Filed 11/5/18 P. v. Ridge CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Steven M. Katz, Judge.

Rachel Lederman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen G. Herndon and Melissa Lipon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

Christopher Scott Ridge (appellant) challenges the jury’s determination extending his involuntary civil commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) for an additional year. Finding the determination supported by substantial evidence, we will affirm.

BACKGROUND

The Kern County Superior Court convicted appellant in 2002 of gassing and battery by an inmate on a nonconfined person. (Pen. Code,[1] §§ 4501.1, 4501.5.) Since parole in 2007, appellant has been under the care of the Department of State Hospitals, first at Atascadero State Hospital and more recently at Coalinga State Hospital. Coalinga State Hospital is a maximum security hospital that houses MDO patients, sexually violent predators, and prisoners too mentally ill to be treated in prison. Having been granted parole, appellant is an MDO patient and not a prison inmate. (§ 2962.)

In January 2017, upon the request of the medical director of Coalinga State Hospital, the Kern County District Attorney filed a petition to extend appellant’s involuntary commitment as an MDO, which was then set to expire on March 12, 2017. (§ 2972.) The evaluating forensic psychologist at Coalinga State Hospital, Joe DeBruin, and appellant testified at trial. On February 9, 2017, the jury returned a verdict finding appellant “suffers from a severe mental disorder, that the disorder is either not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without continued treatment, and as a result, he possesses a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” The trial court then granted the petition, extending appellant’s status as an MDO for an additional year through March 12, 2018, and ordered appellant’s return to Coalinga State Hospital.

DISCUSSION

The Mentally Disordered Offenders Act (Act), at sections 2960 et seq., “permits the government to civilly commit for mental health treatment certain classes of state prisoners during and after parole.” (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 23.) The Act “requires that an offender who has been convicted of a specified felony related to a severe mental disorder and who continues to pose a danger to society receive appropriate treatment until the disorder can be kept in remission.” (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1211, 1218, citing Lopez v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1055, 1061.) The “Act has the dual purpose of protecting the public while treating severely mentally ill offenders.” (Ibid.) A former prison inmate’s MDO status and commitment occurs as a condition of parole. (Ibid., citing § 2962.)

The trial court must recommit an MDO for an additional year of psychiatric treatment where the court or jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender (1) has a severe mental disorder,[2] (2) the severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without continued treatment, and (3) by reason of the severe mental disorder, the MDO represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others. (§§ 2970, 2972.) An appellate court reviews MDO proceedings for substantial evidence. (People v. Pace (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 795, 797.) A single opinion by a psychiatric expert concluding that a person currently is dangerous due to a severe mental disorder may constitute substantial evidence to support the extension of a commitment. (People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1165.) The expert’s opinion must, however, be based on evidentiary support rather than assumption of facts, speculation, or conjecture. (People v. Wright (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 537, 545-546.)

Appellant does not challenge that he suffers from schizophrenia, a severe mental illness, but contends the record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding he currently represented a “substantial danger of physical harm to others” because of that mental illness. A determination of a substantial danger, taken in context of the Act, “appears to mean a prediction of future dangerousness by mental health professionals.” (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 24.) An evaluating psychiatric expert may and should consider the patient’s entire history, including prior violent offenses and mental health history, in making an MDO evaluation. (People v. Pace, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 799.)

Appellant testified he did not believe he had a mental illness and saw no reason to take his medication because they were not court-ordered. He explained he had to put up with everyone else’s mental illness and that he wanted to leave the hospital, but that it might be preferable to remain; he worried he might not safely reintegrate into society unless he could live completely isolated from others.

Although appellant declined to be evaluated by Dr. DeBruin, the evaluating psychiatrist nevertheless reviewed appellant’s prior MDO evaluations, as well as intuitional progress notes, reports, and treatment plans from psychiatrists, psychologists, and clinical social workers over the prior year. Dr. DeBruin concluded appellant’s condition was not in remission and could not be kept in remission in the future without continued treatment. The evaluator expressly opined appellant “presently presents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” When pressed for specific instances in appellant’s history over the prior year that supported such a medical opinion, Dr. DeBruin mentioned multiple staff reports of appellant yelling or screaming loudly in his room, often with racist, sexist, or hyper-religious content. Dr. DeBruin added that hospital reporting also indicated appellant had very poor insight into, and awareness of, his mental illness, and that his thinking was illogical. Dr. DeBruin based his opinion on his Ph.D. in clinical psychology, 20 years in the mental health field, and having performed some 1,700 similar MDO evaluations.

Although appellant suggests substantial evidence fails to support appellant’s current level of physical dangerousness to others because the record lacks specific instances of appellant engaging in physical acts or altercations over the prior year, no such evidence of actual physical harm was required. Dr. DeBruin’s medical opinion was based on objective medical reporting of mental health professionals over the prior year, coupled with his extensive education and experience, and not on mere assumption, speculation, or conjecture.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.