Filed 4/21/17 P. v. Olano CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

FERMIN OLANO,

Defendant and Appellant.
D069484



(Super. Ct. No. SCN339508)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carlos O. Armour and Sim von Kalinowski, Judges. Affirmed.

Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Brendon W. Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Fermin Olano of first degree murder of his brother, Fernando Olano (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true allegations that Fermin used a revolver (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)), and intentionally and personally discharged a revolver, proximately causing great bodily injury and death to Fernando (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). The court sentenced Fermin to 50 years to life in prison.
Fermin contends the court erred by: (1) admitting into evidence his postarrest statements in violation of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda); and (2) ignoring information suggesting that he lacked the capacity, as a result of mental illness, to validly waive his right to counsel and represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). We conclude the court did not err and therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Fermin does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, and the facts of the offense play no part in our resolution of Fermin's appellate contentions; therefore, we summarize those facts merely to provide context for the contentions. Fermin and his brother lived in the same house. On November 30, 2014, Fermin called police from his home and stated he had shot Fernando, claiming Fernando had tried to assault him with a knife. San Diego County Sheriff's deputies went to the house and detained and handcuffed Fermin. Paramedics entered the house shortly afterwards and found Fernando without a pulse. The deputy medical examiner testified that Fernando had suffered eight gunshot wounds, including one to his left chest, causing his death, which was deemed a homicide. Sheriff's deputies retrieved an operable .357-caliber Ruger from the scene.
On the night of the crime, two detectives interviewed Fermin at the police station. At the start of the interview, a detective read Fermin his Miranda rights and asked if he understood them. This colloquy ensued:
"[Fermin]: I reserve all my rights, Fermin Olano. All rights are reserved, comma, by, colon, Fermin Olano. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]
"[Detective]: Do, but do you understand those rights? The rights that I just explained to you, do you understand them?
"[Fermin]: I understand the words you spoke. I do not accept what you're offering.
"[Detective]: I'm not offering anything. I just asked if you understood.
"[Fermin]: It mostly makes clear sense. Do you understand what my response was that I reserved all my rights?
"[Detective]: No, I, no, I don't. So—
"[Fermin]: —That's too bad, because I reserve all my rights.
"[Detective]: Okay.
"[Fermin]: All rights are reserved, comma, by, colon, Fermin Olano.
"[Detective]: Is there anything that you don't understand that I just read to you that I can maybe explain further, or read again? Or do you—
"[Fermin]: Not necessarily 'cause I'm not accepting what you're offering as far as what you've spoken, [pause] sir.
"[Detective]: Okay, But I'm not offering anything. I just, I just need to know if you understand that or not. That you, you don't have to talk to us, okay? That you can talk to an attorney before you talk to us, and if you can't afford one, one will be appointed by the court. Do you understand those three things?
"[Fermin]: No, not really.
"[Detective]: No.
"[Fermin]: No, because I reserve all my rights, sir. All my rights are reserved.
"[Detective]: Well then let me ask you this, do you, do you wanna talk to us about what happened today?
"[Fermin]: I sure do—
"[Detective]: —Okay—
"[Fermin]: —Yeah.
"[Detective]: So in order to do that, though, I need you to understand that, that you don't have to talk to us about that and that if you do wanna talk to us, you have the right to have a lawyer here prior to—
"[Fermin]: I reserve—
"[Detective]: —talking to us.
"[Fermin]: —all my rights, sir. I reserve all my rights to myself. Nobody gives me my rights. I reserve them to myself, colon, by—
"[Detective]: —Okay—
"[Fermin]: —by, comma, by, colon Fermin Olano.
"[Detective]: So, Fermin, do you think that you need an attorney right now?
"[Fermin]: Not necessarily, no.
"[Detective]: Okay, do you want an attorney right now?
"[Fermin]: I don't believe I need one.
"[Detective]: Okay, then you don't—
"[Fermin]: I reserved all of my rights to myself, sir.
"[Detective]: Okay, then why don't we talk about what happened today?
"[Fermin]: My brother assaulted me, I protected myself, a sheriff's detective person told me."
Fermin proceeded to answer the detectives' questions. Fermin stated he had gotten up at around noon that day, and recounted what he did during the rest of the day. Fermin stated that Fernando had been verbally aggressive to him over the past couple of weeks; therefore, when Fernando arrived home that evening, Fermin got his gun and sat down at the dining room table. According to Fermin, his brother had a weapon in his hand and assaulted him. Fermin stated: "I try to gain my balance, reach for my gun, pointed it at him, and defended myself." Fermin said he shot Fernando "[a]s best as I can tell, [in the] upper torso area." His brother fell and wasn't moving. Fermin called 911. During his custodial interview, Fermin periodically mentioned that his hands hurt and were numb from the handcuffs police had placed on him. Fermin told police he was 45 years old and had obtained an associate's degree in applied electronics engineering technology. He worked as a senior technician in the field of metrology.
DISCUSSION
I
The Court Did Not Err by Denying the Motion to Suppress
Fermin contends the court prejudicially erred by admitting into evidence his statements from the custodial interview because, as shown by his "bizarre responses," he did not understand the Miranda warnings. He argues: "Under the totality of [the] circumstances, including [his] lack of criminal history, his responses to the Miranda advisal, his concern about the pain in his hands, and apparent history of mental health issues, the prosecution failed to establish that his Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent, and the trial court erred by holding to the contrary."
A. Background
Fermin moved in limine to suppress his custodial interview statements. Judge von Kalinowski reviewed the recorded interview and denied the motion: "Based upon the totality of the circumstances, including [Fermin's] education, his work experience, his obvious intelligence and understanding of the questions asked, and the fact that after that advisal, [Fermin] goes into and freely discusses what occurred, we would find by a preponderance of the evidence that he understood his rights, and further, by a preponderance, that although he stated he was reserving his rights, he was not asserting them at that point in time but literally was reserving them to assert[ ] them in the future if he chose. [¶] He clearly and unambiguously expressly stated he wanted to talk to the detective about what happened, and he clearly and unambiguously and expressly stated he didn't need an attorney, and the detective specified, 'Do you want an attorney right now?' [¶] And [Fermin] said, 'No.' [¶] And afterwards, as I said, he clearly discussed what happened, and his conduct, therefore, demonstrated he wanted to talk."
The court concluded: "A review of the entire audio/video recording shows [Fermin] never sought to assert his Miranda rights throughout the interview. [¶] It also shows he continued to talk on his own free will, and under the totality of the circumstances, it shows that his will was not overcome. [¶] The detectives' conduct was never overbearing. The physical layout and the positioning of the detectives and demeanor never significantly changed. [¶] The only exception is short periods when the detective stood to act out what [Fermin] was telling them, but the demeanor was essentially unchanged. [¶] [Fermin] did complain at the beginning and in infrequent intervals about numbness in his hands, but he never asked for medical care until after the interview was over. [¶] And it was noted in the video that [Fermin] talks using his hands and moving them freely and consistent[ly] throughout the interview, and only in a couple of fleeting occasions did he seem distracted by it."
B. Applicable Law
" 'The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the validity of the defendant's [Miranda] waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.' [Citations.] In addition, '[a]lthough there is a threshold presumption against finding a waiver of Miranda rights [citation], ultimately the question becomes whether the Miranda waiver was [voluntary,] knowing[,] and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.' [Citation.] On appeal, we conduct an independent review of the trial court's legal determination and rely upon the trial court's findings on disputed facts if supported by substantial evidence." (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 425 (Williams).)
In determining whether a defendant has in fact waived his or her Miranda rights, and the inquiry law enforcement officers may make in resolving any doubt on the issue, we must consider both the subjective intentions of the accused and the objective impact the accused's statements have on law enforcement officers. As the court in Williams stated: "With respect to an initial waiver, . . . '[a] valid waiver need not be of predetermined form, but instead must reflect that the suspect in fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda decision.' " (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 427.)
The California Supreme Court has recognized that "when a suspect under interrogation makes an ambiguous statement that could be construed as an invocation of his or her Miranda rights, 'the interrogators may clarify the suspect's comprehension of, and desire to invoke or waive, the Miranda rights.' " (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 181, italics added.)
"Whereas the question whether a waiver is knowing and voluntary is directed at an evaluation of the defendant's state of mind, the question of ambiguity in an asserted invocation must include a consideration of the communicative aspect of the invocation—what would a listener understand to be the defendant's meaning. The high court has explained—in the context of a postwaiver invocation—that this is an objective inquiry, identifying as ambiguous or equivocal those responses that 'a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood [to signify] only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel.' [Citations.] . . . [¶] In certain situations, words that would be plain if taken literally actually may be equivocal under an objective standard, in the sense that in context it would not be clear to the reasonable listener what the defendant intends. In those instances, the protective purpose of the Miranda rule is not impaired if the authorities are permitted to pose a limited number of follow[-]up questions to render more apparent the true intent of the defendant." (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at pp. 427-429.)
"In evaluating the voluntariness of a statement, no single factor is dispositive. [Citation.] The question is whether the statement is the product of an ' "essentially free and unconstrained choice" ' or whether the defendant's ' "will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired" ' by coercion. [Citation.] Relevant considerations are ' "the crucial element of police coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its continuity" as well as "the defendant's maturity [citation]; education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental health." ' " (Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 436.)
C. Analysis
We conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, Fermin's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, intelligent and knowing. As set forth in detail above, at the start of the custodial interview, each time Fermin asserted that he was "reserving" his rights or made statements raising doubts about his understanding of those rights, the detective asked him proper clarifying questions, or restated the advisals. (People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 181.) When asked if he wanted to speak with the detectives, Fermin unequivocally responded, "I sure do." Finally, the detective asked Fermin if he "needed an attorney," and "want[ed] an attorney." Fermin replied, "Not, necessarily, no." It was only at that point that the detective proceeded to ask Fermin about the events surrounding the crime. Fermin readily answered the detectives' questions, and he did not indicate he was confused or reluctant to respond. Although Fermin did mention at different times that his arms hurt, he did not let that impede his voluntary statements. Moreover, based on Fermin's age, maturity, and education, he was sufficiently intelligent and assertive during the interview that it appeared he was aware of the meaning of his Miranda rights and could have asserted them if he had so wanted.
II
The Court Did Not Err by Allowing Fermin to Represent Himself
Fermin contends the court erroneously allowed him to represent himself without adequately inquiring into his mental state, as was warranted by his "unusual signature" on the form acknowledging the risks of self-representation; the prosecutor's in camera discussion with the court regarding Fermin's mental health based on his statement to detectives about his leave of absence from work; Fermin's extremely cluttered home and his "bizarre explanation for the mess"; Fermin's trial performance, including his irrelevant questions and lengthy pauses during his examination of witnesses; the fact the prosecutor stated in camera that several individuals had reported Fermin had "unusual behavior"; and finally, the court's admonishment of potential witnesses not to testify regarding their perception of Fermin's mental health.
A. Background
1. Judge Armour's Grant of the Faretta Motion
In March 2015, Fermin consulted his public defender as he filled out a form titled, "Acknowledgment Regarding Self-representation and Waiver of Right to Counsel," under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806. The form stated that Fermin was giving up his right to counsel, and he initialed each item in a list of the "many dangers and disadvantages" of self-representation. In the signature block, Fermin wrote: "All rights reserved, by: Fermin Olano." Fermin acknowledged his understanding that the maximum punishment the court could impose on him was 50 years to life in prison. Judge Armour asked Fermin about his education and employment at a hearing on Fermin's Faretta motion. Fermin said he had obtained an associate's degree and had worked in the field of metrology for the last 20 years. He stated he was a "senior-type agent: Specifically with coordinate measuring machines. They're usually found in the automotive industry or the aerospace industry." Fermin asserted: "But the primary aspect of, I guess, my intelligence, would be I can speak two languages, I'm familiar with three other ones, and I have a personal library at home. Autodidactic." The court reviewed each of the form's substantive provisions with Fermin.
During the proceedings, the court asked Fermin: "You understand that there's many dangers and disadvantages to representing yourself, and self-representation is generally unwise and you could conduct your case in a manner that is harmful to your case? Do you understand that?" Fermin replied, "Yeah. [The public defender] conveyed that to me. Yeah." The court asked Fermin, "Do you understand if you're found guilty after representing yourself, that you have waived your constitutional right to claim ineffective assistance of counsel since you can't point the finger at anybody else because you're your own lawyer? Do you understand that?" Fermin answered in the affirmative. The court asked Fermin, "You understand that this form entitled the Acknowledgment Regarding Self-representation and Waiver of Right to Counsel is going to be filed with the court and become part of this court's file? [¶] You understand that on appeal and upon filing any writ, this form will be considered by the Court of Appeal or other courts in determining whether you made a knowing and intelligent waiver of your right to represent yourself?" Fermin replied, "Yeah. That's fine."
The court next asked Fermin, "Have you ever been diagnosed with having any mental difficulties in the past?" Fermin answered in the negative. Judge Armour asked Fermin, "Is there anything in your background as far as mental health issues that I should know about before I make that determination [that you give up the right to an attorney]?" Fermin again answered in the negative. The court asked Fermin's counsel whether, based on his three-month interaction with Fermin, he had "noticed anything about [Fermin's] mental health, his ability to communicate that leads you to believe that he's not able to understand and waive his right to have an attorney represent him?" He replied, "No."
At that point, the court held an in camera discussion with the public defender and the prosecutor, who stated that in Fermin's custodial interview he had mentioned that his employer had put him on an eight-month leave from his job because of "some kind of mental distress or some kind of issue that [Fermin] was having." The court responded, "All right. I don't think—unless either side feels I need to go into that with [Fermin], I don't think that I need to go into that with him." The court added, "It's probably confidential. So it's not good to have it in open court and cause him any more distress." Immediately afterwards, the court relieved the public defender as attorney of record and granted Fermin's right to self-representation: "The Court, having made inquiry into the defendant's understanding of the charges and nature of the proceedings, as well as his background, training, and education, finds the Defendant has made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent wavier of his right to counsel." Fermin immediately sought a 60-day continuance for the preliminary hearing, which the court considered "reasonable" and granted.
2. Judge von Kalinowski's Rulings
On September 1, 2015, at the start of trial, Judge von Kalinowski addressed the People's motion in limine regarding "mental defense" by asking Fermin: "You are not claiming that you are incompetent or that there was some mental deficiency on your part. Is that correct?" Fermin replied, "I am clinically, no, not even entertaining that." The court therefore ruled, "So that is not an issue. And you have been sitting here interacting with me. You fully comprehend what is going on. You appear quite intelligent and are tracking everything. I haven't seen anything that would indicate to me there would be an issue on this either."
The prosecutor stated in camera that she would not call certain witnesses because they might discuss matters the court had excluded from evidence. The court again addressed Fermin: "[A]s I inquired of you, and you were quite positive that you were not seeking in any way, and actually, I think you were a bit offended by the idea of offering a mental defense. Is that true?" Fermin agreed, stating the court's statement was "one hundred percent" correct.
Psychologist Raymond Murphy testified in a hearing conducted under Evidence Code section 402. He had previously interviewed Fermin twice in connection with this case, but he did not evaluate his mental health. The prosecutor asked Dr. Murphy, "Was there anything during your interaction with [Fermin] that led you to believe that there was any kind of an issue or a problem with his competency to stand trial in this matter?" Dr. Murphy replied, "No."
The prosecutor discussed in camera that certain witnesses should not be allowed to testify regarding their observations of Fermin and their concerns relating to his mental health. The court once again confirmed with Fermin that his defense was not about his mental health, but rather self-defense. The court admonished those witnesses: "[T]here were some comments made to the police that [Fermin] indicated he had some powers that—some statements about the angel and the devil and things like that, and some of you may have thought that he needed some mental health issues intervention. [¶] [Fermin] is not asserting any type of mental health defense. His—and, frankly, from a factual basis from the point he first contacted police in the 911 call through his interview immediately after the incident with the list to follow through here today, he has never shown any delusional type of thought process along those lines. Nothing he is raising. So that is nothing that is to be brought up in front of the jury."
B. Applicable Law
"Defendants in criminal cases have a federal constitutional right to represent themselves. ([Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806].) In Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164[, 174] . . . (Edwards), however, the United States Supreme Court held that states may, but need not, deny self-representation to defendants who, although competent to stand trial, lack the mental health or capacity to represent themselves at trial—persons the court referred to as 'gray-area defendants.' " (People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 523 (Johnson).) The Edwards rule applies in California. (Johnson, at p. 523.) Thus, California courts have the discretion to deny self-representation to gray-area defendants. (Id. at p. 528.)
"A trial court need not routinely inquire into the mental competence of a defendant seeking self-representation. It needs to do so only if it is considering denying self-representation due to doubts about the defendant's mental competence." (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 530.) "[T]he standard that trial courts considering exercising their discretion to deny self-representation should apply is simply whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel." (Ibid.) "Trial courts must apply this standard cautiously. . . . Criminal defendants still generally have a Sixth Amendment right to represent themselves. Self-representation by defendants who wish it and validly waive counsel remains the norm and may not be denied lightly. A court may not deny self-representation merely because it believes the matter could be tried more efficiently, or even more fairly, with attorneys on both sides. Rather, it may deny self-representation only in those situations where Edwards[, supra, 554 U.S. 164] permits it." (Johnson, at p. 531.)
"Because the Edwards rule is permissive, not mandatory, . . . Edwards 'does not support a claim of federal constitutional error in a case like the present one, in which defendant's request to represent himself was granted.' " (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 527, quoting People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 878 (Taylor).)
C. Analysis
Before Judge Armour granted Fermin's Faretta motion, he reviewed with him the waiver form. Fermin acknowledged he understood the dangers and pitfalls of self-representation, but still wanted to represent himself. Fermin said he understood the constitutional rights he had during the trial proceedings and claimed he understood them. Fermin had explained he had an associate's degree in metrology and was a "senior-type agent" at his job, where he had worked for 20 years.
As noted, Judge Armour told Fermin that self-representation is generally unwise and he could harm his case. Fermin acknowledged the point and reiterated that the public defender had already communicated that message to him. The judge informed Fermin that he would be foreclosed from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, and Fermin acknowledged that. Fermin also understood that on appeal this court would take into account his signed waiver form.
Having examined the entire record of proceedings, we conclude Judge Armour abundantly explained, and Fermin clearly understood, the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of his case. We believe the court did as much as reasonably possible to dissuade Fermin from self-representation. (See Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 891.) Accordingly, we conclude Fermin made an intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. The denial of self-representation must not be done lightly, or for the purpose of increased efficiency or even fairness. (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.)
Fermin suggests that during the Faretta motion hearing, the prosecutor had informed the court about Fermin's statements that he had experienced mental problems at his work five years earlier, after which the court should have inquired further regarding his mental health. But Fermin's statements about his work-related problems were vague; he did not have any information about his medical diagnosis. He merely told the detectives that he experienced pressure due to the anniversary of his mother's death, a coworker's grandparent's death, and work-related time limits. The court therefore lacked sufficient basis to entertain a doubt about Fermin's mental competence. Moreover, Fermin stated that after a while his work problems were resolved, and he continued working at the company. The logical inference is that any mental health problems he had experienced were not so grave as to impair his work performance for any significant period of time. And those incidents had occurred far enough in the past that they did not substantially impact the court's current analysis. Judge Armour also could observe Fermin's interactions and gauge his ability to understand and voluntarily waive his rights.
Fermin also argues that the manner in which he signed the waiver form should have alerted the court to further inquire about his mental health. In the context of his having signed the waiver form after consulting his public defender and the court's subsequent thorough inquiry regarding his understanding of all the rights he was giving up, the court did not err by failing to attach importance to Fermin's signature.
Fermin contends that during trial Judge von Kalinowski should have further inquired regarding his mental health given that he had cautioned Fermin regarding the length of time he took to formulate his questions of the witnesses, and the judge knew about the numerous successful relevancy objections raised by the People to Fermin's questions of witnesses. The California Supreme Court's statement made in a challenge to a grant of a Faretta motion applies here: "That defendant later took missteps in his self-representation . . . appears to reflect his lack of legal knowledge, not necessarily mental illness or incompetency." (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070.) Moreover, the California Supreme Court has recognized that a criminal defendant's right to self-representation may result " 'in detriment to the defendant, if not outright unfairness.' " (Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 866.) Such results are a cost the defendants pay for the choice of self-representation, if they do make this choice knowingly and voluntarily.
We defer to Judge von Kalinowski's observations of Fermin's conduct during trial. As noted, on several dates the court interacted with Fermin and several times questioned him about whether he was invoking a mental health defense. The court concluded that Fermin was tracking the conversations and had not shown signs of delusions. " 'An appellate court is in no position to appraise a defendant's conduct in the trial court as indicating insanity, a calculated attempt to feign insanity and delay the proceedings, or sheer temper.' " (People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 727.) "As with other determinations regarding self-representation, we must defer largely to the trial court's discretion." (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.) The trial court's ruling regarding a defendant's competence will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.) Such deference is especially appropriate when, as here, the same judge has observed the defendant on numerous occasions. (Ibid.)
Fermin further claims that the court's obligation to examine further about his mental competence was triggered by the prosecutor's request that the court admonish certain witnesses not to testify regarding his mental health, and by Fermin's explanation of his disorderly room. While this case was pending on appeal, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, reiterating: "But a trial court is not required to 'routinely inquire' into a defendant's mental competence when evaluating a Faretta motion. [Citation.] Indeed, a trial court need only do so where it has doubts about the defendant's competence." (Mickel, at p. 208.) It also pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has identified certain "basic tasks" that are relevant to a self-represented litigant's competence inquiry, including " 'organization of defense, making motions, arguing points of law, participating in voir dire, questioning witnesses, and addressing the court and jury.' " (Id. at pp. 208-209.) Fermin does not contend he was unable to perform those basic tasks. We add that the United States Supreme Court has cautioned: "Mental illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes with an individual's functioning at different times in different ways." (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 175.) On this record, Fermin's past conduct with those witnesses and his disorderly room had no bearing to his present ability to represent himself.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.


O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:




NARES, Acting P. J.




HALLER, J.