P. v. Molina
Filed 5/22/13 P. v. Molina CA2/7
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
SEVEN
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MATTHEW TOMAS MOLINA,
Defendant and Appellant.
B240948
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. SA079155)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Cynthia Rayvis, Judge.
Affirmed.
Jolene
Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel,
Jr. and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Following
his conviction for receiving stolen property, Matthew Tomas Molina appeals from
the judgment, contending the evidence is insufficient to support the victim
restitution award. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1.
Hearings
Molina was charged in a felony complaint with
committing first degree burglary and
Represented by appointed counsel, Molina waived his
rights to a preliminary hearing and to a jury trial and entered a negotiated
plea of no contest to an amended third count of receiving stolen property. In accordance with the plea agreement, the
trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Molina on three years
of formal probation. The remaining
counts were dismissed on the People’s motion.
As a condition of probation,
the trial court ordered Molina to make restitution to the victim, Fred Benson
IV, pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f) in an amount to be
determined at a restitution hearing.
2. The
Restitution Hearing
At the restitution hearing, Benson testified he arrived
at his apartment with a computer bag, a red duffel bag and some clothes on the
morning of July 29, 2011. Benson left his bags inside his open front
door and went upstairs to put away his clothes. When Benson returned minutes later, both bags
were gone. After he was unable to find
the bags in the apartment complex, Benson reported the theft to police, who
subsequently recovered the red duffel bag and some of the stolen items it
contained. Among the items police never
found were a camera worth $1,200 or $1,300, an iPhone and a Blackberry phone
each worth $500, a belt worth $275, diamond earrings worth $1,400, a diamond
and 18 karat gold bracelet worth $5,000, custom-made jewelry worth $350, dental
retainers worth $300, the computer bag worth $239, prescription glasses worth
$200 and about $1,000 in cash. Benson
calculated the value of most of these items based on their original purchase
price and provided some receipts to the defense. While the older model Blackberry phone was
probably worth $390, Benson’s cell phone provider charged him $500 because it
was a replacement cell phone, which he had intended to send back to the
provider before it was stolen. The
bracelet was a gift, which Benson had previously used to obtain a $500 loan
from a pawn shop. The proprietor had estimated
the bracelet’s value as $5,000.
Photographs of the bracelet were admitted into evidence. Most of these items were listed in a police
report admitted into evidence at the hearing.
Molina testified he lived in the same apartment
complex as Benson in July 2001 but was at work on the morning of the theft, as
corroborated by a time sheet introduced into evidence. According to Molina, on a different morning,
he saw a red duffel bag near Benson’s front door. After knocking on the door and receiving no
answer, Molina took the duffel bag to his apartment. Inside the bag, Molina found a camera, a
laptop computer, a bracelet, an iPad2, and a Blackberry phone. Molina later returned the duffel bag and its
contents to police, except for the watch, the camera and the bracelet. Officers recovered the watch during a search
of Molina’s home. Molina gave the camera
to a friend in exchange for a different camera, and he pawned the bracelet for
$1,000. Molina denied seeing any cash,
earrings, a second cell phone, or any other of the missing items.
Following the presentation
of evidence, the trial court found Molina was responsible for the missing items
described by Benson and calculated the restitution award as follows: “Camera in
the amount of $1,200; a Blackberry cell phone in the amount of $500, which is
what Mr. Benson had to pay; an iPhone in the amount of $500; a bracelet in the
amount of $5,000. And the Court does
find that that’s a realistic amount given the number of diamond chips in the
bracelet and taking a look at the bracelet; earrings in the amount of $1,400; a
computer bag in the amount of $239; one belt for $275; a pair of glasses for
$200, custom jewelry in the amount of $350; and two retainers in the amount of
$300 for a total of $9,964.â€
DISCUSSION
Molina contends the trial court abused its discretion in
assessing restitution for all of the unrecovered stolen items because the
evidence was insufficient he was responsible for the loss of any item other
than the camera and the bracelet. Molina
further argues the restitution award should not have included the value of the
Blackberry phone, because it was returned to Benson.
Molina
pleaded no contest to receiving stolen property and, as a condition of
probation, was ordered to pay restitution in an amount to be determined
following a contested hearing. Because
it was imposed as a condition of probation, rather than pursuant to Penal Code
section 1202.4, the
restitution award in this case was not only intended to compensate Benson, but
also to address the broader goal of rehabilitating Molina. (See People
v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 27; § 1203.1, subd. (j).) “Restitution
‘impresses upon the offender the gravity of the harm he has inflicted upon
another and provides an opportunity to make amends.’ [Citation.]â€
(Anderson, supra, at p. 27.)
Restitution awards are
vested in the trial court’s discretion and will be disturbed on appeal only
where an abuse of discretion appears. (
644, 663.) “‘When there is a factual and
rational basis for the amount of restitution ordered by the trial court, no
abuse of discretion will be found by the reviewing court.’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Mearns (2002) 97
Cal.App.4th 493, 499.) The standard of
proof at a restitution hearing is by a preponderance
of the evidence, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (People
v. Keichler (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045.)
“[I]t
is well settled that ‘statements by the victims of the crimes about the value
of the property stolen constitute “prima facie evidence of value for purposes
of restitution.†[Citations.]’ [Citations.]â€
(People v. Prosser (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 682, 690-691.) Here, Benson
testified at length concerning the nature and value of the items stolen and provided
supporting documentation. This
constituted prima facie evidence of his loss and shifted the burden to “defendant
to demonstrate that the amount of the loss [was] other than that claimed by the
victim.†(Id. at p. 691.) Molina, in
turn, testified he was responsible only for the loss of the camera and bracelet;
he denied having seen any of the other stolen items inside the red duffel bag
when he found it. Molina also challenged
Benson’s valuation of the bracelet.
The
trial court was free to discount Molina’s testimony and to believe Benson’s
testimony. Resolving credibility issues and evidentiary conflicts were the
exclusive province of the trial court, and Benson’s testimony constituted sufficient evidence to establish the appropriate
restitution in this case. (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
We also reject Molina’s
contention the restitution award must be reduced by $500 because the Blackberry
phone was returned to Benson, as amounting to no more than a request that we
reweigh the conflicting evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the
trier of fact, which is not the function of a reviewing court. (People
v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138-1139, People v. Culver (1973) 10 Cal.3d 542, 548.)
In sum, because there was sufficient evidence Molina was responsible for
all of the stolen items, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
requiring him to pay restitution for the stolen items that were never
recovered.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
ZELON,
J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J.
WOODS, J.
of insufficient evidence in a criminal case, “we review the whole record to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]
The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the
verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced
from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is
subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for
it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor
evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] A reversal for
insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to supportâ€â€™ the
jury’s verdict.†(People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
