P. v. Quintanar



















Filed 5/15/13 P. v. Quintanar CA3











NOT TO BE PUBLISHED





California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.













IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE
DISTRICT

(San
Joaquin)






>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GUY QUINTANAR, Defendant and Appellant.

C071795 (Super. Ct. No. SF120321A)

Following
the denial of his suppression motion
(
ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 19 s FINSGF000001 xpl 1 l "Pen. Code, § 1538.5" Pen. Code,
§ 1538.5), defendant Guy Quintanar pled no contest to href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">possession
of stolen property ( ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 27 s
FINSGF000002 xpl 1 l "Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a)"
Pen. Code, § 496,
subd. (a)) in exchange for a three-year prison term to be served in
county jail.

On
appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his suppression
motion because the evidence obtained against him was the product of his being
unlawfully detained. Defendant also
contends that he is entitled to additional presentence conduct credits. We reject defendant’s unlawful detention
claim, but agree with him that he is entitled to the href="http://www.fearnotlaw.com/">custody
credits he seeks.

FACTS FROM
SUPPRESSION HEARING

The
parties agreed the suppression motion would be limited to “the initial contact
of the stop” of defendant made by Deputy Nick Gomes. Hence, our statement of the facts is
similarly limited.

On
May
6, 2012, around 2:30 a.m. Deputy Gomes and his partner were traveling
in a marked sheriff’s vehicle in the number 2 lane westbound on Fremont Street in Stockton when Deputy Gomes observed defendant in the
middle of the lane directly in front of him.
Defendant was straddling a bicycle, his feet were on the ground, the
bicycle was not moving and it was positioned as if defendant had been pushing
or riding it across Fremont. It
was “very dark,” the bicycle had no lights or reflectors and Deputy Gomes did
not see defendant until the last second before stopping.

Deputy
Gomes activated his emergency lights to alert potential drivers behind him of
the stop and directed defendant to get off the bicycle and to sit on a nearby
lawn. The bicycle was a mountain bike
and had a small trailer connected to the back of it. One of the trailer’s wheels was “not on very
well.”

The
trailer was eventually searched and items stolen from a nearby Regional Transit
Division facility were found.

TRIAL COURT’S
RULING

In
making its ruling, the trial court stated:
“The Court has looked also at ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 27 s FINSGF000003 l "Vehicle Code Section 24250[" Vehicle Code Section
24250[href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]] which states
that during darkness a vehicle shall be equipped with lighting equipment as
required for the vehicle by this chapter and has taken that into consideration
as well as the fact that there were no reflectors as indicated in the exhibits
and pursuant to the officer’s testimony.
[¶] For purposes of a stop . . . the People do not have
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that a ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FINSGF000018 Vehicle Code violation occurred but only
that there was probable cause for the stop based on [a] reasonable belief that
the ADDIN BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s
FINSGF000018 Vehicle Code had
been violated. I think here based on all
the facts and circumstances as described, the officer had a reasonable
suspicion” that defendant was violating the ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FINSGF000018 Vehicle Code.

DISCUSSION

I

Defendant contends he “was
unlawfully detained at the moment [Deputy Gomes] turned on his emergency lights
and stopped him” and that the court misapplied the law in concluding to the
contrary. We conclude that even though
the trial court incorrectly relied on ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 13 s FINSGF000019 l "section 24250" section 24250 to support its ruling,
the ruling was nevertheless correct pursuant to ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 24 s FINSGF000020 l "sections 21200 and 21201" sections 21200 and
21201. (See ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 58 s FINSGF000004 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People v. Superior Court (2012)204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011" People v. Superior Court (Chapman)
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011 [“Appellate review is confined to
the correctness or incorrectness of the trial court’s ruling, not the reasons
for its ruling”].)

“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress evidence, ‘an appellate court defers to the trial
court’s express or implied findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence . . . .
[Citations.] “[T]he power to
judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony,
weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial
court.” [Citation.]’ ” ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 47 s
FINSGF000005 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Munoz (2008)167
Cal.App.4th 126, 132" People
v. Munoz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 126, 132.)

The ADDIN
BA xc <@reg> xl 55 s FINSGF000006 l "Trial Court Erred in Basing Its Ruling on Section 24250"
Trial Court Erred
in Basing Its Ruling on Section 24250

ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s FINSGF000019 Section 24250 applies to vehicles, not
bicycles. ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s FINSGF000019 Section 24250 states: “During darkness, a vehicle shall be equipped
with lighted lighting equipment as required for the vehicle by this
chapter.” ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s FINSGF000019 Section 24250 is contained in, and limited
to, ADDIN BA xc <@st> xl 31 s
FINSGF000007 l "division 12 of the Vehicle
Code" division 12 of the
Vehicle Code, entitled “Equipment of Vehicles.” The operation of bicycles and their required
equipment is contained in ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 24 s FINSGF000020 sections 21200 and 21201 of division 11,
entitled “Rules of the Road.” While the
court cited the wrong ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 20 s FINSGF000008 l "Vehicle Code section" Vehicle Code section
in concluding that Deputy Gomes lawfully detained defendant, its ruling was
nevertheless correct because, as explained below, defendant reasonably appeared
to be in violation of ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 13 s FINSGF000021 l "section 21201" section 21201.

ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FINSGF000018 Vehicle Code
Rules Applicable to Bicycles

ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 30 s FINSGF000022 l "Section 21200, subdivision (a)" Section 21200,
subdivision (a), provides that every “person riding a bicycle
. . . upon a highway has all the rights and is subject to all the
provisions applicable to the driver of a vehicle by this
division . . . .” ADDIN
BA xc <@$st> xl 30 s FINSGF000009 Section 21201, subdivision (d), requires
that when a bicycle is being “operated during darkness upon a highway” it must
be equipped with lights and reflectors.href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]

The Stop of Defendant

A law enforcement officer may
legally stop a vehicle if the facts and circumstances known to the officer
support a reasonable suspicion that the driver has or may have violated the ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FINSGF000018 Vehicle Code or some other law. ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 48 s
FINSGF000011 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">People v. Miranda (1993)17
Cal.App.4th 917, 926" People
v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926.) Since a person riding or operating a bicycle
on a public highway or street is governed by the same rules that apply to
vehicles, it follows that a bicyclist may be stopped on reasonable suspicion
that he or she may be violating the ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FINSGF000018 Vehicle Code.

A “[r]easonable suspicion that href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">criminal
conduct has occurred does not require that an
officer observe all elements of criminal conduct; rather, it requires that
officer to be able to ‘point to specific articulable facts that, considered in
light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective
manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal
activity.’ [Citation.] Further, ‘ “[t]he possibility of an innocent
explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.”
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 72 s
FINSGF000012 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l ">Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2005)130 Cal.App.4th 499, 509" Brierton v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2005)
130 Cal.App.4th 499, 509.)

Here, when Deputy Gomes first
observed defendant, the latter was straddling a bicycle with his feet on the
ground and he was in the same lane in which the deputy was driving. It was 2:30 a.m., very dark, the bicycle had
no lighting or reflectors and it was not moving. Defendant’s straddling of the bicycle in the
middle of the street gave rise to a reasonable inference that he may have just
ridden it to that location, which would have been a violation of ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s FINSGF000021 section 21201. Consequently, Deputy Gomes was lawfully
entitled to detain defendant for further investigation.

Defendant attempts to avoid the
foregoing conclusion, arguing that because there was no evidence he was seen
either “riding” or “operating” the bicycle, which is a requirement for
application of ADDIN BA xc <@$osdv> xl 24 s
FINSGF000020 sections 21200 and
21201, he did not come within the scope of these sections. The argument misses the point. It is not necessary that the defendant
actually have committed or be about to commit an offense for a detention to be
lawful. All that is required is that he
reasonably appears to have done so, and his straddling of the bicycle in the
middle of the street reasonably suggests that he may have ridden it to that
location.

Defendant also faults the trial
court for relying on ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 44 s FINSGF000013 xhfl Rep l "People v. Duncan (2008)160 Cal.App.4th 1014" People v. Duncan (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1014 ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 6 s
FINSGF000013 xpl 1 Duncan),
and ADDIN BA xc <@cs> xl 41 s
FINSGF000014 xhfl Rep l ">People v. Allen (2000)78
Cal.App.4th 445" People v. Allen (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 445 ( ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 5 s
FINSGF000014 xpl 1 Allen)
in support of its ruling. Defendant
claims any reliance on ADDIN
BA xc <@$cs> xl 5 s FINSGF000014 Allen
was error because even though ADDIN
BA xc <@$cs> xl 5 s FINSGF000014 Allen
drew similarities between bicycles and vehicles for purposes of searches,
“nothing in the ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 5 s
FINSGF000014 Allen case holds that a bicycle is a vehicle under the provisions of the ADDIN
BA xc <@$ost> xl 12 s FINSGF000018 Vehicle Code such
that lighting and reflectors are required.”
ADDIN BA xc <@$cs> xl 6 s
FINSGF000013 Duncan is not on point, according to defendant, because that
case involves vehicles, and bicycles are not vehicles under ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s FINSGF000019 section 24250. Even if these cases are not applicable as
defendant claims, this still has no bearing whatsoever on our conclusion that
Deputy Gomes had a reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was violating
ADDIN BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s
FINSGF000021 section 21201.

Finally, defendant contends the
trial court made factual findings which are not supported by substantial
evidence. These are:

(1)
“There was no substantial evidence
that appellant was riding his bicycle.”
Not so. As we have pointed out,
defendant’s straddling his bicycle in the middle of the street raises a
reasonable inference that he may have been riding it.

(2)
“There was no substantial evidence to support the court’s finding that
appellant’s crossing of the street was ‘improper.’ ” Again, the issue is whether there was
reasonable suspicion to believe defendant may
have been violating ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s FINSGF000021 section 21201, which, if true, would have
made the crossing improper.

(3)
“Appellant’s location and the late hour were not justifications to
detain.” While this may be true, it is
irrelevant to the facts of this case.
Defendant’s detention was not based solely on the time or location of
the detention. Rather, the detention was
based upon all of the circumstances known to Deputy Gomes which made it
reasonably likely that defendant was violating ADDIN
BA xc <@$osdv> xl 13 s FINSGF000021 section 21201.

II

Defendant contends he is entitled to
have the court award him 82 days of presentence conduct credit. We, like the People, agree.

At sentencing, the trial court
informed defendant he was entitled to presentence custody credit of 82 days
actual plus 82 days for conduct, for a total of 164 days. The trial court further informed defendant
that “[y]our paperwork is only going to show the actual days, not the good time
credits because they’ll calculate that at the jail for you.” The abstract of judgment provided this court
as part of the appellate record reflects only the 82 days of actual presentence
time served. Appellate counsel has
provided this court with copies of two letters addressed to the trial court
seeking the additional conduct credits which counsel asserts were denied.

ADDIN
BA xc <@st> xl 42 s FINSGF000015 l "Penal Code section 2900.5, subdivision (d)" Penal Code section
2900.5, subdivision (d), states: “It
shall be the duty of the court imposing the sentence to determine the date or
dates of any admission to, and release from, custody prior to sentencing and
the total number of days to be credited pursuant to this section. The total number of days to be credited shall
be contained in the abstract of judgment . . . .” (See ADDIN
BA xc <@cs> xl 41 s FINSGF000016 xhfl Rep xpl 1 l "People v. Duff (2010)50 Cal.4th 787, 793" People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 793 [“At the time of
sentencing, credit for time served, including conduct credit, is calculated by
the court [and] [t]he ‘total number of days to be credited’ is memorialized in
the abstract of judgment ([ ADDIN BA xc <@ost> xl 9 s
FINSGF000023 xpl 4 l "Pen. Code" Pen. Code,] ADDIN
BA xc <@osdv> xl 19 s FINSGF000024 xpl 3 l "§ 2900.5, subd. (d)" § 2900.5, subd.
(d)) and ‘shall be credited upon [the defendant’s] term of
imprisonment . . . .’ ”].)

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the trial
court with directions to award defendant the conduct credits to which he is
entitled and to prepare an corrected abstract of judgment reflecting these
credits and to forward a certified copy to the jail authorities. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.





BLEASE , J.





We concur:





RAYE , P.
J.





BUTZ ,
J.