P.
v. Rigmaden









Filed
10/19/12 P. v. Rigmaden
CA3

NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED










IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----






>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. TERRILLE RIGMADEN, Defendant and Appellant.

C070416 (Super. Ct. No. SF109200A)

In September 2008,
pursuant to plea bargain, defendant Terrille Rigmaden pleaded no contest to
inflicting corporal injury on a cohabitant, admitted having incurred a prior
strike conviction and admitted that he had served a prior prison term. He was sentenced to state prison.

The trial court
awarded 29 days’ actual time credit and 14 days’ conduct credit, for a total of
43 days of presentence custody credits.
In so doing, the court applied the formula mandated by Penal Code
section 4019 (section 4019) as it existed at the time of sentencing, in which
six days’ total credit were allowed for every four days spent by the defendant
in custody. (See In re Marquez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 14, 25-26.)

Defendant’s sole
contention on appeal is that he is
entitled to the retroactive application of the increased rate for earning
presentence conduct credits provided by amendments to former section 4019. “In conjunction with the ‘2011 Realignment
Legislation addressing public safety’ (Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 1; see Pen. Code,
§ 1170, subd. (h)), section 4019 was amended to provide for deductions for
every four days of confinement, so that if all possible days are earned, four
days will now be deemed served for every two days of actual confinement. (§ 4019, subds. (b), (c) & (f).) Originally, this change was to apply to those
confined for crimes committed on or after July 1, 2011.
(Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 482, eff. Apr.
4, 2011.) By further
amendment made before the realignment
legislation became operative, this date was changed to October 1, 2011.
(Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53, eff. June
30, 2011.) Pursuant to the
October 1, 2011, amendment (Stats. 2011, 1st Ex. Sess. 2011–2012, ch. 12, § 35,
eff. Sept. 21, 2011, operative Oct. 1, 2011), subdivision (h) of section 4019
presently states: ‘The changes to this
section . . . shall apply prospectively and shall apply to prisoners
who are confined to a county jail . . . for a crime committed on or
after October 1, 2011. Any days earned
by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011,
shall be calculated at the rate required by the prior law.’” (People
v. Ellis (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1546, 1549-1550.)

Defendant contends
the October 1, 2011,
amendment created two similarly situated classes of prisoners: those who earn conduct credits at the
enhanced rate because their crimes occurred on or after October 1, 2011, and those (like defendant) who
do not earn conduct credits at the enhanced rate because their crimes occurred
before that date. Defendant argues he is
entitled to enhanced credits, calculated retroactively, unless a compelling
state interest supports
the disparate treatment of the two classes.
Relying upon (among others) In re
Kapperman (1974) 11 Cal.3d 542 and People
v. Sage (1980) 26 Cal.3d 498, defendant claims retroactivity is compelled
on equal protection grounds.

Defendant’s equal
protection claim was rejected by the California Supreme Court in >People v. Lara (2012) 54 Cal.4th 896,
906, footnote 9. We are bound to reject
it as well. (See Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450,
455.)

Disposition

The judgment is
affirmed.





HULL , Acting P. J.



We concur:







BUTZ , J.







MURRAY , J.