P. v. Newton
Filed 2/13/08 P. v. Newton CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICKY LYNN NEWTON, Defendant and Appellant. | F052096 (Super. Ct. No. 1068459 & 1089651) OPINION |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Marie Sovey Silveira, Judge.
David McNeil Morse, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, and Louis M. Vasquez, Brian Alvarez and William K. Kim, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Defendant Ricky Lynn Newton was convicted of various methamphetamine-related crimes. On appeal, his sole contention is that CALCRIM No. 220, the reasonable doubt instruction, is ambiguous and constitutionally deficient. We will affirm.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues at great length that CALCRIM No. 220 is ambiguous because it does not clarify that an abiding conviction requires a subjective feeling of certitude rather than an objective assessment of the evidence.[1] He maintains that the instruction does not accurately track the language of Penal Code section 1096.[2] He focuses on the language italicized below.
CALCRIM No. 220, as instructed by the trial court, provided:
The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant is not evidence [] that the charge is true. You must not be biased against the defendant just because he has been arrested, charged with a crime, or brought to trial.
A defendant in [a] criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption requires that the People [prove] each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell [you] the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. [Italics added.]
In deciding whether the People proved their case beyond a reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must find him not guilty.
The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense. (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 361-368.) There is no standard formula for instructing on the meaning of reasonable doubt. (Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 5.) [S]o long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendants guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt [citation], the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the governments burden of proof. [Citation.] Rather, taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury. (Ibid.; People v. Mayo (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 535, 542.) Section 1096a provides that a court may instruct with the reasonable doubt instruction of section 1096, but it does not require that precise language. (People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 503.)
CALCRIM No. 220 plainly required the prosecutor to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the final sentence of the instruction stated: Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an acquittal and you must find him not guilty. The trial court also instructed with CALCRIM No. 103 regarding the presumption of innocence and the prosecutions burden of proving every element of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt and with CALCRIM Nos. 224 and 225 regarding circumstantial evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. These instructions reiterated the prosecutions burden of proof.
Furthermore, we do not believe the jurors, when instructed simply to reach an abiding conviction -- without being informed that an abiding conviction is a feeling, as stated in section 1096 -- failed to give the case the grave consideration necessary or failed to recognize the need for subjective certitude. An abiding conviction, even without further explanation, connotes the weighty nature of the judgment and the importance of the decision. (See, e.g., People v. Barillas (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1022 [use of term abiding conviction without moral certainty is adequate instruction].) Employing plain language, CALCRIM Nos. 103 and 220 correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt in the instant case.
Accordingly, we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors understood the instructions as diminishing the seriousness of the task and thereby diluting either the presumption of innocence or the reasonable doubt standard. In other words, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jurors applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72-73: People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36.)[3]
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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Kane, J.
WE CONCUR:
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Harris, Acting P.J.
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Wiseman, J.
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[1] Defendant sums up the problems with CALJIC No. 220 as the obfuscation of the scope properly given to the jurors individual subjectivity in the reasonable doubt standard, the creation or aggravation of an ambiguity contained in the phrase abiding conviction, and finally a failure to convey the appropriate impression that proof beyond a reasonable doubt requires on the part of the jurors a subjective certitude of the truth of the charge.
[2] Penal Code section 1096 provides: A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his or her guilt is satisfactorily shown, he or she is entitled to an acquittal, but the effect of this presumption is only to place upon the state the burden of proving him or her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case, which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge. (Italics added.)
[3] CALCRIM No. 220 has survived other constitutional challenges as well. (E.g., People v. Guerrero (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1264; People v. Westbrooks (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1500; People v. Rios (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154; People v. Flores (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1088.)
