P. v. Mendez
Filed 1/7/13 P.
v. Mendez CA2/3
OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DANIEL MENDEZ
et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
B234396
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
BA358068)
APPEAL
from judgments of the Superior Court of
County, Robert J. Perry, Judge. Modified and, as so modified, affirmed.
Richard
A. Levy, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant Daniel Mendez.
Robert
D. Bacon for Defendant and Appellant Carlos Garcia.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and
Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendants and appellants
Daniel Mendez and Carlos Garcia appeal their convictions for
terms of 90 and 80 years to life, respectively.
Both
appellants contend the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on
voluntary intoxication; the prosecutor committed prejudicial
an unauthorized sentence when it failed to stay or strike a minimum parole
eligibility period. Mendez further
contends the trial court improperly excluded evidence. Garcia further contends evidence of jailhouse
conversations between him and Mendez should have been excluded, and the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his request for post-trial discovery, a
continuance, and his motion for a new trial.
The People concede that the trial court erred by imposing minimum parole
eligibility periods. We modify the
judgment to correct the sentencing error.
In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
1. Facts.
a.
Viewed in accordance with the usual rules governing
appellate review (People
v. Johnston (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1303-1304; People v. Robinson (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 270, 273), the evidence
relevant to the issues presented on appeal established the following. Appellants were members of the Westside 18th
Street criminal street gang.
The gang claimed a territory south of the 10 Freeway, between La Cienga
and La Brea. Its primary activities
included murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and drug dealing. Bloods gangs were its rivals. Mendez had a large, gang-related tattoo of
red lips on his neck. Members of the gang
often congregated and held parties at Garcia’s apartment, which was known as
“the Spot.â€
Louisa
Bolanos dated 18th Street gang member
Jimmy Arias. She owned a black Jeep
Cherokee automobile. On the evening of May 7, 2009, she fell asleep at the Spot
after getting drunk. Mendez, who was
also at the Spot that evening, took the keys to the Jeep from Bolanos’s
purse. Mendez and Garcia drove off in
the Jeep, with Mendez at the wheel and Garcia in the front passenger seat. Mendez, who was on parole, was wearing a GPS
tracking anklet that was monitored by the state parole office. It transmitted his location every
minute. Mendez drove west, into the
territory of rival Bloods gangs.
(i) The
hit-and-run accident.
At shortly after 7:00 p.m., Mendez drove at
a high speed down Carlin Street. He attempted a turn but was going too fast,
and hit a parked car near the intersection of Carlin and Cochran Streets. He backed up and drove off, laughing and
smiling. Filiberto and Emilia Lopez
observed the accident, and Emilia wrote down the Jeep’s license plate
number. Filiberto observed that the
Jeep’s driver had a tattoo of red lips on his neck, and Emilia identified
Mendez as the driver in a pretrial photographic lineup.
(ii) The
murder of Thomas Wade.
Mendez and Garcia drove on through the
neighborhood. Near the intersection of
27th and Cimarron Streets, the Jeep failed to stop at a stop sign and drove
into the path of Thomas Wade’s vehicle, which was in the intersection. Wade turned sharply to avoid a collision. He stopped his car and leaned out the window,
apparently saying something to Mendez.
Mendez backed up so that the Jeep was alongside Wade’s car, with Mendez
and Wade facing each other. Mendez and
Wade appeared to exchange words. Mendez
partially exited the Jeep and shot Wade.
Mendez then sped off. The
incident was captured by a nearby market’s video surveillance system, and the
tape was played for the jury.
Wade, a
34-year-old African-American, died of multiple gunshot wounds. He had been shot once from the side or
behind, and once in the upper chest.
Police found two .380-caliber shell casings in the street, and an
additional casing in Wade’s car. Wade
was not a gang member. Mendez’s ankle
monitor indicated he was at the intersection of 27th and Cimarron at 7:18 p.m.
Zoila
Marcos, who was at a second story apartment at 27th and Cimarron, heard gunshots
and observed the Jeep speeding away from the scene. She saw that the front seat passenger was
wearing a black baseball cap with a red logo.
He was looking out the window and smiling. Marcos was unable to identify Garcia’s
photograph in a pretrial photographic lineup.
(iii) The
attempted murders of T.M. and R.M.
A few minutes after the Wade murder, 17-year-old
cousins T.M. and R.M. were crossing 27th Street at Arlington
Boulevard. Neither was a
gang member. The Jeep came speeding down
the street, travelling at 75 to 80 miles per hour. It slowed and pulled up approximately 10 to
12 feet away from the youths. The front
seat passenger pointed a gun out the window and said, “What’s up Blood[?]†As the youths ran, they heard gunshots. A bullet grazed T.M.’s buttocks; R.M. saw a
bullet fly past his face. The distance
between the site of the Wade murder and 27th and Arlington could be travelled
by car in under a minute. Mendez’s ankle
monitor indicated he was a block west of 27th and Arlington at 7:19 p.m.
(iv) Arias’s
testimony.
Eighteenth Street gang member Arias, who was initially
a suspect in the case, told police that sometime after May 7, 2009, he and his
girlfriend, Bolanos, encountered appellants at the Spot. Bolanos accused appellants of taking her Jeep
without permission and doing “all kinds of shit in that car.†Appellants stated they had been drunk at the
time. Appellants boasted that they “shot
at some City Stone†and “all kinds of other fools†and were “ ‘blasting at
everybody.’ †Appellants told Arias that
they had accosted a rival Black P-Stone gang member and shot him in the chest
four or five times. They claimed they
went “ ‘blasting’ †in the territory of the Bitty Stone Bloods gang.
(v)
Garcia.
Los Angeles Police Department Detectives Ronald Kingi
and Robert Lait arrested and interviewed Garcia and showed him the videotape of
the Wade shooting. Afterwards they
placed Mendez and Garcia in a cell together and surreptitiously recorded their
conversation, which included the following statements: “[T]hey got that shit on cameraâ€; “they
showed me a picture of the [J]eepâ€; “[t]he camera starts following like . . .
[it has you fool, it has me] . . . they showed me all the way to like
everything . . . [even] when the car, remember, was moving backwards and I put
it in parkâ€; “you can’t even see me or nothing;†and “they got us, cuz of the
license plate they knew the truck and the whereabouts.†Mendez asked, “So you can’t see me that I
actually did it?†Garcia replied, “[n]ot
really†and “[i]t just looked like you walked up to the car and shot
homey.†Garcia referenced “those little
kids who got shot,†and said, “Bam, bam†and “[y]eah . . . we
hit him in the butt.†Mendez told Garcia
he was “[s]tupid†to have admitted the hit and run, because “[t]hat put you in
the car.â€
(vi) Other
surreptitiously recorded conversations.
In one recorded telephone conversation with his
girlfriend, Angie Perez, Mendez discussed what story she should tell the
probation officer. In another call, an
unidentified woman told Mendez that Bolanos wanted to know what to tell
police. Mendez advised that she should
say she always had her car and she did not know him.
(vii) Firearms
and fingerprint evidence.
Firearms analysis of cartridge casings found at the
scene of the T.M./R.M. shooting and in Wade’s car established that both
shootings were committed with the same gun.
Garcia’s fingerprints were found on the outside of the Jeep’s passenger
side front door, and on a can of wax in the cargo compartment.
(viii) Gang
evidence.
When presented with a hypothetical based upon the
facts of the case, a gang expert opined that the crimes were committed for the
benefit of the Westside 18th Street gang.
The locations where the shootings occurred were in the territory of the
Bitty Stone Bloods and Rollin’ 20’s Bloods, rivals to the 18th Street gang. In the expert’s opinion, the purpose of the
trip to rival gang territory was to shoot at anyone perceived as a member of a
rival gang, thus intimidating the community and enabling the gang to commit
crimes with impunity.
name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
b.
Jose Rodriguez
testified that he saw the hit-and-run accident at Carlin and Cochran. When shown a pretrial photographic lineup, he
identified Arias as the driver of the Jeep, and a person other than Garcia as
the passenger. A month later, police
showed Rodriguez a different photographic lineup and he identified Mendez as
the driver.
A gang
expert called by Garcia testified that the shootings were not typical gang
shootings; that a “road rage†incident would not have been for the benefit of
the gang; and that the phrase “ ‘What[’s] up, Blood’ †would not have been used
by a non-Bloods gang member.
At trial,
Mendez did not dispute that he was the driver of the Jeep and fired shots at
Wade.
2. Procedure.
Mendez and Garcia were tried together by a jury. Both appellants were convicted of the murder
of Wade. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)
first degree; as to Garcia, the jury found the murder to be in the second
degree. Both men were also convicted of
the attempted murders of T.M. and R.M.
The jury found the attempted murders were deliberate and premeditated;
that during all the crimes a principal personally discharged a firearm (§
12022.53, subds. (c), (d) & (e)(1)); and that all the crimes were committed
for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)). The
trial court sentenced Mendez to a term of 90 years to life in prison, and
Garcia to 80 years to life. As to both
defendants, the court imposed restitution fines, suspended parole restitution
fines, criminal conviction assessments, and court security assessments. Mendez and Garcia appeal.
DISCUSSION
1.
Prior to trial Garcia brought two separate motions
seeking to suppress or exclude the statements he made during the interview with
detectives, as well as the recorded jailhouse conversations, on the grounds
they were (1) the fruit of an illegal arrest, and (2) the fruit of a
coercive interrogation. The trial court
denied both motions. The People did not
seek to introduce the police interview at trial, but did present evidence of
the jail-cell conversations. Garcia
contends this was constitutional error.
We disagree.
a.
jailhouse conversations were not the fruit of an illegal arrest.
(i)
Garcia initially moved to suppress on the ground the
jail-cell conversations were the fruit of an illegal detention and arrest. The trial court conducted an evidentiary
hearing, at which Detective Kingi and two parole officers testified. Kingi testified that during the
investigation, he learned that the Jeep belonged to Arias’s girlfriend,
Bolanos. Arias was an 18th Street gang
member. Police found the Jeep parked
outside Arias’s house, and Arias had been known to drive it in the past. Police therefore arrested Arias as a
suspect. Detectives Kingi and Lait
conducted a tape recorded interview of Arias on May 14, 2009, a few days after
the shootings. Arias stated that Mendez
and Garcia were involved in the shootings.
Bolanos had told Arias that Mendez and Garcia took the Jeep and “ ‘did
some dirt’ †in it. Both Mendez and
Garcia had told Arias that they went to a rival gang’s territory, and “shot
some OG Bitty,†that is, an older gang member, “in the chest four or five
times.â€
Kingi
contacted Parole Agent Roger Kemp and told him Garcia was a suspect in a
shooting. Kingi learned from Kemp that
tracking information from Mendez’s GPS ankle monitor showed Mendez was at the
locations of the two shootings at the times they occurred. Kingi confirmed this information by reviewing
the GPS data himself. When Garcia came
into the parole office on May 18, 2009, Kingi and Lait arrested him.
After
considering the testimony and the arguments of the parties, the court denied
the suppression motion. It concluded
that, based on the evidence known to detectives, including Arias’s statements
and the data obtained from Mendez’s GPS monitoring device, probable cause
existed to arrest Garcia.
(ii) Discussion.
“ ‘Probable cause exists
when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of
“reasonable caution†that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. [Citation.]
“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities
in particular factual contexts . . . .â€
[Citation.] It is incapable of
precise definition. [Citation.] “ ‘The substance of all the definitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,’ †and that belief
must be “particularized with respect to the person to be . . . seized.†[Citation.]’ †(People
v. Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 474; Maryland
v. Pringle (2003) 540 U.S. 366, 371; People
v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673.)
On review of a denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial
court’s express or implied factual findings if supported by substantial
evidence, but exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the
facts found, the seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (In re
H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 142.)
Challenges to the admissibility of a search or seizure must be evaluated
solely under the Fourth Amendment. (
1141.)
Contrary to
Garcia’s argument, probable cause existed to support the arrest. Detectives knew,
based on information from Mendez’s GPS tracker, that Mendez was at the
locations of the murder and shooting at the times they occurred. They knew from Arias, a fellow gang member,
that Mendez and Garcia had taken and driven Bolanos’s Jeep, the vehicle used in
the crimes. Mendez and Garcia had told
gang associates that they “did some dirt†while in the car, including
travelling to a rival gang’s neighborhood and shooting someone perceived to be
a rival gangster in the chest. These
facts would readily lead a person of reasonable caution to conclude Mendez,
accompanied by Garcia, had committed the Wade murder. There was ample probable cause for Garcia’s
arrest.
Garcia’s
argument that the trial court “improperly relied on hindsight and on
information not in the record†before it when ruling on the motion is not
persuasive. While the court did
reference certain facts that, while accurate, were not admitted in evidence or
testified to by the witnesses at the suppression
hearing, as we have discussed the facts that were in evidence established probable cause.
b. The
jailhouse conversations were properly admitted.
(i)
After driving Garcia from the parole office, Detectives
Kingi and Lait interviewed him at the police station in an interview room. Kingi advised Garcia of his
understood. Garcia replied, “I guess
so,†when Kingi stated they were going to talk about “what happened.†Kingi falsely told Garcia the interview was
not being recorded, and disingenuously and repeatedly assured him that he was
being straightforward.
During the
first portion of the interview, Kingi falsely told Garcia that eyewitnesses had
identified him as the passenger in the car.
He also showed Garcia a fabricated six-pack photographic lineup in which
Garcia’s photograph was circled. Kingi
accurately related that police had a videotape of the shooting and knew who the
driver was because he had been wearing a GPS anklet. Kingi urged Garcia to explain what had
happened, suggesting the shooting was unplanned and Garcia was an unwitting
passenger who was just “along for the ride.â€
Kingi queried whether Garcia knew that “homeboy had a gun,†and invited him
to explain what was said during the confrontation with Wade. Kingi cautioned, “as of right now, you’re the
passenger and you’re involved, depending on what your story is.†Garcia indicated he understood “exactly†what
Kingi was saying, explaining, “I’ve been through this. I’ve done it a lot of times.â€
Kingi
reminded Garcia of the “number one rule†that he needed to take care of himself
and his family, including his two young daughters. He urged that if Garcia failed to tell his
side of the story he was “up the creek†and it would appear he and the driver
had been hunting for persons to shoot.
Garcia professed ignorance and expressed skepticism that police actually
had a videotape depicting him. He stated
he wanted to see his “picture on the camera.â€
Kingi
remonstrated, “You’re not the one that killed [that] guy. I only investigate people that are
responsible.†Kingi opined that it was
“not fair†to see Garcia “go down for this . . . . It’s not fair for you to not have to see your
family, to watch your daughters grow up.â€
Garcia continued to profess a lack of knowledge of the shooting.
The
detectives then tried a different tactic.
They showed Garcia a photograph that made it falsely appear as if there
had been a gun on the floorboard of Wade’s car.
Kingi stated that the detectives had interviewed Mendez, and that Mendez
had not been booked for murder. Kingi
implied that Mendez wanted Garcia to tell detectives the shooting had been in
self-defense, thereby exculpating Mendez.
Kingi also stated that Garcia had been booked only for a parole
violation, because “we don’t believe that it was an actual murder.†Garcia asked what would happen if he told
them what had happened. Lait said,
“Well, my guess is if the story is a lot like what [Mendez] said, then––like my
partner said, we give you a ride home.
[¶] It’s not like we couldn’t get
you again; right?†Lait referenced the
fact that Garcia had just been fitted with a GPS tracking device at the parole
office, and stated that the detectives were still conducting the
investigation. Garcia again declined to
provide information, stating “I ain’t got no story.â€
The
detectives took a break, during which they showed Garcia the videotape of the
Wade shooting. The video had been
altered to make it appear as if the Jeep’s license plate number was readable;
in fact, the number was not clear on the tape.
When Garcia pointed out that he could not be seen on the videotape,
Kingi falsely reiterated that he had been identified by witnesses. Shortly thereafter Garcia told detectives
that before the shooting Wade had called out his gang name and brandished a
gun. Garcia claimed he could not recall
much else, and had been intoxicated.
Garcia indicated he had no more information and said, “See you guys
don’t take me to jail, man.†“I thought
you were just going to let me go . . . .â€
He complained, “I’ve did my little part of the
work . . . .†After
taking another break, the detectives questioned Garcia about the shooting
involving T.M. and R.M. Garcia refused
to provide further information.
Three times
during the interview, Garcia referenced obtaining an attorney, but did not
unambiguously request counsel.
going to have to get me a lawyer. I
don’t know nothing no more.â€
Interrogation ceased.
(ii)
ruling.
Garcia moved in limine to exclude the interview and
jailhouse conversations on various grounds, including that his statements were
involuntary. After an evidentiary
hearing at which a defense police interrogation expert testified, the trial
court denied the motion, finding Garcia’s statements voluntary. The trial court expressed concern about the
detectives’ comments that suggested a promise of leniency, but found that such
statements were not the dominant focus of the interrogation and Garcia’s will
was not overborne. The court also
reasoned that Garcia’s statements in the jail cell were admissible because
there was a clear break between the interrogation and the jail-cell
conversation.
(iii) Applicable
legal principles
An involuntary confession—one that is not free because
the defendant’s will was overborne—is inadmissible at trial under the due
process guarantees of the United States and California Constitutions. (People
v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576; People
v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501.)
“A confession elicited by any promise of benefit
or leniency, whether express or implied, is involuntary and therefore
inadmissible, but merely advising a suspect that it would be better to tell the
truth, when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise, does not render a
confession involuntary.
[Citation.]†(
600; People v. Holloway (2004) 33
Cal.4th 96, 115; People v. Maury
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 404-405.)
Detectives may point out the benefits that flow naturally from a
truthful and honest course of conduct. (
993.)
The
voluntariness of a suspect’s statement is determined based on the totality of
the circumstances. (People v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 993.) The relevant factors include the “crucial
element†of police coercion; the length of the interrogation; its location; its
continuity; and the defendant’s maturity, education, physical condition, and
mental health. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 660.) No single factor is dispositive. (People
v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 436.)
Questioning may include confrontation with contradictory facts, debate,
and even exaggerated statements implying that the police have more knowledge
about a crime than they actually possess.
(People v. Williams, supra, 49
Cal.4th at p. 443; People v. Holloway,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 115; People
v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 299.)
Only those “ ‘psychological ploys which, under all the
circumstances, are so coercive that they tend to produce a statement that is
both involuntary and unreliable’ †are inadmissible. (People
v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 501.)
The People have the burden of establishing the statement was
voluntary. (Tully, supra, at p. 993.) We
accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and inferences, as well
as its evaluations of credibility, if substantially supported. We independently determine from the facts
found by the trial court whether the challenged statement was legally
obtained. (Smith, supra, at p. 502; Tully, supra, at p. 993.)
(iv) Voluntariness
of the statements made during the police interview.
Garcia
complains the interrogation was so coercive as to render his statements
involuntary. We view the question as
close.
The
interview commenced shortly before 6:00 p.m., included two breaks, and was
relatively brief. Neither its duration
nor the hour of day suggested coercion.
Garcia was advised of his Miranda rights
and adequately waived them. (
667-668.) Garcia was not a naïve youth
lacking experience with the criminal justice system; he was four days shy of
his 27th birthday, had previously been incarcerated, and had been a gang member
since the age of 12. His sophistication
was reflected in his statements to the detectives that he had “been through
this. I’ve done it a lot of times†and
“I know what you guys are doing.â€
Nothing suggests he suffered from mental or physical infirmities. His statements strongly suggested he was not
actually intimidated. He expressed
skepticism about some of the detectives’ representations and did not hesitate
to refuse to provide information. Further,
the tenor of Garcia’s jail-cell comments do not suggest he had been coerced or
intimidated. These aspects of the record
suggest Garcia’s will was not overborne.
(See People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th
at p. 442.)
We disagree
that several of the factors cited by Garcia indicate coercion. Garcia argues that his requests for counsel
were ignored, which indicated coercive interrogation. But each of Garcia’s first three references
to counsel were ambiguous, and the detectives had no obligation to stop the
interview or ask clarifying questions.
(See People v. Bacon (2010) 50
Cal.4th 1082, 1105; Davis v. United
States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 459; People
v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 427; People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 266.) Because the detectives did not act
improperly, their conduct cannot have contributed to a coercive
interrogation. Likewise, their references to Garcia’s family were brief,
nondeceptive, and do not appear to have motivated Garcia’s statements. (See generally People v. Kelly (1990) 51 Cal.3d 931, 953.)
Nor do the
detectives’ deceptive comments that witnesses had identified Garcia, and that
the Jeep’s license plate number was visible in the video, compel a finding of
involuntariness. (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1240-1241;
167.) “ ‘Lies
told by the police to a suspect under questioning can affect the voluntariness
of an ensuing confession, but they are not per se sufficient to make it
involuntary.’ †(People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 182;
785.) Where the deception is not of a
type reasonably likely to procure an untrue statement, a finding of
voluntariness is warranted. (
that the defendant’s fingerprint was found on the victim’s wallet did not
render a confession involuntary].) The
deceptive statements were not of a type likely to induce an untrue statement,
especially given that police actually did have evidence the Jeep was the car
used in the crime and Garcia was the passenger.
The same
cannot readily be said of the detectives’ false representation that a gun was
found in Wade’s car. It appears that
this ruse did, in fact, result in untrue statements by Garcia: he falsely told police that Wade pulled a gun
and called out his gang’s name. Also
problematic are the detective’s statements that if Garcia’s story was the same
as Mendez’s supposed story, the detectives would give Garcia a “ride
home.†This statement falsely
represented that if Garcia told detectives the shooting had been in
self-defense, he would be released. This promise of lenience amounted to more than simply pointing out
the benefits flowing from a truthful course of conduct; the detectives knew no
gun had been found in Wade’s car and Mendez did not act in self-defense. The “ride home†statement was arguably somewhat equivocal;
it was followed by statements suggesting the detectives were still
investigating, and could arrest Garcia again.
But there was certainly a chance Garcia would understand the comments to
imply he would be released if he corroborated Mendez’s supposed self-defense
claim. Indeed, Garcia’s later statements
suggest this was precisely how he interpreted the remarks.
However, we
need not determine whether Garcia’s statements during the interrogation were
voluntary. Even assuming arguendo that
they were not, the jail-cell conversations––the portion of the evidence
challenged here––were clearly admissible.
Cal.App.4th 830 and People v. Terrell (2006)
141 Cal.App.4th 1371 are on point. In
admitted during a police interrogation that he had committed murder and
robbery. At the conclusion of the police
interview, he asked if he could call his mother. The officers agreed, but surreptitiously
taped the call. During the call the
defendant confessed the killing to his mother and other family members. (Id. at
p. 1376.) He successfully moved to
suppress his confession made during the police interview, on the ground his
confession was coerced. However, the
“telephonic statements were admissible even if [defendant’s] confession under
police interrogation was not.†(
relatives were not the product of coercion or a custodial interrogation, and
the defendant had initiated the call on his own. (Id. at
pp. 1377, 1382.) The court rejected the
argument that the phone call was inadmissible because it was the “direct result
of unlawful police interrogation tactics which led first to his coerced
confession to the police.†(
call. The defendant did not know the
call was being recorded. From the
defendant’s point of view, the coercive atmosphere of the interrogation had
ended, and he was having a private conversation with his family. His motivation in speaking to his family
members was entirely different from his motivation when confessing to
police: he was not seeking to avoid
reprisals or obtain more lenient treatment.
(Id. at p. 1385.) Thus, his voluntary decision to telephone his
family and confess was an intervening circumstance that broke the causative
chain. (Ibid.)
In
two gang members suspected of committing a drive-by murder together. Police gave each man false information about
the evidence, telling one that gunshot residue had been found in his Suburban
automobile (the car used in the murder), and the other that his fingerprint had
been found inside the Suburban. (
Cal.App.4th at p. 835.) Officers then
put the men together in a surreptitiously bugged jail cell, where they
discussed the crimes and the information that had been given to them by
police. Jefferson rejected the argument that placing the men in the cell
together, where it was reasonably likely they would make incriminating
statements, was a form of interrogation.
(Id. at p. 840.)
‘interrogated.’ ‘Interrogation’ requires
‘a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody
itself.’ [Citation.] That compulsion is missing when a suspect
speaks freely to someone the suspect thinks is a fellow cellmate.†(Ibid.) From the defendants’ perspective, “the
problem was the opposite of compulsion. They were candid because they thought
no one else was listening, not because they were getting the third degree. It was, as the officers hoped, a spontaneous
and natural conversation between friends with a dilemma on their minds.†(Id.
at p. 841.) Accordingly, the statements were
voluntary.
simply by placing the men in the same cell.
“ ‘Officers do not interrogate a suspect simply by hoping that he will
incriminate himself.’ [Citation.]†(People
v. Terrell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1386, quoting Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)
446 U.S. 291, 302; People v. Jefferson,
supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 840.)
The jail-cell conversation did not take place under conditions
resembling a custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent. (Terrell,
at p. 1386). No coercion or police
prompting was used to elicit the jail-cell statements. Garcia did not know the jail-cell
conversation was being taped. (
coercion when the defendant is subjectively unaware of police involvement in
eliciting or recording his statements].)
From Garcia’s point of view, any coercive atmosphere extant during the
interrogation had ended. (
the problem, from Garcia’s point of view, was the opposite of compulsion. While Garcia is correct that many of the
incriminating jail-cell statements pertained to information provided to him
during the police interview, this does not compel exclusion; the same was true
in Jefferson. (Jefferson,
at pp. 835-836.) That the police
interview in Jefferson was not coercive
is, in our view, insignificant. “ ‘A subsequent confession is not the tainted product of the first
merely because, “but for†the improper police conduct, the subsequent
confession would not have been obtained.
[Citation.]’ †(
the jail-cell conversation did not occur until after Garcia had been booked and
moved to a jail cell, a more definitive break than that present in
there
was an “ ‘intervening circumstance’ that broke the causative chain.†(Id. at
p. 1385.)
Garcia urges
that this case more closely resembles People
v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, disapproved on another point in
836, in which the California Supreme
Court held a defendant’s post-interrogation telephone conversation with his
wife was inadmissible. (
interrogations occurring over two days, interspersed with several conversations
between the defendant and his wife. (
pp. 835-838.) Police deliberately exploited the defendant’s initial confession by priming
the wife with information leading her to believe her husband was guilty, and
then setting up the follow-up conversations in which she could elicit further
incriminating evidence from him. In essence,
the wife unwittingly “acted as an arm of the police,
allowing them to continue to interrogate Hogan by means of questions posed by
her.†(People v. Terrell, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384.) Here, in contrast to Hogan, the detectives did not prompt the jail-cell conversation and
did not use a family member as a tool to continue a de facto interrogation.
2. Contentions
related to voluntary intoxication.
Mendez contends the trial court erred by precluding
testimony from a lay witness that the driver of the Jeep appeared to be
drunk. Both defendants contend that the
trial court erred by denying their request that the jury be instructed on
voluntary intoxication. Because
additional proof of intoxication would have been relevant to the court’s ruling
on the instruction, we consider the issues seriatim.
a.
Defense witness Jose Rodriguez testified that he
observed the hit-and-run accident. He
saw a car speeding down Cochran Street at 50 to 55 miles per hour. The car attempted to turn on Carlin, but was
going too fast, missed the turn, and crashed into a small Honda. Mendez’s counsel asked, “The way you
described this car driving the speed and the turn and the collision, was that
consistent with or like the driver was drunk?â€
The prosecutor objected on lack of foundation grounds, and the court
sustained the objection.
Mendez assumes that Rodriguez would have given an
affirmative answer, and complains that the trial court erred by sustaining the
prosecutor’s objection. He is
incorrect. A non-expert witness may
offer his or her opinion if it is “ ‘[r]ationally based
on the perception of the witness†and “[h]elpful to a clear understanding of
his testimony.†(Evid. Code, § 800;
64, 83.) The decision whether to permit
lay opinion rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. (Bradley,
at p. 83.)
The
trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Rodriguez’s opinion was not rationally based on his perceptions. Rodriguez observed, from a distance, the Jeep
speeding and miss a turn. From these
limited observations, Rodriguez could not have rationally formed an opinion
about whether the driver was drunk. As
Mendez appears to acknowledge, it is an unfortunate fact that sober persons, as
well as intoxicated drivers, sometimes drive at excessive speeds and have
accidents. Without a further basis for
the opinion, Rodriguez’s testimony was properly excluded. Mendez’s citation to cases holding that lay
witnesses are permitted to give their opinion on intoxication is unhelpful. (See, e.g., People v. Williams (1992) 3
Cal.App.4th 1326, 1332 [“Lay witnesses have been permitted to give an opinion
of another’s state of intoxication when based on the witness’s personal
observations of such commonly recognizable signs as an odor of alcohol,
slurring of speech, unsteadiness, and the likeâ€].) This principle is unquestionably
correct. The problem is that Rodriguez’s
opinion was not based on these commonly recognizable signs, nor was he close
enough to the Jeep to have been able to make such observations. There was no error.
b. Refusal
to instruct on voluntary intoxication.
Appellants requested that the trial court instruct the
jury with CALCRIM No. 625, regarding voluntary intoxication.
ground there was insufficient evidence to support the instruction. Appellants contend omission of the
instruction violated their constitutional rights to due process, to present a
defense, and to jury trial.
A trial court must instruct, sua sponte, on the general principles
of law that are closely and openly connected to the facts before the court and
that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case. (People v. Moye (2009) 47
Cal.4th 537, 548; People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412,
468-469.) A defendant has the right to
an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the defense. (People
v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 715, disapproved on other grounds in
421, fn. 22.) However, a court is not
obliged to instruct on theories that lack substantial evidentiary support. (People
v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 246.)
Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to deserve consideration by
the jury, that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive. (People
v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 102; People
v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1049-1050.) A trial court “need not give instructions
based solely on conjecture and speculation.â€
(People v. Young (2005) 34
Cal.4th 1149, 1200.) Doubts about the
sufficiency of the evidence to warrant an instruction should be resolved in the
defendant’s favor. (Moye, at p. 562.) We
independently review the question of whether the trial court erred by failing
to instruct on a defense. (
702, 707; People v. Oropeza (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 73, 78.) In deciding
whether an instruction is required, we do not determine the credibility of the
defense evidence. (
People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.)
Evidence
of voluntary intoxication is “ ‘admissible solely on the issue of whether or
not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, or, when charged
with murder, whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored
express malice aforethought.’ †(People
v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 715; § 29.4, subd. (b).) “Accordingly, a defendant is entitled to an
instruction on voluntary intoxication ‘only when there is substantial evidence
of the defendant’s voluntary intoxication and
the intoxication affected the defendant’s “actual formation of specific intent.â€
’ [Citation.]†(Roldan,
at p. 715, italics added; People v.
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 677.)
Here,
the only evidence offered in support of the instruction was the following. First, Arias told detectives that appellants
had taken Bolanos’s Jeep for two days.
They had been at the “Spot,†a location where gang members got high and
attended parties, and were “all fucked up.â€
They told Arias they went on a “big ass shoot out for, like, two, three
daysâ€; were “drunk as fuckâ€; and “ ‘just blasted everyone, just drunk on a good
one, just blasting everywhere.’ â€
Second, Emilia Lopez, an eyewitness to the hit and run, testified that
the culprits were laughing and appeared to be lost. On cross-examination counsel asked whether
she had the impression that the men in the Jeep “might have been drunk.†She answered affirmatively but gave no
further basis for her opinion. Third,
during the recorded jail-cell conversation, Garcia stated that he had told the
detectives he was drunk at the time of the crimes.
Assuming
arguendo that this evidence was sufficient to show appellants were intoxicated
at the time of the crimes––as opposed to some other
period during their two- or three-day “shootoutâ€â€“–it
provides no evidence that they were so intoxicated they did not form the
requisite criminal intent. “[A]n
intoxication instruction is not required when the evidence shows that a
defendant ingested drugs or was drinking, unless the evidence
point he failed to form the requisite intent or attain the requisite mental
state.†(People v. Ivans (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1661-1662, and cases
cited therein ; People v. Williams,
supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 677-678 [defendant’s statements that he was
“ ‘doped up’ †and “ ‘smokin’ pretty tough’ †were
insufficient evidence his intoxication affected his mental state];
1179-1181 [that defendant drank 8 to 10 beers was insufficient evidence
intoxication had an effect on his mental state].) The evidence that Mendez drove too fast and
hit another car was insufficient to show either appellant had not formed the
requisite intent. Omission of the
instruction was proper.
3.
During argument, the prosecutor urged that appellants
were “going out and hunting for rivals to kill.†She discussed the jury instructions on
premeditation and deliberation. In the
course of that argument, she stated: “In
this case we have much more than that because we have gang members, . . . the
instruction tells you the amount of time required for deliberation,
premeditation can vary from person to person and according to the
circumstances. What that tells you is
that you can look to all the other evidence about these particular defendants
that you know to consider whether or not they deliberated. [¶]
person because at some point in time that person decided to join a gang. And when they do so, they know that gang members
aren’t groups of people that are choir boys, they are people that commit
crimes. And as soon as they join a gang,
they have to think––you think if
they’re any type of reflective person, they have to think, am I going to be
down for my gang? If I’m presented with
a rival if I’m with one of my homies, if I see someone, will I be the type of
person that can kill. They’ve already
decided this when they decided to join the gang. They decided this when they . . . got
together, put a gun in the car or put it in their waistband and decided to
drive around rival territory at their own risk.†(Italics added.)
Appellants
argue the italicized portion of the prosecutor’s statements constituted
prejudicial misconduct and violated their rights to confrontation and due
process. They contend that the argument
violated the court’s limiting instruction that gang evidence was admissible
only to prove intent, purpose, knowledge, or motive, but not character.
jurors that gang members are the type of people who kill, that is, they have a
propensity or character for violence and murder. Appellants also contend that the prosecutor’s
argument referenced facts not in evidence, because no witness testified that
gang members “take a vow or commit themselves to killing people when required
[to do so] by the gang.â€
“The applicable federal and state standards regarding
prosecutorial misconduct are well established.
‘ “A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal
Constitution when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so egregious that it
infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of
due process.’ †’ [Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render
a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct under state
law only if it involves ‘ “ ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to
attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’ †’ [Citation.]â€
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15
Cal.4th 795, 841; People v. Vines (2011)
51 Cal.4th 830, 873; People v. Redd
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 733-734.) When a
claim of misconduct focuses on comments the prosecutor made before the jury,
the question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury construed or
applied any of the complained of remarks in an objectionable fashion. (Samayoa,
at p. 841.) We must place the challenged
statement in context and view the argument as a whole. (People
v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1203.)
When the
defense fails to object to asserted prosecutorial misconduct and request that
the jury be admonished, the claim ordinarily is forfeited on appeal. (People
v. McKinzie (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1302, 1358; People v. Souza (2012) 54 Cal.4th 90, 122.) Because appellants
failed to object to the challenged portion of the prosecutor’s remarks, they
have forfeited their prosecutorial misconduct claims. (McKinzie,
at p. 1358; Souza, at p.
122.) Contrary to appellants’
assertions, the record does not suggest an objection would have been futile. (See generally People v. Redd, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 745.)
Appellants urge that to the
extent their claims were forfeited by their counsels’ failure to object, their
attorneys provided ineffective assistance.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a defendant must
establish both that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and resultant prejudice.
(Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687; People v.
Hernandez (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1095, 1105; People
v. Bradley, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at pp. 86-87.)
The prosecutor did not
commit prejudicial misconduct. While it
is misconduct for a prosecutor to argue evidence outside the record (
494; People v.
Ellison (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1353), that did not
occur here. A
prosecutor is “ ‘given wide latitude to vigorously argue his or her case and to
make fair comment upon the evidence, including reasonable inferences or
deductions that may be drawn from the evidence.’ †(People
v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 768; People
v. Thomas, supra, at p. 494.) The
prosecution’s gang expert testified, among other things, that the primary
activities of the 18th Street gang included murder and attempted murder; that
in the gang culture, respect is of paramount importance, and must be earned by
committing crimes for the gang, such as shootings, murders, and other
activities; that it is important for gang members to feel that their fellow
gang members know they are capable of committing violent crime; and that if
gang members travelled into a rival gang’s territory, they would expect a
shooting to occur. Given this evidence,
it was a reasonable inference that persons mired in the gang culture are often
called upon to commit shootings for their gangs and must be willing to do so if
they are to earn “respect.†Contrary to
appellants’ argument, the prosecutor did not state that gang members take a vow
to kill.
Nor do we think there is a
reasonable likelihood jurors would have interpreted the prosecutor’s remarks as
appellants suggest. The prosecutor’s
point was that persons who choose to join a gang do so knowing that they may be
called upon to commit violent acts for the gang, and therefore must have
considered, before joining, whether they were willing and able to comply with
the gang’s norms and demands. This was a
fair inference and comment on the evidence, and was not prohibited character
evidence. While it would perhaps have
been preferable for the prosecutor to avoid the phrase “a gang member is
different than an ordinary person,†certainly her comments were not deceptive,
reprehensible, or egregious, and did not infect the trial with unfairness. Because the
prosecutor’s argument was not objectionable, defense counsel did not perform
inadequately by failing to object.
Defense counsel is “not required to make futile motions or to indulge in
idle acts to appear competent.†(
1084, 1091.)
4.
continuance and a new trial.
a.
Prior to trial, Garcia sought contact information for
the People’s witnesses. Pursuant to a
standard court procedure followed in cases in which a gang enhancement is
alleged, in the interests of witness safety the contact information was not
disclosed, but the People agreed to make the witnesses available for interview.
During the
People’s case-in-chief, defense witness Marcos testified that the front seat
passenger in the Jeep wore a black baseball cap with a red logo.
On the day
Arias testified, the prosecutor informed the defense that she had inadvertently
failed to turn over 155 photographs taken of the search of Arias’s house. The defense examined the photographs in
court. One of the pictures showed a
black baseball cap with a red logo hanging in Arias’s mother’s closet. The defense introduced the photograph into
evidence and questioned Arias about it.
During Garcia’s closing argument, defense counsel displayed the
photograph for the jury and argued it was possible Arias was the front seat
passenger. Defense counsel did not seek
to recall Marcos after obtaining the photograph.
After the
jury rendered guilty verdicts, Garcia filed a “Request for Discovery†seeking
contact information for Marcos and her parents, Eulalia and Jose. Defense counsel averred that the information
was necessary in order for her to prepare a motion for a new trial. Counsel averred that Eulalia and Jose, who
did not testify at trial, had also stated that the front seat passenger wore a
black cap with a red logo. Counsel
stated she intended to show the three witnesses the photograph of the cap and
ask “whether that might have been the hat†they saw. Garcia also moved for a continuance on the
same grounds.
At the
hearing on the motions, the prosecutor stated that the photographs had been
referenced in the police report. The
defense had been in possession of the photographs during trial but never
requested a continuance and did not seek to call additional witnesses, recall
Marcos, or interview Eulalia and Jose.
The prosecutor observed that the hat was found in Arias’s mother’s
closet, next to a Quizno’s uniform apron, and appeared to be part of the
uniform. The prosecutor also noted that
during the jail cell conversations, Garcia had stated that he had been wearing
a dark hat with a logo. The trial court
opined that both motions “border[ed] on [the] frivolous†and denied them. It reasoned that the evidence of the cap was
“[not] a big deal†and numerous similar hats were to be found in Los Angeles.
Garcia
subsequently filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds of, inter alia, prosecutorial misconduct.
prosecutor did not turn over the 155 photographs before trial. Counsel averred that the black cap “exactly
matches the description of what the front seat passenger was wearing†provided
by Marcos and, presumably, her parents.
Had the photographs been turned over, counsel could have questioned
Marcos and the other witnesses about the cap, potentially establishing Arias
was in the front passenger seat and was the person who shot at T.M. and
R.M. The trial court denied the
motion. It concluded the trial evidence
was “extremely compelling,†particularly the fact that Garcia stated in the
jail cell conversation that he was in the car.
Moreover, there was no prosecutorial misconduct. The defense was able to use the photograph of
the cap at trial.
Garcia now
contends denial of all three motions was error.
We disagree.
b. The
discovery request.
There is no
general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case. (People
v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 109-110.)
California’s reciprocal discovery statutes, section 1054 et seq.,
provide the exclusive means for discovery.
(§ 1054, subd. (e); People v.
Superior Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 570.) With the exception of section 1054.9, which
does not apply here, the reciprocal discovery statutes do not provide for
post-conviction discovery. (
pp. 570-572.) “[T]he purposes of the discovery statutes cannot be furthered where, as
here, a jury has already rendered its verdict on the substantive charges
against the defendant . . . . Rather, in
this situation any violation of a defendant’s pretrial right to discovery is
appropriately addressed by available posttrial remedies such as an appeal from
the judgment [citation], a motion for new trial [citation], or a petition for
habeas corpus [citation].†(
318, 327.) Garcia therefore failed to
establish he was entitled to the requested discovery.
Furthermore,
the prosecutor did, in fact, disclose the photographs during trial and had
apparently offered to make the three witnesses at issue available for an interview. Garcia’s counsel introduced the photograph
into evidence and argued its significance to the jury. If Garcia felt aggrieved by the People’s
tardy disclosure, he was not without remedy.
The discovery statute requires that the prosecution disclose specified
categories of information to the defense 30 days before trial. (People
v. Bowles, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 325.) The trial court may enforce the discovery
statutes by ordering immediate disclosure and a variety of sanctions. (Ibid.) If Garcia felt additional discovery,
accommodations, or sanctions were warranted, he could easily have sought them
during trial, but failed to do so.
c. The
motion for a continuance.
A
continuance of a criminal trial may be granted only for good cause, and the
trial court has broad discretion to determine whether good cause exists. (§ 1050, subd. (e); People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 934;
1118.) We review the trial court’s
denial of a motion for a continuance for abuse of discretion. (People
v. Mungia, supra, at p. 1118.) “
‘There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is
so arbitrary as to violate due process.
The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case,
particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the
request is denied.’ [Citations.]†(Id.
at p. 1118.) “In reviewing the
decision to deny a continuance, ‘[o]ne factor to consider is whether a
continuance would be useful. [Citation.]’
†(Ibid.)
The
trial court did not abuse its discretion here.
First, as best we can tell, Garcia sought the continuance in conjunction
with the discovery request so he could show the three witnesses the photograph
of the black hat. As the court properly
denied the discovery request for the witnesses’ contact information, this point
was moot. Second, immediately after the
trial court denied the motions for discovery and a continuance, defense counsel
stated, “I do have a motion for new trial prepared.†Thus, there was no necessity for a further
delay.
d. The new
trial motion.
Section
1181, paragraph (5), provides that a new trial may be granted when the
prosecutor has “been guilty of prejudicial misconduct during the trial thereof
before a jury.†We review a trial
court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. (
668, 729.) A trial court’s ruling on a
motion for new trial will not be disturbed absent a manifest and unmistakable
abuse of discretion. (
We
discern no abuse of discretion here, because the new trial motion lacked
merit. We have set forth the standard
governing prosecutorial misconduct claims ante. While the prosecutor should have turned
over the photographs 30 days before trial (§ 1054.7), her failure to do so was
inadvertent. The tardy production of the
photographs cannot be characterized as deceptive or reprehensible, nor was it
an egregious pattern of conduct that rendered the trial unfair. (See People
v. Vines, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 873.)
Garcia claims that, had he possessed the photograph earlier, he would
have asked Marcos if the cap resembled the one worn by the passenger, and might
have called Marcos’s parents as witnesses for the same purpose. Although Garcia postulates that the cap
evidence was significant in the way the case was litigated, we do not see how
timely discovery of the photograph could have bolstered the defense case. The cap was found in Arias’s mother’s
closet. Based on the prosecutor’s
representations and Arias’s statements, it appears it was part of Arias’s
mother’s work uniform, making it unlikely jurors would believe it was the one
worn by the shooter. Despite the tardy
disclosure, the defense introduced the photograph into evidence and argued its
significance to the jury. Given that the
jury had a photograph of the hat, and knew that the front seat passenger was
wearing similar headgear, it is unlikely the testimony of Marcos or her parents
would have added much to the case.
Further, as the trial court reasoned, the hat was not a uniq
| Description | Defendants and appellants Daniel Mendez and Carlos Garcia appeal their convictions for murder and attempted murder. Mendez and Garcia were sentenced to prison terms of 90 and 80 years to life, respectively. Both appellants contend the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct; and the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence when it failed to stay or strike a minimum parole eligibility period. Mendez further contends the trial court improperly excluded evidence. Garcia further contends evidence of jailhouse conversations between him and Mendez should have been excluded, and the trial court abused its discretion by denying his request for post-trial discovery, a continuance, and his motion for a new trial. The People concede that the trial court erred by imposing minimum parole eligibility periods. We modify the judgment to correct the sentencing error. In all other respects, we affirm. |
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