P. v. Obregon
Filed 7/30/12 P. v. Obregon CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
MOSES OBREGON,
Defendant and
Appellant.
G045220
(Super. Ct.
No. 10NF3260)
O P I N I O
N
Appeal from a judgment
of the Superior Court of
County, James Edward Rogan, Judge.
Affirmed as modified.
Sylvia Whatley Beckham,
under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris,
Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L.
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Christopher P.
Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A
jury convicted Moses Obregon of conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery, felony
false imprisonment and unlawful taking or
driving of a vehicle. The court
imposed a three-year prison term, consisting of the upper term for robbery plus
a concurrent three-year term for false
imprisonment. The court stayed
sentence on the conspiracy and vehicle theft convictions under Penal Code
section 654.
title="">[1]
Obregon claims the trial
court erred by failing to strike the jury panel after a prospective juror
talked to the prosecutor, admitting text messages between the coconspirators,
and imposing sentence for false imprisonment.
He also challenges his conviction for unlawful driving or taking of a
vehicle, arguing the car was just one of the items taken during the
We reject each contention and affirm the judgment.
FACTS
Mohomed Mustafa worked
as unlicensed dealer in precious metals, jewels, and gems. His business had no storefront, and he
advertised his services through various local newspapers and by having
employees pass out business cards. He
used an assumed name, Ricardo Gutierrez, and a dedicated business cell phone
number to conduct his transactions.
Generally, he went to the home of his clients and he usually brought a
good deal of cash to these transactions.
Ihab and Diab
Ali are brothers and Mustafa’s cousins.
Diab operated a store front smoke shop, and he conducted an unlicensed
precious metals business from this store.
Mustafa once told Diab he carried a firearm on his leg to all his
business appointments, which is something he did not do. Around June 10, 2010, Diab accused Mustafa of
stealing business away from him, which caused some animosity between the
cousins.
On June 21, at around
11:00 a.m., Mustafa received a phone call from a woman who identified herself
as Ann Marie. She explained that another
broker had appraised her jewelry and offered her $3,000, but she believed the
jewelry was worth more. She thought the
other broker was trying to take advantage of her because she was disabled. She had seen Mustafa’s business card and
wanted him to give her a second opinion.
She and Mustafa agreed to meet around 4:00 p.m. A few minutes later, Ann Marie called back
and changed the meeting place from her home to an address in an Anaheim
apartment complex that she said was her son-in-law’s home. That was fine with Mustafa because he was
conducting other business in the area.
At about 3:00 p.m., Ann
Marie called Mustafa and changed the appointment time from 4:00 p.m. to 6:00
p.m. She called again between 5:00 and
5:30 p.m. and said “she was running late and she was on her
way . . . .” Shortly
before 7:00 p.m., Mustafa received another call from Ann Marie and again she
asked to delay the meeting.
Around 7:30 p.m.,
Mustafa drove to the address in Anaheim Ann Marie had given him and parked his
black Ford Fusion in the apartment complex’s parking lot. He was carrying over $1,200 in cash; he did
not bring more because Ann Marie was a new customer. He walked to the designated apartment and
knocked on the door. A man, later
identified as Robert Cantu opened the door.
Mustafa asked for Ann Marie.
Cantu told him she was not there yet, but asked Mustafa to wait for
her. Mustafa agreed and returned to his
car. About 15 minutes later, Ann Marie
called and said she was now in her son-in-law’s apartment. She asked Mustafa to come back.
Mustafa walked back to
the apartment at around 8:00 p.m. He
noticed a man standing outside an apartment next door, but thought nothing of
it. When he knocked on apartment door,
Cantu opened the door just enough to show his face. Mustafa asked to see Ann Marie. Cantu said she was upstairs and backed away
from the door. When Mustafa started to
walk into the apartment, Cantu and two other men jumped Mustafa from
behind. They repeatedly punched Mustafa
in the face and body and jumped on his neck.
One of them yelled, “The gun, the gun, the gun is in his leg. Get the gun out of his leg[,]” while another put
something in Mustafa’s back and said, “If you don’t listen, I’m going to kill
you.” Mustafa stopped struggling and
dropped face-down onto the floor.
Once he surrendered, the
men dragged Mustafa into the kitchen while keeping pressure on his neck and
back to prevent him from looking around.
They emptied his pockets and asked, “Where is all the money,” apparently
believing he had $10,000 with him. One
of the men said, “It’s probably in the car.”
Mustafa explained to them that he never took a great deal of money to a
new client’s home. He also told them he
had a partner who knew about the deal and could make arrangements to deliver
more money to them, although none of this was true. One of the men said, “Let me call his
partner.” Another said, “Shoot him in
the legs so he doesn’t follow us.” One
of the men threatened to kill Mustafa and his family if he contacted or
cooperated with the police and another pointed out that they now had Mustafa’s
address and checkbook. They took his
house keys and car keys, and they said they would search his home for money and
other valuables.
As they were preparing
to leave, the men decided to bind Mustafa to prevent him from following
them. The apartment was vacant however
so they had to resort to using shoelaces and a loose cord to tie Mustafa’s
hands and feet. They asked once more if
Mustafa had any more money and then they told him to stay still for at least 10
minutes after they left the apartment.
Once Mustafa realized
the men were not coming back, he worked himself free of the restraints and
headed to his car, but his car had been stolen.
He then decided to get some help at a nearby 7-Eleven. A patron loaned him a dollar to call a cab,
and he took a cab to a friend’s home.
The friend drove him to his home in Ontario. During the drive, Mustafa called the
police. After he checked on his home and
had the locks changed, Mustafa returned to Orange County and eventually he went
to an emergency room for medical treatment for a concussion and severe contusions
and abrasions to his face and body. The
shoelaces and cord left deep red marks on his ankles and wrists.
Mustafa was able to
identify Cantu, but he did not get a good look at the other two men. He gave general descriptions of them and said
one of them had a heavy accent. However,
he did get a good look at one of the assailant’s shoes. They were distinctive athletic shoes, which
he described as white tennis shoes with several accent colors.
During the ensuing
investigation, police officers discovered that Obregon and Dawn Aguirre lived
in the apartment next door to the vacant apartment where Mustafa had been
beaten and robbed. When questioned about
the incident, they said they knew nothing about it and had not been home when
it happened.
Aguirre and Obregon were
arrested on June 23. Investigators found
a cell phone in their possession that had been used to call Mustafa on the day
of the crime and to send text messages to phones found in the possession of
Cantu and Ihab both before and after the robbery.
On June 20th, Ihab
texted Aguirre, “It’s on[]” and “For today I just talk to my cuz.” Aguirre responded, “Do U have to the gold to
do the deal.” Ihab replied, “Yes.” Aguirre texted that “Mo” said they could
meet, and then the two exchanged a series of texts arranging a meeting place
for later that day.
On June 21, at 3:13
p.m., Ihab texted to Aguirre, “Did you guys call him” and asked her if she had
found a spot. Aguirre replied, “There
gona do this lick Ill get you some money KK.”
At 5:13 p.m., she texted Jordan Hernandez, an uncharged coconspirator,
asking him “Do you know of an empty spot we’ll give U money. Think hard.
Can’t do Michelles.” Then, at
5:25 p.m., she texted, “Jordan MO said please make the Hamburger Helper and mac
n cheese he’s tryn to find a spot.”
A second cell phone, one
the police could not connect with a specific person, started texting Aguirre at
6:30 p.m. Aguirre replied, “We’re lookn
for an empty apartment cuz th[e] dudes ready to meet up.” Three minutes later, she texted, “Mo wil pay
2hundered bucks to whoever finds him an empty spot to do that lick.” The receiver replied, “I will see wats up.”
Around 7:30 p.m.,
Aguirre and Cantu exchanged texts.
Aguirre wanted to know if “everything cleared outside[],” and Cantu
replied, “Still[] has he called it’s almost eight[].” At 7:55 p.m., Aguirre texted Cantu, “Not yet
he might get here at 8:30.”
And, at 12:41 a.m.,
after the robbery, she texted an unknown person, “Hey Mo said if UR awake can
you wipe his shoes off.” The following
day, Aguirre and Cantu exchanged texts about getting rid of watches, calling
someone identified as “Mr.,” and Aguirre reminding Cantu to “bring th[e] thing
I got[].”
Investigators discovered
a videotape from a large retail store showing Obregon, Aguirre, and Cantu
together at approximately 3:30 p.m. on June 21.
Obregon and Aguirre are seen on the tape purchasing a prepaid cell
phone.
Police officers located
Mustafa’s car about two days after the crime and 10 to 15 miles from where
Mustafa had parked it. DNA was collected
from the car’s gear shift and from the Nike Air Jordans Obregon was wearing at
the time of his arrest. A forensic
scientist testified the DNA profile obtained from a blood spot on Obregon’s
shoe matched Mustafa’s DNA profile.
Obregon’s DNA profile was found on the gear shift of Mustafa’s car. Obregon was also carrying over $450, which
included four $100 bills.
DISCUSSION
On the first morning of
jury selection, the court read the information and “admonished the prospective
jurors as to their basic duties, function, and conduct.” The court repeated this admonition before the
first recess and before releasing the panel for the day. The next morning, counsel told the court one
of the prospective jurors had given the prosecutor a thumbs-up and told her,
“Good job” as he drove his motorcycle from the courthouse the previous
evening. The court brought all the
prospective jurors into the courtroom and asked them who had driven a
motorcycle to court the day before. One
panel member raised his hand and identified himself as Mr. Rojas. The court excused all panel members except
Rojas from the courtroom and asked Rojas if he had contacted the prosecutor in
the manner described. Rojas admitted he
had done so, and the court excused him from the panel.
When the remaining
prospective jurors reentered the courtroom, the court reminded them of its
previous admonition, specifically mentioning the warning against having contact
with the attorneys involved in the case.
The court explained Rojas had been excused for violating the court’s
admonition and then inquired if any member of the panel had talked to Rojas. One juror said Rojas had walked out of the
courtroom after being questioned and said he had been excused because he had
given the prosecutor a thumbs up the day before. Another juror recalled that Rojas told them
he thought the lawyers were doing a good job.
After a few more
questions to ensure no other juror had talked to Rojas about the case, the
court admonished, “All right. Ladies and
gentlemen of the potential jury, now that you all know that Mr. Rojas gave his
thumbs up to one of our attorneys and felt that [the] attorney was doing a job
worthy of a thumbs up, I am ordering each of you to disregard Mr. Rojas’
opinion as to the merits of respective counsel.
[¶] I’m ordering you not to let that have any bearing on this case,
whatsoever. Clearly, Mr. Rojas’
commentary has no bearing on Mr. Obregon’s guilt or innocence or on the merits
of the evidence.” The court asked if
anyone would not be able to disregard Rojas’ comments or follow the court’s
instruction and no juror spoke. The court
then stated, “If you are of that frame of mind, you are ordered to raise your
hand and let me know so that I may consider excusing you from this case and
reassigning you to another case. If
anybody feels that Mr. Rojas’ commentary has any bearing on your ability to sit
in judgment on this case, you are now ordered to raise your hand and let me
know.” None of the jurors
responded. Defense counsel moved for a
mistrial and the court denied the motion.
Obregon argues the
court’s failure to strike the entire panel violated his state and federal
Constitutional right to due process of law and constitutes an abuse of
discretion. We find neither error, nor
cause to reverse the judgment.
“[T]he
trial court possesses broad discretion to determine whether or not possible
bias or prejudice against the defendant has contaminated the entire venire to
such an extreme that its discharge is required.” (People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 889 (
the question of
individual juror bias
and prejudice is
entitled to great
deference and is
reversed on appeal
only upon a
abuse of discretion.” (People v.
Martinez (1991) 228
Cal.App.3d 1456, 1466; see also People v. Nguyen (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th
32, 41-42.)
Obregon
argues the court should have discharged the entire panel after dismissing
Rojas. However, “[d]ischarging an entire
venire is a drastic remedy that should be reserved for the most serious cases;
it is not appropriate simply because a prospective juror makes an inflammatory
remark.” (Medina, supra, 51
Cal.3d at pp. 888-889.) In
“‘even his own lawyers think he’s guilty,’” (2) “‘they ought to have [sic]
him and get it over with[,]’” and (3) “‘bring the guilty S.O.B. in, we’ll give
him a trial, and then hang him.’” (
conduct or his statement that both attorneys were doing a good job. Under the circumstances presented here, the
court’s remedial acts of interrogating and removing Rojas outside the presence
of the entire panel, questioning the remaining panel members about their
contacts with him and any bias that may have resulted, and its pointed
admonition about what had transpired and order to disregard the information in
forming an opinion as to guilt or innocence, adequately protected Obregon’s
right to a fair trial. In short, Obregon
fails to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
mistrial motion, let alone that there was a violation of his constitutional
right to due process.
As noted, the
prosecution introduced several text messages between cell phones, some of which
were discovered in the possession of various individuals involved in this
crime. Obregon objected to the admission
of the text messages on hearsay grounds.
Following an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, the court ruled
them admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1223.)
On appeal, Obregon
admits the contents of the text messages established a conspiracy between
individuals to rob Mustafa, but argues “in the absence of [text messages] the
preponderance of evidence did not establish that [he] was a member of the
conspiracy.” In arguing some if not all
of the texts should have been excluded, he further contends it is reasonably
likely he would have obtained a more favorable result absent the error. His
argument is not persuasive.
While
hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible (Evid. Code, § 1200), a hearsay
statement is admissible against a party:
“[I]f [¶] (a) [t]he statement was made by the declarant while
participating in a conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in
furtherance of the objective of that conspiracy; [¶] (b) [t]he statement was
made prior to or during the time that the party was participating in that conspiracy;
and [¶] (c) [t]he evidence is offered either after admission of evidence
sufficient to sustain a finding of the facts specified in subdivisions (a) and
(b) or, in the court’s discretion as to the order of proof, subject to the
admission of such evidence.” (
conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons, with specific intent,
to achieve an unlawful objective, coupled with an overt act by one of the
conspirators to further the conspiracy.
[Citation.] The conspiracy itself
need not be charged in order for Evidence Code section 1223’s hearsay exception
to apply to statements by coconspirators.
[Citations.] Further, only prima
facie evidence of a conspiracy is required to permit the trial court to admit
evidence under Evidence Code section 1223; the conspiracy may be shown by
circumstantial evidence and the agreement may be inferred from the
mutually carrying out a common purpose in violation of a penal statute. [Citations.]”
(People v. Gann (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 994, 1005-1006.)
Here,
there is ample circumstantial evidence of Obregon’s involvement in the
conspiracy to rob Mustafa. There had
been bad blood between Mustafa and the Ali brothers. Within 11 days of their falling out, Aguirre,
using an assumed name and information about how Mustafa does business, went to
great pains to arrange a meeting with Mustafa.
She claimed to have over $3,000 in jewelry in an attempt to get him to
bring as much cash as possible. Aguirre
and Ihab sent texts to each other before and after the robbery. On the day of the robbery, Obregon, Aguirre
and Ihab were seen together purchasing a prepaid phone. Prepaid phones are not readily traceable to a
particular person and provide some amount of anonymity. And, as the various texts suggested, Mustafa
was lured to a vacant apartment, which was next door to the apartment Obregon
and Aguirre shared, and he was jumped by three men who thought he carried a
gun, something Mustafa only mentioned to Diab, Ihab’s brother.
Two
days later, Obregon was arrested and investigators discovered a spot of
Mustafa’s blood on one of his pair of distinctive athletic shoes. Further, Obregon’s blood was found in
Mustafa’s stolen car. While Obregon
asserts there could be many explanations for the blood evidence, none of them
are as likely as the one posited by the prosecution, namely that he
participated in the conspiracy to rob Mustafa and the beating that was part and
parcel of this conspiracy. “[W]hether
statements made are in furtherance of a conspiracy depends on an analysis of
the totality of the facts and circumstances in the case.” (People
v. Hardy (1992) 2
Cal.4th 86, 146.) Under this
standard, the facts presented support the trial court’s decision to admit the
text messages in evidence during Obregon’s trial under the coconspirator
exception to the hearsay rule.
Obregon relies on “the
rule prohibiting multiple convictions” to argue the fact the keys to Mustafa’s
car were taken during a robbery preludes his conviction for both the robbery
and for unlawful taking or driving Mustafa’s car. His reliance is misplaced.
An accusatory pleading may
charge different statements of the same offense. (§ 954.)
Yet, as a general rule, “a person may be convicted of, although
not punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or
course of conduct. ‘In California, a
single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions “of any
number of the offenses charged.”
[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th
1224, 1226-1227 (Reed).) However,
“A
judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple
convictions ‘prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included
offenses.’ [Citation.] ‘[I]f a crime cannot be committed without
also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the latter is a lesser included
offense within the former.’
[Citation.]” (
applied to determine whether one offense is necessarily included within
another, the “elements” test and the “accusatory pleading” test, in
the elements test must be applied to make a determination of when a defendant
may sustain multiple convictions based on the charged offenses. (Id.
at pp. 1229-1231.)
The
elements of robbery are the
taking of personal property from a person or the person’s immediate presence by
means of force or fear, with the intent to permanently deprive the person of
the property (§ 211; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1,
34.) The elements of Vehicle Code section 10851 are the taking or driving of a vehicle without the owner’s consent and with the intent
to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession to the
property, with or without the intent to steal.
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).)
a wide range of conduct,’ and includes both a theft and nontheft form of the
offense.” (People v. Garza (2005)
35 Cal.4th 866, 876 (Garza).)
of the two offenses demonstrates that a defendant who has committed
committed the Vehicle Code section 10851 offense
because a robbery can be
committed without stealing a vehicle. This precise principle
has long been recognized by the California Supreme Court. (People v. Marshall (1957) 48 Cal.2d
394, 399 (Marshall.) In Marshall, the court applied the
elements test and determined that robbery
did not necessarily include a Vehicle
Code section 503 offense (the predecessor statute
to Vehicle Code section 10851) because
any kind of personal property may be taken in a robbery, whereas only the taking of a vehicle is prohibited under the Vehicle Code offense.
(Marshall, supra, at p. 399; see also People v. Green
(1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084; People v. Dominguez (1995) 38
Cal.App.4th 410, 419.)
of the elements tests means “a defendant who has committed robbery has not
necessarily committed the Vehicle Code section 10851
offense . . . .”
However, he urges us to following what he characterizes as a “rule” that
a defendant “may not be convicted for more than one offense based upon taking
multiple items of property during a single robbery,” citing People v. Ortega
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 686 (Ortega). We are not persuaded.
The Ortega court
considered whether
grand theft of an automobile (§ 487, subd. (d)(1)) is a lesser included offense
of robbery. The court found grand theft
of an automobile to be a necessarily included offense of robbery even though
“robbery can be committed without taking an automobile.” (Ortega, supra, 19 Cal.4th p.
698, overruled on other grounds in Reed,
supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1224.) The
court held grand theft of an automobile was merely a degree of a theft and therefore necessarily included within
robbery. (Id. at pp. 696-697
Vehicle Code section 10851 does not define merely a degree of theft. Rather, it defines an offense distinct from
general theft.
Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th
1031, “The offense of unlawfully taking a vehicle, defined in Vehicle Code
section 10851, subdivision (a), is sometimes called ‘vehicle theft.” Because the crime requires only the driving
of a vehicle (not necessarily a taking) and an intent only to temporarily
deprive the owner of the vehicle, it is technically not a ‘theft.’ [Citations.]”
(Id. at p. 1034, fn. 2;
see also Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 876.) Ortega’s
grand theft analysis is therefore of little utility.
Section
954 sets forth the general rule permitting multiple convictions, and judicially
created exceptions to this rule should not be interpreted broadly because to so
contravenes “the legislative policy permitting multiple convictions.” (Reed, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1227,
1231; People v. Sloan (2007)
42 Cal.4th 110, 118-120.)
lesser included offense of robbery, a point that distinguishes this case from Ortega and leads to a different result. This distinction obviates the need to discuss several other cases Obregon cites
involving convictions for robbery and grand theft of an automobile under
section 487.
At the sentencing
hearing, the court chose the robbery count as the principle term and imposed
the midterm sentence of three years. On
the remaining subordinate terms, the court imposed a concurrent three-year term
for false imprisonment and stayed sentence for conspiracy to commit robbery and
vehicle theft pursuant to section 654, noting that “if upon appellate review
the court does find that this court erred, then it would be this court’s intent
to stay [the false imprisonment] count also under [section] 654.”
Obregon
argues “unless the robbery conviction is reversed [], the concurrent term for
false imprisonment must be stayed” pursuant to section 654. He asserts “[r]restraining the victim served
to facilitate completion of the robbery [and] was therefore incidental to the
robbery.” He points to the prosecutor’s
argument that criminal liability for the robbery could attach if the jury found
Obregon a participant in the restraining of Mustafa, or if the restraint was a
natural and probable consequence of the conspiracy to commit robbery. The Attorney General counters the false
imprisonment took place after Obregon and his coconspirators had accomplished
the planned robbery and was not incidental to it. We find Obregon’s position persuasive with
respect to the application of section 654.
Section 654 permits an
act or omission made punishable in different ways by different provisions to be
punished under either of such provisions, “but in no case shall [it] be
punished under more than one . . . .” Section 654 bars multiple punishment when a
defendant is convicted of two or more offenses that are incident to one
objective. (Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11;
[reaffirming Neal].) “Whether section 654 applies in a given case
is a question of fact for the trial court, which is vested with broad latitude
in making its determination.
[Citations.] Its findings will
not be reversed on appeal if there is any substantial evidence to support
them. [Citations.] We review the trial court’s determination in
the light most favorable to the respondent and presume the existence of every
fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]”
(People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.) But we do not just rubber stamp it.
Here, the trial court
did not articulate a separate objective that might have been accomplished by
binding the victims and we are unable to imagine one. The case law is replete with cases where
courts found a separate objective where acts of violence were concerned, but
we’ve found none where anyone has put forth any objective accomplished by
binding the victims of a robbery other than facilitation of the robbery. In our case, the decision to bind Mustafa
came as the robbers realized they needed to escape from the apartment. They used items readily available to tie his
hands and feet, which suggests on-the-spot inspiration and not planning. Although they had severely beaten him and
threatened his life and the lives of his family members, the act of binding
Mustafa’s hands and feet did nothing but ensure he would not mount an immediate
pursuit, seek help, or report the robbery to police. Under this set of facts, the false imprisonment
merely served to facilitate the robbery and – as the trial court suspected it
might –section 654 prohibits punishment for both crimes.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified
to stay execution of sentence on count III, false imprisonment, pursuant to section
654. As modified, the judgment is
affirmed. The trial court is directed to
correct its minutes to reflect section 654 stay on count III. The court is further directed to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment and to forward a certified copy to the
BEDSWORTH,
J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P.
J.
IKOLA, J.
name="_ftn1" title=""> [1] All
further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
name="_ftn2" title=""> [2] We
refer to the Ali brothers by their first names for clarity, not out of
disrespect or bias.
