P. v.
Filed 4/22/13 P. v. Mendoza CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
VINCENT DAVID
MENDOZA,
Defendant and Appellant.
B239378
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA111663)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Michael A. Cowell, Judge. Affirmed.
Mark Yanis, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr.
and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Appellant Vincent Mendoza appeals
from a jury verdict finding him guilty of kidnapping,
attempted premeditated murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and conspiracy. He contends the evidence was insufficient to
support a finding that he had the specific intent to kill during his
participation in the events underlying the charges, as required for attempted
murder or conspiracy to commit murder.
We find sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s verdict and affirm the
judgment.
On
August 4, 2009, victim
Christina Martinez was visiting the home of her boyfriend’s cousin. At approximately 2:00
a.m., appellant Vincent Mendoza, his codefendant Eddie Meraz, and
Jose Ayala arrived at her location in order to take her home. Martinez
had worked and socialized with Ayala over the previous two to three
months. She had met appellant and Meraz
just weeks before the incident through mutual friends. Instead of going straight home, Martinez
agreed to accompany the men to the beach and got into a car with them. After she noticed they were not driving
toward the beach, she asked the men where they were going; no one replied. Eventually, Ayala told Martinez
they would have to tie her up. When she
resisted, Ayala stopped the car, put a knife to her neck, and told her to stop
moving or he would kill her. Appellant
held Martinez’s hands while Meraz
tied them. Appellant then pulled out a
syringe and asked Ayala about where to inject Martinez. Appellant then injected Martinez
five to ten times in the neck, refilling the syringe in between
injections. Martinez
then began to choke and gag.
The
car eventually stopped near a canyon.
Ayala and Meraz pulled Martinez
out of the car and her hands were untied.
She was then thrown to the ground and beaten. Although she did not see who was beating her,
Martinez believed it was more than
one of the men and possibly all three of them.
She was then hit over the head with a hard object and lost
consciousness. When she was regaining
consciousness, two of the men picked her up and pushed her over the side of a
cliff. She fell approximately 12 feet
down, and the three men then climbed down to her. Ayala accused her of setting him up and
trying to kill him. As appellant and
Meraz stood by, Ayala pulled out his knife and sliced Martinez’s
neck three times. The three men then
climbed back up the hillside.
Martinez
realized her throat was cut open and bleeding.
Meraz heard Martinez say
something and alerted the other two that she was still alive. Appellant then climbed back down into the
canyon. As Martinez
was trying to pick herself up, appellant came up from behind her, pulled out
his knife, and stabbed her two times in the side of the neck just behind her
ear. The court described the motions
reenacted by Martinez as “forceful
thrusts.†Martinez
decided to pretend she was dead, in order to avoid further attacks, and allowed
herself to slide down the rest of the hill.
After the men left, she was able to climb back up the hill to a house
where she called police. During the
entire incident, appellant did not ask about what was going on or otherwise
question Ayala’s intentions.
The
prosecutor filed an information charging appellant and Meraz with kidnapping
(Pen. Code, § 207, subd. (a)),
name="_ftnref1" title="">[1]
attempted willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (§§ 664, 187, subd.
(a)), aggravated mayhem (§ 205), assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)), and conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)).
remaining counts. The court sentenced
him to a term of 11 years plus a consecutive term of 25 years to life. This appeal followed.
Appellant
contends there was insufficient evidence
to support the finding that he had the specific intent to kill. Appellant contends, and respondent agrees,
that the convictions for attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder
require a finding of intent to kill.
Appellant argues the convictions should be reversed. We disagree.
In
order for a defendant to be convicted of attempted murder, the prosecution must
prove he or she “acted with specific intent to kill that victim. [Citation.]â€
(People v. Smith (2005)
37 Cal.4th 733, 739 (Smith).) Express malice, rather than implied malice,
is required; the defendant must intend the death of the victim or know to a
substantial certainty that death will be the result of his or her actions. (Ibid.) Similarly, in order to convict for conspiracy
to commit murder, the jury must find the defendant had a specific intent to
kill; such a conviction cannot be based on implied malice. (People
v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 607.)
As there is rarely direct evidence of intent to kill, express malice may
be “inferred from the defendant’s acts and the circumstances of the crime. [Citation.]â€
(Smith, at p. 741.) If a jury concludes a defendant’s use of a
lethal weapon with lethal force was purposeful, an intent to kill can be
inferred. (Ibid.)
“In
assessing a claim of insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court’s task is
to review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.†(People
v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11.)
The
record establishes that appellant was present at all times from the point Ayala
and Meraz picked up Martinez to the moment they left her at the base of the
canyon bleeding from her neck and head. Martinez
testified that at no point did appellant question what was going on or what
Ayala intended to do. Martinez
stated appellant held her hands while Meraz bound them. She further testified that appellant took out
a syringe and forcefully injected her five to ten times in the neck, causing
her to have difficulty in breathing. In
addition, the jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant was involved
in beating Martinez after she was
thrown to the ground at the top of the canyon, before she was then thrown off a
cliff. Ayala proceeded to grab her and
slice her throat several times while appellant stood nearby. When appellant and the other two men realized
she was still alive, appellant climbed back down into the canyon. He then approached Martinez
from behind and stabbed her in the neck two times. This conduct alone constituted substantial
evidence, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find appellant harbored
the requisite intent to kill Martinez. (People
v. Rodriguez, supra,
20 Cal.4th at p. 11.) Using a knife
to stab another person in the neck multiple times, then leaving that person at
the base of a canyon, alone and bleeding, provides a sufficient basis for an
inference of intent to kill. (
We conclude sufficient evidence supports the finding that appellant
acted with the intent to kill Martinez
as required for his convictions of attempted murder and conspiracy to commit
murder.
The
judgment is affirmed.
EPSTEIN,
P. J.
We concur:
WILLHITE, J.
MANELLA, J.
Code.
