P. v. Matthews
Filed 1/22/14 P. v. Matthews CA4/1
OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANTRIEL A.
MATTHEWS,
Defendant and Appellant.
D062456
(Super. Ct. No.
SCD240211)
APPEAL
from a judgment of the Superior Court of
San Diego County, Joan P. Weber, Judge.
Affirmed.
Marianne
Harguindeguy Cox, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala
D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R.
Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A
jury found Antriel Matthews guilty of committing a robbery (Pen. Code,
§ 211) and that he committed the crime for the benefit of a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22). Matthews
admitted he had three prior felony convictions.
(§ 1203, subd. (e)(4).) The
court imposed a 13-year prison term, consisting of a three-year middle term for
the robbery plus a 10-year consecutive term on the gang enhancement. The court also revoked Matthews's probation on
three prior felony convictions, and imposed a middle term on each felony to run
concurrently with the sentence on the current offense.
On
appeal, Matthews contends the court erred by: (1) denying his mistrial motion based on his
denying his motion to strike the 10-year sentence on the gang enhancement. We reject these contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Fifteen-year-old
A was walking home when a Mustang vehicle pulled up next to him. Matthews and his codefendant Jose Castillo
were passengers in the vehicle. Matthews
asked A whether he "bang[ed]," meaning whether he was in a gang. A ignored Matthews and continued walking.
Matthews
and Castillo then got out of the vehicle and confronted A. Castillo said "it was City Heights
Juniors," and Matthews "snatched" A's hat from his head. When A grabbed the hat back, Matthews began
punching and socking A's face and head with a closed fist. A started running towards his house to "protect"
himself, but Matthews and/or Castillo tripped A. Matthews and Castillo then punched A in the
head while he was face down on the ground covering his face. Defendants took off A's shoes and grabbed his
hat. At that point, two younger boys ran
to A's house to tell A's family of the beating. Matthews and Castillo ran back to their
vehicle.
A's
older sister (Sister) came out of the house, and after learning the
perpetrators had returned to their vehicle, decided to take her mother's van to
chase after them. At one point, Sister's
vehicle was next to the Mustang and she clearly saw Matthews sitting in the
passenger seat of the vehicle.
Sister
later identified Matthews from a photo lineup as the person she observed in the
front passenger seat of the Mustang. A
also identified Matthews and Castillo from photo lineups. A went to the same school as Castillo, and
earlier that day A had seen Castillo and Matthews together. This information was corroborated by a school
counselor who testified at trial. Officers
later located the Mustang in which Matthews and Castillo had been riding, and
found the vehicle owner was a well-known City Heights Juniors gang member.
At
trial, A testified in detail about the incident, but denied he was fearful or
afraid during the beating. A and Sister each
identified Matthews as a perpetrator of the crime.
With
respect to the gang enhancement allegation, the evidence showed Matthews had
eight documented contacts with police officers.
One police officer testified that during a police field interview conducted
about two years earlier, Matthews had identified himself as a member of the
City Heights Juniors gang and said he joined the gang when he was 10 years old.
Matthews had City Heights Juniors gang
tattoos on his chest and back. Another
police officer testified that in 2009, he apprehended Matthews after he had
been painting gang-related graffiti. Additionally, when Matthews was arrested, his cell
phone contained various photographs of City Heights Juniors gang members,
including the owner of the Mustang used when A was attacked.
Based
on this and other information, Sergeant Phillip Franchina (who testified as a
gang expert) opined that Matthews was "definitely a member of the City
Heights Juniors" gang. Detective
Franchina also testified that City Heights Juniors was a criminal street gang,
and the prosecution presented supporting evidence of two previous crimes committed
by this gang.
Responding
to a hypothetical question, Detective Franchina opined that based on his
training and experience, gang members commit crimes such as beating up a
teenager for no apparent reason (other than to steal shoes or a hat) to "instill[ ] fear throughout the neighborhood" and "build[ ] notoriety" for the gang. He explained that these attacks "promote"
the gang's status in the neighborhood because it makes people "fear[ful]"
and thus brings "respect" for the gang. Based on this information, Detective Franchina
opined that this type of crime would be committed for the "benefit"
of the gang.
Neither
defendant testified. During his closing
argument, Matthews's counsel did not challenge the evidence showing Matthews
was a City Heights Juniors gang member and that he participated in A's beating.
Instead, defense counsel's central
theory was that the prosecutor did not prove the elements of a robbery. In support, counsel referred to A's testimony
that he was not afraid during the attack, and argued that A's shoes appear to
have been taken after the beating and thus they were not taken by force. He additionally discussed the delay in
reporting the incident to the police. Matthews's
counsel also argued that the incident was not a crime, and instead was a "jump-in,"
i.e., an attempt to initiate A into the City Heights Juniors gang.
After
very brief deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of the robbery charge
and found true the criminal street gang enhancement allegation (§ 186.22).
DISCUSSION
I. Claimed Prosecutorial Misconduct
Matthews
contends the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after a police
detective referred to Matthews's prior arrests.
He claims the detective's testimony was the result of prosecutorial
misconduct.
A. Background
Before
trial, the prosecutor requested permission to admit certified court records
showing Matthews's prior convictions for the purpose of proving various issues,
including a " 'pattern of criminal gang activity' " and Matthews's
knowledge of the gang's predicate crimes. During a pretrial hearing, the court ruled
that the evidence of Matthews's prior convictions for the purpose of proving
the gang's predicate acts was inadmissible because the evidence was cumulative on
the gang's criminal activities and was unduly prejudicial. But the court stated the prosecutor could elicit
evidence that Matthews had prior "contacts" with the police,
including that he had previously been caught vandalizing property with gang graffiti.
However, the court admonished that the
police witnesses should not testify that Matthews was convicted of his
tagging/vandalism conduct to show the gang's predicate acts because the fact of
the conviction would be unduly prejudicial and cumulative.
During
trial, the prosecution called Detective Rudy Castro of the criminal street gang
unit to testify about his investigation of the current crime. Detective Castro
testified that about one or two hours after the attack on A, he received
information from Detective Hobbs that Matthews was a suspect in the crime. The following colloquy then occurred:
"[Prosecutor:] Based on
the information you received from Detective Hobbs, what did you do?"
"[Detective Castro:] I
went over to Mr. Matthews' residence, which is on Keeler Avenue
in Southeastern Division."
"[Prosecutor:] How did
you know where his residence was?"
"[Detective Castro:] For
having contacts through field interview
reports and arrest reports of Mr.
Matthews, I had known his address for some time."
"[Matthews's counsel:]
Can we approach, Your Honor?"
"The Court: Yes."
"[The following proceedings were had between the court and
counsel out of the presence and hearing of the jury]"
"[Matthews's counsel:]
Make objection to the officer saying he knew of because of arrest
reports, which I think have to be prejudicial to us. Ask that they be stricken and that the jury
be admonished not to consider them. And
that this also violates my client's due process, protection rights in that
there's no reason or no admissibility for those remarks."
"The Court: You mean the
word arrest?"
"[Matthews's counsel:]
The context they were used that he knew of the address and the location
because of the arrests. This is only
prejudicial to me."
"The Court: Okay. Only because he's using the word arrest."
"[Matthews's counsel:]
Well—"
"The Court: Obviously,
it is relevant to know how he knew where to go."
"[Matthews's counsel:]
He gave other ways or reasons from what officers had told him. He had other information. This is only, I think, to dirty my client up."
"The Court: Again, I
thought we told you to instruct the officers not to mention arrest or
convictions."
"[Prosecutor:] I did,
Your Honor. I didn't tell him not to
mention arrest. I told the other
ones. I [didn't] think it would come in through him. The
arrest portion through this detective."
"The Court: You did or
did not?"
"[Prosecutor:] I did
not."
"The Court: Okay."
"[Matthews's counsel:] I
move for mistrial."
"The Court: Okay. Mr. Ojeil, what is your position?"
"[Prosecutor:] People's
position, one, we can do a curative instruction to tell the jury to disregard
that. [¶] Two, they're going—the jury is going to have
lots of information about the fact Mr. Matthews has had lots of police
contacts, and they're going to know that he's had a lot of contact through all
the field interviews, and Detective Franchina getting documentation reports
already has been mentioned in opening by defense counsel."
"The Court: I want to
reiterate. I said do not mention arrest
or convictions. You need to instruct
every potential witness that they are not—they can say contacts. He could say contact. I know where he lived. Arrests is one step beyond it. If he had said conviction, I probably would
have granted the mistrial motion. I'm
going to tell the jury to disregard the last answer. Ask a leading question about you knew from
prior contacts where he lived."
"[Prosecutor:]
Absolutely."
"The Court: Thank
you. I would instruct the jury to
disregard the witness's last answer in its entirety. You may proceed, Mr. Ojeil." (Italics added.)
B. Analysis
"It
is misconduct for a prosecutor to violate a court ruling by eliciting or
attempting to elicit inadmissible evidence in violation of a court order." (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.) "If the prosecutor believes a witness may
give an inadmissible answer during his examination, he must warn the witness to
refrain from making such a statement." (People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471,
482.) "Prosecutorial misconduct may
constitute an appropriate basis for a mistrial motion." (People
v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1154.)
However, a court has broad discretion in ruling on a mistrial motion,
and a "trial court should grant a mistrial only when a party's chances of
receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged . . . ." (People
v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 555; see People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 573.)
In
this case, Matthews has not shown the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. First, the record is unclear whether the
court had actually ruled earlier that arrests (as opposed to convictions) were
inadmissible at trial. Although the
court appeared to indicate it had made this ruling, on our review of the
record, there was no mention of arrests during the in limine hearing, and the
brief reference to arrests in a sidebar discussion during another witness's
testimony did not necessarily serve to change the court's prior rulings.
Additionally,
even if there had been a prior ruling regarding the arrests, the court had a
reasonable basis to conclude the prosecutor's failure to instruct this witness
on the issue was not misconduct because the prosecutor could have reasonably
believed the fact of prior arrests would not arise during the questioning. Unlike the testimony of the officer who
apprehended Matthews during the tagging/vandalism episode (which related
directly to an earlier arrest/conviction), Detective Castro was called to
testify only about his efforts to locate Matthews after the commission of the
current crime. Although the prosecutor
asked Detective Castro how he knew the location of Matthews's residence, the
prosecutor could have reasonably believed the officer would respond that his
address was well known to police officers through field interview reports and
prior contacts based on Matthews's gang affiliation—testimony that would have
been appropriate and proper.
Further,
Detective Castro's brief mention of prior arrest reports was not prejudicial
under any review standard. (
18, 24; People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 835-836.) There is no reasonable
possibility the jury would have been improperly influenced by the detective's brief
reference to arrest reports. The
prosecution proffered unchallenged evidence that Matthews had prior contacts
with police, Matthews was a long-time member of the City Heights Juniors gang,
and City Heights Juniors gang members regularly engage in criminal
activities. Additionally, the evidence
was overwhelming (and essentially undisputed by Matthews's counsel) that Matthews
committed the beating of the 15-year-old victim. The primary disputed issue was whether the
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of robbery
(particularly that the hat and shoes were taken through force or fear), and it
is highly unlikely the brief reference to an unspecified prior arrest would
have unduly affected the jury's consideration of this issue.
II. Court's Denial of Motion To Strike Punishment on Gang
Enhancement
Matthews
contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike the
punishment for the street gang enhancement finding. (§ 186.22.)
A. Applicable Legal Principles
The
jury found Matthews committed the robbery "for the benefit of" or "in
association with a criminal street gang with the specific intent to promote,
further, and assist in the criminal conduct by gang members . . . ." (See § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) When a jury finds true a gang enhancement
allegation in connection with a robbery conviction, "the person
of 10 years." (§ 186.22, subd.
(b)(1)(C), italics added; see § 667.5, subd. (c)(9).) However, section 186.22, subdivision (g)
provides: "Notwithstanding any other law, the court
may strike the additional punishment
for the enhancements provided in this section . . . in an unusual case where the interests of justice would best be served,
if the court specifies on the record and enters into the minutes the
circumstances indicating that the interests of justice would best be served by
that disposition." (Italics added.)
In
the analogous context of a court's discretion to grant probation in "unusual
cases where the interests of justice would best be served" (§ 1203,
subd. (e)), courts hold this discretion "must be narrowly construed
and . . . limited to those matters in which the crime
is . . . atypical or the offender's moral blameworthiness
is reduced." (People v. Superior
Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1229.)
We
review the court's refusal to strike a gang enhancement sentence under an abuse
of discretion standard.
it is arbitrary, capricious, or irrational. (See People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 376-377.) Under this
standard, we do not reweigh sentencing
factors or substitute our evaluation for that of the sentencing
court. (Id. at p. 377.) " ' "[T]he burden
is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show
that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
[Citation.] In the absence of such a
showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be
set aside on review." ' " (
B. Background
At
the time of sentencing, Matthews was 21 years old and had an extensive criminal
and juvenile history. As a juvenile,
Matthews was adjudged a ward in 2005 for possessing a knife while on school
grounds, and in 2008 for using marijuana and alcohol, associating with known
gang members, and violating his curfew. While at the juvenile detention facility, Matthews
repeatedly violated rules by engaging in gang-related conduct. After he turned 18 years old, Matthews was
convicted of committing three felonies, including vandalism/graffiti with gang
markings, assault with a deadly weapon, and unlawful taking/driving a vehicle. At the time of his arrest, Matthews was on
formal probation for all three of these matters.
After
summarizing this criminal history and discussing other relevant factors, the
probation officer recommended the 10-year gang enhancement sentence be imposed.
The probation officer noted that
Matthews appeared remorseful for putting his own family "through this"
and that Matthews said he was trying to "better" himself by holding
several jobs and attending school for automobile mechanics. However, the probation officer also noted that
during his probation, Matthews had continued his involvement in the City
Heights Juniors gang, "indicat[ing] he led a sort of double life." The probation officer stated: "Despite his exposure to the criminal
justice system as a minor and now as an adult, it has not deterred him from
participating in gang related activities.
[¶] He has failed to take
advantage of the opportunities while on probation to change his life's path and
direction, and has continued to victimize the community at large. The victim . . . was emotional[ly]
traumatized . . . and has attended counseling sessions to address his fear of being
retaliated against. Further, he and his
family have moved . . . two times since the incident as a
result of that same fear."
In
his sentencing memorandum, defense counsel requested the court strike the
10-year gang enhancement sentence. Defense
counsel noted that Matthews was only 21 years old, had completed high school,
and "has accepted employment when available and done reasonably well." Defense counsel also asserted that the
property taken from A was "deliberately small" and "the victim
was not seriously harmed." Defense
counsel also submitted letters from Matthews's prior supervisor and a case
manager, supporting that Matthews was a hard worker and responsible.
At
the sentencing hearing, the court initially observed it was inclined to agree
with the probation department "[g]iven the appalling record that
[Matthews] has amassed in the last few years with the numerous matters where he's
on felony probation—and I do view him as the principal in this case and the
instigator." Defense counsel
responded by repeating the facts in the submitted papers (e.g., regarding
Matthews's age and the positive aspects of his background), and also emphasized
that the prosecution had been willing to strike the enhancement as part of a
pretrial plea bargain (which Matthews declined).
However,
the court found these factors to have minimal weight, noting that Matthews had
shown little or no remorse or regard for the victim. The court stated: "The way I see the case, [Matthews and Castillo]
sought out this victim. . . . It is the
most gratuitous violence to this court that Mr. Matthews thought it necessary
to beat up this young man over a pair of shoes and a hat. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [I]t's
gotten to [the] point . . . that Mr. Matthews has become so firmly entrenched
and committed to this gang that he would commit a crime like that against an
innocent high school kid, while knowing he's on probation for three separate
felony offenses, that's where I'm at with your client."
At
the conclusion of the arguments, the court reiterated: "Twenty-two years I've been doing
cases. I've been sitting up here with
this black robe on and listening to the plight that gangs create throughout our
community, and I'm always just blown away by the lack of regard for other human
beings that gang members have. That . . . they
would track this young boy down and beat him up, like I said, over a pair of
shoes—it's all about the power. It's all
about I'm bigger, I'm badder than you are. . . ." The court then denied the motion to strike,
noting that it "took an hour to go through all" of Matthews's
criminal files "to figure out what sentence was going to be appropriate."
The court stated that granting Matthews probation
for his prior crimes gave him the wrong message that there would be no consequences
for "gratuitous violence," and implored Matthews to make attempts to turn
his life around.
C. Analysis
The
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding this was not an "unusual
case" supporting the striking of the gang enhancement punishment in "the
interests of justice." (§ 186.22,
subd. (g).)
The
court examined numerous relevant factors and found the punishment appropriate
to the defendant and the circumstances of the crime. The court said it had read the probation
report and defense counsel's sentencing memorandum, which contained facts
supporting that Matthews deserved leniency (such as his relatively young age
and that he had completed high school, been employed, and complied with
probation conditions until the current crime). However, the court also considered the nature
of the crime (a random and senseless beating of a teenager who was minding his
own business), Matthews's extensive recent criminal history, the fact that
Matthews had been granted substantial leniency in the past but continued to
engage in criminal behavior, and the fact that Matthews was still an admitted active
member of a criminal street gang.
Contrary
to Matthews's contention, the court's statement that his only "occupation"
was committing criminal acts does not show the court was unaware he had held various
part-time or seasonal jobs. The court's
statement that Matthews's essential occupation
was criminal behavior was accurate on the record before us.
The
court's explanation of its ruling was sound and well-reasoned. There was more than enough evidence to
support the court's conclusion that this was not an "unusual case"
warranting the striking of the gang enhancement. The record shows the court was affirmatively
aware of its discretion to strike the punishment and found it was not appropriate
to do so under the specific circumstances of the case. The court gave the case serious and lengthy consideration. The court balanced the relevant facts and
reached an impartial decision consistent with the applicable legal principles. There was no abuse of discretion.
In
arguing on appeal that the court abused its discretion, Matthews highlights the
facts minimizing the seriousness of the offense and his culpability, and asks
us to reach a different conclusion than did the trial court. For example, he notes there were no weapons
involved in the incident; the property taken had a minimal monetary value; the
victim denied being afraid; Matthews was only 21 at the time of the offense;
Matthews had successfully completed high school and held three jobs during the
past year; and the prior felony convictions did not actually involve serious
violence.
In
asserting these arguments, Matthews is essentially asking us to reweigh the
evidence. This is not the proper role of
an appellate court. This court does not reevaluate
the relevant factors or substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court. "We will not interfere with
the trial court's exercise of discretion 'when it has considered all facts
bearing on the offense and the defendant to be sentenced.' " (People
v. Downey (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 899, 910.) Matthews has
not demonstrated that the trial court's refusal to strike the gang enhancement
sentence was arbitrary or irrational.
DISPOSITION
Judgment affirmed.
HALLER, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
McDONALD,
J.
IRION, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Further statutory
references are to the Penal Code.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] All references to
section 186.22 are to the version of the code section applicable at the time of
sentencing (August 2012).
