P. v. Price











Filed 10/13/10 P. v. Price CA4/2













NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS





California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.





IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF >CALIFORNIA >



FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT



DIVISION TWO






>

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WALTER DEWEY PRICE, Defendant and Appellant.

E047834 (Super.Ct.No. BLF002735) O P I N I O N

APPEAL from the Superior
Court of Riverside
County. John J. Ryan,
Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange
Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal.
Const.) Affirmed.

Martha L. McGill, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney
General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons,
Assistant Attorney General, and Peter Quon, Jr. and Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Walter Dewey Price was
convicted by a jury of first degree
murder of his cellmate, Jamel Banks (Banks). (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) In a bifurcated trial, the court found true
allegations that defendant had suffered a prior strike conviction and a prior
serious felony conviction. (Pen. Code,
§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).) He was sentenced to 55 years to life to run
consecutive to the sentence he was then serving.

Defendant argues the trial court erred in allowing the jury to hear
evidence relative to a past conviction of voluntary
manslaughter in which defendant strangled the victim. We hold that the trial court did not
err. Here, defendant was on trial for
the murder of his cellmate, allegedly accomplished by means of
strangulation. The prior crime of
voluntary manslaughter by strangulation was relevant to prove defendant's
intent at the time of the present crime.
(See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Furthermore, under Evidence Code section 352,
any undue prejudice of the evidence did not substantially outweigh its
probative value.

Defendant also contends his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated
when the trial court allowed Dr. Joseph Cohen, a forensic pathologist, to
testify concerning the autopsy of the victim performed by Dr. Manuel
Montez. We hold that while the autopsy
report and its contents were â€