P. v. Pulido
Filed 2/14/13 P. v. Pulido CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
JUAN PULIDO,
Defendant
and Appellant.
E055269
(Super.Ct.No.
RIF1101263)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior
Court of
County. Jeffrey
Prevost, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven S. Lubliner, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General,
Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Seth M.
Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Juan Pulido
contends that he is entitled to additional presentence conduct credits pursuant
to Penal Code
title="">[1] section 4019, for time spent in custody
between October 1, 2011 and October 21, 2011.
We reject his contention and hold that section 4019, as amended April 1, 2011 and operative October 1, 2011, applies only to
defendants convicted of crimes which took place before October 1, 2011.
BACKGROUND
Defendant pleaded guilty to three
felonies and a misdemeanor, all of which were committed on or about January 12, 2011.
term of eight years eight months.
Defendant was awarded 283 days of presentence custody credits and 140
days of presentence conduct credits. He
filed a timely notice of appeal from the sentence only. Defendant’s subsequent motion in the trial
court for additional credit was denied.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
THE CONDUCT CREDIT CALCULATION PROVIDED FOR IN SECTION
4019, SUBDIVISIONS (B) AND (C) APPLIES ONLY TO PRISONERS IN LOCAL CUSTODY
AWAITING SENTENCING FOR CRIMES COMMITTED BEFORE OCTOBER 1, 2011
A defendant is entitled to actual
custody credit for “all days of custody†in county jail and residential
treatment facilities, including partial days.
(§ 2900.5, subd. (a); People
v. Smith (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 523, 526.)
Section 4019 provides that a criminal defendant may earn additional
presentence credit against his or her sentence for performing assigned labor
(§ 4019, subd. (b)), and for complying with applicable rules and
regulations of the local facility (§ 4019, subd. (c)). These presentence credits are collectively
referred to as conduct credits. (
939.)
Section 4019 has been amended multiple
times. Before January 25, 2010, defendants were entitled to
one-for-two conduct credits, which is two days for every four days of actual
time served in presentence custody.
(Former § 4019, subd. (f), as amended by Stats. 1982, ch. 1234, § 7,
pp. 4553, 4554.) Effective January 25, 2010, the Legislature
amended section 4019 to provide that prisoners, with some exceptions, earned
one-for-one conduct credits, which is two days of conduct credit for every two
days in custody. (Stats. 2009, 3d Ex.
Sess. 2009–2010, ch. 28, § 50.)
Effective September 28, 2010,
the Legislature again amended section 4019.
(Stats. 2010, ch. 426, §§ 1, 2, 5.)
Subdivisions (b) and (g) restored the one-for-two presentence conduct
credit calculation that had been in effect prior to the January 25, 2010, amendment.
Most recently, the Legislature
amended section 4019 to provide for up to two days credit for each four-day
period of confinement in local custody.
(§ 4019, subds. (b)
& (c).) This scheme reflects the
Legislature’s intent that if all days are earned under section 4019, a term of
four days will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent in actual
custody. (§ 4019, subd. (f).)
This version of section 4019 became operative on October 1, 2011.
(Stats. 2011, ch. 39, § 53.)
Defendant now contends that under the current version of section 4019,
he is entitled to day-for-day conduct credits from October 1, 2011, the operative date of the statute,
through October 21, 2011,
the date he was sentenced, even though his crimes were committed before October 1, 2011.
At issue here is subdivision (h) of
section 4019 (hereafter subdivision (h)), which provides: “The changes to this section enacted by the
act that added this subdivision shall apply prospectively and shall apply to
prisoners who are confined to a county jail, city jail, industrial farm, or
road camp for a crime committed on or after October 1, 2011. Any days earned by a prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated
at the rate required by the prior law.â€
Defendant contends that subdivision (h) is ambiguous because the second
sentence contradicts the first. He
contends that the ambiguity can best be resolved by “‘giving effect to both
sentences and concluding that the liberalized scheme applies both to prisoners
confined for crimes committed after October 1, 2011, and to prisoners confined
after that date for earlier crimes.’â€
The function of statutory
construction is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature in order to
effectuate the purpose of the law. (
663.) If the language of the statute is
ambiguous, a court will turn to the rules of statutory construction or to
extrinsic sources to ascertain the Legislature’s intent. (Id.
at p. 664.) Here, we agree that
subdivision (h) is ambiguous. However,
we disagree with defendant’s proposed construction.
The first sentence of subdivision
(h) unambiguously states that the new calculation of conduct credits applies
only to prisoners confined for an offense committed on or after October 1, 2011. The second sentence, “Any days earned by a
prisoner prior to October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the rate required by
the prior law,†could arguably be interpreted to mean that while the credits
earned before October 1, 2011 are calculated at the prior rate, credits earned
on or after October 1, 2011 are to be calculated at the new rate, regardless of
when the offense was committed. That
interpretation, however, is untenable because it renders the first sentence meaningless.
“‘“It is an elementary rule of
construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and
sentence of a statute.†A statute should
be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part
will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one
section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious
mistake or error.’ [Citation.]†(Rodriguez
v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1269 (Rodriguez).) Accordingly, we
cannot read the second sentence to imply that any credits earned by a defendant
on or after October 1, 2011, shall be calculated at the enhanced conduct credit
rate, even if the offense for which he or she is confined was committed before
October 1, 2011, because that would render the first sentence superfluous.
Instead, we rely on another
well-established rule of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity. “‘A statute is passed as a whole and not in
parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be
construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a
harmonious whole. Thus, it is not proper
to confine interpretation to the one section to be construed.’ [Citation.]â€
(Rodriguez, supra, 14
Cal.App.4th at p. 1268.) Subdivision
(h)’s first sentence unambiguously reflects the Legislature’s intent to apply
the enhanced conduct credit provision only to those defendants who committed
their crimes on or after October 1,
2011. Because the second
sentence cannot be read to extend the enhanced conduct credit provision to any
other group, namely those defendants in local custody who committed offenses
before October 1, 2011, without vitiating the first sentence, we conclude that
subdivision (h)’s second sentence is intended to clarify that those defendants
who committed an offense before October 1, 2011, are to earn credit, but only
as calculated under the prior law. (
1546, 1553.) To interpret the second
sentence otherwise ignores the Legislature’s clear intent, as expressed in the
first sentence of subdivision (h).
Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to additional credit for the time
he was confined in county jail on and after October 1, 2011.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL
REPORTS
MCKINSTER
J.
We concur:
HOLLENHORST
Acting
P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All statutory citations refer to the Penal
Code.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2] Felon in possession of a firearm (count 1;
§ 12021, subd. (a)(1)); felon in possession of ammunition (count 2;
§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)); failing to register as a sex offender (count 3;
§ 290, subd. (b)); and misdemeanor willfully giving a false name to a law
enforcement officer (count 4; § 148.9, subd. (a)).
