P. v. Melton
Filed 8/2/13 P. v. Melton CA4/1
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and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
KEVIN DOUGLAS MELTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
D062913
(Super. Ct.
No. SCD241884)
APPEAL from
a judgment of the Superior Court
of
County, Laura W. Halgren, Judge. Affirmed as modified with directions.
Law Offices
of Russell S. Babcock, Russell S. Babcock, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D.
Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Elizabeth M.
Carino, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Kevin
Melton pleaded guilty to inflicting corporal injury on a former cohabitant (Pen.
Code,
273.5, subd. (a); count 2) and disobeying
a court order (§ 273.6; count 4).
Melton also admitted his prior conviction of inflicting corporal injury
on a former cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). The prosecution dismissed the remaining
counts and special allegations in exchange for Melton's guilty plea. The court then suspended Melton's sentence,
granted Melton formal probation, and placed him in custody for 365 days with
credit for time served.
Melton
appeals, contending the court abused its discretion because it failed to
establish a factual basis for Melton's conditional guilty plea, which violated
Melton's Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights and constitutes reversible error.
Melton further contends the probation order miscalculates the total
amount of fines and fees Melton owes. We
affirm the judgment as modified with instructions to correct the total amount
of fines and fees.
PROCEDURAL
FACTS
On July 27, 2012, Melton entered into a
written plea agreement. The court
accepted Melton's guilty plea through the following exchange:
"The Court:
Sir, to the charge in count two that on or about July 5th of this year,
you did willfully and unlawfully inflict a corporal injury, resulting in a
traumatic condition, upon [Y]vette Batia, . . . who was a person with whom you
were cohabitating, in violation of Penal Code section 273.5(a), how do you
plead, guilty or not guilty?
"The Defendant:
Guilty.
"The Court:
'Guilty.' All right. I will note that is what you've said. And to the allegation that you were
previously convicted of Penal Code 273.5(a) in case SCD234647 on April 11th of
2012, within the meaning of Penal Code 273.5(e)1), do you admit that that is
true?
"(The defendant nods head up and down.)
"The Court:
Is that a 'yes?'
"(The defendant nods head up and down.)
"The Court:
I will note that you are nodding 'yes.'
And then to the charge in count four that on July 5th of this year you
did . . . willfully and unlawfully violate a court order obtained to prevent
domestic violence and disturbance of the peace, in violation of Penal Code
section 273.6(a), a misdemeanor, how do you plead?
"The Defendant:
Guilty.
"The Court:
'Guilty.' All right. And the factual basis of your plea is that
you willfully inflicted corporal injury upon a former cohabitant, who was
[Y]vette Batia, resulting in a traumatic condition; you had a prior similar
offense, and you willfully violated a valid court order to prevent domestic
violence. Is that what you did, sir?
"(The defendant nods head up and down.)
"The Court:
Nodding 'yes.'
"The Defendant:
Yes."
DISCUSSION
I
BASIS FOR THE PLEA
Melton
contends the court abused its discretion because it failed to establish a
factual basis to accept Melton's guilty plea.
Melton contends the court should have inquired further into Melton's
conduct because the court's express inquiry, the complaint, and the plea
agreement lacked a sufficiently detailed account of the underlying facts. We disagree.
Under
section 1192.5, when a trial court accepts a conditional plea, it must
establish that there is a prima facie factual basis for the plea and the
defendant pleads freely and voluntarily.
(People v. Holmes (2004) 32
Cal.4th 432, 438 (Holmes).) A factual basis for the plea is necessary
"to protect against the situation where the defendant, although he
realizes what he had done, is not sufficiently skilled in law to recognize that
his acts do not constitute the offense with which he is charged." (People
v. Watts (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 173, 178 (Watts).) Thus, establishing a factual basis for a plea
helps ensure that " 'the constitutional standards of voluntariness
are met.' " (
1170, 1182, fn. 11.)
A court
must either solicit information from defense
counsel or the defendant to establish a factual basis for the plea. (§ 1192.5; Holmes, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 442.) A court may establish a factual basis if
defense counsel stipulates to a factual document in the record, like "a
complaint, police report, preliminary hearing transcript, probation report,
grand jury transcript, or written plea agreement." (Ibid.) A court may also question the defendant
regarding the facts in the complaint or written plea agreement to establish a
sufficient factual basis for the plea. (
If the complaint is sufficiently detailed, a court may simply ask
whether the defendant did what the complaint describes. (Id. at
p. 443.) A complaint is sufficiently
detailed if it includes "the charged offense, the names of the defendant
and the victim, the date and location of the charged offense, and a brief
description of the factual basis for the charged offense." (Ibid.) A court need not conduct a more extensive
inquiry of the defendant to establish a prima facie factual basis for the
plea. (Ibid. ["the trial court's questioning of defendant about the
factual basis in the complaint was adequate to establish that defendant was
cognizant that his acts did constitute the offense with which he was
charged"].) Evidence of each
element of a charged offense is unnecessary to establish a prima facie factual
basis, and a court need not resolve all contradictory evidence to accept the
plea. (Watts, supra, 67 Cal.App.3d at p. 179.)
Melton
cites People v. Willard (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 1329 (Willard) to support
the conclusion a court may not establish a sufficient factual basis for a plea
by using only the statutory language of the elements of a charge to describe a
defendant's actions. However,
because the court in Willard held
defense counsel's stipulation to the elements of a charge was insufficient to
establish a factual basis because counsel failed to stipulate to a factual
document in the record. (
basis by defense counsel's stipulation; rather it expressly inquired of the
defendant based on the information in the complaint. Here, the court established a prima facie
factual basis when it expressly asked Melton whether "the factual basis of
your plea is that you willfully inflicted corporal injury upon a former
cohabitant, who was [Y]vette Batia, resulting in a traumatic condition; you had
a prior similar offense, and you willfully violated a valid court order to
prevent domestic violence[,]" and Melton responded "yes." The court's inquiry described the information
included in both the complaint and the written plea agreement. Further, the court's inquiry contained
information identical to the complaint, which the court found sufficient to
establish a prima facie factual basis in Holmes.
the court asked the defendant if he did what was in the complaint, which stated
the defendant's name, the victim's name, date of the offense, location, and
used only the elements of the charge to describe the defendant's conduct. (Holmes,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 436.)
Similarly here, the elements of the charge sufficiently described
Melton's conduct, and the inquiry included the name of the victim and date of
the offense.
Thus,
further inquiry was unnecessary to establish a prima facie factual basis for
Melton's plea.
title="">[3]
Due
Process and Voluntariness
Melton
contends he did not know the factual basis of his plea because the court failed
to establish a sufficient factual basis, thus he pleaded involuntarily, which
violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. We disagree.
"A
plea is valid if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary under a
totality of the circumstances" test.
(People v. Howard (1992) 1
Cal.4th 1132, 1175 [a strong factual basis for the plea, representation by counsel,
and the court's advisement of the constitutional right to a jury trial showed
defendant's plea was knowing and intelligent].)
Though a factual basis inquiry is not a federal constitutional
requirement, it may help ensure that constitutional standards for voluntariness
are met. (People v. Hoffard, supra,
10 Cal.4th at pp. 1182-1183.)
Here, the
court's express inquiry included information sufficient to establish a prima
facie factual basis for the plea under Holmes,
supra, 32 Cal.4th 432, which supports the court's finding of
voluntariness. The record further shows
Melton understood the nature of the charges against him because he signed the
change of plea form with a handwritten factual basis for his plea.
explained the change of plea form, and Melton stated he understood what he was
signing.
The record
supports the court's finding Melton pleaded freely and voluntarily under the
totality of the circumstances test, thus the court did not violated Melton's
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when it accepted Melton's guilty plea.
II
FEES
Melton
contends the probation report miscalculates the fines and fees he owes, and the
Attorney General correctly concedes.
The
sentencing court's oral pronouncement of fines and fees controls when there is
a discrepancy in the record, and appellate courts may correct such clerical
errors. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
The
probation order incorrectly calculates the total amount of fines and fees as
$1,734. The trial court stayed the $800
fine listed on line 2(a) of the probation order, found Melton unable to pay the
fine listed on line 2(d), and suspended the probation revocation fine of $240. The court then ordered Melton to pay the
remaining fines and fees. The remaining
fines and fees include a court operations assessment of $80, a criminal
conviction assessment of $60, a domestic violence fund fee of $400, and a
restitution fine of $240. Excluding the
stayed and suspended fines and fees, the correct calculation of fines and fees
is $780.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is modified to reduce the fines imposed as set forth in this
opinion. The superior court is directed
to modify its minute order accordingly.
In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL,
P. J.
O'ROURKE,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
specified.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] The complaint in Holmes
stated the following: " 'The
above named defendant(s) committed a violation of Penal Code section 220, a
felony, in that on or about March 24, 2000, in the County of Riverside, State
of California, he did willfully and unlawfully assault Sandra R., with the
intent to commit rape.' " (Holmes,
supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 436.)
