated that the evidence was so prejudicial
as to render defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair.  (Ibid.)

IV

DISPOSITION

            The judgment is affirmed.

            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL
REPORTS

CODRINGTON                     

                                                J.

 

We concur:

 

 

RAMIREZ                              

                                         P. J.

 

 

KING                                     

                                              J.