P. v.
Quintanilla















Filed 12/17/12 P. v. Quintanilla CA2/7

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>NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115>.







IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA



SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION
SEVEN




>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN GEOVANNI QUINTANILLA, Defendant and Appellant.

B231296 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. VA110907)

APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of href="http://www.adrservices.org/neutrals/frederick-mandabach.php">Los Angeles
County, Robert J. Higa, Judge.
Affirmed.

J. Kahn,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Lawrence M. Daniels and
Lauren E. Dana, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________



Brian Geovanni Quintanilla was convicted following a jury
trial of first degree murder. On appeal Quintanilla contends his
incriminating statements to police officers should have been suppressed because
they were obtained through custodial interrogation after he had invoked his href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">right to counsel and were
involuntary. He also contends the
evidence of premeditation was insufficient to support the verdict. We affirm.


FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The
Information

Quintanilla was charged in an
information with the willful, deliberate and premeditated murder of Jesus Ramos
(Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189)href="#_ftn1"
name="_ftnref1" title="">^[1] and the attempted murder of Rigoberto Barragan
(§§ 187, subd. (a), 664). The
information specially alleged Quintanilla had personally used a deadly or
dangerous weapon, “to wit, [a] knife,” in committing both offenses (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)). Quintanilla pleaded
not guilty and denied the special allegation.

2. The
Offenses

According
to the evidence at trial, Barragan was helping paint Ramos’s living room when
Quintanilla entered the home. Barragan
was on a ladder unable to see Quintanilla; but he heard Quintanilla say,
“Buenos dias” when he walked into the living room and heard Ramos respond, “Buenos
dias.” Suddenly, Barragan heard a
scuffle. As he climbed down from the
ladder, Barragan saw Quintanilla pull a knife from Ramos’s chest. Ramos lay on the floor with blood pouring out
of him. Quintanilla then attacked
Barragan and tried jabbing him with the knife through the rungs of the ladder
before fleeing.

Ramos was
79 years old. He died from a single stab
wound that penetrated his heart and severed his coronary artery.

3. Quintanilla’s
Statements to Police

After Quintanilla’s fingerprint
was found at the scene, Huntington Park
police officers asked Quintanilla whether he would agree to an interview at the
police station. Quintanilla was told at
the outset he was not under arrest, he did not have to speak with the officers
and he could leave any time he wanted.
Quintanilla said he understood and wanted to cooperate.

At some
point during the interview, after Quintanilla had repeatedly denied being in
Ramos’s house at any time, Detective Miguel Navia, who was conducting the
interview along with Detective Gabriel Alpizar, took a break and then returned
with Sergeant John Navarette. Navarette
said he believed Quintanilla was involved in the murder and told him he was
going to be arrested. Quintanilla was
immediately advised of his right to remain silent, to the presence of an
attorney, and, if indigent, to appointed counsel. (Miranda
v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694] (>Miranda).) Quintanilla responded he understood his
rights and wished to continue to talk to the detectives and Navarette.

Several
minutes into the second part of the interview, Quintanilla said, “I want to
talk to my lawyer first” before saying anything further. Sergeant Navarette responded, “That’s
fine. A lawyer won’t let you talk to us,
so if you want to say anything, you have to talk to us. If you want a lawyer, we’ll give you a
lawyer.” Quintanilla reiterated his
request to have a lawyer present.
Navarette stated, “You’re going to end up going to jail for murder. And if you want to talk [to] us and tell us
the truth, you have to come to us. We
can’t go to you anymore because you asked for a lawyer, okay? That’s cool.
But you have to go to the jailer and then you have to ask for Detective
Navia or Detective Alpizar, okay? The
two detectives on the case. . . . [B]ut we
can’t talk to you anymore, all right?”


At this point
Quintanilla said, “I’ve got some more questions.” Sergeant Navarette responded, “We can’t talk
to you anymore. You want to make some
voluntary statements?” Quintanilla said
he did not, but wanted to know certain things, like where he would be stationed
and what the charges would be. After he
was informed the charge was murder, he would be held in custody at the jail and
there would be no bail in a murder case, he asked, “How long will it take to
get a lawyer?” Navarette responded,
“You’ll get some phone calls once we get done.
Then you can make some notification.
When you go to court you’ll get a public defender there, too.” When Quintanilla inquired, “So can I get a
public defender right now?” Navarette replied, “Yeah, but you have to make some
phone calls when you go down to the jail.”
Detective Alpizar added, “You have to call for an attorney.” Quintanilla then asked, “And he’ll show up
today?” Alpizar replied, “You get one
appointed for you. What, today’s
Tuesday—probably on Thursday when you go to court.” Quintanilla persisted, “Oh, so I won’t be
able to talk to one?” Navarette replied,
“You can call your own attorney, but we’re done, because you asked for an
attorney, so we’re done. You kind of cut
it off, so we’re done. We wanted to talk
to you some more but we can’t.”
Navarette concluded this second part of the interview, telling
Quintanilla, “All right, . . . you take care and like I said, if you want to
talk to the detectives, you have to ask for them okay?”

The
interview resumed shortly thereafter without Sergeant Navarette. Before beginning this third part of the
interview, Detective Navia stated, “While we were getting ready to take you
over to the jail area, you were asking a bunch of questions . . .
about your attorney, when you go to court and all that. I just want to clarify you’re here to talk to
us right now of your own free will; we didn’t try to force you to talk or
anything . . . .”
Quintanilla confirmed he had requested to speak to the detectives about
the case without an attorney present.
The detectives then readvised Quintanilla of his rights under >Miranda, and Quintanilla agreed to speak
to them about the case.

Quintanilla
explained he had gone to Ramos’s house to ask for work; Ramos often hired
people to work handyman jobs for him. He
said hello to Ramos in Spanish after he walked in, and Ramos suddenly advanced
on him with a knife in his hand.
Quintanilla grabbed the knife from Ramos and stabbed him in the chest
believing Ramos was going to attack him.
He denied trying to stab Barragan.
Quintanilla said he panicked as soon as he realized he had stabbed
Ramos. He fled the scene and threw the
knife away.

4. >Quintanilla’s Pretrial Motion To Suppress
His Statements

Quintanilla filed
a pretrial motion to suppress his statements to the detectives, contending they
were the result of an interrogation that had improperly continued after he
invoked his right to counsel in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The trial court denied the
motion, concluding the detectives had honored Quintanilla’s request for counsel
by discontinuing the interrogation and their brief responses to Quintanilla’s
inquiries about a lawyer did not amount to the functional equivalent of
interrogation. The court also ruled the
statements were not involuntary.

5. Quintanilla’s
Trial, Verdict and Sentence

At trial the evidence focused on
whether Ramos or Quintanilla had been the aggressor. Barragan testified he did not see a knife in
Ramos’s possession or on the living room table prior to Quintanilla’s
attack. Ramos’s wife testified that,
although she had not been home the morning of the murder, Ramos routinely used
a large, distinctive knife to cut a papaya every morning; he always left the
knife on the kitchen counter or in the sink when he was finished; and the knife
had been missing since the murder.
Police at the scene testified that a half-cut papaya was on the kitchen
counter when they arrived, but the papaya knife could not be found.

Quintanilla
testified on his own behalf, reiterating his statements to police that Ramos
had advanced on him with a knife in his hand.
He reacted to protect himself, inadvertently stabbing Ramos in the
ensuing struggle. A clinical
psychologist testified on Quintanilla’s behalf, opining in accordance with a
hypothetical involving similar facts that a young man would have felt
threatened when confronted by a person with a knife in such close quarters and
would have reacted to “fight” rather than “flee.” The psychologist also opined the acts of
discarding the weapon and failing to report the incident were consistent with
someone experiencing acute stress disorder.


The jury
was instructed as to first degree premeditated murder and second degree murder,
lesser included offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, imperfect
self defense and justifiable homicide.
The jury found Quintanilla guilty of both murder and attempted murder,
determined the murder was willful, deliberate and premeditated, and found the
special weapon-use allegation true as to both offenses. The court sentenced Quintanilla to an
aggregate state prison term of 34
years to life.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"
title="">^[2]

DISCUSSION

1. The Trial
Court Did Not Err in Denying the Motion To Suppress Quintanilla’s Statements to
Police

a. Governing
law and standard of review

Miranda admonitions (advising a
suspect of his or her right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney
and, if indigent, to appointed counsel) must be given and an individual in
custody must knowingly and intelligently waive those rights before being
subjected to interrogation or its “functional equivalent.” (Rhode
Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 300-301 [100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d
297]; People v. Ray (1996)
13 Cal.4th 313, 336.)

“Interrogation
includes both express questioning and ‘words or actions . . . the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect.’” (>People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735,
752 (Enraca); accord, >People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1,
26; see Davis v. United States (1994)
512 U.S. 452, 458 [114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362]; Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 485-486 [101 S.Ct. 1880, 68
L.Ed.2d 378]; Rhode Island v. Innis,
supra, 446 U.S. at p. 301.)href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3" title="">^[3] Determining whether the words or actions of
the police were likely to lead to an incriminating response focuses on the
perception of the suspect, rather than the intent of the officers involved. (Rhode
Island, at pp. 300-301; People v.
Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 198.)
Whether particular questioning or statements amount to interrogation or
its functional equivalent depends on the “total situation,” including the
length, place and time of the questioning, the nature of the questions, the
conduct of the police and all other relevant circumstances. (People
v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 383, disapproved on another ground in >People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th
312, 382; Edwards, at p. 482.)

Once the
right to counsel has been invoked, interrogation must cease. Questioning may resume only after the suspect
initiates further discussions with the police and knowingly and intelligently
waives the right he or she had invoked.
(Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th
at p. 753; Connecticut v. Barrett (1987) 479 U.S. 523, 527 [107 S.Ct. 828, 93
L.Ed.2d 920].) A suspect initiates
further communication when he or she “‘“speaks words or engages in conduct that
can be ‘fairly said to represent a desire’ on his [or her] part ‘to open up a
more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the
investigation.’”’” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 385; People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 642.) When a suspect invokes his or her right to counsel
during custodial interrogation, any subsequent waiver of that right is presumed
invalid; and the burden is on the People to show under the totality of the
circumstances “both that the defendant reinitiated the discussions and that he
knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked.” (Gamache,
at p. 385; accord, Oregon v. Bradshaw
(1983) 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-1045 [103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405]; >People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th
405, 425.) “Only if the ‘totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice”
to waive a protected right under Miranda “and
the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude the >Miranda rights have been waived.” (Moran
v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 [106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410];
accord, Williams, at p. 425.)

“In
reviewing Miranda issues on appeal,
we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences as well
as its evaluations of credibility if substantially supported, but independently
determine from undisputed facts and facts found by the trial court whether the
challenged statement was legally obtained.”
(People v. Smith (2007)
40 Cal.4th 483, 502; accord, People
v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 476.)

b. There
was no Miranda violation; Quintanilla’s statements were not involuntary

Quintanilla contends the
statements he made to Detectives Navia and Alpizar were the product of
custodial interrogation that should have ceased after he unambiguously invoked
his right to counsel. Contrary to
Quintanilla’s contention, however, the detectives did not continue to
interrogate Quintanilla after he requested counsel at the end of the second
interview session. Rather, they simply
told him they could not talk to him anymore because he had asked for counsel
and explained, if Quintanilla wished to discuss the case further, he would need
to ask for them. Then, after briefly
answering Quintanilla’s preliminary questions about when a lawyer would be
provided, the detectives ended the interview.


Quintanilla
insists the detectives made false statements about the availability of a
lawyer, which amounted to an unlawful continuation of the interrogation
following invocation of his right to counsel and effectively coerced his waiver
of his rights under Miranda. The Supreme Court rejected a strikingly
similar contention in Enraca, supra, 53
Cal.4th 735, a case decided earlier this year.
In Enraca, after the defendant
had requested counsel during a custodial interview, the interrogating officer
told the defendant the officer could not speak with him anymore. The defendant then inquired when he would be
able to see an attorney; and the officer responded, “‘[Y]ou can, when you go to
court and get arraigned, one will be appointed to represent you. [T]hat’s when you can see your lawyer. Now I suggest[] for the next 48 hours, that
you deeply consider that[.] Is that
clear[?]’” (Enraca, at p. 753.)

The
defendant in Enraca argued the
officer’s statements after he had invoked his right to counsel constituted
further interrogation in violation of Miranda. The Supreme Court disagreed, observing
the officer had told the defendant he could not talk with him anymore because
he had invoked his right to counsel. The
officer’s brief response to the defendant’s subsequent question about when he
could see his lawyer was not interrogation; it could not have been reasonably
perceived by the suspect as one calling for an incriminating response. (Enraca,
supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 756.) The
Court expressly rejected the argument that Quintanilla makes here, that the
officer coerced the defendant’s waiver of his previously invoked right to
counsel by leading him to believe he would have to wait, possibly several days,
for an attorney to be appointed for him:
“There is no merit to the defendant’s claim [the officer] should have
told him that he could consult with appointed counsel immediately. Defendant was correctly informed that he
could acquire his own counsel or, if he was eligible, counsel would be
appointed when he was arraigned. ‘That
is in fact when his right to counsel attached.
[Citations.]’ ‘>Miranda does not require that attorneys
be producible on call, or that police “keep a suspect abreast of his various
options for legal representations.”’” (>Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p.
756; see also People v. Smith, supra, 40
Cal.4th at p. 483 [officer’s response to defendant’s question concerning the
timing of the appointment of counsel was appropriate because the authorities
are not required to have an attorney on call for the purpose of custodial
interrogation].)

The other
statements Quintanilla challenges also fall short of constituting improper
interrogation. For instance, after
invoking his right to counsel, Quintanilla asked detectives where he was going
to “be stationed,” for how long he would have to remain in custody, and what
the charge was going to be. Sergeant
Navarette told him the charge was murder; and Detective Navia, interpreting the
question as relating to the availability of bail, commented there would be no
bail in a murder case. The detectives
also told Quintanilla they could not answer any more questions because he had
invoked his right to counsel. We agree
with Quintanilla that his questions about the charges and where he would be
housed while in custody did not reinitiate discussions of the investigation so
as to constitute a waiver of his Miranda rights
and permit further questioning about the case.
(See People v. Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th
at p. 385; People v. San Nicolas,
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 642.)
However, the detectives’ brief responses to those questions also did not
amount to interrogation in violation of Miranda. (See People
v. Dement, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 26 [“‘Clearly, not all conversation
between an officer and a suspect constitutes interrogation. The police may speak to a suspect in custody
as long as the speech would not reasonably be construed as calling for an
incriminating response.’”]; People v.
Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 985, disapproved on another ground in >People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th
390, 421, fn. 22 [same]; see also People
v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 198 [police statement to defendant
that he was “a suspect” in murder investigation was not reasonably likely to
elicit incriminating response and, therefore, was not interrogation in
violation of Miranda]; >Clark, at p. 985 [officer’s casual
estimate of possible penalties in response to defendant’s question following
defendant’s invocation of right to counsel did not constitute improper
interrogation].)

>People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, on
which Quintanilla relies, is inapposite.
In Neal the interrogating
officer continued to question the defendant about the case after the defendant
had invoked his right to counsel because, even though the officer knew the
interrogation violated Miranda, he
hoped to use the defendant’s responses at trial to impeach him should he choose
to testify. (Neal, at p. 74; see >People v. DePriest (2007)
42 Cal.4th 1, 32 [voluntary confession obtained in violation of >Miranda admissible for purposes of
impeachment].) The Court held the
defendant’s statements were not only obtained in violation of >Miranda, and thus were not admissible in
the People’s case in chief, but also were involuntary, and thus not admissible
at all. The Court emphasized the
officer’s deliberate violation of Miranda
during the course of the interrogation notwithstanding the defendant’s repeated
requests for counsel, coupled with the defendant’s lack of access to food,
drink or toilet facilities while in overnight custody, and concluded the
officer’s behavior effectively told the defendant that his right to silence and
to counsel would not be honored until he confessed. (Neal,> at p. 83.)

Quintanilla’s
reliance on People v. Esqueda (1993)
17 Cal.App.4th 1450 is similarly misplaced.
There, the defendant maintained his inculpatory statements should have
been suppressed because they were elicited without the benefit of >Miranda rights. The People argued the defendant was not in
custody at the time he made the statements. The Court of Appeal disagreed,
finding a lack of evidence the defendant had willingly agreed to go with police
to the station and would have reasonably believed he was free to leave. In addition to finding the interrogation was
custodial and thus subject to the protections of Miranda, the Court of
Appeal also concluded the confession was involuntary under the totality of the
circumstances: Police engaged in
interrogation for more than eight hours, in which the defendant received no food
and little, if any, respite “from the constant police pressure to
confess.” (Esqueda, at p. 1485.) In
addition, the officers used lies and promises of more lenient treatment to
obtain a confession, effectively telling the defendant he would not have to go
to prison if he told them the killing was an accident. The court held the confession was the product
of “outrageous police behavior” in which the police took advantage of the
defendant’s exhaustion, emotions and minimal education to overcome his resistance
and induce an involuntary confession. (>Id. at pp. 1484; see >id. at pp. 1486-1487.)

Here, in contrast, there was no
evidence of any oppressive conditions of interrogation.href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">^[4] Quintanilla was neither deceived by false
promises nor coerced by oppressive conditions into waiving his >Miranda rights. (See People
v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 985 [officer’s response
concerning potential penalties “contained no suggestion that if defendant
confessed he would receive more favorable treatment, or that if he did not
confess the penalties would be more harsh”].)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not
err in concluding Quintanilla’s statements were neither the product of unlawful
interrogation nor involuntary.

2. Substantial
Evidence Supports Quintanilla’s Conviction of First Degree Murder

Quintanilla contends there is
insufficient evidence to support his conviction of first degree murder on a
premeditation theory. (See § 189
[any murder that is “willful, deliberate and premeditated” is murder of the
first degree].)href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"
title="">^[5] “A verdict of deliberate, and premeditated
first degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill. [Citation.]
‘Deliberation’ refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a
course of action; ‘premeditation’ means thought over in advance. [Citations.]
‘The process of premeditation and deliberation does not require any
extended period of time. “The true test
is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great
rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at
quickly . . . .”’” (>People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041,
1080.)

In >People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15,
the Supreme Court identified three categories of evidence relevant to deciding
the issue of premeditation and deliberation:
(1) planning activity, (2) motive, and (3) manner of killing. (Id. at
pp. 26-27; accord, People v. Steele (2002)
27 Cal.4th 1230, 1249.) The list was not
intended to be exhaustive or require that the identified factors appear in any
specific combination or be afforded any particular weight. (People
v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247; People
v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125.)
The Anderson factors are
“descriptive,” rather than “normative,” and are not a “sine qua non” to finding
first degree premeditated murder. (>People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786,
863-864; accord, People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 331; see People v.
Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p.
1249 [Anderson factors are simply
“intended to guide an appellate court’s assessment whether the evidence
supports an inference that the killing occurred as the result of preexisting
reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse”].)

In the case
at bar, the coroner testified a large-bladed knife had been used in the attack;
and Ramos’s wife testified a large-bladed papaya knife, typically in the sink
or on the kitchen counter, had been missing since the murder. Barragan testified the knife was not in the
living room where the men had been working, and he had not seen Ramos with a
knife before the attack. From this
evidence the jury could reasonably infer Quintanilla had entered the house,
retrieved the papaya knife from the kitchen sink or counter and, at that point,
formed his plan to murder Ramos. This
evidence, coupled with the manner of killing (a single stab wound through
Ramos’s heart), amply supported the jury’s verdict. (See People
v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p.
1122 [sufficient evidence of premeditation where the defendant surreptitiously
entered victim’s house, obtained steak knife from kitchen and used it to stab
victim]; People v. Nazeri (2010) 187
Cal.App.4th 1101 [retrieval of knife from upstairs bedroom minutes prior to
killing the victim downstairs was sufficient evidence of premeditation and
deliberation to support verdict of first degree murder]; see also >People v. Morris (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d
193, 197 [stab wound to heart, coupled with lack of an any spoken words between
defendant and victim consistent with jury’s conclusion killing was premeditated
and not result of “‘rash impulse hastily executed’”].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is
affirmed.



PERLUSS,
P. J.





We
concur:







WOODS,
J. ZELON,
J.