P. v. Medina
Filed 10/19/12 P. v. Medina CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule
8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
8.1115.
COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
THE
PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MANUEL
MEDINA, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D058545
(Super. Ct. No.
JCF22610)
APPEAL from a judgment of the
Christopher W. Yeager, Judge.
Affirmed.
Manuel
Medina, Jr. pleaded guilty to attempted murder of his wife (Pen. Code,
§§ 664/187) and admitted he personally inflicted great
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Medina was
sentenced to a determinate term of 12 years in prison. Following three restitution hearings, the
court ordered restitution to be paid
to the victim in the amount of $28,221.32.
Medina appeals challenging only a portion of the
restitution order imposed by the court.
Specifically, he contends the court erred in ordering restitution in the
amount of $25,170.95 billed by the University
of California San Diego
(UCSD) hospital. He contends there is
not sufficient evidence of the amount actually owed by Medina's
wife. Medina
also contends, for the first time on appeal, that ordering restitution in the
amount selected by the court amounts to an excessive fine in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
We find no abuse of discretion and find there is
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there has not been any insurance
payment to the hospital and therefore no adjustment of the bill by the
wife remains obligated to pay the full amount of the bill. We are also satisfied the restitution order,
based on the actual economic losses of the victim, does not constitute a fine
or punishment and thus does not violate the state or federal Constitutions.
STATEMENT
OF FACTS
Since Medina
does not challenge his conviction or that the victim was treated for injuries
he inflicted, we find it unnecessary to set out a statement of the facts of the
offense. It is sufficient to note Medina
severely injured his wife by throwing sulfuric acid on her in an attempt to
kill her. The victim was treated at a
local hospital and then air-lifted to the UCSD hospital for treatment of severe
chemical burns.
DISCUSSION
I
Following Medina's
guilty plea the court held several restitution hearings in an attempt to
determine the correct amount of restitution necessary to compensate the victim
for her economic losses. At the end of
the process, the only amount in dispute was the amount, if any, owed to UCSD
for necessary medical care. The
difficulty in calculating the amount arose because Medina's
insurance company, Tricare, initially paid around $5,900 to the hospital and it
appeared the hospital adjusted the balance to accept that amount as basically
full payment. Unfortunately, the
insurance company then determined that Medina's
policy did not provide coverage and withdrew its payment. Thereafter the hospital billed the victim for
the full amount. In the trial court Medina
indicated he was willing to pay the amount which was initially paid by the
carrier. Following the dispute over what
was owed, Medina took the position
that no amount had been proved. He now
contends there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support the amount
of restitution ordered for the UCSD treatments and thus the trial court abused
its discretion in ordering the full amount of the bill in restitution.
A. Legal Principles
In California,
crime victims have both constitutional and statutory rights to restitution for
their economic losses "from the persons convicted of crimes for losses
they suffer." (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b); § 1202.4, subd. (f);
Cal.App.4th 463, 467 (Baker).)
The
standard of proof of the amount of restitution is by a preponderance of the
evidence. (Baker, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 468-469.) Trial courts have broad discretion to set the
amount of restitution, choosing any rational method of calculating the
appropriate amount. (People v. Giordano
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663-664 (Giordano).) We will sustain a trial court's decision on
the amount of restitution unless the record shows it to be a clear abuse of
discretion. (People v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682, 686-687.) On appeal we will not reweigh the evidence
regarding restitution but will determine whether there is sufficient
substantial evidence to meet the lower burden of proof required for such
calculation. (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Relying
in part on his interpretation of People
v. Bergin (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1166 (Bergin),
Medina argues that a court may not
order restitution in an amount simply based on a hospital bill. He argues the bill might be adjusted, or that
his insurance might actually pay some portion of it. The opinion in Bergin does not aid Medina.
settled for the amount paid by insurance, the restitution order could not be
based on the higher amount billed. All
that could be required was for the defendant to be responsible for what was
actually paid to settle the medical costs, in that case the amount paid by
insurance. (Bergin, supra, 167
Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) The court noted
that nothing in the record in that case showed that the victim might be liable
for an amount above what was paid by insurance.
(Id. at p. 1172, fn. 4.)
Similarly,
in People v. Millard (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 7, we held that to "fully reimburse" a victim for
medical expenses as required by section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3), "means
to reimburse him or her for all out-of-pocket expenses actually paid by the
victim or others on the victim's behalf (e.g., the victim's insurance
company." (Millard, supra, at p. 27.)
It was not necessary for the trial court to
determine whether Medina's insurance
carrier could properly withdraw its payment to the hospital. The record showed that the payment was
withdrawn because the carrier determined that Medina
was not covered at the time he injured his wife. Nor was it unreasonable for UCSD to likewise
withdraw the adjustment it had made when the carrier made payment.
The
final record before the trial court showed that UCSD had not been paid by
anyone and that they had billed the victim for the full amount. Thus it was not an abuse of discretion for
the court, based on those facts to hold Medina
responsible for the whole, unpaid amount.
Although the victim had not yet paid the bill, she was liable for the
amount and it was entirely reasonable for Medina
to be required to pay for the medical care which was required by his criminal
conduct.
II
Medina
argues that the restitution order imposed on him by the trial court amounts to
an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We find the argument to be without merit.
The
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of excessive fines. The word fine, as used in that provision, has
been interpreted to be "a payment to a sovereign as punishment for some
offense." (United States v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 327-328.) A fine is excessive for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment "if it is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the
defendant's offense." (
Victim restitution is not punitive. (People
v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 649-650 (Harvest).) It is paid to the
victim and not the state and its purpose is to make the victim whole, not to
punish the defendant. Simply stated, an
order requiring a convicted defendant to pay the victim for his or her economic
losses caused by the defendant's criminal conduct is not a fine. Accordingly the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against excessive fines is not implicated
In his
reply brief, Medina argues that
been severely criticized by the Supreme Court.
Thus he argues the holding that restitution is not a punishment should
be suspect. We disagree. In Giordano,
supra, 42 Cal.4th at page 662, footnote 6, the court commented on
that restitution hearings require less due process than other hearings. The view was premised on the idea that
restitution hearings are sentencing hearings.
The court went on to note that Harvest
and the other cases cited were decided before Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, which addressed
certain Sixth Amendment issues implicated in sentencing hearings. Having noted that subsequent Sixth Amendment
case law might implicate such "sentencing hearings" the court noted
no such issue had been presented by Giordano,
thus "we do not have occasion to address possible constitutional
challenges to restitution hearings."
(Giordano,
Respectfully,
the court's comments in Giordano, supra, 42
Cal.4th 644, have absolutely nothing
to do with the question of whether restitution orders are
"fines." The issue was not
addressed in Giordano and the Eighth
Amendment was not even mentioned.
Whatever the implication of the court's ruminations about the impact of
Sixth Amendment and due process jurisprudence might have on the viability of
portions of the opinions in Harvest,
supra, 84 Cal.App.4th 641, and the other cited cases, nothing indicates the
high court disagrees with the conclusion that restitution is not
punishment. Since restitution is not
punishment and is not a sum payable to the sovereign as punishment, it does not
amount to a fine, let alone an excessive fine.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
HUFFMAN,
Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER,
J.
O'ROURKE,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise specified.
